

MACKENZIE




AUSTRAL AFRICA


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Ever yours sincerely
John Mackenzie

AUSTRAL AFRICA

LOSING IT OR RULING IT

BEING

INCIDENTS AND EXPERIENCES
IN BECHUANALAND, CAPE COLONY, AND
ENGLAND

✓ BY

JOHN MACKENZIE

VOL. I

London

SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE & RIVINGTON
CROWN BUILDINGS, FLEET STREET

1887

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PREFACE

THE value of the Cape to Great Britain as a naval and commercial Power was recognised at the beginning of the present century; and its vital importance to the Empire is fully admitted on all hands. It is evident, however, that the advantages flowing from the possession of the Cape are inseparably connected with the loyalty of a contented and well-governed inland population living under the Queen. Thus the difficulties and complexities of our administrative work as the Supreme Power amongst the peoples of South Africa, our failures and our successes in the past, and the alternatives now before us as to the future, are questions of Imperial moment, and their due settlement is matter of grave concern to the Empire as such.

When we turn to the social, political, and administrative questions calling for solution from the Imperial Government in Southern Africa, we find that they are in themselves of transcendent interest and importance. They appeal not only to the British Statesman, but also to the broad-minded Philanthropist, to the promoter of Colonisation, to the advocate of Temperance, and to the friend of Peace, as well as to the multitudes who are interested in Commerce. I hazard the opinion that in the following narrative every friend of the Empire—every lover of righteousness—will

meet with the strongest inducements to give special attention at the present time to the right management, by the Imperial Government, of our South African affairs. I trust the reader will find, as I have done, that when we face these questions, and carefully examine them, while their interest and importance increase in our estimation, their difficulty and their complexity decrease and disappear; and we come to see that British statesmen can evolve the Dominion of Austral Africa out of that chaotic South Africa, which is the unhappy product of ignorance and inattention.

The method (as I earnestly believe) by which this great end can be accomplished, is unfolded in these pages. I am encouraged to hope that my views—now for some years before the public—will not be without support from both Imperial and Colonial statesmen and leaders of public opinion. My present aim is to recall to mind doctrines which have already secured general approval, and to lay clearly and exhaustively before the English public a question of vital Imperial importance, so as to supply the data necessary for its satisfactory settlement.

When I returned to England to direct public attention to this question, I had the prospect of receiving, as before, the invaluable assistance of the late Mr. Forster, who, as a statesman as well as a philanthropist, had long made a study of South African questions. In the lamented death of Mr. Forster the Empire has sustained a great loss, and the cause here advocated its ablest and most distinguished supporter. While, however, I deplore the loss of Mr. Forster, I do not mourn as if England were a decaying state, the prosperity of which depended on the life of one or two great men. In sending out this work, I have the

fullest confidence that England is a vitally sound and growing commonwealth, whose great public questions invariably secure for their settlement not only the services of capable statesmen, in whose judgment the public have confidence, but the attention and conscientious study of the people themselves; and it is this study which I court in these pages.

I have to thank many friends in South Africa and in England for their encouragement and co-operation in seeking to place our administration of South African affairs on a satisfactory footing. Some success has been attained; but these efforts must not be relaxed till the object in view is fully accomplished. That object is, on the one hand, to deliver South Africa from the calamities, and England from the expense, heart-burning, and disgrace, hitherto attending the Hammer-and-Tongs Policy, and the equally disastrous Policy of Shirking; and on the other hand, to save the Empire from having an ill-secured dominion, and an ill-disposed because neglected population, close to its most important naval station.

My best thanks are due to Sir Charles Warren for his kindness in affording me every facility in his power for verifying my narrative. I am also indebted to other officers of the Bechuanaland Expedition—especially to Lieutenant C. E. Haynes, R.E., for placing at my service the photographs which he took in Bechuanaland. I have to thank the Hon. Mrs. George Grant of Grant for kindly allowing me to copy from her album two sketches which appear in these pages; and have also to acknowledge further obligations in this department to M. Coillard of the Paris Missionary Society; to Dr. Joseph Anderson of Edinburgh; and to the Secretaries of the London Missionary Society and of the Wesleyan Missionary Society.

To those friends who have so kindly assisted me in the irksome work of revising the proof-sheets I must express my warm thanks.

I have prepared an index for the convenience of the reader, and he will find a map at the end of each volume—of which, undoubtedly, most people stand much in need. I have taken some trouble with the maps, and while they are not perfect, they are the best known to me. If I were asked to name the most telling page of this work, or to say where its most powerful argument is to be found, I should point to the map of Austral Africa. The permanent and satisfactory settlement of the question brought forward in these pages has been delayed only through ignorance, and that ignorance I hope to see dispelled.

PORTOBELLO, N. B., *August 1887.*

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AUSTRAL AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

THE Colonial Exhibition of 1886 has impressed many useful lessons on the public mind. The concrete and palpable realities connected with the English Empire have appealed to every type of mind, among colonists as well as among the untravelled population of Great Britain and Ireland, and the value of our Colonial Empire is realised to-day as it never has been before. One cannot help feeling that the thought and the power which conceived and successfully carried out the magnificent idea of the Exhibition are capable of greater and higher work. The bringing together of articles from the various colonies for exhibition, inspection, and comparison, implies healthy and effective co-operation throughout the whole empire for one specified object. The life, however, is more than meat, and the body than raiment. The existence and wellbeing of the empire is a higher question than an exhibition of its products or its industries. The thought and the power which brought together the things will not rest satisfied till they have brought together the minds of the various parts of the English Empire, for the good of the empire, and the peace of the world. The possibility of Imperial federation is no longer questioned; its advisability is also conceded in many quarters; and the discussion is gradually coming to be one concerning the wisest and best course to pursue—so that our Imperial Parliament may cease to be misnamed, while the Parliament of the United Kingdom may occupy a more

clearly defined and efficient position, its labours assisted and simplified by Local Parliaments in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Time and patience and public interest and discussion in England and in the colonies will bring about a solution of this great question, for who can separate the members of an empire of self-governing communities who desire to be united? Leaving this high theme to abler minds, I must ask the reader to accompany me in our imaginary inspection of the Exhibition, with another object in view.

The greatness—indeed, the vastness—of our Indian Empire was perhaps the thought which most deeply impressed the intelligent and thoughtful visitor to the Colonial Exhibition. The boy at school is taught that India has a population of 254 millions of souls, and the boy learns the figures, with many others. But here in the wonderful Indian courts some help was given to the realisation of the vastness of the population and the costly magnificence of an ancient civilisation. What struck myself most in those Indian courts was the splendid collection of different kinds of grain—the food of millions of our fellow-subjects, and fodder of their cattle—the very names of most of which are absolutely unknown to the ordinary Englishman. In India we have great native empires owning the English sway, whose population, already so large, is steadily increasing, and where there is little room for English planters or settlers.

The visitor turned with pleasure from the strange idols, the gaudy ornamentation, and the oriental grandeur of our Indian Empire to the inspection of those nobler trophies of peace and industry which had been sent to the mother country from her children inhabiting the Greater Britain beyond the seas. It was very striking to look at the Australian jungle with the representations of the rude life of natives who have “died out.” You turned round from these relics of the past and found the rude log-hut of the English settler, denoting the starting-point of the new race. On every side of you you found, in gold and in grain, in wool and in leather, in wood-work and in iron-work, in photo-

graphy and in painting, the abundant evidences of the vitality and ability of the English stock in the great land of the South. You noted that the Australian native has passed away, and the Englishman reigns with great vigour in his stead. The Australian natives are represented by images; Australia itself is practically a white man's country.

On entering the South African court we found, it is true, a native hut, but we found no images of departed tribes, and the hut itself had been erected there by living natives. Elsewhere in the court we found an excellent ox-waggon, carts, wheelbarrows, farm implements, articles of elegant household furniture,—all the wood-work and iron-work of which had been done by native hands in South Africa. When we came to inspect the diamond-washing operations, we saw there within the enclosure the stalwart form of a South African Zulu or Kaffir, assisting his European fellow-workers in washing the diamondiferous "blue stuff" from the Kimberley mine. It was an epitome of Kimberley, where half the population are natives, and of South Africa itself, where the natives largely outnumber the whites, and where all the heavy labour is done by native hands.

In India then you have only the native; in Australia (practically) only the white man; but in South Africa, as here before your eyes, you have the white man and the black man working side by side; and among the articles exhibited you have specimens of sound honest work actually produced by the trained hands of the South African natives. The Colonial Exhibition thus brought out in the most striking manner the distinguishing peculiarity of our South African problem. Like India, South Africa has a native population which does not die out through contact with Europeans. But unlike India, South Africa has immense unoccupied tracts, into which it has been satisfactorily shown of late that emigrants can be peacefully introduced with the approval of the native chiefs and people. Like Australia, it is rich in minerals and in vast unoccupied districts; it possesses a climate unsurpassed for Europeans, whom it thus invites to its shores. But unlike the Australian, the South

African natives are not dying out, but increasing and improving, some tribes slowly, others more rapidly, after contact with Christianity and with civilisation. The African hut in the Exhibition pointed to habits, but not to a people, slowly passing away. The native labourer washing diamonds pointed to the actual work of the black man at present, as supplying the unskilled labour of South Africa, where it is abundant and cheap. Then the artisan work already mentioned pointed to the future, establishing beyond doubt the capacity of the race, and giving good ground for hoping that there is a useful future before them. It seems to me that statesmen, philanthropists, and politicians of all shades should consider well the lesson of the South African court in the Colonial Exhibition, which epitomised the much misunderstood South African problem.

A great change has taken place within the last few years in public opinion concerning our Colonial Empire. There is now no eminent or influential statesman who would come forward and advocate the separation of any of the colonies from the mother country. For some years no public man of any weight has advocated "giving up" South Africa, although that idea had its advocates some time ago. In the discussions that took place, however, it was shown that the possession of the Cape was absolutely necessary to England as a naval power, and in connection with the defence and protection of its varied interests in the Southern Hemisphere; and that it was of even greater value to England than the Suez Canal. Unable to gainsay this, the "giving-up" people next advocated that a coaling station only should be retained at the Cape—a mere Gibraltar in the Southern Ocean. "Let the Boers, Blacks, and British fight it out among themselves inland," said these men; "our responsibilities will be confined to the coaling station." The miserable desertion of duty as the supreme power in South Africa, which was implied in this policy, was no sooner mooted than it was condemned by public opinion. It implied a narrow-minded selfishness which had not even the low merit of being feasible on economic grounds, for it was shown that it would cost more to defend our Southern

Gibraltar from enemies on sea and possible enemies on land under the rule of another European power, than it would to uphold our supremacy in a country becoming every year more sincerely loyal as England becomes every year more intelligently appreciative of its peculiarities and wants. The unconditional "retreat" policy and the "coaling station" plan have been tested by public opinion, and have been condemned finally.

The following pages give some information concerning certain efforts which have been made to recommend to Her Majesty's Government a policy for South Africa worthy of the power which governs India, and which presides over the rising communities of Canada and Australia. It was looked at favourably, but with some hesitancy, in 1884, when the Protectorate of Bechuanaland was undertaken, and that of Zululand seriously spoken of. But the reader will find that when the Bechuanaland Protectorate met with such difficulties as were always foreseen from the enemies of progress and of the Imperial Government in South Africa, it was practically abandoned by Her Majesty's High Commissioner, who was apparently acting under the misleading advice of certain local politicians at the Cape, who were endeavouring to use the Imperial movement in their game of local colonial politics. The withdrawal of an Imperial officer from Bechuanaland, and the substitution of a colonial politician instead, aggravated every evil symptom, and South Africa passed through one of the gravest crises in its history. An outburst of pent-up loyal feeling on the part of the most intelligent and influential colonists took place in every colonial centre, and England was thrilled by the cry of fellow-subjects who complained of desertion by the Imperial Government. The intelligent and hearty response of the English people and of Her Majesty's Government to that cry from South Africa will never be forgotten there. It was given in the form of the Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir Charles Warren. That admirably-equipped expedition expressed the highest thought and wisdom of the country. It was conciliatory to every government in South Africa, and interfered with no local rights; it was for the defence

and prosperity of all peaceful people; and to secure the peaceful and orderly opening up of the country which had been ruined morally and commercially by lawless freebooters.

The full benefits of the Bechuanaland Expedition were not secured to England and to South Africa as they might have been, from causes which will be traceable in these pages. Indeed, it would appear as if the Evil Spirit dogs all such good works in South Africa to frustrate or minimise their influence. But in spite of adverse circumstances, which were of an unusual nature, the expedition led to the pacification of the country, and the encouragement throughout South Africa of the party of progress. The courage, however, to be steadfast and to do the right in what belongs to us in the affairs of that country is not yet a confirmed sentiment in England. It is not fully recognised that we have at present permanent Imperial duties in South Africa, to the performance of which we are called by all the South African governments, and by the unanimous desire of the native chiefs and tribes. This fact will be fully brought out in these pages. I bring no railing accusation against any one; at the same time I feel bound to say that my hope is in the increase of intelligent interest in this question on the part of all classes of Her Majesty's subjects. As soon as they resolve that the change shall take place, the times of deafness, blindness, loss of memory, duality, hot and cold sweats in our South African policy will no doubt come to an end for ever; and the affairs of a magnificent country, as yet only at the threshold of its true development, will be regulated by common-sense, and a coherent idea steadily kept in view. That idea will be twofold,—the local self-government of certain European communities; the personal or paternal government of native territories by the Imperial Government. We have here the fullest scope for that administrative ability which the British people have shown in other parts of the world, and at certain times in South Africa itself. But if we need common-sense and wise policy furthered by able and single-minded administrators, it is absolutely necessary that our Government should have

steadfastness in upholding such men, and thus beget confidence all round.

I have written the following pages in order to place this great question fairly and fully before Her Majesty's advisers and the general public. Want of correct information has been the greatest part of the difficulty, and this want I have endeavoured to supply. I have employed the narrative form as being the most natural, and, on the whole, the most satisfactory and reliable. I shall therefore ask the reader to accompany me to native towns in Bechuanaland, and to interviews with native chiefs and people there, in order to understand one interesting and important side of the South African question. We shall also visit the freebooters at their camp, and study their methods at first-hand. Then we shall have the privilege of entering together the offices and the studies of leaders of public opinion in England and at the Cape, and note the opinions propounded by these distinguished men. The London Convention, entered into by Lord Derby with President Kruger and the Transvaal delegates, will be described; and the history of the Protectorate will be followed from its establishment to the return of the Bechuanaland Expedition. It is of the utmost importance to observe that while the narrative deals chiefly with one locality, the lessons are applicable to all native territories in South Africa, in which there are still unsolved problems connected with the peaceful growth or expansion of the European population. Just as the history of the Batlaping and Barolong clans will introduce the English reader to South African native life and native ideas as to land and tribal government, so the recent history of Bechuanaland will supply lessons of the utmost importance for our guidance in native administration elsewhere in South Africa. The manner in which treaties have been formed with the natives in Bechuanaland marks a new departure in our contact with these interesting and useful people; and the readiness with which they have responded to our policy, and invited our acceptance and our occupancy of their vast unoccupied territory, is an event of unique importance in the history of the meeting of the two races. No such event

has ever taken place in South Africa, and in its results it will probably be more influential and important than were the transactions between Penn and the American Indians.

This recent action of the chiefs in South Africa in welcoming Europeans to their country under Imperial control was taken by them after great deliberation, and from the desire of self-preservation. But the movement taken by the natives in their own interest has to us in Britain a deep meaning when viewed in connection with the overcrowding and distress which characterise so many parts of the United Kingdom. While the lower animals spread and migrate as a matter of course, seeking their proper food where their unerring instinct teaches them it is to be found, it is reserved for mankind to huddle together in certain spots of the appointed habitat of the human family—insisting on living there, and there only. Some, indeed, would go so far as to assert that the place of their birth belongs to them by that event, and that the inhabitants of these densely populated regions are bound to supply food for all the inhabitants, however numerous,—and this as a matter of right. Not only so, but many would insist on being supported in their native region by a single department of industry, and if that fails them, they “go on the parish” without shame and as a civil right. And alas! besides these, there are thousands in Britain who live only to prey on their kind—human vultures who belong chiefly to the extremes of society, to those who are surfeited and debased by their wealth, and to the abject poor, rendered hopeless and reckless by their crushing poverty. The increase of these vultures of human society in any country points to the inevitable decay and death of a people.

Now I know it is fashionable in certain quarters to censure the poor for their reckless early marriages, followed by large families. And their censors frequently delay marriage in their own case till late in life, and have few children. It is evident that if this course were persisted in for some time by both classes, the world would become the possession of the reckless and thoughtless people—the race of wise men having died out of the world as the result of their superior

wisdom! For my own part, I am deeply impressed with the conviction that our whole difficulty consists in the fallacy that people ought to live on in one spot, huddled together in a way that would shame the lower animals. There can evidently be too many people in one place as there can be too many plants in one flower-bed. Why, in God's great garden, should His flowers be kept to certain beds, while other flower-beds have none? Why should the plants be choked and killed in one part of the garden, while other parts—equally desirable—are left lying waste? Having lived for a long time in one of those comparatively unoccupied regions of the earth—Bechuanaland—I am deeply impressed with the truth that there is still, for very many years to come, abundance of room for God's flowers in the garden of the Great Husbandman. It is hardly necessary to say that I am far from approving of reckless marriages, but it is quite plain to all that if thousands of the poor were to wait till they had a fixed income, or till they had "saved a competency," they would never marry; and it is unphilosophical to suppose that comparatively ignorant people, brought up, too, under the sanctions of an English poor-law, will thus practise self-denial on public grounds. Therefore the remedy for the huge danger is to be found elsewhere—in the colonisation of wide unoccupied countries, where men can find room and go back to a simple, natural life. No people are so landless as the English; yet no government has had so much land at its disposal as the English Government. Immense and all but unoccupied trans-colonial territories in South Africa have been offered to the English Government, and to the landless people of England. It is waste of breath to censure early marriages; we ought rather to help the people to occupy and take root in new countries, and we shall have all their highest instincts on our side.

Those early marriages, which appear so reprehensible in our crowded and unnatural state of society in England, are encouraged and praised among both Dutch and English-speaking colonists in South Africa. As the birds build their nests, so the young colonist raises his modest dwelling and brings to it the girl whom he has chosen as his life-com-

panion. He is able to provide for her—while she is able in her own department to add considerably to the income of the young farmer. Both have to work hard; but their work is not in vain, as want is unknown in their house; they have many pleasures, and are able to give their children a useful education. The fault in England is not early marriages or large families, which would seem to be normal to Scotchmen, Irishmen, and Englishmen, but the persistence in huddling together in one particular spot of the globe—leaving thousands of more desirable parts, where the hand of industry can soon produce plenty and comfort, to the buffalo and the antelope. Man is destined to subdue the wild beasts, and to raise human homes throughout every unoccupied land. The remedy for our overcrowding and our hideous suffering is to be found in colonisation: the raising of new human homes, the cultivation of human food where only prairie grass has waved before, the establishment of schools and markets where only the wild beasts have hitherto herded. Such colonists are not lost to England, as some falsely suppose. Their colonising forms a clear gain to the mother country: lightening burdens of overcrowding at home, widening the area of useful production and the sphere of British commerce. The responsibility for overcrowding rests with Government. At present it has delegated the care of the poor to local or parochial authorities throughout the kingdom. The healthy country people who are crowding to our cities, and who will form the paupers of a few years hence, should be educated and encouraged and helped, while still in the country, to colonise rather than crowd the cities and towns in Britain; and thus one fountain of pauperism would be dried up. The poor-law has proved to be no cure; and it must not be forgotten that, even if it were, “prevention is better than cure.” It is better that young country people should be directed abroad, where in a few years they may by industry possess a home of their own, than that they should be found going down year by year in a large city, till they are found as paupers in a workhouse. The question, therefore, of colonisation as a preventive to pauperism is one of immediate importance to Britain, and ought to com-

mand the attention of Her Majesty's advisers, as well as of all benevolent and patriotic people.

In this connection it is of importance to remember that while waste lands in all our colonies belong to the colonial governments, the waste land of Bechuanaland belongs, or has been offered, to Her Majesty's Imperial Government—that is, to the English people themselves.

But colonisation is not to be spoken of merely in connection with the poverty of the lowly: no subject is more appropriate for the consideration of the young English men and women of good birth and liberal education who find themselves in thousands with absolutely nothing to do. The idea that a young English lady should colonise, or should consent to marry a rancher or colonist, unless he has amassed a pile of money, would be held by many to be quite absurd. So the young men live unmarried in the colony and their sweethearts grow old in this country while the pile is being made. The following story, "which I tell as it was told to me," shows, I think, a happier course—the ideal one for the unemployed—who are healthy and capable, and who wish to live natural, happy lives.

A young lady from the West End was lately "slumming" in the East End of London. In a miserable room, cold and bare, she came upon a young woman, with a babe at her breast and another child who was able to walk. Her husband was out of work. She said she would to God they had never left the country—they were so happy there. Her husband would emigrate, but he had no money. Her own brother was now a colonist and likely to succeed. "And here we are in London willing to work and have not a bit to eat, and only charity to think of." The young lady—whose life was made up of the excitements of fashionable enjoyments, with constant doses of "slumming" as an alternative or tonic—had then in her pocket a letter from a very special friend of her own, dated from his colonial farm, and informing her that he had raised his cottage and had done a good deal of work on the farm; but that there was no chance of what was called a fortune, at any rate not for years. He did not see how he could do better elsewhere,

however, and as he would be so long in gathering money, he thought it would be unfair to keep her waiting for him, and so on. She had not made up her mind what step to take. She had the old-fashioned desire to join the man she loved, and help him to fight life's battle, but she knew it was unconventional to do so nowadays; it was termed throwing herself away, making a slave of one's self, and so on. But as she looked on the unfulfilled happiness of the wedded life of this starving young woman through want of work, pinching hunger, and maternal anxiety; and when she thought of her own purposeless life, separated so far from the man she truly loved, she made up her mind what to do.

"Does your husband drink?" she asked.

"Never takes a drop, even when he had plenty of money," was the reply.

"Tell him not to go out to-morrow till I call, and in the meantime here is some money to buy food."

Of course there was a great scene when this brave girl went home and said she was going out to be married to her young colonist. She was told again and again what she would lose, what people would say, the low life she would live; but nothing moved her. And she not only went herself, but paid the passage of the starving man and his wife, under a stipulation which she had duly written out and signed by them that they would serve her for a certain period of time wherever she might need their services. Instead of a letter acknowledging her release from her engagement to marry him, the delighted colonist heard of the arrival of the young lady herself; and of course there is no happier homestead anywhere.

If the East End and the West End of London and of English society could be thus mutually helpful in thousands of cases, the happiness of both classes of emigrants would be increased, and the mother country and the colonies would be alike benefited. Cottars in bogs and crofters in moorlands are to-day the potential owners of fine estates, if they would only cross the sea to enter upon possession; and crossing the sea does not mean leaving the empire. Her Majesty's ministers, it would appear from some recent utter-

ances, are not prepared to take much responsibility upon themselves, and would wish to leave this pressing matter to benevolent effort. This is a mistake. The distribution of population is a vital national question. Whether men shall huddle as in the East End of London; whether parishes, if not counties, shall be given back again to their ancient denizens the deer and other game, as if they could defend a sovereign or uphold a commonwealth; whether people should be told that they are landless when thousands of miles of unoccupied land are at their disposal—these are questions not to be left to private people to settle, unless, indeed, the Government of Great Britain itself is to be handed over to such people; for no question is more deserving the highest thought of the people and of their chosen rulers.

It is now a recognised doctrine among European Powers that it is to their advantage to be associated more or less closely with the interests and the commerce of some part of the globe, the inhabitants of which are still uncivilised. It may be doubted whether there is real colonising ability on the part of some of these Powers, and whether claims which are unknown and unacknowledged on the ground may not lead to more harm than good, if ever put forth there. But in cases where both parties know one another and desire more intimate relations, the benefit ought to be very great on both sides. Speaking only of Southern Africa and its "apportionment," it belongs to England as far north as the Zambesi River, by the wish of the natives and the desire of the colonists. This implies no unfriendliness to the Portuguese, who have been so long on the east coast, nor to the Germans, who are trying to obtain a footing on the south-west coast. But if there is to be friendly "apportionment," Germany might yield to England, as representing the South African European community, her scarcely secured, and to her almost valueless, possession north and south of Walvisch Bay. The attitude of complaisance on the part of England with regard to Germany's enlarged desires on the east coast of Africa near Zanzibar ought to render it easy for Germany to yield an advantage which she gained against the wishes of the European community at the Cape,

and through unusual blundering on the part of Her Majesty's Government. At the same time, Germany has fairly gained Angra Pequena, and if she very much desires to hold it, we can only show our kinship as a race by being friendly and helpful neighbours to her in South-West Africa.

My object in now addressing the public is the development of the work on which I entered some years ago, when in various ways I directed public attention to this important South African question. The lesson has been only half learned. There is still the hesitancy of want of information, and in some quarters, I am afraid, the hesitancy which is unfortunately chronic. I hope to see this mischievous want of steadfastness removed and exchanged for a clear and intelligent conviction as to how England can further her own interests, and at the same time render the highest service to all branches of the South African community, without offending the "susceptibilities" of any. I hope to show that the policy which will open up new markets for our commerce will also secure the highest and best interests of the natives as helpers and friends, and not as "our common enemy." And last, but not least, it will be shown as we go on that the adoption of the course which I recommend is destined to be a source of revenue rather than of expenditure to the Imperial Government.

I trust the reader, like myself, will bear this purpose steadily in mind. I shall give clearly and in detail an account of events and of opinions which I consider necessary to the object in view; but nothing is further from my plan than to enter into irrelevant or controversial matters which do not bear on the general question. My position is, that the pictures which I give of the past few years are our lessons and our warnings for the future, and ought to be studied with this idea in our mind. I wish to say explicitly that I abjure all intention or desire to follow any question into personalities, or to write up or write down any man. I conceive of my work as being on a higher level altogether. Of course the public actions of public men form a fair field for necessary comment; and where public servants have disagreed, my object has been to lay



FELLOW-WORKERS—NOT ENEMIES. AN EPITOME OF SOUTH AFRICA.

the question and the circumstances fairly before the reader, and to state my own opinion with clearness, but not with dogmatism. Whether I gain the approval of individuals or not, by this course I shall best discharge the duty which I have undertaken, of enabling the English reader to understand the difficulties of the South African problem and their effectual remedy.

I may be allowed to remark here that it is not enough to conceive a good South African policy; to carry it out steadily with the best men we possess; to define their duties so as to prevent friction; and to support them cheerfully and loyally when they are at their post. We must also cease to be impatient and in a hurry. Matters have been wrong; it will take time to bring them right. Our own individual experience must come to our help in this matter. Every earnest man comes short of his own ideals, and nations have thus failed also. The children of Israel, in their early years as a nation in Palestine, gave a poor requital for the previous years of isolation and solitary teaching in the wilderness. Our recent and even our present action in more than one part of South Africa would be condemned by the principles and doctrines which command the approval of the national mind. Ours, however, is the comfort—the sad but real comfort—of knowing that our present uncertain action is an improvement upon the positive meannesses and wrongdoings in those countries of former years. We therefore take courage. So long as our face is towards and not away from our ideals there is hope. A few years ago our back was wilfully turned upon our highest conceptions of duty in South Africa. We have changed our attitude; at a distance, and fearfully, and with many mistaken notions, we are now facing our distinguished work there, which any European nation would feel honoured in performing. In these pages will be found an account of some events connected with the return to the path of duty of a backsliding Government, at whose timorous step the reader must not smile. In the case of an English Government, the habit of backing out and running away is neither hereditary nor much developed through practice, so that the pace and the

gait will improve after a little more experience. It is easy to let go and give up; it is far more difficult to resume a position almost lost, and to discharge its duties.

In her administration of South African affairs England has done much good and permanent work. But ignorance of England and of Europe on the part of the Dutch-speaking colonists has been equalled by England's ignorance of the real state of affairs in South Africa. This state of things, I am happy to say, is no longer possible. All the past "dangers" of the Imperial connection, from the colonial point of view, and most of the "dangers" in South Africa which were feared by the Imperial Government itself, were simply the result of ignorance, and had no real existence. In illustration of this, and for the encouragement of all whom it may concern, I shall relate the following story, leaving the reader to make the application for himself.

A gentleman on horseback, with good gun and well-filled saddle-bags, but much more accustomed to an English counting-house than the *veldt* or open country in South Africa, was benighted and caught in a thunderstorm at a place where he had no shelter or fire. First came the blinding dust-storm—swirling and sweeping along with a force which tears up the forest trees by the roots, and occasionally levels miles of them to the ground. The densest darkness followed the storm of wind. The thunder, which had long been murmuring in the distance, came nearer and nearer; the flashes of lightning closer and more vivid, till the crash of the thunder was fairly overhead, and the dazzling gleam of the lightning was simultaneous with it.

A few heavy drops were followed by an ordinary fall of rain, which in turn gave place to a downpour of sheets of water, which was soon shown by the lightning flashes to be rushing past in torrents on the road. By and by the mighty paroxysm was over—the fury of the wind, the roar of the thunder, the angry flash of the lightning, were followed by Nature's profuse tears—and the storm had passed. Our crouching countryman, dazed and overawed, made himself certain, by moving one limb after another, that he had really survived it all, and was still in the exercise of all his

faculties. His saddled horse also took stock of himself by energetically shaking saddle-bags and stirrup-irons in his endeavour to shake off the rain. But these signs of life and rising hopes gave place only to a deeper despair at a terrific roar which resounded through the darkness and desolation of the night. What could a lion want abroad on such a night as that? With still greater force the traveller asked himself what he wanted in a country where, if you escaped the fury of Nature, it was only that you might fall a prey to wild beasts? He thought of all the sweetly safe and pleasant places which he knew in England; while there he shuddered at the back of a bush, his only companion a shivering horse; his saddle-bags soaked, the charge of powder in his gun probably damped by the rain, and not even a tree to climb into out of reach of the lion. Seizing his gun, he awaited the fatal spring, his mind occupied with the problem whether it would be on the horse or on himself, and whether, after all, his powder was damp; but no spring was made. Even such misery must have an end; by and by a welcome streak of light appeared in the east: little birds which had not been blown away in the tempest, or scorched to death by the lightning, or drowned in the flood, began to chirrup and twitter in the bushes. Soon the crack of a waggon-whip was heard, afterwards the sound of human voices. An Englishman was preceding his ox-waggon, his two sons running by his side. They had spent the night some distance behind, and in all the comfort of experienced travellers. The appearance of our friend at once excited pity, and a halt was made. In a short time, and in dry clothes, he was drinking warm coffee—made at a camp-fire—for the inflammable nature of the “mahatla” bush cannot be overcome by any amount of drenching. His own garments were soon dried on the bushes under the bright sun. The driver mends his whip; the leader fills the water-vessels at the neighbouring pool—for a South African traveller “never trusts to the well on ahead.” The children pursue with great delight the occupation of collecting and pressing wild flowers. The oxen browse diligently on the rich grass, as if they anticipate that the yoke will soon be placed on their

shoulders again. Everything was so bright and peaceful and merry that our friend could hardly think this could be the dark and terrible spot where he so narrowly escaped an untimely death. In a voice of assumed carelessness he ventured to ask the master of the waggon if he had heard the lion in the night?

"That wasn't a lion; that was only an ostrich," broke in the eldest boy of the family before his father could reply.

"Don't be cast down," said the boy's father, smiling. "You are not the first who has been deceived by the cry of the ostrich. You'll know the difference by and by. I once made a greater mistake, not as to sound but as to shape. It was after sunset, and I beheld on a rise before me the outlines of what I took to be the monarch of the forest. My way was barred; but it was my duty to go on, so I cocked my gun and went a little nearer. What were those two objects sticking up out of or very near the lion's head? My uncertainty was ended by a loud familiar bray—ears and voice belonged to a stray jackass! Had I turned back I should of course have sworn that I had seen a large male lion right in my path."

BOOK I

ILLUSTRATIONS OF NATIVE LIFE AND
EUROPEAN EXPANSION



CHAPTER I

NATIVE LIFE AND INDUSTRY—FIRST CONTACT WITH EUROPEANS —THE PROBABLE REGION OF OPHIR

THE South African problem can never be solved till the native question is thoroughly understood. Instead of bringing forward a dry essay on this subject, I shall ask the reader to proceed with me to a native territory, that I may introduce him to it, to its people, and to the various questions which arise when Europeans appear in numbers in such a territory. As I am best acquainted with Bechuanaland, I shall select that country and its people for close description, and the events which have transpired there since 1878 for the illustration of what is going on in other native territories in South Africa. The reader will be introduced to the views which I hold, along with the circumstances in which they occurred to myself, and the exciting scenes which emphasised them.

The term Bechuanaland is of recent origin, and is used loosely to describe the country inhabited by the Bechuana tribes. The most southerly tribe is that of the Batlaping, whose territory borders on the Cape Colony; the most northerly the Bamangwato, the larger division of which tribe lives at Shoshong, under the chief Khame, but possesses the country northwards to the Zambesi; while the smaller division of Bamangwato lives at Lake Nghabi (Ngami), under the chief Moremi, and occupies the country lying to the north and north-west of that lake. The Bechuanaland of the Bechuana is thus bounded by the Cape Colony on the south, by the Zambesi on the north, by the Transvaal

east of that place. They have been almost entirely destroyed as a people by the Matebele. They are much better farmers than the Bechuana, and trust more to their gardens and less to the chase. They are closely allied by language and customs to the Mashona, whose country lies to the east and north-east of Matebeleland, and who have also suffered very much by the constantly recurring wars of the Matebele.

The Bushmen of Bechuanaland are taller than those of the Cape Colony. I was informed by the Bamangwato that they knew of two families of Bushmen whose languages were different. Then there are the Madenassana Bushmen, living not far from the Mababe, whose physical appearance is very commanding, and who, although called Bushmen, may turn out to be a remnant of some Koranna tribe, as the people of the Kalahari are remnants of Bechuana tribes. The Bushmen in Bechuanaland in the present day are following their masters' lead in the ways of civilisation. They are employed as herdsmen and waggon servants in South Bechuanaland. I found on entering Khame's country, when accompanying Sir Charles Warren on his recent journey to Shoshong, that Khame had entrusted a flock of goats to the Bushmen who were living at Mama-bula. In the heart of the Kalahari the vassals have herds of cattle and flocks of sheep and goats of their own, while they herd also the flocks of their masters. Thus in Bechuanaland we have no warlike system of polity to contend with on the one hand, nor have we people hopelessly degraded or opposed to change on the other.

It is about eighty years since Europeans first came into Bechuanaland. The first rude trade has almost entirely disappeared from South Bechuanaland; it is still supplied with some skins and feathers from the Kalahari. Large game was found in abundance in what is now called Griqualand West, within the memory of many who are still living—such game as we did not meet with in our recent journey to Shoshong, and as we might not have met with for hundreds of miles to the north of that town. In times of peace, however, the traders of Shoshong still have large quantities of ivory and ostrich-feathers, the hunters in many cases cross-

ing the Zambesi or Chobe Rivers to get these articles. Thus the guns, which the natives were so eager to obtain, have enabled them to shoot down the game throughout the whole of the country; and when besides guns—as in the case of Khame's men at Shoshong—the people have horses, then the existence of all large game is a question of a few years, unless, indeed, attention is directed in another way, say to farming.

Bechuanaland is well supplied with grass throughout its whole extent. In South Bechuanaland there are still some forests of acacia-trees; but many have been cut down to supply fuel for the steam-engines at work in the Kimberley diamond mines. The "mahatla" or "vaal-bosch" is found in all parts of the country, growing to a tree in the central district. Its prevalence in many parts of South Bechuanaland gives a peculiar appearance to the landscape. The leaves and bark are medicinal; its wood is highly inflammable even when green, and, therefore, eagerly sought by the traveller in winter, or in a downpour of rain; in winter the bush also affords welcome shelter to stock when grazing. The high-lying country between the Kaap Range and Kuruman, consisting mostly of blue limestone, is characterised by a sour grass on which the stock does not thrive, especially cows in milk. In winter they are here attacked by a peculiar bone-disease, of which nothing but artificial feeding or entire change of grazing will cure them. But this district has many fine fountains, suited to irrigation, only the soil in many places, and especially on the Kaap Range itself, is very light, and needs heavy manuring. South Bechuanaland, along the Hart River, passing Taung and Stellaland, and reaching the Molopo, is a very valuable country both for pastoral and agricultural purposes. The "sheep bush" is found along the Hart River chiefly, while the grasses are sweet and fattening. There are numerous fountains; water is easily obtained in the sand-rivers, Setlagoli, Maretsani, and Molopo; well-sinking and dam-making would render those portions valuable which are not near a fountain or running stream.

When the traveller reaches Kanye the scenery improves. Instead of the vast plains of the south he has hill and dale

giving many a beautiful view, and suggesting to one after another of our party splendid sites for homesteads. The grasses continue extremely good, while now there is a variety of forest trees, several of which are useful in housebuilding, and others make handsome furniture. The timber of some is proof against the destructive termite or white ant, so plentiful in Bechuanaland. The country remains equally desirable along the Notwani and Limpopo Rivers. Following the waggon-road, there is to the north of this a belt of less interesting country as to scenery after passing the Matshwapong Hills, although the frequent sand-rivers, extensive forests, and invariably good grazing make the land none the less valuable. At Makobe's Hill a lovely country begins, extending far to the east and north. The views of natural scenery in this district are very remarkable for their beauty. The district due north of Shoshong, which Khame retains for himself and his people, is well wooded and watered, and valuable both for agricultural and pastoral farming. To the north of that again we have extensive salt-pans, some of which still yield good salt; others are grown over with grass. It has been surmised that a tributary of the Zambesi may have, at one time, sent some of its waters in this direction, as the Zouga and the Nata still do. It is well known that game congregate near such salt-pans for the sake of the salt; and stock of all kinds usually thrive in such a neighbourhood. From these salt-pans, north and north-west, the country is not well watered, but the pasturage is good everywhere. Both banks of the Zouga or Botletli River are peopled with Bechuana and Makoba. There is first-class grazing on the banks of the river, and large herds of cattle belonging to the natives are now grazing there. In summer Europeans and natives from other districts are subject to climatic fever in this river district. The most effectual cure is to take the patient away from the river into the high open plain, when little medicine is usually needed to effect a cure, unless, indeed, there has been too long delay, and the malaria has already done its work. Between the Botletli River and Shoshong, and westward of Shoshong and of Sechele's, we

have a country with deficient surface water, but which is, nevertheless, very valuable. Even now there are numerous small wells in it where Bushmen and Bakalahari live, the latter with their stock. On the waggon-road between Shoshong and the Botletli River, as also on the western road from Shoshong to the Zambesi, there are several long reaches without surface water; but I have recently heard of reaches equally long in certain parts of Australia; and no European has thoroughly explored the country away from the waggon-roads with the view of finding water, or likely places for well-sinking. When enterprise and skill have conquered this difficulty, these parts of Bechuanaland will hold their own on account of their very rich grasses. I remember the Bamangwato stock grazing in these regions was always in prime condition. With reference to the Kalahari, which is under Her Majesty's protection, and which has been offered to her Government by the native owners, I shall merely hazard the opinion that in the hands of Englishmen the Kalahari will turn out to be no desert at all, but a country, like many parts of Australia, where you begin operations by sinking wells.

The vast country here described is only thinly inhabited, taken as a whole, probably not containing 200,000 people from the border of the Cape Colony to the Zambesi. At certain points you have a considerable population; and again you travel for days and never see a human habitation, or, indeed, a human being, except those of your own party. I have already stated how much vacant land there is, according to Sir Charles Warren's calculations. The town of Shoshong is the largest in Bechuanaland, containing, it is said, some 20,000 inhabitants. Besides travelling traders visiting the town, Shoshong is supplied with a considerable number of well-built and well-furnished European stores connected with the Cape Colony and Natal.

Between the years 1861 and 1876 I was a missionary at Shoshong in North Bechuanaland. It may be interesting to the reader to be introduced to the mode of life of a tribe of Bechuana like the Bamangwato while as yet uninfluenced by European ideas. In the olden time the Bechuana

derived their sustenance from the land in three different ways. Near every township there were the gardens or corn-fields of the town, which were then cultivated chiefly by the women; there were the cattle stations, which were mostly under the care of the young men, superintended, however, by the frequent visits of their fathers to see that all was right; and there was the hunting station, which in its direction and its range was as well known as either the corn-land or the cattle-grazing ground. All these properties were held by arrangement, made in the public kotla or courtyard, and any grievance or complaint concerning them was brought before the chief and his councillors. There can be no doubt, therefore, that although the sale of land was unknown among the Bechuana, the tribes had actual possession of certain districts; and, within these, townships and individuals had their well-defined holdings. There was more than enough land for the three objects which they had in view, so that children growing up, or strangers joining the tribe, on applying to the chief, were after consultation shown lands which they could call theirs. The chief usually occupied much more land than any other man in the tribe. His corn-lands were more extensive, as was his harem more numerous—the members of which had charge of his corn-lands; he had more cattle stations than any one else; his cattle-pens were larger and better filled; his hunting stations were wider and better supplied with game and with vassal-huntsmen than any of his “brothers” in the tribe. But while holding more extensively than others, he held his land and other property exactly on the same footing as his people—they as men and he as chief of the tribe of which they were members.

In years of plenty the Bechuana family would remain in town, while its young men spent their time at the cattle post and at the hunting station. If their wives left the town for the cattle station, it was regarded as an indulgence; usually the sour milk-sacks, piled upon pack-oxen, were sent from the posts to the town for the use of wives and children, parents and masters, as the case might be. In the same way the produce of the hunting stations kept

streaming into the town, brought by sons on pack-oxen and by vassals on their heads. Thus, with millet of more than one kind; with maize, a comparatively recent introduction into the country; with sweet-reed or sugar-cane; with pumpkins, calabash-plant, and other gourd-fruits from their gardens; with sour milk from their cattle station; and with dried meat occasionally from the hunting station, the food of the Bechuana was such as Europeans could enjoy, and some of it would be regarded as a delicacy, as, for instance, some of the species of vegetable marrow to be found in North Bechuanaland. Although possessing cattle, sheep, and goats in abundance, the Bechuana men seldom slaughtered their stock, and never their breeding stock. Of course, when custom demanded it, at marriage and other feasts, cattle and other stock were duly slaughtered, according to the station of the head of the family. In times of plenty, beer was made from the millet, and in South Bechuanaland from honey. Theoretically, all honey found and every pauuw or bustard shot went to the chief as delicacies; and the breast of every head of game shot was his also. Practically, this meant that every huntsman returning from the hunt must carry a part of the produce of the chase to the chief, including feathers or ivory if he had shot ostriches or elephants.

Thus, in years of plenty, the natives of Bechuanaland had great variety, as well as excellent quality of food. In years of drought, and when the supply of corn was nearly failing, the family would remove to the cattle station or to the hunting-field, or to both, according to circumstances. Here they would have recourse to certain well-known roots of trees and plants which are prepared in different ways, and which in some measure make up for the want of fruits of the garden. It ought to be noticed that no housewife in North Bechuanaland would eat up all her corn. Invariably a suitable quantity of the very best of each kind would be kept for seed. During the months of their absence from the town this would remain in the corn-bin, carefully plastered over with clay, or otherwise stowed safely away. In some villages in South Bechuanaland this wise custom has been lost sight of, and the people

use all their grain, trusting to being able to buy from the shop in the village when the spring comes round.

It is most interesting to notice that as the game has disappeared, and this resource in drought has been taken away from them, the native man in these circumstances betakes himself to the neighbouring colony to seek for work and food for himself, and for wages with which he will return to supply his relatives at home. I have often heard natives of South Bechuanaland say, "It is of no use for us to go out with our guns any more; the game has disappeared; to 'yaka'" (go on the hunt) "now is to go and work for the white men." And in years of extreme scarcity—when, long ago, all would have left the house in town, which would be shut up for months while they were living on the game in the hunting-field—all will still leave their dwelling, but now it is for the neighbouring European village or farm, where the man, the woman, and their children will all of them find something to do, and thus earn both wages and food. The true native settlement of a country would be one which would reserve to the men a suitable garden-plot and grazing-ground, leaving them, in the absence of game, to eke out their resources by service on neighbouring farms. But there ought to be the idea of permanence; the man ought to feel that his house and his cornfield are his own, and not mere "Government-land"—as is too often the case at present—which can be sold at any time over his head. Thus we could look for improvement and enterprise amongst these people as soon as they felt quite secure of permanent tenure. Of course, in cases where Bechuana industry has already turned the mere cattle or hunting station into a civilised man's farm, where a furrow runs and fruit-trees grow, and wheat, maize, and millet are to be found in the fields—who will stand up and say that a government like that of England, on entering upon the administration of such a country, should drive a man like this from his holding, and make him go down to the level of the brandy-drinking, heedless native man? There is a school of politicians in the Cape Colony who would more or less openly avow that, in their opinion, such a man ought to be dispossessed, and his fountain

and the results of his industry given to another man, because this latter is white and he, its owner, is black. But the number of those who hold such doctrines cannot be large in the Cape Colony, although they have been able to make a great noise through a certain anti-progressive newspaper.

I have elsewhere ¹ told at length the story of my life at Shoshong. There was first the rough work of the pioneer, who has to put off his coat and build his own house if he would have one better than a round hut, the only kind of dwelling which the natives could make for him. There was the great interest of teaching and preaching in a new scene and to new people, the early converts, the heathen dislike and opposition, the growth of the Church amid trials and failings. There were the tribal disputes and wars in which "the teacher" was the acknowledged friend of both sides, which he showed by doctoring the wounded of both. There was the slow but steady growth of commerce, and with it the increase of the number of European travellers and traders. Trade was first only from the traders' waggons. Then round huts were built for the traders by the native women as shops. Then sun-dried brick houses were made by the Europeans themselves. Then large burnt-brick and iron-roofed stores were raised for the increasing trade of the town and district. Clothing was largely worn, especially by the young. Improved breeding-stock, horses, guns, ploughs, and generally the hard and soft goods sold at a colonial store, came to change hands in large quantities at Shoshong during the period of my stay there. When I left Shoshong in 1876 I was thankful that the work remained in the hand of my friend and colleague Mr. Hepburn, assisted as far as he could be by the chief Khame, and also by the efforts of exceedingly well-disposed and able European traders.

While living at Shoshong I had frequent intercourse with natives and Europeans from the surrounding districts. I had myself, years before, visited Lake Nghabi and the district of the Zambesi without having reached the river itself. More than once a visit from Shoshong to the Victoria Falls was planned, but pressing duties rendered its

¹ *Ten Years North of the Orange River.*

fulfilment impossible. During my stay in North Bechuana-land I twice visited the Matebele country. The first time was in 1863, during the lifetime of Moselekatse. I then formed the acquaintance of Lobingula, the present chief, who was at that time merely one of the "chief's sons," of whom there were many. The question of a Zulu chief's successor is one which is generally avoided. But whether in view of his future position, or merely from a desire to gather information, Lobingula found himself frequently at our encampment, always anxious to hear about "the ways of the white man." When I again visited the country, ten years afterwards, I found him fully recognised as chief of the Matebele, and ruling the people as best he could on the old Zulu lines of his father. He was no longer the student thirsting for information; he was like a rider on a restive and uncertain steed, who has little time for thought or question, except how to keep his seat. To myself he showed the attention of an old friend, and I found that the English traders as well as the missionaries were unanimous as to Lobingula's friendliness to them.

With reference to European trade in Matebeleland, Manchester looms are now underselling native manufactures; for while some years ago it was not uncommon to see natives with Mashona cotton blankets made by native hands from Mashona cotton on the rude native loom, now the traveller finds it difficult to obtain a specimen of these blankets, and still more difficult is it to meet with one of those blue shoulder-cloths, also of native material and workmanship, which were so much worn by the chiefs' wives in Matebeleland long ago. You can still purchase Mashona rice however, which is grown in large quantities in the rich low-lying tracts of Mashonaland. I have seen in Matebeleland some six kinds of millet, which grows luxuriantly, as also maize and the native sugar-cane, while wheat grows well at Hope Fountain in winter. In short, we have here in apparently larger extent the same rich belt which forms the plantation-grounds of Natal nearer to the coast than the higher wheat-growing district. Thus in Mashonaland the mining community will have plenty of food within the country, while

the agricultural community—whatever they may be able to export and send to the market of the world—will always find a demand for their produce in supplying the wants of a large mining population. The Mashona have for ages smelted their own iron ore with charcoal, and their knives, razors, axes, adzes, assegais of all sorts, and battle-axes are really well made. These implements still hold the field. Whether Birmingham and Sheffield will accomplish what Manchester has already achieved in superseding local manufacture remains to be seen.

Mr. F. C. Selous, a plucky and successful English hunter, and good artist, in his *Hunter's Wanderings* thus describes what he saw of the cultivation of cotton and the native weaving:—

“At old Lomajondie's kraal we noticed a man weaving a blanket on a native hand-loom and out of native cotton. It seemed very slow work, and judging from the progress he made whilst we were there, it must have taken him at least a month to finish. We also saw that they had planted a few cotton bushes near the huts and enclosed them with a hedge. Later on, when we were down the Uniati, I noticed that at every Banyai kraal we visited the people had planted and enclosed a few cotton bushes near their villages.”

I may add that I have had in my own possession cotton blankets made from the produce of such small native cotton fields, and made at such a loom as is here described.

Great interest and excitement were created in the years 1866-68 by the undoubted discovery of gold in Mashonaland, Matebeleland, and different parts of North Bechuanaland. In connection with the gold mine discovered at Tati, the chief at Shoshong (Matcheng) addressed a letter to Sir Philip Wodehouse, who was then Governor of the Cape Colony. The purport of the chief's letter was that if large numbers of Europeans were to come northwards to dig this “tsipi” or metal, the chief would expect the Representative of the Queen, as head of the white men in South Africa, to send an officer into the country to control them, and prevent them from taking the law into their own hands. In due course he received the following letter in reply:—

“GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
“CAPETOWN, 2d June 1868.

“MY FRIEND—I have received your letter of the 29th March, in which you describe the position in which you are placed in consequence of the reported discoveries of gold in your country, and intimate your wish to be taken under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen.

“I am much gratified at the confidence you have expressed in the justice and humanity of the British Government, and at the wise and peaceful arrangements you have made for the immediate control of the Europeans visiting your country in search of gold. I also admit the obligation resting on me to protect you, as far as lies in my power, from suffering wrongs at the hands of British subjects. But in order to enable me to judge of the manner in which this can best be accomplished, I shall be glad if you will send me the best information you can obtain as to the real extent and position of these gold fields, and the proportion of gold found in the ore; also as to the number of Europeans that may have come to you, and from what quarter; also as to the time occupied in travelling from the borders of the Cape Colony to your place of residence and to the gold fields—the best season for the journey, and the nature of the country through which the road passes—with any other information that you may think likely to be of use.

“On the receipt of this information, I trust I shall be able to allay your present anxiety as to your position and prospects, and, in the meantime, would advise you to adhere to your determination to avoid coming under any engagements in other quarters.—I am, your friend,

“P. WODEHOUSE,
“Governor of the Cape Colony.”

An official from the Transvaal was at this time sent to negotiate treaties with the Matebele and with the Bamangwato, but he was quite unsuccessful in his effort. Having occasion to travel through the Transvaal in the year succeeding the discovery of the gold, I was astonished to find the interest which the event had excited in that country. Had it not been for the discovery of diamonds about the same period, the “rush” of Europeans would no doubt have found its way to the gold long before this time. But I found in the Transvaal that wealthy men who had something to lose—I mean Dutch-speaking men—were secretly anxious for the English Government. I mention my own experience only. Respectable Transvaal burghers came to my waggon at night, and rousing me, asked the news, and inquired if it was true that the English would “take over” the gold country



ANCIENT RUINS AT TATI.

in Bechuanaland. A burgher would shake hands when parting, along with others, and then come back as if he had forgotten something, and ask if I knew anything about the coming of the English Government to the gold country in Bechuanaland. If I was writing to the Cape I must not say that they, the farmers of the Transvaal, were against that—they were for it; and yet this man would not say so in the presence of his friends. This was some ten years before the annexation of the Transvaal. I mention the fact as being within my own knowledge, and as illustrative of the character of Transvaal farmers, with whom straightforwardness and steadfastness have not hitherto been their best known traits of character.

Not the least interesting matter connected with the discovery of gold was the fact that the mines had been formerly worked, and that the forts and furnaces of the former miners had also been discovered.


When I was raising the walls of my house at Shoshong, a native from the interior came to me, and after carefully inspecting the building, said he had now a new idea: the huge walls in his country which he had seen when a herdboyc, and which he had regarded as the "works of God"—like the hills or the rivers—he was sure now, from what he saw, were really the works of man. On further inquiry I found this native was describing certain stone structures which are found over an extensive district to the east and north-east of Shoshong, and are at present the only traces of an ancient enterprise and civilisation—all knowledge of which, or even tradition concerning it, has completely died out among the present inhabitants of the country. But I have come to the conclusion that at whatever time, and by whomsoever conducted, a mining enterprise was carried on from the east coast in the region indicated. The walls, which remain to this day as monuments of the industry, enterprise, and civilisation of those who raised them, were apparently forts for defence, with structures which may have been smelting-furnaces. One of these ruins is near the waggon-road at Mpakwe River; another is at Tati. In the photographic illustration of the latter, the reader will discover

the remains of a course of stones stretching along the wall, which has been built in "herring-bone bond" as an ornament to the wall.


The most important of these ruins yet discovered is that of Zimbabwe, or Mazimbaoe (lat. $20^{\circ} 15' S.$, long. $31^{\circ} 57' E.$), which was visited and described by Herr Mauch in 1871, and afterwards by Mr. Thomas Baines and others. These ruins are extensive, covering part of a gentle slope, while upon a granite hill stands what was apparently a fort. It lies about 160 miles west of Sofala. The tower is described as being 450 feet in diameter; its walls are still 30 feet high and 15 feet thick; they are built of granite hewn into small blocks about the size of a common brick, and put together without mortar. The most remarkable of these walls is thus described by Mr. Baines:—"It is situated on the very edge of a precipitous cliff, and is in perfect preservation to the height of 30 feet. The walls are about 10 feet thick at the base and 7 or 8 at the top. In many places there remain beams of stone 8 or 10 feet in length projecting from the walls, in which they must be inserted to a depth of several feet, for they can scarcely be stirred. At the most they are 8 inches broad by 3 inches in thickness, and consist of a very compact stone, with a metallic ring, and of a greenish black colour. It is surmised that they were inserted to support a gallery or upper story, of which they are now the only trace. On one stone, ellipsoid in section and 8 feet in length, ornaments are engraved, consisting of lozenge-shaped figures one within another, separated by horizontal bands of diagonal lines."¹ The Banyai or Makalaka have been inhabiting this part of the country for about forty years—perhaps since the coming north of the Matebele.

Mr. Frank Oates, an English gentleman travelling in these regions (whose career as an explorer and naturalist was brought to a premature end by malarial fever in 1875), discovered one of those remarkable walls on the Shashi River, N.N.W. of the Tati gold mine. In his interesting journal, published by his brother Mr. C. G. Oates, the following remarks occur:—

¹ *South-East Africa*, by T. Baines, p. 122.



ROUND TOWER AT ZIMBABWE.



RUINS AT ZIMBABWE, REGION OF AFURA (OPHIR).

“Just before reaching the waggons (8.20 A.M.) I came to a most singular building, built on a little isolated kopje in the midst of the level tree-studded veldt, but with other kopjes near. There has been an excellently-built wall running round the sides of the kopje, and a regular entrance to it. The boys say it was built in old times by the ancestors of the present race of Makalakas, and was the king's residence. No white man, they say, helped to build it. It is not seen from the waggon road.”¹

The Hon. Guy Dawnay has also travelled and hunted in those regions, and came upon the same building as that described by Mr. Oates, or another similar to it, also N.N.W. of Tati mine. In a letter which I have recently had the pleasure to receive from him on the subject, he says:—

“I happened to come across a building, or apparent remains of a building, on the northern bank of the Tati River. It seemed to have been a circular erection, some 40 feet in diameter. All that showed above ground was the wall, a few feet high, made of roughly-shaped stones about the shape and double the size of an ordinary brick. Inside the wall there were soil and sand, with trees growing. The apparent shaping of the stones attracted my attention.”

Mr. Frank Whiteley, who lived many years in North Bechuanaland, and acted during part of the time as Secretary to the chief Khame, while travelling in the district east of Shoshong in 1876, discovered another of these remarkable stone erections. In a letter with which he has favoured me on the subject, he says he was surprised to come upon a well-built wall of stone in the midst of the dense bush. This was on the Limpopo River, and to the north-east of Seleka's town. Mr. Whiteley was hunting at the time, but turned aside to examine this unexpected sight. Tsetse fly had only just left that district, and Mr. Whiteley was probably the first European who had hunted in there on horseback, and travelled with an ox-waggon on the north bank of the Limpopo. The country was uninhabited, and without sign of recent occupation, being only visited by native hunters.

“Leaving my guide,” says Mr. Whiteley in his letter to me on the subject, “I went to examine the stone wall, and found it to be eight or nine feet high, but one could see that it had originally been higher; indeed it was now everywhere imperfect, and evidently only the ruin

¹ *Matabele Land*, from the Letters and Journals of the late Frank Oates, by his brother C. G. Oates, p. 175.

of what must have been a substantial erection. From memory, I should say the thickness would be from four to six feet. I followed the course of the wall for some distance, and when it had entirely fallen I could trace the debris till it appeared again. I did not follow the wall to its termination, resolving to return and make a more careful examination. Running parallel with the first wall was another, which was in a still more ruinous condition. Connecting these two walls at right angles were several other walls. In places where the walls had fallen, and inside the enclosures made by the intersecting walls, there were trees growing quite as large as any to be found in that part of the country. No mortar had been used in the building, but the stones were laid with evident care by people who understood their work. In its plan it bore no resemblance to any native building in the country, and was more extensive than the stone erections to be seen in the Matebele country. I saw no signs of mining, such as are found elsewhere along with these stone erections; but my visit was too brief to be exhaustive, and I regret that I was not able afterwards to return and examine carefully the most curious structure which I had seen in my wanderings in South Central Africa. The site of these walls is only a few hundred yards from the Limpopo River, and was, I thought, particularly pleasant."

The question who erected these extraordinary structures—having first hewn each one of those hard stones into its present shape, a little thicker than a Roman tile, so that they could be built exactly in their places, without mortar, and remain for ages in good repair—is still shrouded in mystery. Herr Mauch executed drawings of the ornaments engraved on certain of the stones, and submitted these drawings to Herr Petermann, the famous geographer, who pronounced them to be neither Arab nor Portuguese workmanship, but believed they were specimens of Phœnician art. This brings one's thoughts back to very ancient times indeed, when the Phœnicians were the masters of the sea; conveying from all parts of the known world articles of commerce to the Levant and Red Sea and Gulf of Akabah, which for so long were centres of the commerce and power of the world. Perhaps more was known or thought about Ophir in the time of Milton than in our day; for he says in his *Paradise Lost*—

"And Sofala thought Ophir."—Book xi.

Thus it is not impossible that the gold which was used for sacred purposes in the temple of Solomon at Jerusalem was procured from Bechuanaland and Mashonaland.



Mosenbach.

PERSIAN TOWER OF REFUGE.

No doubt much light will be thrown upon this most interesting problem when the gold mines themselves are once more opened and worked. A cynic may say that Jews would never have left a gold region so long as there was any gold there. But it is known that there is still much gold in these districts, and it has been discovered at places where there are no old mines at all. Then the great strength of the forts would seem to point to the fact that the country was not really subdued by those ancient gold-seekers, but that the gold was worked in a hostile country by armed men, who lived as garrisons as well as miners and smelters in the forts, and who were probably visited at regular intervals by their fellow-countrymen from the Phœnician fleet in sufficient numbers to overawe opposition. As in the case of the withdrawal of the Romans from Britain, there may have been orders from headquarters for the evacuation of these gold regions; or, as the forts were widely scattered, it may have happened that the miners were overcome at one fort after another, by hostile natives appearing in the district who would be jealous of such strangers, or who desired the supplies brought from the ships. At present the only article reported to have been discovered is a stone vessel shaped like the common native wooden basin of our own time. It was 18 inches in diameter and 3 inches in depth, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ inch thick at the edges, and half an inch thick at the bottom. It was of talcose gneiss, and when found by Herr Mauch was extremely soft.

I have recently obtained information on this very interesting subject, which I think materially strengthens these surmises of my own. It would appear that similar towers, with the same lozenge-shaped ornamentation, are still used on the Persian frontier, as places of refuge from the frequently-recurring Turkoman raids. Mr. William Simpson, the well-known traveller and artist, to whom I am indebted for the illustration of the Persian tower of refuge, in an interesting article on the subject,¹ says:—

“In many cases the fields were too distant for those working in

¹ *Harper's Magazine*, March 1886; see also *Illustrated London News*, 25th April 1885.

them to have time to run to the villages, so towers of refuge had to be erected. These could either be entered by a ladder, which was drawn up afterwards, or by a narrow opening, through which it would have been certain destruction for the pursuer to attempt to follow."

Archæologists have disputed much as to the origin and the uses of the ancient round towers of Britain and of Ireland. It would seem, however, that their origin is generally ascribed to the Phœnicians and other traders of early times. They came to Cornwall for tin; they went to Sofala, Afura, or Ophir for gold. Stone towers are still in use in the Caucasus, and round towers of dry stone, without mortar, are used in parts of Italy. Dry-stone ruins are also met with in Sardinia and in the Balearic Islands. Describing Spain under the Moors, Washington Irving thus mentions towers of refuge and their use:—

"The vega" (or plain) "was studded with towers of refuge for the peasantry; every pass of the mountain had its castle of defence, every height its watch-tower."¹


There are found as many as three hundred ruins of dry-stone round towers, known as "brochs," in the five northern counties of Scotland.² The "brochs" are remarkable not only for their great number in a circumscribed area, but also for their high development of architectural design. As to the use of these ancient buildings, the description of Mr. Simpson and his illustration would seem to remove all difficulty and make it quite plain why their doors were so small, or apparently so inaccessible. On this subject Dr. Anderson says of the "brochs":—

"As a rule, they mark the area of the best land in the districts in which they are situated. . . . They are the defensive strongholds of a population located upon the arable land."³


To these most ancient dry-stone round towers of refuge would seem to belong the ruins of Zimbabwe. To a later, but still ancient period belong the round towers of South Britain and of Ireland, which are built of stone and cement. They are said to have been treasuries and places of refuge. In Britain we have advanced in matters of defence far beyond these ancient round towers; in South Africa, on the

¹ *Granada and Spain*, by Washington Irving, Bohn's Cheap Series, p. 7.

² *Scotland in Pagan Times*, by Joseph Anderson, LL.D., p. 192. ³ *Ibid.* p. 205.



BROCH OF DUN DORNADILLA, STRATHMORE, SUTHERLANDSHIRE.



ROUND TOWER OF BRUNLESS, BRECKNOCKSHIRE.

other hand, the Bantu population has never attained to the erection or the use of such structures; while in Persia and in the Caucasus round towers of refuge were recently as necessary as in the olden times.

The first rediscovery of gold in these regions was in 1866. Herr Mauch, who was then travelling with Messrs. Hartley and Gifford, has the merit of this discovery, which was extended in after years by Mr. Thomas Baines, Sir John Swinburne, and others. Herr Mauch declared that the extent and beauty of the gold fields were such as to cause the traveller to stand, as it were, transfixed and lost in thought. Thousands of people might work in this gold field without interfering with one another.¹ Traders and hunters occasionally brought gold dust in quills from the Mashona, but these wretched people have been so much harassed by the Matebele that this industry seems to have ceased altogether. There is no sign of Portuguese residence or power in the country. Beyond Bechuanaland, Lobingula is master in one district and Mzila in another.

The friendship which Lobingula showed to Englishmen he extended also to Boer traders and hunters for several years. But the Zulu guides having reported the continual exclamations of the Transvaal hunters as to the beauty of the country, and having also overheard them, half in jest and half in earnest, laying claim to certain beautiful fountains as "their farms," and one of their number about this time having forgotten to return a favourite horse which he had borrowed from the chief and taken to the Transvaal, Lobingula forbade Transvaal hunters to visit Mashonaland or to hunt in the chief's country. This law, however, did not affect European traders or travellers, who are still welcomed to trade and permitted to hunt. But the game is every year becoming more and more scarce, as it falls before the guns and the assegais of the Matebele hunters, who engage in the chase in increasing numbers. Then there is, no doubt, uneasiness in the native mind with reference to the known presence of the gold reefs, not only in Mashonaland, but also in Matebeleland itself. Then there is also a

¹ *The Gold Regions of South Africa*, by T. Baines; p. 13.

rumour that the Matebele find there are no more large herds of cattle to be "lifted," or children to be enslaved, on the borders of their present residence; and it is said they are seriously thinking of the original destination of the tribe when they left the Transvaal, and are quietly taking steps which will enable them at some future time to cross the Zambesi River. Such a report, on first consideration, is not unwelcome; but reflection leads one to see that, on the whole, it would be far better if these people remained where they are, and yielded themselves yet more to the civilising influences which have worked a great change in their general condition during the last twenty years. In the meantime it is said the chief is not averse to the working of the Mashona mines by Englishmen. Indeed, it is rumoured that more than one concession has been already secured by Englishmen known to the chief, although none is worked.

The extent of this auriferous district can be seen by the reader on the map. It is said to extend on the north to the River Mazoe, which flows into the Zambesi, and to the Limpopo on the south. The ancient buildings are found as far westward as Tati and the Makalaka country north of Tati—the mines which were probably the farthest from the east coast. The wide intervening country contains very many known quartz reefs, as well as sand rivers, in which alluvial gold is found. Although discovered twenty years ago, the gold of Mashonaland and Bechuanaland still lies waiting the hand of enterprise and industry—preceded, let us hope, by friendly engagements with Lobingula and other native chiefs on the part of the British Government. The discovery at the same time of the diamonds, and afterwards the discovery of the gold mines of the Transvaal—some of which are proving so valuable—combined to direct men's attention away from this more distant part of the country. Nature, however, keeps securely her own treasures for centuries and ages. There are many reefs in the country I am describing which have never been worked. In other cases the modern digger and miner, when he appears on the scene, will clear out the workings of the Phœnicians, and the gold of Ophir will once more circulate in the commerce of the world.


CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF THE BATLAPING

1802-1884

ON leaving Shoshong in 1876 I proceeded to Kuruman in South Bechuanaland, where I resided till 1882. These were critical and important years in the history of that part

BATLAPING GENEALOGY.



¹ The first chief visited by Europeans, 1801.

² Batlaping separated in time of Mothibi, 1830. He died a Christian at Borigelo, 1845.

³ Molale was killed by a buffalo in hunting. Mankoroane being a minor, Mahura, now head of his mother's house, acted as chief of a division of the tribe till his death in 1863.

⁴ Killed by the Boers in 1857. The head of Gasebone was sent to the Batlaping in a sack by the Boers after they had killed him.

⁵ At the first separation of the tribe, Mothibi went to Vaal River district, taking with him his chief wife's house. Afterwards Gasebone and the heathen party went to live at Borigelo (Springbok Fontein), and Jantje and the Christians remained at Likatlong. Mothibi, now an old man, accompanied Gasebone. For some time Botlasitsi has resided at Pokwani.

⁶ Living representatives.

of the country, and it fell to my lot to take some part in the events which then transpired. Before, however, proceeding with my personal reminiscences in South Bechuanaland, it may be interesting to the reader to have some information concerning the two great clans of that part of the country—the Batlaping and the Barolong.

The above genealogical tree of the Batlaping chiefs is supplied from information given me by Setlohomi (a very old man, since deceased), son of Lekwe, one of Molehabangwe's brothers, and thus uncle to the late chief Jantje and grand-uncle to Mankoroane. I have compared this information with the traditions retained by other headmen of the tribe, and their correctness has been confirmed. It will be seen that the dates are mere computations of my own, going back from the death of Molehabangwe, and giving thirty years to each chief; and they are inserted for the purpose of aiding the mind to grasp what native tradition has dimly retained of the distant past. It may be thought that thirty years would exceed the average of a Bechuana chief's reign; but my estimate is more than borne out by the lives of those of whom we have more or less exact information. Thus, Molehabangwe, who was alive when Messrs. Truter and Somerville visited Bechuanaland in 1801, was dead, and his son Mothibi reigning in his stead, when Mr. Campbell appeared in the country in 1812. In the table

I have supposed that Molehabangwe died about	1810
Then we know that Mothibi	1845
and Jantje	died 1882

I need hardly say that I have not made out this tree for the purpose of establishing or of destroying any one's claim to property or to prestige in Bechuanaland. It seems to me every one is now satisfied that tribal land, such as that of the Batlaping country, which is now part of our English colony, did not in any sense belong to the chief or chiefs, but to chiefs and people—to the tribe as such. In short, our contention here is in accordance with the statements of those who declare that long ago the land of the clans in this country belonged to those clans,—chiefs and people. It is impossible to hark back so long in any practical way

as to land in Great Britain, but the present is just the time to remember these doctrines with reference to South Africa.

For many years missionaries, traders, and hunters, with an occasional scientific traveller, were the only Europeans who visited Bechuanaland. Among the hunters I have pleasure in mentioning the name of the late General Warren, father of Sir Charles Warren, whose name has since been so much connected with the country. General Warren, accompanied by Mr. Glegg of the Madras Civil Service, pierced as far as the Batlaping and Barolong countries in 1824, and



BATLAPING, 1824.

took sketches of the people and country, which are now in possession of his son. I present one of these to the reader as illustrative of the Batlaping tribe some sixty years ago.

It speaks volumes for the peaceful disposition of the Bechuana tribes that for more than half a century these people have lived near our colonial border in entire peacefulness, and that while their own tribal system was slowly decaying. In 1857 the Pokwani branch of the Batlaping, under Gasebone, were mixed up in some disturbances on the Free State border. At that time the Free State was at war with the Basutos, and the Transvaal burghers, marching to

the assistance of their friends in the Free State, came to the Batlaping country to demand reparation for what had been done in the Free State. At this critical time Jantje, acting for himself and those under him, kept the Likatlong branch of the tribe entirely separate from the war, and secured the encomiums of the Boer leader for his attitude. The Pokwani branch retired to Taung, and Mahura, Mankoroane's predecessor, not adopting the policy of Jantje, received the Pokwani cattle-lifters into his town and made himself responsible for their actions. The fact that old Gasebone was killed by the Boers in the engagement which took place at Taung did not in any way affect the political situation, inasmuch as, when he died, he had several grown-up sons, the eldest, Botlasitsi, at once succeeding his father. The Batlaping of these two branches at that time tacitly consented to the assumption of supremacy which Mahura then made, and held themselves as represented by him in his dealings with the Boers. No doubt the flight of the others from Pokwani to Taung strengthened the political position of the Taung branch. The Transvaal officials accordingly recognised and addressed Mahura as "Great Paramount Chief of the Batlaping," ignoring Botlasitsi, while the separate and peaceful attitude of Jantje had previously been recognised by them. In point of influence and power Mankoroane, in recent times, was undoubtedly first, Jantje second, and Botlasitsi third, although almost equal to Jantje in number of adherents. It will also be well to notice that the true heir of the chieftainship, so far as birth goes, is a person who has never made any public claim to it, so far as I know, and who has never been considered in connection with it. Perhaps, however, Mankoroane may have felt that his own descent from the "inferior house" was in some way made up for by having in his town and among his adherents the true heir of the "great house." Throughout the whole of the Batlaping country there were evidences for many years that the question of supreme chieftainship was in abeyance. At one farm or fountain an industrious headman under Jantje would make a water-furrow and lay out a wheat and maize plot, and he would be followed by a man living under Mankoroane, or it might

be some one from Botlasitsi's town. They all worked land which was watered by the same fountain. Were they not all Batlaping—did not the country belong to the Batlaping? Instances such as the above will occur to those who knew the Batlaping country before the recent disturbances. And so the lands were tilled and the produce sold, or consumed on the farm, or conveyed to Likatlong, or Taung, or Pokwani, as the case might be; and there was no apparent difficulty or hardship in the matter. If a dispute arose for adjudication outside the residences of these three chiefs, and one or other of them happened to be in the neighbourhood at the time, he would, as a matter of course, adjudicate in the case. In this way, at the mission station of Kuruman, each of these branches of the Batlaping tribe has decided cases and assumed supremacy after the separation of the tribe.

The right of way into the interior for Europeans was disputed by the Boers of the Transvaal as soon as they had gained their independence in 1852. They waylaid and seized Mr. M'Cabe, one of the first English travellers to cross the Kalahari Desert, and others were also seized on the waggon-road. In 1858 the Rev. Dr. Moffat was informed by Mr. J. Viljoen, a Transvaal official since notorious as one of Mr. van Pittius's supporters in Goshen, that Dr. Moffat and his young missionaries must obtain the sanction of the Transvaal Government before they proceeded into the interior. Dr. Moffat having addressed Sir George Grey, then representing Her Majesty's Government, on the subject, he received a reply, dated 23d February 1859, from which the following is an extract:—

“I shall in the meantime forward to Her Majesty's Government a copy of your letter of the 4th January, and of its enclosure, in order that they may determine what steps should be taken in case of the authorities of the Transvaal Republic persisting in molesting British subjects in their passage through the territories of independent chiefs whilst on their way to the interior of the Continent.”

Sir George Grey also addressed the Transvaal authorities on the subject, reminding them of the great interest taken in the Kuruman Mission by many people in England, who would deeply regret its destruction.

There was nothing in the Sand River Convention to prevent the Boers from attacking Kuruman, or any other town in native territory ; nor was there anything in it to prevent them from stopping travellers on their way into the interior, whether they were missionaries or not. But in this case the great tact of Sir George Grey averted the threatened complications ; the Batlaping were not again attacked, and missionaries and traders were allowed to proceed unhindered into the interior.

The three branches of the Batlaping tribe were afterwards represented at the inquiry held at Bloemhof in 1870 at the formal request of President Pretorius, concerning the western boundary of the Transvaal, and the boundary between the chief of the Griquas and the Batlaping tribe. These lines were settled by the award of Governor Keate of Natal in 1871, the evidence taken at Bloemhof being before him. One of the documents then produced was a treaty said to have been made between Mahura and Waterboer, chief of the Griquas. In this document the rights of Jantje and his branch of the Batlaping were entirely ignored, and the country in which he lived given to the Griquas, as also in a great measure the rights and the lands of Gasebone and his branch. The treaty was in Dutch, a language with which Mahura was not familiar ; and the names of places were given in that language. Dr. Moffat afterwards obtained a copy of the treaty, which had not been publicly signed or publicly discussed according to necessary tribal custom. When Mahura heard the terms of his agreement in his own language he entirely repudiated it ; and the chief Jantje, on behalf of himself and his branch of the tribe, tore up the copy of the treaty which he held in his hand at a public meeting at Kuruman. This treaty was upheld by Governor Keate as valid, and a boundary-line was indicated in accordance with its terms. As this line passed through Bechuana country having Bechuana names, and as these were not known, or at any rate not used, by the Griquas in their treaty with Mahura, it was a difficult, if not an impossible, thing to find out what was exactly meant in the said treaty, or to trace the line given in the country itself. Of course it was easy to see what was meant within a few miles ; but when once

you lose sight of exactness of definition in such a matter as a boundary-line, and more especially when native land is concerned, it is impossible to say where the "judgment" of your surveying officers may lead you. In this case an Imperial officer was called in to settle the question, and the boundary-line of Colonel Moysey, R.E., after some slight alteration by a member of the Colonial Government, is now the northern boundary-line of the Cape Colony. But the vagaries of colonial officials, to correct which this Imperial officer was called in, had removed the boundary-line northward into native territory—at its greatest distance some forty miles from the present line—and letters were penned in grave defence of such a course! After the line of the Imperial officer was marked out, and with some unimportant changes, ratified by the colonial authorities, a proposal was introduced into the Cape Parliament to reopen the question by the appointment of a commission of inquiry, those who moved in this matter being still under the impression that it could be shown that the boundary of the colony ought to be much farther to the north. The commission was accordingly granted in 1882, the result of their inquiries being the report to the Cape Government that already the northern colonial boundary had inflicted injustice on the Batlaping, and that some 70 farms (about 6000 acres each) of Batlaping land had been wrongly included in the colony. It was suggested that, having thus injured the natives, the Colonial Government should listen to the petition of Mankoroane, which was for English protection in the first instance; but failing that, for annexation to the Cape Colony. The Cape Government of the day, however, would neither move to restore to the natives the wrongly-obtained land, nor to assist Mankoroane in his distress by establishing order in Bechuanaland.

After the cession of Griqualand West to the English by the chief Waterboer in 1871, the territory of Jantje passed with it, and Jantje found himself a British subject. After this event the chief, now an old man, came to live almost permanently at Manyiding, near Kuruman, which had formerly been held by him as an agricultural farm. But

the majority of his people remained behind in English territory, so that the influence of this party of Batlaping was much weakened. President Burgers of the Transvaal endeavoured, although unsuccessfully, to go behind the award of Governor Keate by raising pretenders to native chieftainships along the Transvaal border on the disputed territory. It was in this way that he pressed the claim of Botlasitsi Gasebone, whose "paramountcy" had not been recognised by his predecessors, the Transvaal officials in 1857-58.

The disturbances between Mankoroane and Massow, a petty Koranna chief, had a simple enough beginning. The Bamaidi tribe had long been living along with the Batlaping, and in practical submission to them, although their internal affairs as a people were managed by their own chief or headman. In 1881 there was strife among the Bamaidi headmen, and one of them took some stock and made off to Massow's town, the others complaining to Mankoroane. Such movements not infrequently take place among natives, and are usually settled without fighting. Mankoroane requested Massow to deliver up the fugitive headman and the stock. As the man had fled from Mankoroane, the usual course would have been for Massow to intercede for him and make it possible for him to return. In this case Mankoroane and his tribe were so much stronger than the subordinate chief Massow that no serious thought of war seems to have been for some time entertained by Mankoroane; and his repeated efforts after peace redound to his credit. In these efforts he was well seconded by Mr. Daumas, the Resident at Taung (3841, 81).¹ Because, however, this Resident went out with Mankoroane to the neighbourhood of Mamusa for the purpose, as he thought, of assisting to make peace, and inasmuch as Massow fired on Mankoroane's messengers, the Resident was blamed, and without inquiry paid off by the Cape Government. They wished to wash their hands of Bechuanaland, and here was their chance. To refuse, as Massow did, to give up man or stock was, when demanded by chief and owner, the action of one who wanted war. Massow

¹ Figures thus quoted refer the reader to the Bluebooks on Bechuanaland affairs presented to the House of Commons. Here the reference is to Bluebook C.—3841, p. 81.

had also knocked down some of the boundary-line beacons erected in terms of the Pretoria Convention. Mankoroane remonstrated, and reminded Massow that he, Mankoroane, would be blamed by the English Government for what he, Massow, was doing. Massow, who literally did not understand what was involved in thus interfering with the boundary-line put up for his own protection, sent a defiant answer, and also attacked one of Mankoroane's villages and took it. Mankoroane now went out with a large body of men and formed a laager. He sent on messengers to Massow, still working for peace. His messengers were fired on; and when his main body arrived they were repulsed by Boers, who fired from a position within the Transvaal. Mankoroane attempted a second time to take Mamusa, but was again driven back by the firing of the Boers. At this time Mankoroane had not enrolled volunteers. Massow and his volunteers then acted aggressively, and attacked Mankoroane. Afterwards, however, Massow wrote a letter to Mankoroane to say that he personally was tired of the war, but the Boers refused to stop. Mankoroane now asked for the help of the British Government, and begged specially that he might be allowed to purchase ammunition. In July 1882 the British Resident visited the western border of the Transvaal, but effected nothing. He thus describes a man whom he met on his journey, and whose name will often occur:—

“I met at the farm of a Mr. Cronje, near the confluence of the Mooi River with the Vaal, the notorious character Adrian Delarey, who was a short time since sentenced to six months' imprisonment for the assault upon and shooting of one Frank Wells, near Christiana. He has been and still is prominently associated with the freebooters on the south-western border. He informed me that he was on his way to Stellaland as a subject of that republic, and no longer considered himself to belong to the Transvaal” (3841, 101).

On the 26th of July 1882, partly through the questionable efforts of Mr. Ferreira, an official of the Transvaal, an armistice and afterwards peace were concluded, in which the Transvaal was made supreme power and sole referee, and in which cession of land was made to the Transvaal. The Transvaal Government formally accepted of this in a letter from the Government Secretary to Massow, dated 16th Octo-

ber 1882, a copy of which was also sent to Mankoroane (3486, 35). This was at once disallowed by the British Resident as soon as the matter came to his knowledge, because it had not been reported to him, as the correspondence itself ought to have taken place through him (3486, 35). Lord Derby approved of what the Resident had done, and pointed out to the High Commissioner for the information of the Transvaal Government and of the native chiefs, that this so-called treaty, with that of Moshette and Montsioa, was not regarded as valid or binding, inasmuch as they were made in disregard of the terms of the Pretoria Convention (3486, 46). Mankoroane now offered the freebooters a certain piece of land. They refused this offer, and proceeded themselves to mark off a larger tract of country (3486, 82 and 3686, 4), a course which was not in accordance with the supposed treaty. Mankoroane protested and informed the High Commissioner. The next step was the formation of the Stellaland Republic on the 18th September 1883 (3841, 102). A still further development in the affairs of the freebooting community was reported (3841, 130) by the British Resident to the High Commissioner in November 1883. Stellaland and Goshen were to be united under one flag, the name to be "The United States of Stellaland." Gey van Pittius opposed this union, Van Niekerk promoted it; but although a "proclamation" was issued, it seems to have fallen to the ground. And so Van Pittius reigned in Goshen—Van Niekerk in Stellaland.

In the month of April 1883 the commission appointed by the Cape Parliament to examine into the northern boundary-line of the Colony, carried their labours as far north as Taung and Stellaland. We have seen that Mankoroane agreed to petition to be annexed by the Cape, but only as an alternative—his desire was to be brought under the rule of the Imperial Government. A petition was also sent in July from Stellaland (addressed to the Hon. Cecil Rhodes, M.L.A.) for the annexation of Stellaland to the Cape, but the active efforts of the party opposing this course were soon seen in a petition which Mr. van Niekerk and his friends at this time despatched to Pretoria for the union of Stellaland with the Transvaal (3841, 23).

The Government Secretary of the Transvaal cleverly endeavoured to secure by a side wind the recognition of Mr. Niekerk as Administrator of Stellaland, by requesting the British Resident to forward enclosed letter to the chief Massow, "as also as speedily as possible to send enclosed copy to the Administrator of Stellaland, Mr. G. J. van Niekerk." The Resident forwarded the letter to the chief, but sent back that addressed to Mr. van Niekerk to the Transvaal Government, informing them at the same time that he did so because, if he undertook the transmission of the letter addressed to the Administrator of Stellaland, it might be construed as an official recognition by the Resident "of Mr. Niekerk's assumed status of Administrator." This decisive action was expressly approved by Lord Derby on 17th August (3841, 25), and his Lordship repeated his opposition to the extension of Transvaal territory on its western border.

The vacillation in our policy with reference to Bechuana-land at this time could not be more clearly brought out than by contrasting the action of Government in March 1883 with that of March 1884 towards the native chiefs and their country. At the former date a definite message had been sent to Mankoroane that the British Government would not interfere by force in his behalf, but in the event of Montsioa or Mankoroane being driven from their country, the Government would consider what pecuniary or other assistance could be given to them in the Colony! This idea represented the lowest depths of an evil policy, and was, besides everything else, quite impracticable. But in March 1884 Mankoroane was assured of a British Protectorate, and told in the meantime to hold his own (4036, 2).

In October 1883 Mankoroane announced to the High Commissioner that he was on his way to England to beg Her Majesty's Government to consider favourably his case. He also announced that he had appointed Mr. Donovan to be his agent. It was Mankoroane's desire to proceed to England at this time in order to state his case while the Transvaal Deputation was there. He was informed, however, by the Secretary of State, that his wish to be represented in London could not be acceded to, but Her Majesty's Government would give full attention to any matters he

might bring before them through the Acting High Commissioner at the Cape. Mankoroane then asked that I might represent him at the conference in London. In reply he was told on the 26th of October that "Lord Derby readily consented to hear Mackenzie on any points affecting his interests, but Mankoroane cannot be formally admitted nor represented at any conference here" (3841, 59). Mankoroane visited Graham's Town and Capetown, and then returned to Taung. It is not quite plain why the chief of part of Bechuanaland should be forbidden by Lord Derby entrance to a conference which was discussing among other things the boundary-line and ownership of part of his own country.

On his way to Capetown Mankoroane seems to have drawn up a formal statement of his case for the information of Her Majesty's Government. The signature to this paper was witnessed by the Rev. W. Ashton and Mr. Agenor Daumas, Mankoroane's trusted advisers. In this document Mankoroane went so far as to say that he regarded himself as being punished by the Transvaal for having been a friend of the English, and that even to the last he had been taunted and threatened as trusting in a government which would never appear for his protection. He stated also that the Boers who fought for Massow "are now occupying my ploughing, grazing, and hunting grounds." And again, "The Boers are preventing my people from ploughing by threats." The above was handed to Mr. Cecil Rhodes at Kimberley, and by him forwarded to the Acting High Commissioner (3841, 139).

While at Capetown Mankoroane agreed to part with some of his territory, which would be represented by drawing a line from Kopje Enkel to Kunwana. He was afterwards more than once represented to Her Majesty's Government as having at that time agreed to the southern boundary of Stellaland, which went in an entirely different direction, and cut off all his best garden-ground. This was an unfounded assertion; the southern boundary of Stellaland was not sanctioned by any authority whatever till it was adopted by Her Majesty's Government to indicate the new boundary of the Transvaal in that district.


CHAPTER III

HISTORY OF THE BAROLONG

1812-1884

FROM Montsioa himself, and from many other corroborative native sources, I gathered that the Barolong country had never been occupied by any other tribe within the memory of even the oldest men. Early in the present century the Barolong were living at Kunwana and at Morokweng. This is fully borne out by European testimony, beginning as early as 1812, when the Rev. John Campbell visited Bechuanaland and found the Barolong at Kunwana, and the Batlaping at Litakong (Lattakoo). In 1824 Dr. Moffat found the Barolong in the same locality, the chief then living at Pitsani. In 1825 and in 1829 Dr. Moffat mentions the Barolong as occupying their country. The Bahurutse (Ikalafing's people) were found by Dr. Moffat in the Mosiga basin (now in the Transvaal) in 1835. Dr. Moffat then met Moselekatse forty miles east of Mosiga. The Barolong suffered much from the inroad of the Basuto tribe called by Dr. Moffat the Mantatees. Part of the tribe then went southward as far as Litakong and Taung, afterwards returning northward to Kunwana. Other divisions of Barolong remained at Kunwana, Pitsani, Morokweng, and Moretlwe, the eye of the Maretsani River. The Barolong were in their own country when the Matebele entered what is now called the Transvaal from the south. The Bahurutse at Mosiga (Ikalafing's tribe) paid tribute to Moselekatse. The Barolong killed the Matebele who came to levy tribute on them,—a tribute which would have included as many

BAROLONG GENEALOGY.



1 Living at Ganyesa.

2 On the Molopo. 3 At Morokweng. 4 At Kunwana.

7 This branch has lived chiefly at Thabanchu, in the Orange Free State.

8 Now in Basutoland.

9 At Matlhaba.

3 This branch has lived chiefly in the Transvaal. They came some years ago to Lotlakani, where they now are.

boys and girls as Moselekatse wished to obtain from them. The Barolong in the following year were attacked by the Matebele. After this, part of the tribe went southward again and joined Moroko, who was then at Platberg, and with him removed to Thabancho (Free State), and part remained in the Barolong country. At this time Maikechwe was at Morokweng, Moalosi near Pitsani, Motlabani between Maretsani and Molopo, Pholwe at Mabati, and Matshanni at Pohlfontein. The Barolong who went to Thabancho remained there nine years. They were visited at that place by emigrant Boers from the Colony, under Hendrik Potgieter, on their way north. Montsioa and the other Barolong at Thabancho warned Potgieter that Moselekatse and his Zulus were living in that direction; but the Boers disregarded the warning, and said the Barolong must have been themselves to blame for the outbreak between them and the Matebele. The Boers were soon after attacked by the Matebele, who were armed only with the assegai. The Boers had made a strong laager or fort, by means of their waggons and the dense branches of thorn-trees which they had dragged and adjusted so as to fill all the interstices, and fastened inside the laager. The Matebele were shot down when attempting to scramble over the waggons. The women inside the laager acted with the utmost bravery, making bullets and assisting the men in this life and death encounter. The Matebele were unable to take the Boer laager with the emigrants' wives and children, but they took all their cattle; and the waggons were thus left motionless in the open country. In their distress the Boers sent back messengers to Montsioa's father for oxen to pull the waggons containing their families out of danger, and by the friendly help of the Barolong the women and children and waggons were safely brought back to Thabancho. The Boers now found themselves practically without food, so the Barolong supplied them and their families. In the course of some months Potgieter received reinforcements, and felt strong enough to go upon the track of his cattle and attack Moselekatse. He asked the Barolong to go with him, and they agreed to do so. The Boers were able to capture a number of Mose-

lekatse's cattle, and brought away with them also certain American missionaries who were then residing with the Matebele at a place now called Zendelings Post in Marico. This was the most westerly Matebele town, and is now included in the Transvaal. The Boers and their native allies attacked several other Matebele towns, but not the one in which Moselekatse was said to be, which was called Ramoshana. The Barolong also captured cattle and drove them separately out of sight of the Boers, till they reached the Vaal River, when their cattle-drivers by mistake brought them along where the Boers were, and the latter saw them. Potgieter then said that the cattle which they (the Boers) had captured would stand in place of those stolen by the Matebele, and they would now therefore proceed to the division of those captured by the Barolong, Potgieter saying to Montsioa's father, "Remember, you started by saying that you were going to fight for your country, and not for cattle, because you did not like the Matebele as neighbours." The Barolong submitted, and the cattle were so divided, and they all returned to Thabancho. The Boers and the branch of the Barolong tribe which was acting as their allies now left Thabancho and proceeded northward, settling for a time where Potchefstroom now stands. Montsioa's people were there five years. Moselekatse did not, as is generally supposed, flee to the north after his engagement with the emigrant Boers. He remained for years in the Transvaal after that event. During this interval he was attacked by some half-castes from the Vaal River, and by Zulus under Dingaan, who were in overwhelming numbers. An immense slaughter of Matebele took place in a kloof near a hill called Dilolwe. The Zulus also lost very severely at this place. It was after this that Moselekatse proceeded northward, taking with him his flocks and herds. Soon afterwards Potgieter came to Montsioa's father and announced to him that he was about to move farther northward to look out for a country, and that the Barolong could go with him or turn aside to their own country. So when Potgieter went to what is now known as Zoutpansberg, the Barolong returned to their own country, where they found the branches of the

tribe which had never left it. These Barolong welcomed back Tauana, and those in the eastern part of the country placed themselves under him. Tauana (Montsioa's father) and his people, on their return, went first to live at Lotlakani, the birthplace of Tauana, and here the old man died and was buried. Matlhaba (Machabi) remained for a time at Potchefstroom, and Gontse was then living near what is now called Schoonspruit.

In 1850 the Boers asked that a boundary-line should be made between themselves and the Barolong, which was done by a commission of Boers in December of that year. A formal document was promised to ratify the boundary-line, the points of which were well known to Montsioa and other full-grown men of the tribe; but this was not done at the time. It would appear, however, that a treaty of peace afterwards concluded a border disturbance between the Boers and the Barolong, under Molema, Montsioa's brother; and in this treaty the above boundary-line, agreed to by Commandant Potgieter, was again recognised. This was ratified by Commandant Pretorius on the 11th of January 1852. The boundary-line here agreed to was more or less that afterwards given by Governor Keate in his award.

When the Boers, in 1852, resolved to attack Sechele, with whom Dr. Livingstone was then quietly living as a missionary, and who has described what took place on the occasion in his *Travels*, they asked the Barolong under Montsioa to assist them. As the Bakwena and the Barolong were on friendly terms, Montsioa declined to join the Boers in their aggressive war. For this, on the return of the Boers, the Barolong were severely censured, and no unmeaning threats were held over their heads—"the bullets would soon fall on their town like hailstones," etc. A missionary of the Wesleyan Society visited their laager to intercede for the Barolong, but the leaders refused to see him. The Boers were as good as their word, attacking the Barolong after the lapse of a short time, and capturing a great many of their cattle. After a year had passed a message was sent to Montsioa from the leaders of the Boers, offering to make peace. Montsioa met this messenger at Lotla-

kani, and Viljoen, the representative of the Transvaal, declared the peace would last from generation to generation. Montsioa, however, distrusted their professions, and retired for a time with a portion of the tribe to Moshaneng, in the Bangwaketse country, leaving his brothers and several headmen with their people and their cattle to occupy the Barolong country. The Boers in 1865 demanded taxes from the Barolong, which the latter refused to pay. In 1868 an official of the Transvaal Government was sent to levy taxes on them, and on their refusal a commando followed, which was repulsed by Molema, Montsioa's brother, and taxes were never levied.

This was the state of affairs when the diamonds were discovered on the Vaal River and in the adjoining district in 1868. In that year the Transvaal issued a futile "proclamation," including within its western boundary all Bechuanaland, from Lake Ngami on the north to Langberg Hills, south-west of Kuruman. This proclamation was never treated by the Transvaal Government itself, or Her Majesty's Government, or by the native chiefs as a serious proposal, much less a decision.

In August 1870 a very great meeting took place on the border of the Transvaal near Mafiking at a place called *Buurman's Drift*, to listen to what President Pretorius and Commandant Paul Kruger had to say on the subject of the diamonds. Moroko from Thabancho, Maikhechwe from Morokweng, Matlhaba and Phoe from the Transvaal, were there representing the Barolong tribe; Gaseitsiwe, chief of the Bangwaketse, and Massow, the Koranna chief from Mamusa, were also present. According to Montsioa's statement to me, the Transvaal leaders' speeches were to this effect: "Here are the English, quite close to us now. Let us come to a common understanding—let us work together. The English have taken President Brand's country, and that of Waterboer and Jantje—they will take yours also. You can save it by joining it to the Transvaal now, and letting us dwell together." Clearly the Transvaal leaders were following in 1870 the policy which they afterwards so earnestly desired to carry out in London in 1883,—that of

joining Bechuanaland to the Transvaal, and thus interrupting the advance of the English from the south. Montsioa declared his answer was a point-blank refusal to these overtures of friendship, and that he used the illustration that "no one ever spanned in an ass with an ox in one yoke." All the chiefs, including Massow and Phoe (for Moshette had not then been discovered), agreed with what Montsioa had said. Montsioa gave me the following racy description of the conclusion of this great meeting, which really decided the fate of Bechuanaland for that time: "Then Paul Kruger stood up and said, 'I shall call in men who are strangers to let them judge between us, for I regard this country as my own.' Then I answered, 'I also am willing to call in strangers to decide between us.' Then Paul said, 'If the strangers decide in our favour, will you agree to it?' I answered, 'Yes; but if they decide in favour of the Barolong, what will you Boers say?' 'We will agree to it,' said Paul Kruger. So we separated, each one saying, 'Let it be so.' I then went to Klipdrift and met Sir Henry Barkly, who directed me to go to Bloemhof, where the commission sat."

At this meeting the Transvaal Government claimed the Barolong country on account of some alleged cession to them by the Portuguese Government,—a course which only showed how sorely pressed they were to show any sort of title to the country. Nothing ever came of this claim or alleged cession, and it was not even mentioned at Bloemhof.

It is matter of history that when the commissioners who took the evidence at Bloemhof could not agree with reference to the boundary question, President Pretorius suggested that Governor Keate of Natal should be called in to arbitrate. His award was given in 1871 on the evidence submitted to the commissioners at Bloemhof. It was regarded by the Transvaal as unfavourable to their interests, and was repudiated by them.

In his attempts to increase the influence of the Transvaal on its western border, President Burgers in 1872 "discovered" Moshette, who was in the service of a farmer in the Transvaal, and brought him forward as "paramount

chief" of the Barolong. It will be seen from the Barolong genealogy that he had no pretensions to that position: indeed it was a question whether there was a drop of Barolong blood in his veins. It is true that, following the polygamist law that the issue of a woman who becomes a widow and then marries again is not reckoned to her second husband, but is counted to her first husband, who paid to her father the *bogadi* or marriage-cattle for her, Moshette would be reckoned the son of Khosi, and thus higher in rank than Gontse, his next brother. But even in this case Moshette had no position which Gontse had not possessed before the discovery of Moshette in the Transvaal—except, indeed, what he owed to the patronage of the Transvaal Government. The genealogical table shows that he and his brother Gontse were both, in fact, many steps from being entitled to rank as chief of the Barolong tribe. The appearance of Moshette, therefore, as "paramount chief" on the western frontier of the Transvaal boded evil for the country; for Moshette knew he had been made chief, not by the preference of his own people, but through the influence of the Boers, and of those Barolong who resided within the Transvaal.

In 1873 President Burgers asked from Montsioa an alteration of the boundary, as given by Governor Keate, but Montsioa refused. Other efforts were then put forth in behalf of the Transvaal; in fact, the Transvaal branch of the Barolong were being moved at this time like men on a chess-board. Montsioa's people were dislodged from Pohlfontein, where they had long resided, and Matlhaba (Machabi) and his people were brought up from Potchefstroom district to occupy Pohlfontein. The next move was in 1875, when a few Barolong from the Transvaal asked Montsioa's permission to live at Lotlakani. Montsioa acceded to their request on condition that they would obey his rule, and to this it is said they agreed. Their coming and the setting up of Moshette as paramount chief may be said to have been the commencement of Montsioa's later troubles. In 1868 Montsioa had addressed Sir Philip Wodehouse, then Governor of the Cape Colony and Her Majesty's representative, complaining of the injustice of the

Transvaal; in 1874 he formally requested to be taken under British protection, addressing himself to Lieut.-Governor Southey of Griqualand West. At the end of 1878 he made a similar request through Colonel (now Sir Charles) Warren. Mr. Christopher Bethell, who had been a lieutenant in the Intelligence Department of the force there under Colonels Lanyon and Warren, was stationed with Montsioa by Colonel Warren, and he remained there in that capacity till Bechuanaland was abandoned by the English Government in 1880-81.

The annexation of the Transvaal by England in 1877 was followed in 1880 by the Transvaal war, and the retrocession of the country by England. Englishmen and loyal Dutch-speaking colonists took refuge in Bechuanaland, and were well received both by Montsioa and Mankoroane. There can be no doubt of the importance to loyal people of the attitude of these chiefs at that time. The other chiefs on the western border of the Transvaal stated at a public meeting that they desired to be regarded as neutral or as favourable to the Transvaal: this meeting was succeeded by hostile action on the part of Moshette and Matlhaba, in which Montsioa's people were driven from their places on the Maretsani.

On the 5th of February 1881 Montsioa gave Matuba, who had been now some years resident at Lotlakani, notice to leave that place. Matuba declined. Moshette collected his men at Kunwana; Matlhaba (Machabi) at Pohlfontein. On the 2d of May Montsioa attacked Lotlakani and routed Matuba's people, killing over 100 men. The fight began at dawn, after the usual native fashion, and lasted till nine o'clock. It was reported from the Transvaal, and repeated in England in the press and in the House of Commons, that Montsioa's men had been guilty of great brutality on this occasion in skinning and mutilating the bodies of the dead. Exhaustive inquiries were consequently directed to be made on the spot by members of the Bechuanaland Expedition, and these stories were found to be entirely without foundation. After the engagement Montsioa's people retired to Sehuba, leaving the defeated people ample oppor-

tunity to return and bury their dead. The Barolong, however, did not think of doing so, and the consequence was that wolves, jackals, vultures, and pigs were seen two days after holding high carnival at Lotlakani. This was the testimony of an Englishman living with Montsioa, who was asked by that chief to visit the scene of the conflict two days after it had taken place. He found the body of only one woman among the men,—a small proportion, considering that the town was attacked by men who fired into it from all sides. Another woman was wounded and was taken care of by Montsioa's people, along with a wounded man. The woman died, but the man recovered, and afterwards was allowed to go home again ; and the woman was visited before her death by her husband. The Transvaal advocates thought well to invent and spread these dreadful charges of brutality, and Mr. Uppington unwisely allowed himself to follow their incorrect statements in public utterances. The Barolong are no doubt only emerging from many cruel ways, but we should be true to an ally even if he had cruel habits. It is, however, gratifying to be able to assure the reader that the stories which were thus circulated were pure inventions—no doubt started for a political purpose. A native tribe fought—Barolong against Barolong—and, as usual in such cases, no one buried the dead. But there was no actual outrage on the bodies by the survivors. At Shoshong, after an engagement, I succeeded, with the help of a fellow-missionary and some native students, in burying those who fell. The Bamangwato did not think of burying those killed in battle any more than did the Barolong.

Montsioa was next attacked in Sehuba by the combined forces of Moshette and Matlhaba, acting under Boer guidance and help. Repelling this attack, Montsioa again invested Lotlakani, where his enemies were, and driving them from the place, killed nearly as many as before—taking also some wounded as prisoners, who were attended to and afterwards sent home. When the report of these disturbances reached Natal, where the Royal Commission was then sitting, Major Buller and Commandant Joubert were sent as commissioners from the English and Transvaal Governments, to

inquire into the causes of the war, and if possible arrest its progress. They found that the war was a result of the English and Transvaal war, and of the recent meeting of the chiefs. The struggle was a purely native and tribal one, and for the usual object of ambition—tribal supremacy. Obviously the intervention of the two commissioners, unless some award were openly given and adhesion to it publicly pledged, would be without permanent result. Colonel Buller and General Joubert led the natives to suppose that the Royal Commission would settle the affairs of Bechuanaland, and urged the chiefs to keep the peace till the Commission had concluded its labours. When these were over it was found that no notice whatever had been taken of the condition of Bechuanaland, and no message was sent to the chiefs. Moshette now enlisted Boer volunteers and declared war against Montsioa. And so the strife went on; and we find Montsioa complaining of Moshette's hostile actions and his constant retreat into the Transvaal when followed up, taking with him stock which belonged to Montsioa. In August and September a new bone of contention appeared in the shape of the boundary-line of the Pretoria Convention, which was marked off by Colonel Moysey. Both Moshette and Massow were highly displeased with this line, because it was rumoured that while they belonged to the Transvaal side of the line, those who had taken the English side were to have the country on the Bechuanaland side. As stated elsewhere, this, and no liking for the Transvaal, was the reason why Moshette and Massow opposed the line, and actually pulled down some of the stone beacons which marked it. At the end of 1881 Moshette, assisted by some Boers and some wandering Basutos, attacked Montsioa once more at Sehuba and burned part of the town. They were, however, repulsed on this and on another subsequent occasion by Montsioa and his people. Captain Nourse, sent by the British Resident at Pretoria, next visited the border, with Commandant Greef and Captain Raaf, and reported on its condition. Captain Nourse did not hesitate to say that Moshette appeared to be acting under Greef's orders, and he tele-

graphed that the Boers were actively participating in the disturbances. It was well known that several members of the Transvaal Volksraad were engaged personally or by substitute in the war against Montsioa. Those whose names had become notorious as leaders resigned their place in the Raad; and the Government gave out that they had left the country—which was not the case. Captain Nourse reported that Moshette had the privilege of using the Transvaal as a safe base of operations, especially for the grazing of captured cattle; and that ammunition in large quantities had been furnished by the Transvaal Government to the neighbouring landdrosts or magistrates. Burghers could practically purchase as they liked, so that Moshette and his volunteers had no lack under this head. Even the "Border Guard," sent by the Transvaal Government professedly to keep the peace and preserve neutrality, joined the freebooters and fought against Montsioa (3486, 61). Captain Nourse succeeded in getting a meeting of the chiefs; but failed on this and on a second occasion to induce Moshette, or rather the Boers behind him, to consent to a peaceful settlement. Had Captain Nourse been residing on the border, and in communication with the British Resident and Her Majesty's Government, the event might have been different. As it was, as soon as he left, matters resumed their former condition.

A peacemaker now appeared from another quarter. Bonokwani, the recognised chief of the Barolong at Morokweng, and who by birth was before Moshette and Montsioa, visited his fellow-tribesmen and asked them to lay down their weapons and submit their quarrel to his settlement. To his credit, Montsioa was agreeable to this; but Moshette, influenced by those who were using him for their purposes, declined the authority of the chief of his tribe, thus proclaiming to every tribesman that his real confidence was in his Transvaal friends, and not in the natives, or in the rectitude of his cause. Soon after this Moshette and his white allies formed a laager between Mafiking and Buurman's Drift outside the Transvaal. The English Government called upon the Transvaal Government to enforce neutrality on its western border; and the Transvaal Government issued a proclama-

tion, which was of no effect. In February 1882 the High Commissioner issued a proclamation warning British subjects against the breach of the Foreign Enlistment Act. This had the effect of withdrawing almost all Mankoroane's volunteers and giving the other side an assurance of victory. So sure was the Transvaal Government of the indifference of the English Government at this time, that it actually called upon Her Majesty's Government to intervene and establish peace between the conflicting parties. This enabled the Transvaal Government afterwards to assert that Her Majesty's Government would neither make peace itself nor allow the Transvaal Government to do so. Breaking the Pretoria Convention, Commandant Joubert addressed himself direct to the chief Haseitsiwe; and the conduct of the Transvaal Government towards its own subject, the chief Ikalafing, was such as showed that it regarded the Convention and the suzerainty as of the most shadowy nature. The Free State also issued a proclamation, forbidding its subjects from joining in the wars on its border.

In June of 1882 it struck both Sir Hercules Robinson and Lord Kimberley that "it was hard that a friendly chief should be debarred from obtaining ammunition in self-defence; it was worthy of consideration whether he should be so debarred." In July of the same year joint armed intervention, to put down freebooting in Bechuanaland, was proposed by the Secretary of State, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. The Cape Colony agreed; the Free State found that it had no law to warrant its acting in this way beyond its borders. The gist of the answer of the Transvaal Government was that the cure (as contained in this project of united action) would be worse than the disease (3419, 63). Joint armed intervention to uphold the peace of Bechuanaland was not perhaps the sort of measure that one would have looked for from Her Majesty's Government, judging from the utterances of some public men in behalf of the Pretoria Convention, but it was a little better than nothing at all.

In the months of August and September 1882 Montsioa was hard pressed by his enemies, especially by the Boer volunteers from the Transvaal, who had now brought with

them cannon to assist them to take Mafiking. By this time Moshette was also tired of the war, and afraid and jealous of his own volunteers. On the 24th of October Montsioa and Moshette signed a treaty of peace (3486, 71), the document having been drawn up by the Transvaal volunteers. After this document had been signed, another document was produced and read to Montsioa, in which he was made to "absolutely decline the British Government, and to enter under the government of the South African Republic and its laws, to obey it with all he had, and to remain faithful to it." This Montsioa refused to sign, although threatened that war would be resumed unless he did so. When he still refused, one of the Transvaal volunteers affixed a cross beside Montsioa's name, despite his protests, and the document was given out as signed by Montsioa!

This "alleged treaty," as Lord Derby styles it (3486, 46), contained complete submission to the Transvaal, and exclusive recognition of its authority and protection. It granted land to the white volunteers, who were not to be under the one chief or the other, or under a separate republic, but under the government and control of the South African Republic. All defences were at once to be broken down, and no new ones erected. A commission was to be appointed—two persons by the two chiefs, and a third by the "lawful volunteers." This commission was to go out within two months from that date to mark off the farms which were to be of the usual size, 6000 acres. No new inhabitants were to be admitted without consent of the Transvaal Government. In the case of whites, they would be required to take the oath of allegiance to that Government. The last article in the treaty was to the effect that Moshette and Montsioa bound themselves and their subjects for the fulfilment of the various articles of the same; that they would move the Transvaal Government to make known this contract of peace to Her Britannic Majesty; and in case of difference or disunion, it was stipulated that the Government of the Transvaal should, "without any delay or invitation, peremptorily intervene, and after full investigation, punish the guilty to extremity."

It is hardly necessary to direct serious attention to a document that was never honoured in any way, by the one side or by the other; although the attitude of Mr. Upington, the Premier and Attorney-General of the Cape Colony, at Rooi Grond strengthened the contention of the freebooters and of the Transvaal Government that the treaty was a valid one. If we regard the document from a native point of view, it is entirely useless, inasmuch as its whole scope is outside the laws and customs of the Barolong, and especially as certain branches of the tribe, and indeed the heads of the whole tribe, were not present or consulted concerning this attempted alienation of tribal land. If, on the other hand, we regard the document as a white man's document, meant to confer certain advantages upon certain white men, then is the document equally valueless; for the white men in question were private persons, chiefly subjects of the Transvaal Government, who had no status whatever outside that territory, and no power, in the face of proclamations, to band themselves together to levy war, or to secure the benefits accruing from such unlawfully waged wars. The defences were never broken down either by the volunteers at their laager or by Montsioa at his town. The land commission was never appointed by the chiefs, and was refused by both of them, and Montsioa's people ploughed his old lands. Thus on the spot the "treaty" was never operative or observed. Then the duties assigned to the Transvaal Government in the treaty were enough of themselves to nullify the document, inasmuch as the performance of such offices on the part of that Government would have involved a breach of the Pretoria Convention. This was pointed out by Lord Derby, who said that on that account the treaty could not be recognised as valid by Her Majesty's Government (3486, 46).

In November 1882, soon after the signing of this treaty, Mr. Rutherford, the secretary of the British Resident at Pretoria, appeared at Rooi Grond and Mafiking on a "mission of observation and inquiry." He reported that Masibi's people had been, without doubt, murdered, and that nothing could restore tranquillity except the inter-

ference of a civilised Power. About this time Mr. Gey van Pittius issued a so-called proclamation in which the world first heard of the South African "Land Goossen" (the Land of Goshen). At the end of 1883 the native chiefs, bereft of all hope in the interference on their behalf of England, began to take steps to unite against the Transvaal, which they regarded as their common enemy, the compact extending as far north as Sechele. This course was regarded with considerable alarm by the President of the Transvaal, who requested the assistance of Mr. Hudson, the British Resident at Pretoria, to dissuade the native chiefs from such a union. The reply on behalf of Her Majesty's Government was to the effect that the chiefs in question should be warned against any violation of the Transvaal border, but that the chiefs were free to protect themselves outside that border.

It was about this time that Mr. Gey van Pittius paid Montsioa a visit of a most treacherous kind. He informed Montsioa, who refused his request for an interview alone, that Moshette had deposed him (Gey) from being chief of the volunteers, but that, nevertheless, he had still his own party among them. He produced a letter, which he said was from General Joubert from Pretoria, and from which he read. In it great sympathy was expressed for Montsioa and his sufferings; and it stated that the only remedy for the chief was to give himself up to the Transvaal. The letter as read by Gey then promised that if Montsioa would do this, the Transvaal would recognise his supremacy over Moshette; but if Montsioa did not do this, it threatened that he would lose everything—his country and his life. Gey read this from a long paper which had many words, but that was the gist of it. Mr. Gey then asked Montsioa to sign his name to the paper which he held in his hand, but refused to let Montsioa have it in his own hand that he might understand it aright. He refused also to let a copy be taken. When Montsioa refused to sign the paper Gey then offered himself and his volunteers as Montsioa's men, and offered to fight against the chief Moshette, whose volunteer he had so long been.

Montsioa at once declined, remarking that the destruction of Moshette would be no profit to him (Montsioa). Mr. Gey van Pittius urged his proposal by saying that Montsioa would thus get back his country and subdue his enemy Moshette. Thus Mr. van Pittius was prepared, alongside of his old enemies, to fire on his old friends Moshette and his people. He was prepared with the volunteers who had adhered to him to attack the volunteers who preferred to be under another freebooter as captain (4194, 47). If the usual standard of action among civilised men is to obtain in South Africa, then Montsioa, when thus tempted, came off an honest and noble man, and Mr. Gey van Pittius a mean and baffled betrayer of his own comrades.

In the beginning of 1884 the "Land Goossen" was not under the sway of Van Pittius, but of another Transvaal burgher called Karl Weber. At this time there existed a provisional union between Stellaland and Goshen, which was much encouraged by Van Niekerk, but disliked by Van Pittius and his followers. On the 11th of January, on the petition of Johannes Celliers, the volunteers of Moshette deposed Weber and restored Gey van Pittius as Chairman of the Bestuur (Executive). In February the Bestuur made what they called an inspection of the farms of the Land of Goshen, and estimated them at 250 farms of 3000 morgen each. Already 350 lots had been drawn by volunteers or by others with the sanction of the Bestuur, so the Goshen land difficulty was of an aggravated description at an early date. The "inspection" referred to had been prevented by Moshette as well as Montsioa, and the latter early in March warned the volunteers to leave his country. The dissensions among the Rooi Grond freebooters would seem to have been healed over by the news of an imminent calamity in the shape of the assumption of a Protectorate by England—the news of which would reach them early in March.

On the 25th March there was held a meeting of the Rooi Grond volunteers, which determined to measure Barolong land and to occupy it. The freebooters expressed determination to have land, and declared they had reason to expect assistance from the Transvaal. Mr. Gey van

Pittius told his people he had received advice from a "great man" to measure and occupy west of the Convention line at once, and that help would be forthcoming. It was reported that the field-cornets of Marico, Rustenburg, and Pretoria had asked for instructions as to holding their commandoes in readiness (4036, 49). With reference to their inspection of Barolong country, Montsioa wrote to them :—

"I have heard that your intention is that you will come and survey my country, and that you will also try to take my cattle. You cannot look to me for payment or for farms; I did not hire you. You all know this. I did not interfere with your seeking your payment from the person who hired you as his volunteers. At the same time I warn you to leave my country."

Shortly after this, and in answer to claims advanced by the volunteers, Montsioa again wrote :—

"My Friends—I do not know the Land Goossen you write of. My people are living on the lands their fathers have lived on—the lands of the Barolong."

On the 18th of March Captain Bower arrived at Mafiking. He did not visit Rooi Grond, but informed Montsioa that he was to defend himself if attacked, but must respect the Transvaal frontier.

Recruiting now commenced in the Transvaal, apparently with the object of obtaining a better hold on Bechuanaland before Her Majesty's Government could take any step in the country. Besides holding the meeting of volunteers at which it was determined that they should go and occupy their farms, Van Pittius commenced also, on the one hand, to urge Moshette to fulfil his part of the so-called treaty of 1882, and grant the volunteers their farms; while on the other, he sent a notice to Montsioa on the 1st of April to remove his people in four days from certain lands cultivated by Montsioa's people. Montsioa, on the 4th of April, refused to do this, and declared that he would regard such action as that threatened by the volunteers as war. The Rooi Grond people now proceeded to carry out their threat in the peculiar way of destroying Montsioa's corn in the


fields by letting their cattle feed in them. This again led to angry correspondence, and to the expulsion of the intruding Boers from Bechuanaland. On the 12th of May a large body of Montsioa's people proceeded to Rooi Grond, having sent forward warning of their coming, and of their determination that all Boers should leave the Barolong country. I quote from the description of an eye-witness:—

“We sent them on word to leave at once and take their goods, Montsioa's orders to his people being that they should appropriate nothing. The Boers drove their cattle and horses over the line, and took their waggons, etc. over. We then went and burned three houses, and returned to Mafiking.”

This action on the part of Montsioa was unwarranted if the so-called treaty of 1882 was a binding one. In the same way the refusal of the chiefs Montsioa and Moshette that the land indicated in that document should be measured and divided into farms and given to the volunteers of Moshette was quite unwarranted, on the supposition that that treaty was of any force. But as the treaty in question was not recognised by the English Government any more than it was practically by Moshette and Montsioa, we cannot deny that Montsioa was acting within his rights if at any time he expelled from his country, or induced to leave it, people who were there without his consent. It was no doubt a forceful action, but ample warning was given; time for the removal of property was afforded, and not a hair on the head of woman or child was injured. As an action of authority and right on the part of the chief of the country, what Montsioa did at Rooi Grond on the 12th of May is not, so far as I can see, open to exception either as to the conception or the mode of execution. The prudence or policy of this action is quite another question. Like the suggestion of Captain Bower, that the Stellalanders should expel the Goshenites, it was an appeal to force, which implied supporting force behind. Above all, such a movement presupposed that if once driven over into the Transvaal, these disorderly persons would be taken charge of by the Government of that country, and that they would no longer appear in Bechuanaland. This expectation was quite op-

posed to the past action of the Transvaal Government, but something might fairly be expected from them out of deference to the friendly attitude of the English Government—the recent remission in London of part of the Transvaal debt, and the solemn and definite promise of the deputation to co-operate with the British Government by upholding peace and order within the Transvaal border.

I have now brought down the history of the Batlaping and Barolong tribes to the date of the Protectorate. I may be allowed, however, to anticipate the narrative of the events which took place on my arrival at Mafiking on the 20th May 1884, by remarking that before I reached Mafiking as Deputy Commissioner, I heard that Montsioa had had recent differences with the freebooters of Rooi Grond about his cultivated lands, and that he had, as here related, driven them into the Transvaal. It was afterwards asserted by a bitterly anti-English paper, the *Zuid Afrikaan*, that the attack on Rooi Grond by Montsioa took place after my visit to that chief, and that his action was traceable to my influence, if not my orders. The same idea was repeated months after by the Secretary of the Transvaal Government (4213, 72), although the undeniable facts of the case were before him when he wrote. The disputes leading up to Montsioa's action on the 12th of May were taking place while I was still in England and in the Cape Colony, and the expulsion of the freebooters took place at Rooi Grond while I was still at Vryburg. I arrived at Mafiking on the 20th of May, and for my doings there after that date, and at Rooi Grond and at Zeerust in the Transvaal, I am willing to be held fully responsible.



MOFFAT INSTITUTION, KURUMAN.

CHAPTER IV

LIFE AND WORK AT KURUMAN IN PEACE AND IN WAR

1876-1878

My first work at Kuruman, on my arrival there in 1876 from North Bechuanaland, was to superintend the erection of an Institution for the education of native ministers, and for giving higher education to the natives of the country. Some £10,000 had been subscribed in England for this purpose, and as a memorial to Dr. Moffat, who had so long laboured at Kuruman, and whose name the Institution was to bear. The best site for the Institution was on the east bank of the river-course, and here the local committee of missionaries decided to rear the new building. There was a native village on the spot, the villagers being tenants of the Missionary Society, and I had the delicate work imposed on me of "inducing" the people to remove their houses a short distance along the river-course. No money compensation was thought of on either side, but I was pleased to lend waggons, oxen, and men for the purpose of bringing in the material for new houses on the new site, which of course had money value. One man took a position different from the rest. He removed his things from the old house, but said he would have nothing to do with the house-building: I must place him in the new village as comfortably as he was then in the old one. As this fellow had a reputation for laziness, and was still young, I thought I might teach him a lesson. In the course of years native houses have many insect pests, and one inducement which the villagers had in building the new village was that they would get rid of their numerous enemies when the old tenement was committed

to the flames. In dealing with my peculiar friend, I broke down both ends of his empty house, lashed the roof closely together to strong beams along its two sides, then introducing a long buck-waggon into the house, and raising the whole structure by means of screw-jacks, I secured it on the waggon, and was able, to the surprise and amusement of the villagers, to remove his veritable house to the exact site which I asked its owner to point out. Here his old oblong house was soon standing on its own wooden poles again, and his wife now came forward and assured me that she and her husband would do the rest. All that he gained by his action was the privilege of living in his old house instead of enjoying the immunities of a fresh-roofed one like his neighbours.

In South Bechuanaland I was met with different social conditions. I found that the power of the chiefs was very small indeed, and that the people had been divided and subdivided by rival chiefs and headmen till the cohesion of the tribe, as such, was practically at an end. The annexation of Griqualand West had brought Europeans nearer on the south, while from the Transvaal side the farms were constantly spreading farther and farther westward. Instinctively feeling that there was little force in the country, in their divided state, the chiefs tried to rally their people on the old tribal lines, and to induce them to give up living at their farms, for the old life in the large native town. But the advantages of cultivating their lands, and the necessity for personal oversight and exertion at their farms, were so apparent, that the chiefs were unable to effect their purpose. I remember one of the chiefs introduced the matter to me and asked my advice.

“We accepted the Word of God in our youth,” said this old chief, “but we did not know all that was coming behind it. Our people are now scattered over the country like the white men. But I observe that the white men are nevertheless united, while there is nothing binding us together since the headmen have taken to live at their own places instead of in the chief town. They are just small chiefs themselves, and take no notice of me or my laws. Divided as we are, we are at the mercy of any enemy.”

“Quite right, chief, from your point of view. But think of the other side—that of your people. They cannot live the old life. The world itself has changed. Where is the game? You have shot it down with your guns. Where are your cattle since pneumonia came among them? Your people must live at their farms.”

“Then you too are against me and against my chieftainship?” said the old man.

“By no means,” I replied. “You don’t understand me. You must readjust your system. Be the chief of to-day and not of the olden time, and your people will be as loyal as before.”

“But they refuse to live in my town as before,” he persisted.

“And they are right,” I added, “for they know that if they did so they must suffer hunger or steal. There is no food in your town as in the olden time.”

“Then how am I to be the chief of to-day?” said the chief in triumph.

“By allowing your people to remain at their farms all the year round, but appointing certain dates, say twice a year, when all should assemble at your town, and when they should not come empty-handed, but bring to you the ‘breast’ from their farms as they brought the ‘breast’ from the hunting-field long ago.”

The chief turned to his sons and headmen, who had been listening, and asked them, “Do you hear what the teacher says—could this be done?”

“The teacher’s words are living words to us as a people,” said his son. “The thing could be done.”

“Not only so,” I continued, “but you should fully face the change that has come and is coming. In the olden time you all had your gardens and cattle stations, and no one interfered with the one or the other. Now you see the coming wave of white men. They seek land—they seek fountains. Where they find open country they will build and put in the plough, and will tell you that the unoccupied country is God’s and not yours. But white men respect hard work, and if you improve your houses and your lands

you may depend on it no English officer would dispossess you. Now I see you are none of you building good houses now, and I am told that you say the white men will take the country from you, and why should you build good houses for others?"

"Yes, it is so; you have observed truly," said several of the people. "We build no houses now—our hearts are troubled."

"But it is in your power as Batlaping to put that all right. Why not meet together once more as a tribe although you have been long separate, and introduce a better custom as to land? Every fountain or farm should be apportioned to him who cultivates it, and he should have a title to it acknowledged by the tribe."

"But would he not sell it?" I was asked at once.

"Fools might sell," I answered, "but the men of the tribe would not. You don't sell your cows or heifers—why should you sell the earth, which is the greatest producer?"

"But there is great deception about papers,—the agents deceive stupid people," said one of the men.

"I have thought of all that," I replied. "You ought to have individual rights and title-deeds, but it ought to be printed on every one of them, 'Not saleable—not transferable.'"

This was a new idea—individual titles, but unsaleable. It was declared on all hands that this would exactly meet their case. At many a fireplace up and down the country this was discussed, and I heard from all sides that great pleasure was expressed. The idea of individual right to land, beyond the power of the clever agent, was held to be "living words." Letters came to me from people who had not themselves talked with me on the subject, thanking me for the advice, and hoping the chiefs would listen to me.

After a time some of my questioners would come back with difficulties which had occurred to them in their own discussions. I was much struck by the importance of one of these difficulties, which had reference to the very expensive survey of the farm which has to be paid for by its owner before he can call it his own under Her Majesty's Government.

“There is the case of —— in Griqualand West. He began by paying twenty-five pounds to the agent for seeing his case through the land-court. Then some sixty pounds were said to be owing to Government for survey and other expenses. The farm belonged to this man before the English came. The English did not refuse him the farm, but it took all this money to mark out the farm and to satisfy the English that it was his.”

“Is it true,” I asked, “that some people who wanted to retain their farms have been compelled to sell in order to pay agents’ and other expenses?”

“Yes,” I was assured; “that has been one great cause of the sale of farms. The people were dunned by the agents, and at length sold the farm itself.”

“You mean that some people have had to sell their farms before they could prove to the English that they were their property.”

Such statements made me respect the rough-and-ready method by which the Dutch-speaking settlers “inspect” a new country by calculating its dimensions by the pace of a riding-horse. Surely, however, when Her Majesty’s Government enter upon the work of Territorial Government in native territories, and superintend and control their occupation by Europeans, it will be easy to arrange so that the first survey shall be done under the superintendence of qualified officers of the Royal Engineers, so as to lessen the introductory expense. The great object of Government is to enable native owners and European settlers to obtain and to hold land on easy terms. An expensive survey throws the land into the hands of the wealthy speculators, and retards the progress of the country.

To my own students, some of whom were petty chiefs, I explained the different kinds of governments which had succeeded one another in other parts of the world—especially explaining how the feudal and tribal system could be superseded by a general government without loss of personal property, the unoccupied lands and the supremacy of the chiefs being the only things taken away. I was cautious enough to say that I myself wanted no change, but that

every one should understand fully about these things, so that prejudice might die and common-sense guide their thoughts as to the present and the future. I explained that a general government was always stronger than a single tribe, and that if the chief's personal property was protected by the power of a general government, I thought that was a very fair equivalent for a chieftainship which had ceased to be of its ancient value.

"But why don't the white men stay in their own country?" said some intelligent natives to me one day when talking on these points. "Why does not the Queen stop them and tell them to stay at home?" referring to the old native law which compelled every man to ask permission of the chief before leaving the town.

"The Queen has always enough people round her, and does not miss those who go to other lands."

"Perhaps it is she who sends them. Some say this is the English mode of warfare—by 'papers' and agents and courts." This was said with contempt.

"No, no; these men are not sent. Don't you see they go and come as they like, and do nothing in concert? The white people are like the locusts—nothing will stop them; you can only prepare for their coming."

"We would not mind the big Englishmen like some whom we have known, but the agents and common men cheat us."

"But would you be afraid to buy a cow from an agent?"

"No; I could buy a cow from the cleverest agent."

"Just so. When your young people get to know the English language and customs as well as you know cattle, you won't be afraid of the agents. If you wanted to sell an old worthless cow, to whom would you take her?"

"We should take her to Mr. ——, for he does not know an old from a young cow."

"It is the same doctrine," I rejoined, "which influences the agent when he imposes on your ignorance about title-deeds." This argument went home, I could see, and was fully appreciated.

"But will you explain to me," I asked, "why it is that

if a black man breaks away from his chief, he does not face northward like the white men, but goes southward ? ”

“ He goes south,” was the immediate answer, “ because he knows he can get work and wages.”

“ Can these south-going people be stopped ? ” I further asked.

“ No ; the chiefs have tried, but they cannot stop them.”

“ Well, then, it seems to me that God is teaching us all in this country that He would have the people to live in friendship and be helpful to one another, and that He means both the white man and the black man to live in it. Instead of the game you are getting white people to fill the country ; that is what is taking place.”

By such conversations I endeavoured to discharge my duty to those well-disposed but bewildered people in view of the advance of the Europeans. The doctrines afterwards advanced by me in England in connection with Territorial Government were threshed out in the borderland, where the meeting of the races was taking place, and where the power of the native chiefs was fast passing away.

I have no doubt whatever that such discussions would have borne fruit in South Bechuanaland in the course of time, and that arrangements might have been made which would have been of great practical benefit to the people at the time, and which would have smoothed the way for the just administration of a general government entering the country. But the time was too short. The disturbances and wars which prevailed in Kaffirland in 1877 began to exert an influence even in a part of the country so distant as Griqualand West and Bechuanaland. This is to be explained by the proximity of that great centre of native population, the Diamond Fields, and by the fact that the chief Waterboer, many years before, had consented to the settlement on the Orange River of certain villages of colonial Kaffirs. Local irritation was excited in Griqualand West by the action of those in power in certain districts, and the people were thus the more inclined to listen to lying rumours. The Kaal Kaffir first, then the Griquas, next the Basuto and

Bechuana living near Griquatown, were more or less involved in plans for a local insurrection. By and by their agents appeared in Bechuanaland, and as soon as they did so, I was secretly informed of their coming and of their business.

They brought a false story of the triumph of the Kaffirs over the English in Kaffirland. Everywhere the white man had been driven back, and the Kaffir headmen were now comfortably occupying the farmhouses and other residences of the white men, their owners having been killed or driven away. When the people mentioned the news which had been told them of what had really taken place, as contained in the newspapers, they were at once met with the confident assertion that these reports were, of course, printed and spread by the white men in order to prevent, or at least postpone, their complete defeat. The conclusion of these messengers was—"It needs only that you all join us here in the north, and our success will be certain." These agents of evil visited all the chiefs in South Bechuanaland with the same message. They were exhorted to make a thorough colour war of it; no white man must be spared—not even the missionaries—for although it was granted that they had done no harm, still, wherever they were, other white men congregated, and the work, in order to be thorough, must include their death, and that of all white men in the country. To their credit it has to be stated that the Bechuana chiefs, with hardly an exception, refused to be connected with any such nefarious plot. On perceiving this, the exhortation of the emissaries soon gave place to threatening; and they informed the chiefs that if they refused, the fate of the white men would be theirs also, and those who were not killed would be reduced to servitude by the victorious Kaffir chiefs. "Whether it is lies or whether it is truth we know not," said my first informants, "but we thought it our duty to tell you that such evil words were being spoken." The truth of the report was afterwards confirmed by some of the chiefs themselves, who gave me the names of the messengers. Months passed, and although I did not forget the message, I mentioned it to no one, not desiring to spread such mischievous talk.

Early in 1878 the rumour received unexpected confirmation by a young chief, who took me aside one evening and told me, with a great air of mystery, that strange things were about to happen. But I was not to be alarmed,—no one in the country would do any harm to me or mine. The young rascal's assurances, meant for my comfort, produced great uneasiness in my mind, for it now seemed more than likely that mischief was brewing. Soon afterwards we heard of the murder of Mr. Burness, his wife, and his brother, at Daniel's Kuil, the news being brought by a European resident at Kuruman, who was at Daniel's Kuil when the outrage took place, and himself had a narrow escape. The chief Jantje also arrived at Kuruman, and openly congratulated us on our being still alive! The preconcerted time, it seemed, for the general rising was the date of the outrage at Daniel's Kuil. The plot, as such, had thus fallen through, at least for the time. But the Europeans throughout South Bechuanaland were now thoroughly alarmed, and fled to the mission station of Kuruman. The Burnesses were respectable people, and very friendly to the natives; indeed it was well known that they were so trustful as to be totally unarmed. If they then had been murdered, and if a woman had been shot down in broad daylight in violation of all the usual principles and traditions of the Bechuana, the reality of an underlying plot or understanding became evident. I found that the traders who had brought their goods with them in their waggons wished to assemble by themselves in a store about a mile from the mission station, where they said they would be quite able to defend themselves. They invited me to go there also, as the place, having an iron roof, could not be set on fire. I declined to leave my house, and told them that, in my opinion, if they went there with their goods and by themselves as traders, they would certainly be attacked. I offered them what accommodation the new Institution afforded on condition that we took up the position of neutrals and non-combatants, reserving all our strength for what would be strictly defence of our families and of our own lives. After deliberation among themselves they accepted

of my offer, and in a short time over twenty men, some of them with families, found accommodation in the unfinished buildings of the Institution, which, although having thatched roofs, were really well situated as a strong place of refuge.

Of course any miscreant could set the thatched roof on fire, so for about six weeks none of us slept the whole night through, but each had to take his turn in guarding the premises. The approaches were closed by waggons and by thorn-bushes, and all the gateways between the students' cottages were built up, leaving only loopholes. Bags of grain were placed against the dwelling-house windows, or were in readiness for that purpose. The Kuruman villagers were in great alarm when they saw these preparations, and some of them were suspicious. I was able, however, to disarm their suspicions—saying simply that the white men were afraid, and no man could measure or weigh out fear. Then was there not reason? Where were the Burnesses? I sat down among them and told them the news when the colonial post arrived, and succeeded in getting them to feel that our interests were one as people of Kuruman. It was, however, a time of great excitement, and extraordinary things were taking place on every hand. Even on Kuruman station a young man, who was heard to remark the ease with which the Institution could be burned, afterwards hid himself in terror in the reeds of the river-bed, where the poor fellow's toes were frost-bitten, for it was the depth of winter in these southern latitudes.

There were some old soldiers among the Europeans, and "they looked at matters," they said, "from a military point of view." I confess this was just the one thing that alarmed me—the danger of getting into a quarrel about some trifle when people's minds were excited. So when the assembled Europeans unanimously asked me to act as their commandant, and when I became assured they were sincere, and not merely complimentary in doing so, I accepted of the office—viewing the matter not quite from "a military point of view," although that could not be excluded. No doubt there was some ground for the appointment, especially as preserving to us to the utmost limit our chance of holding

the position of non-combatants and neutrals, and it was in this spirit that I accepted of it.

During these troubles we were visited by two members of the Society of Friends,—the venerable Mr. Isaac Sharp and Mr. Langley Kitching. Their object was chiefly to quicken and encourage Christians and Christian workers of whatever Church. They addressed our people at Kuruman, Europeans and natives, and their visit cheered and strengthened us. Having all my life cherished views on account of which I claimed to be “almost a Quaker,” I was much interested in comparing notes with these Friends—taking our illustrations from the circumstances of the country.

Mr. Sharp was present when I dissuaded the traders from taking up a stand by themselves with their goods, and when I offered them a place as non-combatants in the Institution.

“It is strongly borne in upon me, John Mackenzie,” said my friend Mr. Sharp, “that thou wilt have no bloodshed here. The Lord will uphold thee and prevent it.”

I replied that we must do all in our power towards this end, and leave the rest in God’s hands. That evening there was some conversation about the use of physical force in self-defence, and in the defence of those whom we loved, and of whom God Himself had made us the protectors. I remember that when the words of our Saviour against resistance were quoted, His own example before the highest Jewish Court was brought forward as explanatory of what He really meant. We were to be forgiving and charitable and long-suffering; but we had His own example, that there was also an occasion when we should stand up for our rights. When a man smote our Lord unjustly in open court, as a matter of fact He did not invite him to repeat the blow, but stood on His rights as a man, under the law of Moses. “If I have spoken evil bear witness of the evil; but if well why smitest thou me?”—that is to say, a public court is a place for evidence and judging, and not for assault, and I demand justice. Then it was mentioned that the law was universal, that the strong male defended the weaker female and their offspring. This law of nature surely extended to man, and

was not abolished by Christianity. It was, therefore, right in the highest sense for Christian husbands and fathers to defend those whom God had given them, and if need be, to die in their defence. I remember well the summing up: "It is more than likely that Friends would also defend those dear to them; but if they did, they would regard it as a falling away from the Master's high teaching, and a yielding to the flesh, for which they would have to ask forgiveness." I thought these were beautiful and touching words—expressing that longing to be "like Christ," which has strongly characterised this body of Christians. Speaking in what was practically a fort—the place of refuge of non-combatants—and with children moving about among us as we spoke, it was evident that there was practically little, if any, difference of opinion between us.

One night after the arrival of our post-runner from the Colony—who had had some adventures on the road—I found the Europeans engaged in somewhat loud discussion when I entered the large hall. One of them had been reading a letter from a Diamond Fields friend, expressing his amazement that no formal request for assistance had been sent to the Griqualand West Government from the Europeans assembled at Kuruman. I was at once asked for an explanation. Was it true that no request for assistance had been sent to Government? I replied they all knew I had said I would not ask for assistance, so far as I was personally concerned. I had come into native territory at my own risk many years before, and I should not respect myself if I asked for the assistance of Government to protect me in my work in a native territory.

"But, good heavens! there are our wives and families," said one.

"I also have wife and children to think of, but my wife agrees with me in my views, so far as we ourselves are concerned. At the same time," I added, "what one man cannot do, another can. I respect other opinions. Make out your petition and send it. I have already sent full information concerning the exact state of the country."

The fact is, we were in a position in which a man had

to act according to his highest lights, and stick to it. I felt I simply could not ask for troops to defend me at my mission station. It is true the matter was now complicated, as the general European population of the country were there as refugees; but I considered that I discharged my responsibility when I sent exact information as to the proximity of the Burnesses' murderers, with the plunder of their premises, and gave information also as to the actual condition of Kuruman.

In Kimberley there was great excitement concerning our condition while shut up in Kuruman, and false rumours of disaster were not wanting. One gentleman, now a dear friend, but not then well acquainted with any one at Kuruman—whom I afterwards welcomed to my house, his arm in a sling from a gunshot wound—waited on the Acting Administrator at Kimberley, and offered, with twenty picked men and spare horses, to ride through, and relieve the little garrison containing so many European women and children. Sir Bartle Frere telegraphed from the Cape that Kuruman must be relieved at once. Colonel (the late Sir Wm. Owen) Lanyon, Administrator of Griqualand West, had been for some time engaged in quelling the rebellion, within the province, of Kaal Kaffirs and Griquas. Having been telegraphed for by the Executive Government of Griqualand West to return with the Diamond Field Horse from the eastern border of the Cape Colony, where they had greatly distinguished themselves, Colonel (now Sir Charles) Warren was now assisting Colonel Lanyon in concluding this work. Judge Barry was Acting Administrator, and addressed a letter to me, the reading of which to the natives of Kuruman had a most beneficial effect. Although a large number of Griqualand West men were thus already in the field, Mr. Ford, a personal friend of the Burnesses, found no difficulty in raising, under orders of the Executive Government, another company of colonial soldiers, chiefly from the Barkly West district. The Acting Administrator instructed Commandant Ford to proceed with his men to the northern border and restore order there, and also to relieve Kuruman should he hear that it was in danger. Although the northern

boundary of the Colony was not clearly defined at this time, it was quite evident that Kuruman was beyond it, and that technically to cross the border, either to arrest the murderers of the Burnesses or to relieve Kuruman, would be an "invasion" of native territory. This was acknowledged by Colonel Lanyon in his communications with the High Commissioner. "Deeds of aggression and murder had forced them to invade the Batlaping territories." But while this was the case, the reader may be well assured that the movements of all concerned were influenced and quickened by the desire to relieve women and children from circumstances of danger. But before they reached Kuruman Commandant Ford's detachment met with a reverse at Ko, having been led into an ambush by Luka Jantje, when they lost four men killed and five wounded—one of the latter being Commandant Ford himself. It was the intimation of this reverse which brought both Colonel Lanyon and Colonel Warren into the country.

The chief Mankoroane, while well enough disposed, did nothing to arrest the murderers of the Burnesses, saying it was the duty of the chief Jantje to do so, as he lived near to Koning, where they had taken up their quarters. Mankoroane, however, willingly sanctioned the entrance of the volunteers into Bechuanaland, so that there was no "invasion" so far as he was concerned. He afterwards sent a party of men, accompanied by Mr. Daumas, who, although cautioned by the chief not to pass Motito, came on to Kuruman, after making preliminary inquiry as to our condition. We were thus relieved from two sides simultaneously, but the relief from Mankoroane was entirely owing to the appearance in the country of the detachment under Commandant Ford.

The news of the reverse at Ko was at once spread all over the country, and a pistol, taken from one of the Englishmen who were killed, was sent to Morwe's town as a proof of what was termed a great victory. Next day the chief Morwe, with a large party of men, on foot and on horseback, and accompanied by empty waggons, arrived at Kuruman. The men were all armed; the empty waggons,

it was stated, were intended to carry home the loot. This war-party did not pass Kuruman, but made the village and the mission station their camp. From this Morwe sent on all his horsemen to join Luka and his men at Manyiding, where another engagement was expected. Some time after his men had started, Morwe came over to pay me a visit. He viewed with a sharp eye all our quiet preparations, but merely expressed surprise—what did it all mean?

“We are afraid, chief; but don’t intend to die like fools. No man’s property is here but that of the people who are here assembled. We have a quarrel with no one, and are just going to live quietly behind these walls till peace comes.”

After some further conversation Morwe went over to his camp; but so impressed was he with what I had said about the advantages to him of being friendly with the English, that he sent for his men who had gone to Manyiding. His order was, “If you find that they have not taken part in any fighting, bring them back at once.” In the meantime, however, this was hardly an advantage to us, as it only increased the numbers of those who were pillaging and destroying at their pleasure on the opposite side of the Kuruman valley. Our emissaries brought us news that there was great disagreement among the members of the war-party. Some would go home again, but they were laughed at; others would join Luka and attack the camp of the Diamond Field Force at Ko with its wounded men; others preferred to attack the Institution first, and then they would have plenty of ammunition and everything else. Things were in that state for days; the people themselves could not make up their minds whom to attack first, and all that we could do was to wait.

At length, one Sunday morning, the chief Morwe began his operations, which were carried through cleverly enough. Early in the morning I received a friendly message that it would not be right for a European teacher to go over to church—a native minister must be sent that day. Next a Kuruman man, who was a great gossip, made his appearance, and said to me that he happened to be standing near the

Batlaro chiefs, and he heard them say that they did not want to attack the missionaries, nor those who were under their protection. "Only Mr. Mackenzie must let them have powder and lead, and if he did so, they would go away at once." The man was of course sent by the chief, who did not want to own a formal message.

"Should you find yourself in that neighbourhood again," was my reply, "you can tell the chiefs that powder has become very plentiful in the country, and is just like anything else in a shop. He who wants powder and lead will also desire guns and horses and saddles and clothing and the lives of the owners of these things. Powder is just like anything else that belongs to a man. When demanded it means the man's life in the end."

My visitor went off, and I have no doubt went straight to Morwe and his council. In a short time another man appeared with the statement that Morwe was coming over to see me; he wanted to speak to me. I became suspicious, and answered in a tone which I had not before assumed, "I should be glad to see Morwe, and to speak with him as his friend. But confusing words were being spoken, and I wanted to be quite clear as to what I was doing. Morwe could come over, but he must only have two men with him. Morwe's own town was ten miles off, and he and his people were destroying Kuruman. Why was this? Still I was willing to see him."

The chief soon came over, accompanied by only two men. "Was it too late to become the friend of the English?" was the burden of Morwe's business with me. This was to me a welcome enough inquiry, and I could see he was in earnest.

But I answered with reserve that I did not know; the leaders of the English force must decide.

He said he was quite willing to go at once and catch the Burnesses' murderers if I ordered him to do so.

I was sorely tempted to send him, but reflected on my real position as a missionary, and replied that I had no right to give him such an order—the English commander could do so.

"Well, write a letter for me to the commander," said Morwe.

"No, Morwe, I won't write a letter for you to the English; you have changed your views too often lately for me to do that."

Seeing that my words gave great offence, as I knew they must, I quietly added, "I do not say by any means I am not your friend; I only say I won't sit down with you and write this letter, as if I were surety for you. But if you write it with the help of some one else, in Sechuana, I shall willingly put it into English."

The chief's face brightened up again; one of the students wrote the letter, and I translated it. Who was to take it to the camp, which was still at Ko, with Manyiding, the town of Luka Jantje, lying between? I suggested that Morwe should select ten men, and that I would send two white men as interpreters, to explain the business of the messengers, lest they should be fired on in approaching the camp.

I made up my mind that a certain European who had often proclaimed his great trust in Morwe should be one of the messengers. I found him and his wife in their room when I called. After explaining my business, I said I wanted two volunteers; but I felt sure he would like to get the first chance, as he had known Morwe so long, and owed a good deal to him and his people.

"Well, what do you say, my dear?" said this gentleman to his wife.

I was a little afraid of this way of deciding such a matter, but was very much amused and gratified when his wife quietly replied—

"I think you should go at once, my dear, if Mr. Mackenzie wishes you."

This was not the reply he expected from his sensible wife. So he now spoke plainly, and said, "The fact is, I don't quite like to go. I'll have a look at the men first. There are some great ruffians among them. But if there are decent fellows in the party, I'll go."

I felt there was no chance of securing his services. A

short time after he came to me, shaking his head solemnly, and declared he would not go with "that lot." I had several volunteers, but the natives did not appreciate artisans as their convoy—they wanted "big white men" to go with them. In a way which delighted me at the time, and for which I shall always feel thankful, my fellow-missionary, Mr. Wookey, came forward and offered to go on this peculiar mission. The natives were glad, and started with their letter, accompanied by Mr. Wookey and by brave old John Fraser, one of the men working at the Institution. They struck off to the south, intending to pass Manyiding at some distance on that side, and then make for Ko. But they lost their way in the moonless night—could not light a fire for fear of the enemy, for Luka's people would regard Morwe's people as deserters, so had to pass the night in the bitter cold as best they could. At gray dawn they found, to their dismay, that they were within sight of Manyiding,—the very place they wanted to avoid. On reaching Ko, they found the Diamond Field Force had struck their camp, and moved on towards Manyiding. Retracing their steps, the party saw that an engagement was taking place at Manyiding. The natives had prepared a very hot place for the Force if they had come blindly forward on the waggon-road. There were the Manyiding reeds on the one side; within fifty or sixty yards on the other there was a rise, on the top of which concealed rifle-pits had been made by the natives. Knowing that the road was here dangerous, Mr. Sam Edwards and Mr. Chapman induced the officers in charge to divert the march to the left, through the open country at some distance from Manyiding. At a point where it was seen that the waggons would again enter the road, a party of nine young natives took up their position, determined to shoot the oxen and bring the waggons to a stand. They paid for their temerity with their lives—only one of the party, a son of the chief, escaping.

"Come on, come on," said old John Fraser to Mr. Wookey and his native companions, as they saw the firing in the distance; "come on, Mr. Wookey, it will cheer up our fellows; come on!" as he rode off towards Manyiding.

Of course Mr. Wookey refused to accompany this old soldier on such an errand, and he came back when he found no one would go with him. But he did not forgive Mr. Wookey, and dwelt on the "fine effect" his plan would have had in cheering up the men by the arrival of such a valuable reinforcement!

Mr. Wookey and his party returned on Monday evening, and informed us of these facts; and on hearing the news Morwe made no delay, but hastily broke up his camp at the mission station and returned to his own town—his waggons still empty. Next morning every eye was turned eastward, and it was a welcome sight to those who had been shut up in Kuruman to see the dust of the horsemen and their waggons coming to our relief. There were full-hearted cheers when they arrived; and we felt we could not show our thankfulness better than by at once making the comfort of the wounded men our special care. It was afterwards my duty, in behalf of the community at Kuruman, to tender our thanks to the officers of Her Majesty's Government for their opportune appearance at Kuruman, and for the manner in which they were performing the work of pacification. Some of those Europeans who had been shut up with us at Kuruman now joined the Force, and assisted in the pacification of the country.

Aware that according to native usage Jantje would be expected to arrest the murderers of the Burnesses who were now at Koning, I had taken occasion, in his visit to Kuruman, to seek to impress the chief with the great importance to him and to his people of giving the English Government in Griqualand West to understand that they had good and capable neighbours in Jantje and his sons. I induced Jantje to promise to arrest these criminals, and he wrote a letter to that effect to be sent to Griqualand West. His sons, however, were the enemies of a peaceful course like this—they now wanted war. I was determined to stick as long as possible to what government there was in the country, but my effort to "galvanise" Jantje's chieftainship was unsuccessful. When Jantje found he could make nothing of his sons, who had got all his people to

side with them, the old man returned himself to Kuruman, declaring openly to his people that "his heart was with the white men, and he would go to them." We had pleasure in receiving the old man, who was surely in an unenviable condition—his own wife and his sons at the head of the war-party, and he intensely against it. When Jantje heard that his sons had waylaid and shot white men at Ko, and that the Force had passed Manyiding on its way to Kuruman, the old man slipped away from the station, sending a little child to me with the key of the place which he had been occupying. I suppose he felt he could not hope for mercy from the English after his son had shot their men at Ko; so he went to his own people, who were now at Litakong, although he had no sympathy with their doings. He afterwards saw that the English could discriminate, for while his sons were caught and lodged in prison he was specially permitted to return to his home under English protection. Jantje has since died in old age—a Christian chief without reproach, except that in his old age he allowed his power to be usurped by his sons, who did not walk in their father's footsteps.

CHAPTER V

ENGLISH MILITARY OCCUPATION AND SETTLEMENT OF BECHUANALAND

1878-1881

ON the 14th July Colonel (now Sir Charles) Warren arrived at Kuruman with the Field Force from the south, and Colonel (the late Sir William Owen) Lanyon arrived from the east with a detachment of troops on the 16th. One evening I came upon a solitary member of the Force in plain cord uniform making a minute inspection of the mission station. I found it was Colonel Warren, whom I had not met before.

“Do you quite trust your natives, Mr. Mackenzie, or had you any doubt of them?”

“I quite trusted them, after repeated trials of their faithfulness. But for this the history of the last few weeks here would have been different.”

“But are there no rebels among them?”

“None amongst those connected with the Institution. Seven men left the village and joined Luka Jantje, after much threatening from him. The rest were firm.”

“I am glad your people have been faithful. It is pleasant to hear of it at a time when so many of the black people on the colonial border would seem to have lost their heads. I cannot see why the two races should not be friends.”

“That opinion, I think, will only deepen the more you know the country,” I answered; and so began an intercourse which has since ripened into friendship.

The manner in which the war in Bechuanaland was

carried on by Colonel Lanyon, and afterwards by Colonel Warren, tended to raise and not lower the name of Englishmen in the country. Orders were given that native houses should not be burned either in Griqualand West or in Bechuanaland. It was recognised that the war was not levied against the body of the people in Bechuanaland, but against those who had invaded Griqualand West, or who now harboured and abetted these invaders of the Colony. Prisoners were taken, and after inquiry those who gave themselves up were usually allowed to return to their homes, while certain ringleaders were sent to Kimberley for a time "to be out of harm's way," as political prisoners. The more recent doings of Sir Charles Warren in Bechuanaland will form the subject of certain chapters of this book. With reference to Sir William Owen Lanyon, I have the greater pleasure in mentioning his able and successful work in Bechuanaland, as he was afterwards officially connected with events in the Transvaal which are very unpleasant to ordinary Englishmen.

Colonel Lanyon expressed himself as greatly surprised with the condition of some parts of Bechuanaland, and the amount of skilled cultivation carried on by the people.

"Don't you think, Mr. Mackenzie," the colonel asked me, "our march into the country, and the punishment inflicted on the evil-doers, will be a lesson for the future?"

"No chastisement will meet our case," I replied; "there is really no government whatever in this country. Things could go on, so far as the Bechuana themselves are concerned, as they have done for the last fifty years; for they are all a well-disposed people on the whole. But strangers from the Diamond Fields, black and white—some of them fugitives from colonial law—these and the natural tendency of the Europeans to come northward combine to make a visit of a military force such as the present, however successful it may have been, entirely inadequate as a permanent remedy."

"And what is your permanent remedy?" inquired the colonel; adding, "you know how unpopular annexation is with some."

"I have nothing to do with the names and phrases used in political discussions in England. One in my position here must speak out what he sees and has ascertained as to the state of things in the country and its requirements after careful study of the subject. It is for others to fit the facts of the case into the political schemes and doctrines of the day. The only real question is—Will the Europeans in South Africa advance northward by haphazard, blindfold, and with outrage and blood, while the Home Government regards every step in advance with irritation and almost with despair, or will she master the problem, no longer regard this movement as an evil, but arrange for it and control it? In short, is the spread of Europeans in South Africa to be peaceful and orderly and remunerative to a Central Government, or is it to be accompanied by outrage and war—the classes reaping most apparent benefit being just those who least deserve it?"

"But we are told," said the colonel, "that your chiefs are very jealous of their prerogatives, and there are plenty of good people in England who would make much trouble if we interfered with their inherited rights."

"These were my own feelings," I replied, "and I dare say they are common enough. The theory is sound enough, but the actual condition of the country must be taken into account. The natives cannot fully occupy Bechuanaland. It is advantageous to no one that the country should remain unoccupied. If these people had a hundred years before them in a distant island without undue interference from Europeans, the case would be different. The word 'annexation' is misleading. The real movement is that which is happening before our eyes in the country in the spread of the whites. That is the 'annexation.' Will you uphold the right, and regulate this movement northward, and get a revenue through doing it, or will you leave the border quarrels to be settled by bordermen alone?"

"Of course I have no power whatever as to these affairs," the colonel explained, "except to report upon them. I am here by orders; but I can repeat what you have said to the High Commissioner. Are you not, however, too san-

guine about the goodwill of the chiefs towards the growth of European influence?"

"The chiefs as such are in a bad case anyhow, as they themselves are quite ready to admit. Their power has left them. If a General Government would secure them in possession of their cultivated lands, their flocks and their herds, they would consent, especially if the right to arbitrate among their people were still conceded to them. The people, on the other hand, from one end of the country to the other, would welcome the Government of the Queen, and would be willing to pay taxes for its support."

"But are these people to be regarded as entitled to the ownership of land? I hear talk about 'driving the niggers back.' What do you say about it?" said Colonel Lanyon with a smile.

"Ah! now you are ceasing to talk as an Englishman, and ventilating local views," I answered. "As for myself, I confine my remarks to the tribes which I know, and appeal to your own observation, and your education as an English officer. You have seen the native villages,—the extent of their industry in the cultivation of land; you have seen their fruit-trees and the water-furrows which they have made. The work might be better done. The lines are not always straight lines, and the whole work could be improved. But if such an industrious population welcomes the Queen's Government and offers to pay you taxes, why should you, as an English Administrator, evict them? You have to do politically with the chiefs and the headmen as constituting the government of the country, but it is quite against the traditions of the English army to wage war with the peasantry or farming population of a country. Then as to 'driving the niggers back,' it is only a misleading expression. They don't really drive them anywhere. They only take their country and call it theirs, and then its former inhabitants come back to it practically as a servile class."

"Well, it does not sound well of course; but is there any way of avoiding it?"

"Certainly there is. The 'driving out' course is fraught with the very utmost danger. It is to divide the population

on colour lines. If you get all the whites on one side and all the blacks on the other in South Africa, as the South African policy would do uninfluenced by England, you mean that the future of the country is to be written in blood. The alternative, which I propose in such territories as Bechuanaland, is to respect private property, and to be just and firm, and severe when there is occasion ; then the natives will believe in you, and the country will make peaceful and rapid progress. The way to avoid war and bloodshed is to incorporate peaceful native communities by arrangement with the chiefs, under a General Government, before complications have arisen, take over all unoccupied lands as belonging to Government, and defray the expenses of local administration by local taxation."

"Then you would advocate giving natives individual titles to their farms by Government? Would they not very quickly sell these?" inquired the colonel.

"I notice that people who are really not interested much in the general welfare of the natives are very anxious that they should not get individual titles to land. I question if it is sheer benevolence in some cases which prompts the apparently philanthropic speech. I am afraid the desire is to retain the native land as Government land, and dispose of it when Government feels inclined or when it gets an inviting offer for it, and the native can go elsewhere. At the same time it would not be fair to the native who is unacquainted with our language or our laws to place him in possession of a document in a foreign tongue representing hundreds or thousands of pounds' value, while he has not the slightest idea what our law requires of him in connection with it. If you want to separate the people from their old habits, and gather them round the new Government, you must have something to bestow upon them—you must give them individual titles to the land of which you find them in possession. But then you are not bound to make that title at once saleable. Native land is not saleable now. There are of course estates in England which are unsaleable. In the first instance, therefore, and while the bulk of the natives are ignorant of our language and our laws, native

titles to lands should be plainly printed documents in English and in the language of the country, and the words 'Not saleable—not transferable' should be prominently printed in both languages."

"But would not such a course arrest the progress of the country?"

"On the contrary, it would give it an onward impetus."

"But would you propose that non-saleableness should be the permanent condition of such native territory?"

"Well," I answered, "you know what is being said about land just now in England; but as I have already remarked, we have to do with the actual state of things in South Africa, and especially in border districts. Considering everything, I do not think that native land should permanently remain unsaleable unless they desire it to do so. Some natives would like to sell from the first; others would afterwards wish to do so for special reasons; while a higher class would after a time wish the full common law to be introduced into their district, conscious that the best part of the population would then be prepared for it. This change could be brought about by formal request of the natives of a tribe or a defined district, sanctioned by the local Commissioner and the High Commissioner also. Then I find, according to native law, that chief and people can dispossess a man of his garden. While the land is still unsaleable I should retain that power in the hand of the Government, so that if the owner and occupier of land made no improvements, opened no fountain, made no dam, dug no well, and built no house, but was known before the courts as a cattle-stealer, and his place as a receptacle for stolen goods—in such case his land could revert to Government, and be bestowed on a more worthy applicant."

"Would not such a course as is implied by you entail great expense on the Imperial Government?"

"By no means. When countries are taken over from their chiefs peacefully and by cession before complications take place, a country such as Bechuanaland would do a great deal more than pay its own way. It would cost very little to govern it. It is our timidity in doing what is right and

necessary in time which in the end entails expense. This has been so often the case in the past that one would hope the lesson has been learned by Her Majesty's Government."

In several protracted conversations with Colonel Lanyon these and other branches of this intensely interesting question were discussed; and I understood from the colonel that while the ideas were new they approved themselves to his mind. Afterwards, in going over the same ground with Colonel Warren, I found that his own mind had been travelling in the same direction, as the result of his personal observation of the people and of the country. In order that the matter might not depend upon what was remembered of conversations, I addressed a letter to Colonel Lanyon on the subject, a copy of which I also forwarded for the information of the High Commissioner at the Cape, Colonel Lanyon himself being then in the neighbourhood of Litakong.

The military occupation of South Bechuanaland did not take place without opposition—opposition which was prompted in every case by the Griqualand West rebels and those who had pledged themselves to co-operate with them. Engagements took place at Gamoperi and Litakong. At the former place a grandson of Dr. Arnold of Rugby was mortally wounded, and died at Kuruman. His remains were interred in the burying-ground of the mission. A remarkable result followed the fight at Gamoperi. A party of Basuto from the Orange River had joined the headman of Gamoperi, who had assembled a mixed force of natives who wanted to fight. Morwe, the chief of that part of the country, having "made his peace with the English," had to commit himself openly to his adopted side by accompanying the Force in person in the affair at Gamoperi. He was, however, quite unable to restrain his greed, and having openly and repeatedly disobeyed orders as to the giving up of stolen cattle known to be in his country, and in other matters likely to lead to serious complications, Morwe was removed to Kimberley as a political prisoner, where he was detained for some time. Some of the Basuto made their appearance at Kuruman after the fight, tendering their complete submission. They denied all intention of fighting, but admitted that they had been

mixed up with those who wanted war, and who had now some of them fallen in the war which they had desired. Colonel Warren accepted their statement, showing great insight in doing so, for these people's story, although sounding strange to a European, was perfectly reliable. They had broken away from the war-party, which contained their elder brothers and other relatives; there was a limit even to clan-nishness, and they wished now to show that they also were Queen's people. Their faithfulness was tested in many ways, and by and by they were allowed to carry their guns in the Queen's service. They afterwards returned to Griqualand West, and settled down peacefully there.

The engagement at Litakong completely crushed the disturbances so far as the Bechuana were concerned. Litakong (Lattakoo) or Takong is a very strong place, having a series of stone enclosures built by ancient inhabitants of the country, and forming a very strong fortress as against rifle bullets. A spirit of recklessness seemed now to have taken possession of one of the sons of Jantje and his followers, for they went to the mission station of Motito, and pillaged the missionaries' house and the store of a trader. Mr. Wookey with his family had previously come for safety to Kuruman. The stolen property was conveyed to Takong. A similar party of natives murdered Mr. Thompson at his store near the border, and pillaged his store. As many of the natives assembled within the walls of Takong were good elephant-hunters and familiar with guns, the work of taking the place was not an easy matter. After the place had been shelled for some time it was stormed and taken, many of the Batlaping fighting to the last and dying behind the walls, which they thought were impregnable. The order was given to close in well on the north, so as to prevent fugitives from escaping in that direction, and carrying disaffection and mischief farther into Bechuanaland. To show what confidence the natives had in the walls of Takong, it may be mentioned that Colonel Lanyon before the engagement sent a message to Mere, the chief of the town, offering him the opportunity to come out and separate himself and his people from the people of Griqualand West and of Luka Jantje, who had recently

assembled there. The chief sent back the message that he had taken a side and would now stand by it. A large number of cattle fell into the hands of the force at Takong, as also waggons and loot of every kind. Indeed the articles taken at Takong testified in an unmistakable manner to the degree of civilisation reached by the misguided people.

“Kerl, de natie was ryk ; waarom zou ille fecht ?” said a Dutch-speaking member of the Force as the loot was being sold by auction at Kuruman. “Comrade, the tribe was rich ; why should they fight ?”

After taking Takong, Colonel Lanyon returned to Kimberley to resume the discharge of his duties as Administrator of Griqualand West, leaving Colonel Warren in command in Bechuanaland.

When the Griqualand West force concluded its operations in Bechuanaland a garrison was left behind at certain places—those at Kuruman being under Major Lowe, an excellent officer whose name will often occur in this book. After this time, however, we had no active Bechuana trouble except such as came from the disturbed country to the south. A disturbance was taking place on the northern border of the Cape Colony, and some of the natives, being driven from their places of refuge, fled into Griqualand West, and made for the strong Langberg range of hills. Gathering reinforcements from the people of Griqualand West and from the Bechuana living at the Langberg, they sallied out and attacked Griquatown. Colonel Warren again took the field with local forces, and was authorised to cross the border into Bechuanaland ; “and to take such measures as may seem to you advisable for the safety and protection of the Province and of Imperial interests beyond.” The enemy consisted of Griquas, Kaal Kaffirs from the Colony, and Bechuana. There were several first-class shots among them ; they knew their ground, while the fastnesses of the Langberg were a mystery to those who were dislodging them. In short, there were the possibilities of ambushes, guerilla fighting, and loss of men and serious reverse. With the sanction of Colonel Lanyon I was able, by letters and messages sent by trustworthy people, to bring out from among the belligerents

a number of people (Griquas and Bechuana) who had not the slightest wish to fight. The Griquas were enraged, and their leader wrote to me in Dutch that he would certainly inform the directors of the Missionary Society in London that I was not confining myself to preaching the Gospel! His jealousy, however, was not for the preaching of the Gospel, but because the people listened to my advice and deserted his cause, saving their own lives and securing their property by doing so. A series of successful actions—some of them partaking of the nature of exploits—were concluded by Colonel Warren and his men at Gamaganyana, the chief camp of the rebels, situated in a natural fortress in the mountains, and only accessible, it was thought, through certain ravines which were lined with sharpshooters. Colonel Warren, however, saw the key to the situation, and during the night, by the help of willing men, he had conveyed his guns to the top of the hill. There was no path, but the thing had to be done. The next morning, instead of being in a place of security, the dwellers in this well-sheltered camp found that its fastnesses were now rather inconvenient than otherwise, for they prevented their speedy escape from the guns playing on them from the top of the mountain. The rebels were now completely dispersed, and they never afterwards appeared in any number either in the Colony or in Griqualand West. Many sought refuge in the Kalahari, and several months afterwards the leaders of the party, skirting the Kalahari on their way into the interior of the country, were brought to Morokweng by messengers and letters sent by me, and there gave themselves up to the Force in occupation under Major Lowe. The leaders were taken to Kimberley and tried for the crimes which they had committed; the common people were allowed to return to their homes.

In reporting to the High Commissioner on the state of Bechuanaland, Colonel Lanyon explained that certain natives who had committed outrage and murder in the Colony had been followed and conquered, while—

“Others who maintained from their inherent weakness a very questionable neutrality have again petitioned to be brought under the

peaceful sway of Her Majesty. To withdraw now would be regarded as weakness on our part. The chiefs, weak as they were before, would now be powerless for good, and the result would be that a state of anarchy would prevail which would be fatal to civilisation, and dangerous to the interests of surrounding territories. In writing this I do not wish your Excellency to suppose that I advocate the taking of the country by a strong hand, so as to displace the native for the advancement of the European. There is land in abundance for a fair population of whites without disturbing the aborigines" (2454, 27).

Again, in a letter to Colonel Warren, Colonel Lanyon says :—

"The High Commissioner fully approves of the occupation of the country till some definite arrangements can be made as to whether it should be annexed or be a Protectorate. One thing is, I think, quite certain, that it will never be left again to the state of anarchy which prevailed there before."

Such was the opinion of Colonel Lanyon written on the 7th December 1878. In another letter Colonel Lanyon explains the practical difficulty of the question. He says :—

"Major Lowe will be able to remain behind at Kuruman and take charge. But he will have to rule there as commanding officer. I have no power to make him a magistrate."

Colonel Warren had received special instructions from the High Commissioner to collect information concerning the "country between Griqualand West and the Transvaal," which meant South Bechuanaland, as the claims of the Batlaping and the Barolong included the whole of that country. Colonel Warren was to find out, among other things, how far the chiefs were disposed to place themselves under the protection of the English Government. Petitions for this protection in one form or another came from all the prominent chiefs—some having before urged the same request.

Colonel Warren reported from Taung to the High Commissioner on the 25th November 1878 :—

"The whole of the territories within the limits of the Molopo belonging to the Batlaping, Barolong, and Batlaro, commonly called Bechuanaland, have for many years past been under no firm rule, until the chiefs have lost all the power they formerly possessed, and are unable to keep their people in order without the assistance of the

British Government; for this purpose a border police has been established in these territories by the Administrator of Griqualand West. . . . As to the general feeling of the natives themselves, there can be no doubt they are only afraid of British laws being thrust upon them before they are able to understand them, otherwise they entirely acknowledge that they have no real government among themselves. . . . I have, therefore, in anticipation of my report to your Excellency on the subject of the native territories between the Transvaal and Griqualand West, to recommend that all those lands within the limits of the Molopo, from the Desert of Kalahari on the west to Lichtenburg on the east (including the district of Bloemhof), may be proclaimed as British territory, and annexed to the province now called Griqualand West, but with such separate form of administration for the present as will enable the natives to appreciate the justness of British law without suffering unduly from its severity, owing to their ignorance of such matters" (2252, 41).

The High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, treating of the tribes on the skirts of the Transvaal, says:—

"I would not annex their country as an integral portion of British territory under British law. I would, when the chiefs and people desire it, afford them protection and direction as subsidiary or tributary states in subordinate alliance with us, and managed by their own chiefs under the supreme authority of the British Crown."

Again he says:—

"By refusing to accept the position of a Protecting Power, habitually acting as arbiter in inter-tribal disputes, we escape nothing save the name of responsibility. Its realities are already incurred, and when at length we unwillingly undertake the burden of dominion, we shall find it greatly aggravated by delay and neglect" (2220, 35).

These were the opinions in 1878 of Her Majesty's High Commissioner, supported by the reports of his officers and local commissioners after personal inspection.

As to the attitude of the English Government with reference to this question, in answer to the remarks of the High Commissioner above quoted, the Secretary of State said, under date 21st September 1878:—

"You have undoubtedly urged strong reasons in favour of the establishment of some kind of control over those native tribes in their relation to one another and to Europeans" (2220, 152).

In October 1878 the actual fact of the acquisition of new territory on the western border of the Transvaal would

seem to have been fully realised by Her Majesty's Government. The Secretary of State, addressing the High Commissioner on the subject, says:—

“I take this opportunity of observing that any arrangements which it may be necessary to make at the present time for the disposal of territory not hitherto included in any colony or province, must be subject to revision hereafter; and that although the district of which Colonel Warren is to take charge, in accordance with Sir T. Shepstone's recommendations of which I approved, will be temporarily under the supervision of the administration of the Transvaal, its ultimate position will be matter for future consideration” (2220, 273).

With reference to the settlement of Bechuanaland, writing from Kuruman in November 1878, I remarked: “The war in Bechuanaland is now at an end. A greater work, however, remains to be accomplished—that of settling the scattered people.” To that work Colonel Warren turned his attention with great success. Among other steps which he took was the issue of a “Notice to Griquas, Korannas, Basuto, Bushmen, Batlaro, Batlaping, and Barolong, who have carried on war in and around Griqualand West.”

In this document, after recounting the incidents of the war in which they had been defeated everywhere, and in which their old people, women, and children had been well cared for by the English forces, Colonel Warren went on to say:—

“The British Government is merciful—it seeks no revenge; it metes out justice, and desires all its children to have peace. In justice, the ringleaders in this war must be punished, as also the murderers of the Burnesses and of Mr. Thompson, so also the diggers-up of the graves of the dead. But consideration will be shown for the misguided. Already many who fought at Gamoperi, Takong, and other places have given themselves up. They are now living under the protection of the Government; some of these are bearing arms for the Government. Many of the prisoners taken are hired out as servants. Others are living happily in the camps.

“You are now dispersed, some have fled to other lands, but some are still hidden away among the rocks, and can only live by stealing cattle. If you steal, you must be punished. Let such give themselves up to the Government at once. Already those who are quiet have been sent to villages to plough and sow. Let all near at hand return

without delay, or the season will be lost and a famine will arise in the land.

“CHARLES WARREN,

“Colonel Commanding Field Forces, Griqualand West.

“KURUMAN, November 3, 1878.”

This notice was approved of by Colonel Lanyon and the Griqualand West Government, and a proclamation of amnesty was afterwards issued by the Administrator on the same lines as the notice, and warm congratulations were telegraphed to Colonel Lanyon and Colonel Warren by the High Commissioner. In this connection it is worthy of notice that the thanks of Her Majesty's Government were tendered on the 15th January 1879, through the High Commissioner, to “Colonel Lanyon and Colonel Warren, and the officers and volunteers under their command; and I am glad to learn that the authority of the Government has now been effectually re-established throughout the province of Griqualand West and the adjoining territory” (2222, 191).

At Kuruman, when natives gave themselves up who had been fighting, they were asked if they were willing to submit to the form of government which it might please Her Majesty to establish, and the answer was always gladly in the affirmative. Indeed it would be difficult to exaggerate the enthusiasm of the Bechuana when they understood that they were to come under the protection of the Queen, without the confiscation of their private property. As an illustration I may mention that a man came to me explaining that his brother had been engaged in cattle-stealing with some Griquas; that the bulk of the cattle were still in his brother's possession, and that he, the speaker, was willing to make up from his own stock those which had been slaughtered. “If we are really to be regarded as people, and as the subjects of the Queen, I, for my part, want to enter with a white heart,” said this man as he concluded his story to me. Then the personal influence of Colonel Warren soon came to be very great among the people. The same qualities that had endeared him to his men in the Gaika war and in Bechuanaland, evoked also the respect and the regard of the Bechuana chiefs and headmen. Ability alone does not evoke this sentiment of

personal attachment and willing obedience. Rich human sympathy is needed ; and "Warren" had plenty of that for his men, as "Glass" had for the natives who, he said, reminded him of some of the tribes with whom he had worked in Arabia and the East. It was amusing to see how natives not sure of their ground shrank when they saw the colonel calmly put up his "glass" to his eye and then turn it full-cock on them. But when the truth was ascertained, his pleasant ways and sense of humour reassured them, and even those who were guilty and those who went away disappointed, could see that he was their friend, strong and just, and bearing no malice.

"I am bound to say, I begin to think like you that something can be made of those people," said the colonel to me one day after he had had many hours' work among the natives ; "but perhaps I don't arrive at my conclusion by the route usually taken."

"Well, the result reached is the great thing," I replied, "like a judge's finding. But the reasons are sometimes interesting. By what route do you reach your decision?"

"Simply this, that they are the most persistent, hard-headed, and selfish fellows I have had to do with for a long time. They are not at all like Griquas or Korannas."

"And what do you infer?"

"Why, this, that people with such shrewdness and tenacity of purpose do not belong to the peoples that are dying out. They keep too fast a hold for that. I really think they might become useful enough people."

One of the matters now happily settled at this time by the presence of Sir Charles Warren in the country, was a long-standing dispute as to property in land which had subsisted between the trader at Kuruman and Dr. Moffat and the Rev. Wm. Ashton, the missionaries, and which had been a source of much unhappiness in such a small and isolated European community. Dr. Moffat and Mr. Hamilton, in the early years of the mission, had been much assisted in the work of the station by two traders, a Mr. Hume and a Mr. Millen. The latter died on a trading trip into the interior, while the former retired from business

and settled in the Colony, having cleared a considerable sum of money. Mr. Hume had been a helper of the missionaries, and had asked and obtained their permission to occupy premises which were first erected by Mr. Bailey, a missionary assistant of Dr. Moffat. Being a mason, Mr. Hume made occasional additions to these premises, with Dr. Moffat's sanction and for his own convenience. Mr. Hume's successors did not conduct themselves as Mr. and Mrs. Hume had done, but became for a time the source of serious trouble and opposition to the work of the mission. Dr. Moffat and Mr. Ashton therefore wished the young men to remove from the mission premises. Instead of doing so they thoughtlessly sent for a chief from Taung, received him with lavish hospitality, and asked for the decision of the chief as to their leaving the premises of the missionaries. The decision, of course, was that the traders should remain. Having let loose angry passions and stirred up prejudices by saying that Dr. Moffat was setting up as a chief in the country—whereas he was only asking to exercise the functions of landlord upon mission premises—these young traders really put the mission families in considerable anxiety as to themselves and their work at this distant spot. Such conduct is, I think, without a parallel; Europeans who are determined to live after a certain fashion do not usually force themselves on mission premises through the wild decision of hard-drinking native chiefs.

“Mr. ——,” said Colonel Warren, “Mr. Mackenzie has been telling me the story of your conduct to the solitary missionaries here, and their forced acquiescence in your living on their premises. Before you return to those premises, please to show me your right to do so.” Similar questions were put to other traders before they re-entered their stores, and one was banished as a disturber of the country.

The Kuruman trader and his friends came to me and to Mr. Brown, my fellow-missionary, and a friendly arrangement was soon arrived at. These people had, of course, nothing whatever to show for their long residence on mission premises. But it seemed, from their own statement, that they had for some time been ashamed of their position, and

were not unwilling to come to a settlement. As great enlargement and improvement had taken place in the premises from time to time, it was agreed that these improvements were to be regarded by the Missionary Society as rent for the past years. The ownership of the Society was now recognised, and the payment of an annual rent was cheerfully agreed to. So long as I was at Kuruman these conditions were faithfully observed. Indeed, the trader's family in my time had again become one of the mission families—most friendly and neighbourly in our somewhat lonely life.

At this time another case came before Colonel Warren for settlement at Kuruman. A man called Arend is mentioned by Dr. Moffat in his book as among his first converts at Kuruman. He was a runaway slave from the Cape Colony. With Dr. Moffat's consent he occupied a plot of ground close to the eye of the Kuruman fountain, and on one side of the river-bed. The "uninterrupted use" of this water had been granted to Dr. Moffat by the Batlaping at an early date for the irrigation of the mission and native gardens. The other side of the river near the eye of the fountain was occupied by a native called Mauto, a person of the serf class who had raised himself by hunting, and who was an industrious man. The old people died. After a time the young Arends obtained "a paper" from Mahura showing that he permitted them to occupy their plot of land. Having failed to pay the trader for their outfit as elephant-hunters, they brought this paper to the store as a mortgage for next year's supply. The trader declined the paper. It was concerning one patch of land only. The Arends' claim must be for a farm, and not for a garden-plot, and must include Mauto's land. If the Arends could get a paper from Mankoroane better than the old one from Mahura, he would take it as a bond for the payment of the hunters' debts, and the hunters should receive supplies for the next hunting season. A new paper was drawn up, and the Arends took it to Taung for signature by Mankoroane. Now this new claim was quite incompatible with the previous grant to Dr. Moffat in the early years of the mission. The owner of a farm, including the fountain, could ruin the Kuruman mission

station by using up all the water necessary for the irrigation of the mission and native gardens. The hunting trip was disastrous, and the Arends were now heavily in debt at the store. The missionary then in charge at Kuruman, the Rev. John Moffat, having got the sanction of the directors of the Missionary Society, paid the debt of the Arends at the store, and thus their claims to a farm, which would rob Mauto and others of their lands and the missionaries of their water, passed into his keeping. Mr. Moffat continued to take charge of those papers after I came to Kuruman in 1876. The hunters had died one after the other, and the young Arends (grandchildren of old Arend) were not equal to those who had gone before them.

When the disturbances broke out in 1878 the Arends took the side of the enemies of Mankoroane, and fought against the English in the engagements of Ko and Takong. The survivors presented themselves at Kuruman with the rest of those who came in "from the bush." In his military settlement, Colonel Warren resolved to find a place for them in Griqualand West, and they were told to leave Bechuanaland. At their request I interceded in behalf of these misguided people, who now begged to be allowed to cultivate land at a place called Kau, not far from Kuruman. This request was granted, and the Arends removed to Kau.

The claim which the Arends had been tempted to put forward was a dishonest one, appropriating that which had already been given to others; but as there were now several widows among them, I offered, on behalf of the Society, a reasonable sum of money as representing the value of the improvements which they had made on the plot of land which they had been occupying under native law. I did not acknowledge the validity of their claim to a farm, or to Mauto's land as well as their own; in making this offer I had merely before my mind the improvements made by the Arends on their own plot. I called the Arends, and old Sere the representative of Mankoroane, and my fellow-missionaries, and made the offer publicly in the church. But there were several families to

be thought of in the distribution of the money ; and the sum which I offered, having no reference to fictitious claims, but only to the actual work done on the one patch of land, was declined by them as not being enough.

It afterwards came out that the Arends had an object in view in taking this course. Some time after, a white man was boasting that Kuruman gardens would soon lack water, except so much as he might please to let them have. The young Arends were disposing of their claim to their so-called farm to a European speculator, who thought he saw a prospect of making money by the transaction. It was now represented to Mankoroane by the Rev. W. Ashton that a paper, supposed to give possession of Batlaping land at the eye of the Kuruman fountain, was being disposed of to white men without the consent of the Batlaping. The natives were indignant, and cancelled the Arends' claims by public notice in the colonial papers, warning white men at the same time that Batlaping land was not saleable by any of its present holders. In consideration of the great work which the Missionary Society had done to his country and people, especially in connection with the educational work of the Moffat Institution, Mankoroane now confirmed the grant of land made by his predecessors, specially including the eye of the fountain, and the grazing land adjoining. The object of the missionaries at this unsettled time was to protect the Batlaping country from the disturbing and dangerous efforts of speculators, to retain for the Society that ownership of Kuruman water and lands which it had hitherto enjoyed in the interests of the Industrial Institution and of the native village, and to protect the widow Mauto and other natives in their well-cultivated gardens, out of which they could have been driven at any time by the recent claims of the Arends. In acceding to the request of the Society, which was placed before the chief at Taung by the senior missionary, the natives stated that they were only emphasising the original gift from the Batlaping to Dr. Moffat and Mr. Hamilton, which the missionaries had enjoyed for more than fifty years. When I left Kuruman, therefore, in 1882, the Missionary Society was

in possession of the traders' premises on the station, for which rent was cheerfully paid by their occupants; and the patches of land at the eye of the fountain were also in the hands of the missionaries, and thus secure to their native occupants, who were no longer in danger of being injured by means of the unjust and absurd claims of the Arends.

Before he returned to Griqualand West, Colonel Warren asked me to assist Major Lowe in the settlement of the country. For several succeeding months I took part in this work. The people came to me; I found out their case; and sent them with a recommendation to Major Lowe. In other matters connected with the pacification of the country I was in regular communication with the Administrators of Griqualand West, and with their officers in Bechuanaland. I gave no "orders"—only "advice" and "recommendation." I believe they had their instructions to regard these as orders. The arrangement was peculiar. It seems more unreasonable when written about than it was on the spot. I daresay the officers of Government thought, on the whole, it was the best arrangement possible under the circumstances, and it certainly was popular with the natives; so I went quietly on with it, attending carefully to my duties as tutor and as missionary at the same time. Among the officers with whom I came into contact was young Lieutenant Bethell, whose name will occur farther on. He impressed me with his ability, energy, and love of fair-play, and he transacted successfully matters that were entrusted to him.

Colonel Lanyon had personally and by letter asked me to leave the service of the Missionary Society and enter the service of Government. I was reluctant to do this, and in reply to his written request in September 1878, proffered rather the sort of help I was giving as a temporary measure, till a good government was organised in the country. Colonel Warren succeeded Colonel Lanyon as Administrator of Griqualand West in February 1879. The High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, requested me to meet him at Kimberley in May 1879, to give information concerning the condition of Bechuanaland. At his request and that of

Colonel Warren, I drew up a paper on the subject, with suggestions for the government of the country as far as the Molopo. These suggestions were adopted, and it was resolved to put them into practice. A proclamation was also then sketched, which was afterwards put into shape by legal hands, and sent to me to Kuruman for further suggestions; and that was the last I saw of it, in June 1879. While we were at Kimberley the High Commissioner was kind enough to offer me the work of Commissioner for the Territory. I agreed to go on doing the work "just as you have been doing," as Colonel Warren expressed it; and if the directors of the Missionary Society agreed, I should give my undivided attention to it. In the meantime the business of the territory now came before me in a more formal way, and for many months (and without remuneration) I discharged those local duties. Colonel Warren left Griqualand West for England on account of ill-health in October 1879. After his departure I was on the same terms of confidential correspondence with his successor, the Hon. Rose Innes, C.M.G. But the sanction of the directors of the Missionary Society was not given to such a corporeal union of Church and State; and, as I have already said, the proclamation establishing Her Majesty's protection over Bechuanaland, and which mentioned my name as Commissioner, was never issued.

On the 17th April 1879 the Secretary of State addressed the High Commissioner—having now before him the despatches from Colonel Lanyon and Colonel Warren, and other papers on this subject—in the following hesitating and temporising terms:—

"The adoption of Colonel Lanyon's proposals would appear to involve the assumption of such increased responsibilities as to be open to very serious objection in present circumstances, whatever view may be taken of the subject in the event of a confederation or union of the South African States being carried into effect" (2454, 35).

The issue of the question of Confederation was problematical, while the fate of Bechuanaland if left without any Government was certain. So Sir Bartle Frere, in the end of 1879, instructed Captain J. W. Harrel, while reporting upon

the state of the police in Griqualand West, to visit also Bechuanaland south of the Molopo and report upon the police which would be necessary to preserve order in that country. Captain Harrel went over the whole country and presented an able and exhaustive report, dated Kimberley, 27th April 1880. In it he showed that the natives had made considerable progress in civilisation, and that the taxation of the country would more than cover a simple system of government, which he sketched out. He referred to the impression produced on the people by the manner in which the late disturbances had been quelled, and testified to the effecteness of the rule of the chiefs and the desire of the natives to come under the protection and government of the Queen. Captain Harrel, in connection with the suggestion which he makes, gave also a strong warning in the following words:—

“If left to themselves and to the sinister influences of those whose profit and policy it is to promote strife among them, it needs no prophet to predict that ere long the territory would become a kind of Alsatia for lawless adventurers, land speculators, and discontented subjects from the adjoining British provinces, and that before long, probably, through some untoward act, blood would be spilt, and Her Majesty’s Government might find itself involved in the necessity of fitting out an expedition as unsatisfactory in its results as it would be burdensome in expense.”

After the departure of Sir Charles Warren the government of the Province of Griqualand West was administered for a time by Judge de Wet. Finding a number of police stationed beyond the border of the Province in Bechuanaland, he was taking steps to remove them before any answer had been returned by Her Majesty’s Government to the overtures of the native chiefs. The necessity for their presence was pointed out by me both to the authorities at Kimberley and to the High Commissioner at the Cape, and their removal was countermanded. In my communication to Sir Bartle Frere I mentioned the following incident as illustrating the state of the country. While on my way from Kuruman to Kimberley in October 1879, I met a party of some forty or fifty white men armed and mounted—their waggons following on behind, containing ploughs, spades, etc. They had crossed the border when I saw them,

but told me they had Government sanction, and were expecting the district magistrate to accompany them ; and that they were on their way to select farms and to occupy them. On inquiry of Colonel Warren at Kimberley I found that they had been instructed not to cross the border. Orders were at once sent to the police to bring them back. They were acting, it seems, under the guidance of a speculative "agent," to whom each farmer had already paid one pound, and had signed an agreement promising to pay said agent other fourteen pounds when the latter had successfully established Mynheer's claim at a land-court to a farm between Boetsap and Kuruman ! One of these enterprising men managed to elude Major Lowe's police, and was found by them, after complaint had been lodged by a native farmer, ploughing at one end of this native man's field, while the native was ploughing at the other. These men were "jumping" farms ; proposing to cultivate a little, run up the cheapest form of house, and then abide the decision of a land-court as having "occupied and improved." They would then pay the agent his fourteen pounds, and enter upon possession of their farm worth hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pounds ; or sell it, and proceed once more to the frontier to pose as the industrious settler, anxious to occupy and improve ! I could see how all this might be controlled and turned to good account. But in the meantime there was no government and no control in the country beyond that of the police, and their action in these cases was of course to turn the speculators back.

The reader will please specially to notice that the military occupation of Bechuanaland commenced in 1878 ; the proclamation of a British Protectorate was drafted and corrected in 1879, but never issued ; the police force was decreased in numbers from time to time, but Sir Bartle Frere fully recognised the necessity for it, and it was not till April 1881 that, under his successor, all the police evacuated Bechuanaland. We were thus three years recognised by the Bechuana as at the head of their affairs. Technically this was no more than "military occupation," but it supplied a Central Power around which all could gather, and which,

however undefined and insufficient, was productive of much good. The reader can imagine the weariness of these years of uncertainty. The question was ever, "Has not the 'mouth' of the Government come yet?" "No; we hear nothing yet," being the invariable reply. And to our shame as an Imperial Power be it said, when the last policeman left Bechuanaland, he did so obeying a mere local police order. No warning from the High Commissioner was given to the chiefs; no reply to their offer of obedience and submission; no advice as to the future; the policemen just left—the military occupation of three years ended; and Bechuanaland became what every confidential adviser and commissioner of Her Majesty had said it would become—the abode of anarchy, filibustering, and outrage.

On the 14th of September 1880, before leaving South Africa, Sir Bartle Frere sent the following message to Mankoroane through the Hon. Rose Innes, who was then Acting Administrator of Griqualand West:—

"I request that you will kindly take any means in your power to inform Mankoroane Molehabangwe, the Batlaping chief, that I had the pleasure to receive from Captain Harrel his letter of the 29th March, and that I hope he will not mind what is said of him by other chiefs who have not behaved so loyally as he has. Assure him that if he obeys the orders of the British Government as conveyed to him through yourself or through the High Commissioner or the Administrator of the Transvaal, he may rely upon every reasonable support in doing what is right and loyal to the British Government. Tell him that I exhort him to trust to the high British officers I have named, and that I hope he will continue to deserve and receive every support and assistance from them.

"Inform him also that I am leaving the Colony, but that he will always find friends in yourself, in Sir Owen Lanyon or Sir George Colley, and in my successors, as long as he continues to behave loyally to the British Government, and that I wish him every prosperity" (3686, 32).

CHAPTER VI

DOWNING STREET ADDRESSED FROM THE DESERT

THE more I pondered the native question in South Africa, and the attitude of Her Majesty's Government, the more deeply convinced was I that we were working on the wrong lines, and that this was the reason of the unpopularity of the English Government with the "Boer" population, as also one of the causes of our numerous wars. We were opposed to forcible "expansion" or "annexation," and we had no peaceful and orderly substitute. We were never long in one attitude towards the native question, and it was difficult for either colonist or native to understand us. We could not look for much assistance in the work of general government in South Africa from the separated colonies and states, whose scattered condition was also owing to our letting affairs "drift." The more I studied the question the plainer seemed to be the way out of the difficulty. At length, for the sake of my own peace of mind, I resolved to lay my views before those responsible for the good government of the country. In December 1879 I drew up a paper on the subject, copies of which I sent to the Secretary of State, to Sir Bartle Frere, and to the recently appointed High Commissioner for South-Eastern Africa, the Viscount (then Sir Garnet) Wolseley. A digest of that communication will not be without interest now.

I premised that a new departure was to be expected as the sequel of the recent disturbances and wars, and that it was most important for Government to know the widely

different character and wants of the races with which the English Government had to deal, and, eschewing all haphazard or improvised policy, to have a carefully considered policy for the future.

“Responsibility is thrust upon the English Government in Southern Africa. It is impossible to avoid it except by abandoning the country altogether. The northward progress of Europeans in South Africa has been steady and rapid in the past. It takes place with the consent and at the request of the native chiefs and people who welcome missionaries, travellers, and traders. They have a keen sense of the benefits flowing to themselves from this contact. The government of the country becomes more and more difficult after the advent of Europeans in numbers. The new wine of European energy, persistence, and sometimes recklessness cannot be contained in the old skin-bottles of tribal laws and customs. In several instances the chiefs have recognised this fact, and have asked for the help of the English Government. Such a reasonable request has usually been refused. The Government could not consent to ‘annexation,’ or ‘increase of responsibility.’ The new wine and the old bottles are therefore let alone by the Government, and thieving, murder, war, inevitably follow. Thousands, it may be millions, of pounds are now spent, precious lives are lost, and recriminations take place as to who are to blame. . . . Now the blame lies with the English Government to this extent, that England has no South African policy worthy of the name, and in so far as it has one—viz. to let things alone as they are and to shrink from responsibility—it is worse than no policy, for it is practically impossible; while it so far hampers the Government in South Africa as to cause them to do things in a shuffling and uncertain manner.

“As to the advance of the European race northward and of the blacks southward, close and careful study of the subject led me to the conclusion that it was a movement over which no government had control, but which occurred with such regularity and force as that it might be regarded as ‘a law’ or as ‘the will of God.’ . . . No one can prevent it. The question came to be, ‘How is it to be regulated, and by whom?’ And here was the key of the whole situation. The natives, chiefs, and people were usually anxious for English protection, and willing to submit to Her Majesty’s Government. Their unoccupied territories would thus fall into the hands of Her Majesty’s Government. As protector of the natives and administrator of native territories, supremacy, the control of expansion, all the possibilities of the future would be in the hands of England. I suggested the use of an expression from the United States’ system of Government. ‘It is well known that in the political economy of the United States, a “territory” is a state in embryo. I propose that in accomplishing a nobler and more Christian work in Southern Africa than Europeans have placed before them in America, England should institute a provisional government over tribes or districts conquered or ceded, by

means of which justice could be administered and peace preserved, while at the same time the people would be trained to understand and appreciate our English law and procedure.' The same standard would be before the Administrator of a Territory as before the Governor of a Colony; the same code of law would be the guide of the territorial judge or magistrate as of his colonial brother; but in the former case the mode of procedure would be simpler, and more adapted to people emerging from an uncultivated state. Land should not be saleable, but individual titles should be given. In, say, ten years, an inspection of farms by government officers should take place to ascertain their condition, and whether improvement had actually taken place. In the course of time, when the English language was known by the people, when they had become instructed in our laws and modes of procedure, the territorial system might cease, and union take place with some colony or province. The local administration would be more than met by local taxation.

"I would not propose that such administrator of a territory should be under the lieutenant-governor or governor of the nearest, or of any, province or colony. The time has come, in my opinion, for dissociating the office of High Commissioner from that of Colonial Governor. Her Majesty's High Commissioner or Governor-General of Southern Africa ought to be the highest officer of the Crown in the country. . . . Her Majesty's Government in England would thus have the views of every local government conveyed officially, and also the judgment of a responsible adviser living in South Africa, and familiar with the general aspects of South African affairs, and uninfluenced by that local spirit of advocacy which may be expected occasionally to appear in the correspondence of lieutenant-governors who have become deeply and engrossingly interested in the affairs of a certain colony or province. It was pointed out how easily such an officer as the High Commissioner would be able to nip in the bud native disturbance or sedition, as also to quiet frontier 'scares' and tumults.

"I recommend that Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Zululand should be administered as 'territories' under the High Commissioner. Basutoland is at present (1879) annexed in a manner to the Cape Colony—annexed as to taxation, still separate as to representation. . . . If the English Government is to be successful anywhere, it ought to be so in Basutoland. There if the people are prejudiced it is in favour of the English and not against them, and it is an honour and a boast in the mouth of a Basuto that he is a subject of Queen Victoria. It would be easy to remove all this, no doubt, and to make the Basuto like 'other niggers,' and perhaps even more dangerous. In my judgment, this is on the whole less likely to happen under the Imperial Government and the High Commissioner than under a Cape ministry."

In this communication I urged the adoption of "Territorial Government" in Zululand instead of the petty-chief arrangement which was made:—

“In place of the power of Cetewayo we give them chieftains, all ignorant, all incapable of leading their people forward. Suppose a common Zulu man had learned to have a wholesome dread of the English power, and had no wish to meet the English soldiers again, not to mention the case of the man who wished to abjure heathenism and become civilised—what guarantee has he that his new master or masters will not begin to plot at once, and that in a few years he will not find himself in trouble out of which he knows he can never extricate himself? I feel certain I have described the common Zulu feeling. They desire the helping hand of a friendly English officer living near their homes, to whom they could go in their difficulties, and who would keep them from ‘getting wrong’ again with the English. Well assured, therefore, that I propose what is best for the Zulu people, for their European neighbours as well as for the Imperial and the English public, I have no hesitation (1879) in submitting that Zululand ought to be proclaimed to be an English ‘territory.’ With each of the new chiefs, John Dunn included, a resident or commissioner ought to be at once placed. Taxes ought to be raised throughout Zululand. The Zulu law, holding land to be unsaleable, should be retained in the present condition of the people. But as soon as the taxes will pay for it, a model farm or two ought to be commenced in Zululand, with the view of instructing and stimulating the inhabitants of a rich agricultural country. Schools ought to be commenced in Natal and Zululand as a Government measure. . . . In short, the Government is bound by every motive to help a Zulu to keep out of trouble with the English, and the above are some of the ways of doing this. Those who would object to a policy like this, taking refuge under some hackneyed expression like ‘annexation,’ are in reality advocating another Zulu war.”

Alas that such a scheme as the above was not then followed in Zululand! Through the action of some, England suffered severely in Zululand; through the action of others she suffered in vain. Wherever we may have shown the instincts of a noble or an Imperial race, it is certainly not in Zululand, where we have done and undone and let alone and taken up—and yet accomplished nothing.

My remarks concerning the Transvaal and Griqualand West in this communication can now lead to no beneficial result, as the phase of the question as to those countries to which I was then speaking has already been settled.

In laying my memorandum before the Secretary of State I stated the opinion that it was on these lines Her Majesty’s Government would find the ultimate confederation of the country. An important step was the separation of the

office of High Commissioner. That by itself would have a unifying effect in South Africa. But the special feature of my scheme was the recognition of the spread of Europeans and the provision for it under "Territorial Government," which would also secure the rights of the natives. I concluded by expressing my regret that a scheme calculated to do so much good had no more influential name than my own to recommend it.

On the 3d February 1880 the Secretary of State requested the High Commissioner to convey to me his thanks, and that "he had perused my communication with attention." When this message reached me at quiet, isolated Kuruman, the confidante of all my thoughts and projects said something about a "pigeon-hole." But I resolved that what seemed to me our only hope should not be shelved so easily.

So when there was a change of Government in 1880, and a North of Scotland man, Mr. Grant Duff, was appointed Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, I wrote to him and referred him to the communication addressed to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, from which I have quoted. I also directed his attention, and that of Her Majesty's Government through him, to the great value of Bechuana-land to England and to the Cape Colony as the key to the interior—more especially after the retrocession of the Transvaal and the delimitation of that country. These were arguments which I hoped would at once appeal to those who had in their hands the whole question of South African policy. Besides these important considerations, there were our obligations to the native chiefs, which I hoped would be regarded as the first consideration. Mr. Grant Duff sent me a kind note in reply, after he had read the communication to which I had directed his attention. But not a scintillation of hope was in the kind words.

I found it impossible, however, to be really cast down—the thing which I recommended was so plain, feasible, and just. But I felt that Kuruman was a somewhat distant spot from which to introduce anything new to the English Government, whether in politics or in anything else. I was pigeon-holed.

In July 1880 I was so deeply impressed with the idea that the Basuto war, which was then imminent, might be averted, that I sent the following suggestion to the High Commissioner, having previously talked the matter over with him in Capetown:—

“SIR—Without discussing what is called the Disarmament Policy of the present Cape Ministry, it is evident that it will be impossible for the Cape Colony to carry with it in its enforcement of that policy in Basutoland the sympathy and support of the English Government. Thus the policy of the Cape Government and that of the Home Government are at variance as to Basutoland.

“In this situation of affairs, and with war imminent, if not already begun, would the Cape Colony be content to part with the responsibility of the government of Basutoland, and would the Imperial Government agree to assume that responsibility, Basutoland, to be a ‘territory’ under an administrator in correspondence with the High Commissioner and with Downing Street?

“If this were agreed to by telegram and announced to the Basuto, it would probably avert war.

“If Basuto fight, other tribes are likely to break out.”

I further recommended that an officer should be selected as a “Queen’s man” and sent into Basutoland with the following message, straightforward and yet adapted to the native mind:—“That the Queen’s ministers in the Cape were only saying the truth when they stated that English artisans and small farmers were not armed as the Basuto were, but neither could the Queen gainsay the word of the Basuto that they had done no harm with their guns. This was also true; and as the Basuto had misunderstood the meaning of the words of the Queen’s ministers at the Cape, the Queen herself, when she saw the misunderstanding, had sent a message to say the guns of the Basuto might be retained by them.” I assured the High Commissioner, when I was on a visit to Capetown, that such action, instead of lowering the name of Her Majesty, would raise it and endear it; while the statement would only give expression to facts as they stood. On the other hand, it would release the Cape Colony from a very grave position. I have the best reason for believing that Sir Bartle Frere thought favourably of this plan, going so far as to make up his mind as to the officer whom he would send as “Queen’s man.” But his responsible ad-

visers would not consent to what seemed humiliation. The humiliation, however, was nothing when contrasted with their own failure in negotiation, their unsuccessful war costing over four millions of money, and the same step which I suggested found to be necessary in the end.

In August 1880 Sir Bartle Frere, writing to me on this Basuto question, concluded his letter with the following sentences:—

“You will no doubt have heard by this time that I have been recalled, and am expecting the arrival of my successor about the middle of next month, when I shall be leaving immediately for England. I do not like to miss this opportunity of wishing you farewell, and saying how earnestly I trust that every prosperity may attend you and your mission. I shall look forward to having the pleasure of meeting you again under happier auspices. If in this world, then we may resume our discussions of South African questions, which, whilst I live, will never cease to have the same interest for me which I feel now.”

On the 10th November 1880 I informed Mr. Rose Innes, who succeeded Colonel Warren in the government of Griqualand West, that “were the police withdrawn and no Government influence whatever exerted in Bechuanaland, I should regard local disturbances as inevitable, with theft of stock and outrage.”

Early in 1881 Sir Hercules Robinson assumed the duties of High Commissioner in South Africa. To assist him in understanding the affairs of Bechuanaland I sent him, on the 6th April, a paper on the subject, bringing clearly before him the pressing condition of the country and its history during the last few years. In that letter the following sentences occur:—

“It would be difficult to prove that it is our interest to wait until a great many more thefts have taken place in Bechuanaland, more blood has been shed, and some crowning outrage has been committed, and then undertake the government of the country in question. The chiefs offer that government now, and profess their inability. Why not accept what will certainly be ours in the long run before the usual outrages have taken place? After what has recently been stated in England by the Government as to their sense of responsibility in connection with the natives bordering on the Transvaal, I am led to cherish the strongest hope that they would favourably entertain the request of the chiefs along the Transvaal western border if their attention were

directed to the subject. I beg you will do this service to the chiefs and people of Bechuanaland."

Mr. St. Leger Herbert, the Secretary of the Royal Commission then about to meet at Pretoria, replied to my letter on behalf of Sir Hercules Robinson. He said: "His Excellency has read your letter with much interest, and desires me to thank you for this expression of your views upon a difficult question. The matters to which you refer will be considered by the Royal Commission appointed for the settlement of Transvaal affairs when deliberating upon the subject of the Keate Award Territory." There was nothing done in the question by the Royal Commission. Sir Evelyn Wood has the merit of having seen the necessity for doing something, and for insisting that his opinion should be recorded that there should be Residents on the borders of the Transvaal, in the native territories, who would be in communication with the Resident at Pretoria, otherwise the office of the latter would be of no practical utility. The majority of the Commission overruled him; but in this case the soldier was right, and the lawyer and Administrator were both wrong. It is certain that all the commissioners were aware, with equal clearness, that neither the laying down of a boundary-line in a convention, nor its "beaconing off" on the ground, would supply order and good government to Bechuanaland. The soldier was the true statesman on this occasion, and desired that actual fact should be faced. His fellow-commissioners, whatever they thought, refused to face these facts.

In September 1881 I had occasion to direct the High Commissioner's attention to the northern boundary of the Cape Colony, which seemed in danger of emulating the western boundary of the Transvaal by partaking of the shifting qualities of the local mirage. To this question the High Commissioner gave prompt attention, and it was speedily settled. The Pretoria Convention had then been concluded, and the discussions upon it had taken place in England. There were some remarks made in England which gave me great hope. It was said in justifying the action of Government that they had no intention of abandoning the

protection of the native races; and Mr. Gladstone made his famous statement in the House of Commons that by the arrangements which the English Government had made in the Convention, and especially by the retention of the suzerainty, the appointment of a British Resident and the veto retained upon native legislation within the Transvaal, Her Majesty's Government would be in a better condition to protect the natives than if the Transvaal were a British colony. Without entering into the merits of that argument at present, what struck me on reading the speech at Kuruman was, that there appeared to be at least the full recognition of responsibility, with the honest intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government still to uphold its position as the supreme Government in the country. In writing to the High Commissioner, therefore, in September, I was unworldly enough to believe that some arrangement was still contemplated by Her Majesty's Government with reference to Bechuanaland. Its condition was known. Those clear statements in England I regarded as the pledges of distinguished English statesmen. I was prepared to find that the Royal Commission, notwithstanding Sir Hercules Robinson's promise to me, had discovered that they had nothing to do with the internal affairs of Bechuanaland, and that they would only settle its boundary-line, so long disputed. But then it was here, as I thought, that the High Commissioner would be sure to take the matter up, and I was glad to think that he would find Her Majesty's Government in the mind to second his efforts. For some time I was under this delusion, and rejoiced to think that Her Majesty's Government had discovered the true key to supremacy and to the peaceful government of the country. It was under this impression that in September I congratulated the High Commissioner on the conclusion of his peculiarly difficult and important labours at Pretoria, and expressed a favourable opinion of the Convention itself. I waited on for some appearance on our horizon of the looked-for assistance from Government; but alas! none came. Disturbances had already broken out in the Barolong country between Montsioa and Moshette, and in the Batlaping country between Mankoroane

and Massow. Every day difficult cases came before me at Kuruman, arising out of the circumstances of the country. So on the 2d November I once more addressed the High Commissioner, referring to his promise in April that the condition of the country would be brought before the Royal Commission, and stating that, so far as I could see, nothing had been done with reference to the internal affairs of Bechuanaland. I once more recited the history of the country, and its recent English occupation for about three years, and the fact that no message had reached the chiefs when the last of the police left the country. I said: "It is beyond conception or belief that questions thus left unsettled or half-settled could right themselves!" Were not the facts before us, it would be beyond belief that a Government having conquered one part of the country, and received petitions for protection with cession of territory in another part, should, after taking charge of the country by military occupation for a time, simply let it alone and leave it. "It is not saying too much to call such a course as unfair as it is unworthy; and yet I am far from charging any of Her Majesty's servants with unfair or unworthy intention." In the same communication I narrated specimens of the cases submitted to me by the natives themselves; also cases brought before me in which Europeans were concerned. The bare narration of these cases showed the imperative necessity for some government in the country. At that date probably two hundred men had already fallen in the wars between Mankoroane and Massow, and between Montsioa and Moshette, and these wars would never have occurred if the Protectorate had been sustained. A chief had just sent out his son two hundred miles to ask my advice as to what course he should adopt, and he implored me to tell him what had become of the "words" which were spoken by chiefs and people to "Warren." To this letter to the High Commissioner of the 2d November I received no answer.

In trying to save the country from being overrun by filibusters there was another step which I could take, and I took it. After the colonial annexation of the Diamond Fields, I drew up an account of Bechuanaland (of which

people knew less at Capetown than in England), and sent it to Mr. Saul Solomon, a distinguished member of the Colonial Parliament and a friend of fair-dealing as between the Europeans and the natives. My position here was, that it was a strange thing for the Cape Colony to annex Griqualand West with all its advantages, and yet take no heed of its past history and responsibility in connection with Bechuanaland. Failing health, however, precluded Mr. Solomon from giving that attention to the question which he otherwise would have done. Papers were called for on the subject, but I am not aware that they were ever produced. Certainly no step was ever taken by the Cape Government to uphold peace and order in Bechuanaland in deference to the past responsibilities of Griqualand West.

I tried yet one other move in order to arrest the outrages which were taking place. I took steps to communicate with Massow, Mankoroane, and Botlasitsi, and to induce them to meet together and sign a concurrent proclamation on the state of the country. Massow, however, was too well watched; my messengers could not accomplish my object, and of course I had my own duties to perform at Kuruman, which kept me to the place.

It is the rule of the London Missionary Society to grant its agents in South Africa a furlough every ten years. I had on two occasions "put in" eleven years; so that in 1882 my second furlough was overdue. There was the family reunion to think of; and it might be possible to do more for Bechuanaland in England than in South Africa.

Before leaving Kuruman for England I saw that the cattle of Mankoroane's people were moving westward out of their own grazing lands for safety. The freebooters followed them, and under this pretence penetrated into districts totally unconnected with the disturbance. One party of freebooters reached the hill of Kiang near Motito, which is within thirty-six miles of Kuruman. A native herdsman visited me, at whom they fired twice—the first time they missed him; the second time the cap snapped; when some one shouted out, "Let the fellow alone; he will help to drive on the cattle," and so his life was spared. He afterwards

escaped in the night. While he was driving the captured cattle one of the freebooters said to him, "Are these Mankoroane's cattle?"

"No, they are not," he replied.

"Ah well, it does not matter," said the white man; "we have got them now, at any rate."

So in 1882 the various states and colonies of South Africa remained ostensibly within their own boundaries, and England was practically out of South Africa—except in Government House, Capetown, Simon's Bay, and Natal. The questions of growth, future extension, highway to the interior, were unthought of, except by the enemies of England; and Van Pittius and Van Niekerk, finding Bechuanaland empty of Imperial influence and distracted by tribal quarrels, called to their assistance kindred spirits from among those who could shed blood and quote Scripture; and the last state of this important but unfortunate native territory was worse than the first.

CHAPTER VII

ENGLISH OPINIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA

1882-1883

ON my way to England early in 1882 I met a friend who had just arrived in South Africa from that country.

"Mackenzie," he warned me, "if you say a good word for South Africa you'll get insulted. They won't hear a word on its behalf in England—they are so disgusted with the mess that has been made."

"They have good reason to be disgusted. But I want all the same to tell them a number of things about the true condition of the country."

"They won't listen," my friend declared; "they will swear at you—even missionary-people are as prejudiced as the rest."

This was not very encouraging, but it was not far from the truth as to public feeling in 1882.

Soon after my arrival in England I had an interview by appointment with a Member of Parliament who was a warm supporter of missions, a pushing man of business, and an ardent politician—I leave the reader to guess on which side.

After a little preliminary talk he asked me, "How is it, Mr. Mackenzie, that you missionaries are continually asking Government to interfere to protect you in your work?"

"I must say," I answered at once, "it is a very cool thing of you to begin by censuring me for doing a thing for refusing to do which I had to endure the censure of my fellow-countrymen when we were shut up at Kuruman. I never heard of such missionaries as you describe."

“ But how is it, then, that missionaries are constantly connected with unpleasant and difficult questions all over the world ? ”

“ Ah ! that is an entirely different thing,” I replied. “ Your question now is easily answered. The missionary is a witness of what he describes. Like the history of the world itself, his experience, when all goes well, is not worth recording ; and you forget it at once when you have read it. In the countries where missionaries are labouring, there is often a great deal of what is wrong and unpleasant going on. Is your ideal missionary to speak out as a witness or hold his tongue ? Unpleasant reports from policemen, from doctors, and from inspectors of all kinds, are as necessary and as valuable as they are unpleasant.”

“ It is strange, however, that traders don't tell the unpleasant things that missionaries do, and don't harass Government as you people do.”

“ Allow me to explain that almost all the unpleasant things of which you speak are connected with the trade of these countries, and not with the missionaries themselves. The Abyssinian war is the only exception, I think. At Kuruman any danger which we ran was in connection with the protection of traders and their property. As to harassing Government, I hope I may be able to give a faithful picture of what is going on out there. How any Government can answer for it to the English public—that is another question.”

After this we had a long talk, for my friend really wanted to understand the question ; and when we separated I have no doubt he was better able to answer those who had been bamboozling him with vapid talk, which he mistook for very clever criticism.

Being in ——— counties of England in 1882, I was offered an introduction to the editor of a well-known newspaper, who was also a pungent writer on social and political questions, under a *nom de plume* which had got to be so well known as no longer to serve the original purpose of concealment of the writer's identity.

"You come from South Africa, do you?" said this great man; "a place where we have had much trouble, but mean to have no more."

"Trouble, however," I answered, "is inseparable from empire. Whoever governs South Africa must meet with some trouble and difficulty, although not much when honestly faced."

"I assure you," he broke in, "we are not going to try it again—after the one fashion or the other; neither after what you would propose, nor what any one else would propose. We are out of it, and we mean to remain so."

"You astonish me," I answered. "What about the Convention so recently signed at Pretoria? What about the speech still more recently made in this country in support of it, and declaring that England still is in South Africa, and of course, if there at all, as Supreme Power?"

"As to the speeches, I say nothing at all. The speakers are responsible for them. As for the Convention, I know we signed something—people often do, when they are getting out of a nasty business; but we never meant to keep it; nor shall we."

I believe I whistled a low whistle just to let off the steam, and then replied calmly and pleasantly, "Will you allow me to say that by your own showing you are a bad lot—a very bad lot, as politicians."

"That may be, but it does not alter the fact, which is as I state."

"Well, I am an outsider, but I assure you the English people, should they ever know the facts, will agree with me in saying that you are a bad lot. Such doctrines in commerce would ruin —— in a day; you know that."

"The people are with us; they are disgusted and heart-sore with the whole business."

"I grant you such is their frame of mind. But I differ from you entirely as to their attitude when they come to consider the facts and doctrines, the advantages and responsibilities, of our position in South Africa. The only difficulty with me is to communicate the truth to the public mind."

Of course I felt I could expect no help in this quarter. As I rose to take leave, Mr. —— expressed his regret that he had felt bound to say unpleasant things; he assured me he had no unpleasant feelings. I replied with perfect good-humour that I sincerely hoped I also had succeeded in making the interview unpleasant for him in the position which he had assumed.

I was deeply impressed by this interview. Did this influential politician represent a large number of English people as to South Africa? Was his interpretation of the action of the Government a true one, and were they in their own minds "out of" South Africa, and resolved never to return? I have much pleasure in adding that, before I left England, I noticed that the paper which this gentleman so ably conducted, advocated the rigid definition of the Transvaal boundary-line and the retention by England of the trade-route to the interior of the country along with the Protectorate. So that when his own knowledge was increased, he turned out to be not such "a bad lot" after all, but really a true-hearted, as he certainly was a very plain-spoken, Englishman.

"I don't know what you think, Mr. Mackenzie, but we are all saying here that Mr. Gladstone made a great mistake in not recalling Sir Bartle Frere at once. In fact, we are of opinion that Frere should have been tried and hanged."

The speaker was a fine specimen of an Englishman—tall, with a good head, evidently intelligent and able, as well as strong in speech. He was a large manufacturer and local magnate. His wife was little, gentle, and yet quite fearless of her grim-looking lord. She begged that I would always make a deduction when her husband referred to South Africa; "he never could keep his temper when on that subject."

Taking no notice of this quiet statement, except by a twinkle of the eye, my host abruptly demanded, "But don't you think Frere should have been hanged?"

"My dear, you will frighten Mr. Mackenzie with your vehemence—and the first time you have seen him too; and you know you don't mean it a bit," said my hostess.

“Mean it? How do you know I don’t mean it? Isn’t it what everybody is saying here? At any rate I have given Mr. Mackenzie a text, and he must now give us his discourse.”

I was not unwilling to give him a sketch of our doings in South Africa—how we got it; how we improved it at once from what it was; how we allowed swarms of white men to get beyond our control and to become independent; how in the end we handed the future of the country over to them in the Sand River Convention, pledging ourselves never to make treaties with natives, but allowing the Boers to do so; and granting the Boers ammunition and the natives none.

“Which Government was in when that Convention was signed?” broke in my friend.

“I have never cared to look it up,” I replied; “I don’t regard that inquiry as of the slightest interest.”

I then proceeded to sketch out the work which Sir Bartle Frere had had before him—its fatal element of haste, but its calamitous failures in no way chargeable to him. “In short,” I concluded, “but for the grave blunders of others, you would have canonised Sir Bartle Frere instead of speaking of him as you do. He is the ablest man you ever sent to South Africa. As to his personal character, I do not know a finer, manlier Christian.”

“I am quite bewildered,” said my host at the end of our long conversation. “I know more about South Africa than I ever knew before, or thought I should know; but you don’t do what all political people do, and we shan’t believe in you unless you ‘pitch into’ some one. You haven’t done that yet; you have only explained the past history, and have had a good word for everybody.”

“Then, sir,” I quickly answered, “I ‘pitch into’ you, and into your Governments, one after another, for not considering and for not mastering the facts of our South African life. Why did you allow Europeans to separate in a way the United States refused to permit? And when you sent out an able man to bring these errors right again, why did you hurry on his operations? And when he had carried out

your behests, and the whole country was in your hands, why did you swear at him and refuse to acknowledge in any way that he had done what he was sent to do? And why do you now refuse to protect your own commercial highway into the interior, and at the same time conserve the work of missionaries whom you have supported for two generations, and thus put an end to the freebooting of the Boers and of our own people who join them? At present," I concluded, "there is a disarmed population—disarmed by your laws, disarmed on account of their colour; and there is an armed population—armed under your laws and on account of their colour; and you decline to interfere in any way. You will neither protect them nor give them fair-play and an open market, so that they might protect themselves."

"Now, my dear," said the little wife, "I wonder who deserves to be hanged now? I am sure we are obliged to Mr. Mackenzie for giving us such a clear view of things."

"No, no; you are always too hasty, you know," said my host to his wife quite gravely; "the thing gets very serious. Do I rightly understand you, Mr. Mackenzie, that practically we Englishmen arm those freebooters and practically keep those blacks disarmed; and when the blacks have called on us to interfere, and have offered themselves and their country to the Queen, we have paid no heed? Is this true?"

"Every word true," I replied.

"Then, may I ask, did you not fight for these people? You could surely get a rifle?" said my host, evidently in earnest, and turning right round on me.

"My dear, you forget Mr. Mackenzie has been their missionary," said his wife. "You yourself as a director of the Society would have had him cashiered if he had done anything of the kind. I know you would have voted for that."

"Nonsense; you don't see the thing. I assure you, Mr. Mackenzie, I could not have endured such meanness and injustice. I should have broken such confounded laws. I am sure any Englishman would have naturally taken the side of those so unjustly used. I should have shouldered a

rifle, I know," said the indignant man, as he paced his room.

"My dear, you would have got shot, you know," said his wife.

"Shot! Yes, certainly; why not?" said my host, and then added gravely, "A fellow would know also why he was shot." After a pause my host further inquired: "And is it true, Mr. Mackenzie, that those very blacks were, as you said, kind to our people who fled to them from the Transvaal, and that they then protected them?"

"Still quite true," I rejoined.

"Then, by heaven," said Mr. ———, raising his voice——

"Let us go to supper, my dear," broke in the gentle ruler of the house. "You are only wearying Mr. Mackenzie with your constant wish to hang some one."

I trust my kind friends will forgive me for recalling this conversation, so vividly picturing the state of people's minds in 1882. I found that most people were incredulous as to such facts being known at the Colonial Office, and there was a uniform and firm persuasion that Mr. Gladstone was perfectly ignorant that such things were going on. Everywhere I was seriously advised: "Just see Mr. Gladstone; explain the case to him as you have done to us, and you'll see he'll put it right at once."

We are in the *sanctum* of a leading London paper, and I am in the presence of the high priest, well known as an author and a politician. I was willing to be trotted out, up and down, over and across, the whole subject of South Africa. I was astounded at the strength of opinion and the narrow basis on which it rested.

"You are quite right; we have not had a working knowledge of the country which we have been attempting to govern. And I suppose the next man who arrives will overturn all that you have been saying."

"Please to separate the facts and my deductions from them. No man can gainsay the facts. There they are; stick to them. Should another man bring doctrines dissimilar to mine, test them with the facts, and judge between

us. You have got the country; hold it and govern it as practical, governing Englishmen."

"I am inclined to believe we had better clear out," said my friend half-jestingly, "and leave you to make it out among yourselves."

"Don't say so even in joke," I replied. "The attitude which you have indicated is that of a decaying State. Find out that your task is too hard; then give it up because your hand shakes and your eye is dim, and your ears dull of hearing, and your worn-out teeth are loose in your head;—and you have sealed the doom of your country. Make up your mind for what will follow. You will have to remove from the main street of the world and settle down alongside Holland in a back street in a neat, snug cottage, with flowers in the window."

"Seriously, then," said my friend, "there might be something to be said for your views, had we the men to carry out your policy. We have not got the men. We have merely the humble servants of political parties, willing to see or not to see, as they are told. We need true men; and we have not got them."

"Then you arrive by another path at the same gaping chasm. It is all up with England when it can be said with truth what you have now said."

"Well, I hope I'm mistaken. I don't see, however, how the thing is to be done, for another reason. The House of Commons has far more work now than it can accomplish. Why should it interest the legislature of this island whether one of your chiefs had sugar in his coffee or not?"

"The matters which you indicate don't come before the legislature of the island. Even the 'questions' which are daily put in the House of Commons prove incontestably that your Parliament is more than an insular one. But as it exists at present it is a disgrace to a business-like and organising people. The coffee and sugar questions, as you are pleased to term them, have almost always to do with fundamental principles of right and wrong. They are worthy of consideration on their own merits, and especially if you would save your colonists from future trouble. They are of infinitely higher

importance than many a local bill which may lead to a long discussion in your one *omnium gatherum* House of Commons."

"Well, Mr. Mackenzie, you are very impracticable. You decline to be 'labelled,' as you term it, along with any of our past South African guides. It follows that you must say your say where you can be heard. Write a review article and bring it to me when done."

I felt that this was genuine and broad-minded kindness to an unknown person like myself. And this impression was deepened some time after. Reading the papers, I found my friend had made a slashing speech, in which views dissimilar to my own as to South Africa had been very strongly expressed by him. Next time I met him I referred to this speech, and said I supposed he would not care now to be sponsor to my article.

"My dear sir," was the reply, "you quite mistake me. I very much want your views to have a chance and a good hearing. Of course you have not converted me yet. You may do so; but our old agreement still stands about the article." And so it did; and the article appeared.¹ Some introductions and much personal friendliness have also to be acknowledged by me from the same quarter—all the more appreciated that they were the good deeds preceding rather than following conversion.

"Look out, Mackenzie, you will get insulted as ——— from New Guinea was."

This was the cheering message which I received from some friends before starting for an interview from which I had been expecting great things. Beyond stating that the interview was in London with "X," a leading politician on South African affairs, it will not be necessary to make further introduction.

After the weather, voyage home, and so on, had been disposed of, "X" said, "Now, Mr. Mackenzie, I understand you want the Government to do something out there. I should like to know what you propose."

"To state it quite clearly would take a little time."

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, April 1883.

“Do it your own way. I shall be glad to listen.”

The outlines of “Territorial Government” were hastily sketched and illustrated from events in South African history. Its adaptation was shown, and its evident benefits to both natives and Europeans. As I spoke “X” rose and paced the room, but still listening; now and then interrupting and asking for more information, or for an explanation of something advanced.

When I had finished he broke in with earnestness—even vehemence, as he went on—“Mr. Mackenzie, there is not the slightest hope for the fulfilment of your wishes. Your plan is good—I am bound to say that; it is well thought out. But there is no use talking; it can never happen.”

“But why should it not happen?” I asked, in surprise.

“Because the public would never sanction it; they would not hear of it, I assure you.”

“Well, it seems quite absurd for one from Bechuanaland to venture to differ from you on such a subject; but I have a strong opinion—amounting to a feeling of certainty—that your estimate of public opinion is entirely wrong when the public know the truth.”

“The public know the truth! When will that happen? No; we go by hot and cold stages here. We were very hot a while ago; we are chilly just now; whether we shall ever be hot again I don’t know—I think not.”

“My object is to prevent the hot as well as the cold stage. Why should our interest in South African affairs suffer from hot and cold attacks, as if one of the Departments of Government had chronic malarial fever? The way to cure malaria is to convey the patient into a higher atmosphere. The way to remove your hot and cold stages is to cause you all to move in an atmosphere of truth on this subject, as if you had all been in South Africa.”

“Very easily said, but the thing can’t be done.”

“Well, we shall see. But,” I added, “your patience with my long story, and your kind remarks about it, embolden me to make a request. May I know what you would propose instead of what I have sketched?” My request was a bold enough one. What prompted and encouraged me to make

it was that I had given my own thoughts, and my interlocutor had not despised them. They could not be accepted. It was natural to ask, therefore, what he thought was to be the substitute. I was of course prepared for anything after the warning I had received. But there was not the slightest reason.

"X" sat down and spoke for some time, shutting his eyes while doing it. When he had finished, I said on the spur of the moment,

"I may as well complete my boldness by criticising what you have said."

"Yes, do."

"You have sketched as nearly as possible the old border policy of the United States—which the States Government itself has changed, and of which it is now ashamed."

"X" moved uneasily in his chair. "Yes, I daresay you are right."

"It is only our Bushmen who are mere trappers of game. The rest are tillers of the soil and owners of stock. Are you prepared for results following from your policy in South Africa similar to what has happened on the border of the United States?"

"X" said, in a tone of ill-assumed indifference, "I daresay—yes—the same results might follow."

"Well," I said, "I should not like to have to support your South African policy before an English audience."

Without intending it, my criticism amounted to a retort. Each had said to the other that his view would not have the support of the people of England. In a short time "X" had indubitable evidence as to which of us was right.

Soon after I landed in England I was asked to make a statement in the Westminster Palace Hotel to a number of gentlemen interested in South Africa. That statement was afterwards printed as a pamphlet, and extensively circulated. At the request of the London Missionary Society I also drew up a more extended account of the Bechuanaland question, and this had a still wider circulation. Being asked to deliver addresses and lectures in different parts of the country, I was expected to give a correct account of the state

of things in the country from which I had come. I did so, taking great care, however, never to declaim or to denounce. I had nothing to do with party politics; I gave evidence as to matters of fact. There was great surprise as well as indignation expressed everywhere. Resolutions were drawn up and transmitted to the Colonial Secretary—the first one sent being the deliverance of a public meeting held in the Town Hall of Birmingham.

“The meeting earnestly trusts that the British Government, through its British Resident at Pretoria and the High Commissioner at the Cape, will firmly discharge the responsibilities which they have undertaken in protection of the native races on the Transvaal border.”

My friend, Dr. Dale, who had moved the resolution, also addressed the Colonial Office on the subject. Lord Kimberley, in reply, sent his Birmingham correspondents a recent Blue-book with the information that “the High Commissioner and British Resident had been in constant communication with the Transvaal Government on the subject of these disturbances.” Whether or not this reply was satisfactory to the Colonial Secretary himself, it was not at all so to those to whom it was sent. Dr. Conder, Mr. Frederick Baines, and Mr. Thomas D. Yates of Leeds preferred to address themselves direct to Mr. Gladstone as Prime Minister, which they did on behalf of a public meeting held at Leeds, and which also passed a resolution for the protection of Bechuanaland; and a similar step was taken by Mr. Hill, the Mayor of Bradford, who was chairman of a meeting of his fellow-townsmen, the resolution on the subject having been put before the meeting by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Duff. Then Mr. Wills of Bristol addressed Lord Kimberley on the same subject in behalf of a meeting of some 2000 of his fellow-townsmen—the resolution having been moved and seconded by Mr. S. D. Wills and the Rev. Arnold Thomas. Mr. W. Chorlton and Mr. D. F. Howorth forwarded a similar document to Lord Kimberley from Ashton-under-Lyne; Mr. Thomas Rigby, in behalf of a public meeting held in Chester; and similar resolutions were moved elsewhere in England and in Scotland.

Special mention ought to be made of a communication

which was addressed to the Colonial Office by the Secretary of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, enclosing the following resolution passed unanimously at the autumnal meeting of that body held at Bristol in October:—

“That this Assembly of the Congregational Union, recognising with devout thankfulness the precious and substantial results of the labours of two generations of Christian missionaries in Bechuanaland, learns with grief and alarm that the lawless incursions of certain Boers from the Transvaal threaten the utter ruin of peace, civilisation, and Christianity in that land; and this Assembly therefore respectfully but most urgently entreats Her Majesty’s Government, in accordance with the express provisions of the Convention by which self-government was granted to the Boers, to take such steps through Her Majesty’s High Commissioner in South Africa, and the British Resident in the Transvaal, as shall effectually put a stop to a state of things as inconsistent with the pledged word of England as with the welfare and progress of the Bechuana nation, and that a copy of this resolution be signed by the chairman, and be forwarded to the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary.”

These were not words of war but of peace; they were not the words of the enemies but of the friends of the Transvaal, of whom many had been prominent in agitating for their getting back their independence. They felt that this was the just complement of that action. The Boers were to have freedom within the Transvaal, but not licence to turn Bechuanaland into a pandemonium.

In Edinburgh there is perhaps a closer contact with South Africa than is the case elsewhere, owing to the constant presence at the University of a large number of students from different parts of South Africa. An influential public meeting was held in Edinburgh, which was addressed by the late Bishop Cotterill, who had himself been many years in South Africa; by Mr. John Gifford, who had long resided in Natal; by Professor Calderwood, whose relatives have resided for many years in South Africa; and by Dr. Blaikie, the accomplished biographer of Dr. Livingstone; and by myself. Mr. Bruce, a son-in-law of Dr. Livingstone, took great interest in the question, and provided a large map to illustrate the subject then under discussion. The speeches of the evening were afterwards collected and extensively circulated in pamphlet form by the efforts of Mr. Bruce.

At this meeting my aged and venerable friend, the Reverend G. D. Cullen, who had known Mr. Campbell, the first missionary traveller in Bechuanaland, and had often entertained Dr. Moffat and Dr. Livingstone in his house, was present that evening to express his interest in the prosperity of the Bechuana and his friendship for myself. There were the kindest expressions used towards our Dutch-speaking fellow-subjects. But grave condemnation was expressed of the attitude of the Transvaal policy towards the coloured people, in making it a fundamental law that they are not to be equal to the whites either in Church or State. A great deal of misleading nonsense has been written, and is still being written and spoken about the "misrepresentation of South Africa" in England. When speakers have such knowledge of their subject as had those who spoke in Edinburgh, and when the audience contains so many veritable South Africans as were then present, it is certain that there are all the elements of fair representation and unprejudiced exposition of facts.

With reference to what occurred at this meeting in Edinburgh, the following conversation afterwards took place in a certain town in the Cape Colony. A lady and gentleman had just returned from a tour in Europe and America. They had seen many of my friends, and they themselves expressed general approval of the object I had had in view: "But could you not have accomplished it without speaking against the Transvaal, Mr. Mackenzie?" asked the gentleman, with the tone of a man who was determined to "have it out," rather than pass over an unpleasant topic.

"In so far as Transvaal claims clashed with those of the Cape Colony and of England, I upheld the latter. Do you as a Cape colonist find fault with me for doing that?"

"No, we are thankful for that help. But did you not say some bitter things against the Transvaal at some public meeting? Where was it, dear?" turning to his wife.

"Perhaps you are thinking of the meeting in Edinburgh, which young —— described to us."

"Yes, I remember now; the things I complain of were said by you in Edinburgh," said the husband.

“Well,” I replied, “I am prepared to uphold every word I said in Edinburgh, and there was not a bitter word in my speech.”

“Now I remember, my dear,” said Mrs. —, “it was not Mr. Mackenzie who said the objectionable things. But don’t you remember, what we said when we heard about it was, ‘Why didn’t Mr. Mackenzie stand up and contradict the other speaker?’”

Now at the meeting in question the speeches were delivered by gentlemen specially conversant with the subject, and who were quite prepared with chapter and verse for every statement which they made. I mention the matter to show how an undefined fault-finding, if unchecked, is liable to grow to vague opposition of an unreasonable kind, and this in the case of very excellent people.

A South African Committee was formed in London, of which Mr. F. W. Chesson was the able and indefatigable secretary. A very influentially supported address to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State, on behalf of the Bechuana, was signed under its auspices and forwarded to the Colonial Office. Twice were meetings called at the Mansion House by the then Lord Mayor Fowler (now Sir R. N. Fowler, Bart., M.P.), at which speeches were delivered by the late Earl Shaftesbury, the Right Hon. W. E. Forster, Sir Henry Barkly, formerly High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, the Hon. R. Southey, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West, and by myself.

I think the following eloquent and weighty utterances of the venerable and beloved Lord Shaftesbury ought to be reproduced in these pages, in the hope that they may stimulate right thought on this subject both in England and in the Transvaal:—

“ . . . This morning has been put into my hands the reply of the Transvaal delegates to the Aborigines’ Protection Society. I read it with a certain amount of astonishment (hear, hear), and of comfort too—of astonishment that men should be found possessing such a depth of Christianity, such sentiments for religion, such love for veracity, and such regard for the human race as to put upon record and to sign with their own hands such a denial of atrocities and cruelties which have been recorded against them for I do not know how many years.

It is most blessed to contemplate the depth of religious sentiment they express, the love they bear to our Lord and Saviour, and their desire to walk in His steps. All this is very beautiful, and, if true, is the greatest comfort ever given to the natives and ourselves. I will take that document, and you may take it along with me, as a promise for the future, that they will act upon these principles,—that they are Christians, and that they will act upon Christian principles and respect the rights of the natives. That is, perhaps, the most generous view to take of the matter; but nevertheless we shall be inclined to doubt, until we see that they have put these principles into practice. . . . Let me come to the laws of the Transvaal. It is a fundamental law of the State that there can be no equality either in Church or in State between white and coloured men. No natives are allowed to hold land in the Transvaal. With such a fundamental law, is it anything more than a necessary transition to the conclusion that the coloured people should be condemned as being of an inferior order, and only fit for slavery? (Hear, hear.) That is a necessary transition, and it is for Englishmen to protest against it, and to say that all men, of whatever race or creed or colour, are equal in Church and State and in the sight of God, and to assert the principle of civil and religious liberty whenever they have the opportunity. . . . I have my fears at times of the consequences of democratic action; but I shall never be afraid of appealing to British democracy on a question of civil and religious liberty. That strikes a chord that is very deep in and dear to every Briton everywhere. They believe—and their history shows they act upon the belief—that the greatest blessing here below that can be given to intellectual and moral beings is the gift of civil and religious liberty. Sensible of the responsibility we have assumed, we appeal to the British public, and I have no doubt what the answer will be. It will be that, by God's blessing, so far as in us lies, civil and religious liberty shall prevail among all the tribes of South Africa, to the end that they may become civilised nations, vying with us all in the exercise of the gifts that God has bestowed upon them. (Loud cheers.)”

Mr. Forster in his masterly speech went very thoroughly into the past history of the question. With reference to the Sand River Convention, he said:—

“Can anything be more grossly unfair and unjust, than on the one hand to hand over these people to this Government, and on the other hand to do our utmost to prevent them from defending themselves when their rights are attacked? (Hear, hear.) I really cannot conceive any provision more contrary to that principle of which we are proud—British fair-play. (Cheers.)” Speaking of Bechuanaland, Mr. Forster said:—“The story of these men is a very sad and humiliating one. I would rather never allude to it again.” He then glanced rapidly at the settlement of the western boundary of the Transvaal by Governor

Keate, and the immediate repudiation of his award by the Transvaal. Then came the Pretoria Convention only two years ago, which included within the Transvaal all the occupied farms, thus adding a large block of native land to the Transvaal. "That was not enough. Freebooters came over, mostly from the Transvaal, and afterwards from other parts of the country, and they were joined by several deserters from our army. Representations were made to the Transvaal Government; there was a *non possumus* reply, 'We cannot stop them.' Sir Hercules Robinson records his belief, with good ground, that they were stimulated by the officers of the Transvaal Government. The result was that the chiefs and the people lost by far the larger portion of their land. They appealed to our Government, and it did nothing. . . . Then there were again despairing appeals to England, and how were they met? I am ashamed to say how they were met. I can only believe it was through ignorance of the question it was possible to meet them as they were met. It was proposed to meet them by a miserable compensation in money or in land, not to the people, but to the few chiefs who, to their credit, as a lesson to us, a great Christian and powerful country, said, 'We will not desert our people even if you desert us.' (Cheers.) Then there came utter disorder and disorganisation in Bechuanaland. Now comes in the Transvaal Government, and says, 'Give us the country, and we will maintain order; if owners of the land object, we will put them down as rebels; we will take their land as we have taken Mapoch's, and 'apprentice' their children. These quarrels about land, you have got tired of them; leave them to us, and we will put a stop to them, because we will protect the robbers who have taken the land.' That practically is the demand. (Cheers.) Are you prepared to grant this demand? ('No.') I, for my part, say that rather than grant it I would—(A voice—'Fight')—yes, if necessary, fight (cheers); but I would do my utmost to persuade my fellow-countrymen to make the declaration that force, if necessary, will be used, which, if it was believed in, would make it utterly unnecessary to fight. The Transvaal Boers know our power well enough, and the delegates know our power; it is our will they doubt. I say, if I could not persuade my fellow-countrymen to show that they meant not to grant such demands as these, I would rather even do what I should otherwise with all my might oppose,—withdraw from the Cape Colony altogether. I am not so proud of our extended empire as to wish to preserve it at the cost of England refusing or admitting that she is powerless to fulfil her duties. . . . I wish to say a word about English taxpayers. There is among our taxpayers a strong feeling against our entry into fresh entanglements with any nation, and I sympathise with it; but if we have obligations, we must meet them, if we have duties we must fulfil them, and I have faith and confidence in the English people that, first or last, it will make any Government meet its obligations. I have said, 'first or last,' but there is much difference between first and last. Last is much more difficult than first, and much more costly than first; the cost increases with more than geometrical progression. A year or

so ago, when the freebooters first came over, Sir Hercules Robinson said that a few men, at a slight cost, could restore order, but with delay it became difficult, and would have taken more men at greater cost. (Hear, hear.) There are people who say—but the British nation will not say it—‘Leave matters alone; let these colonists and Boers and natives, whom we are tired of, fight it out as best they can. Let us declare—perhaps not declare in words; there is no occasion to do such an awkward thing—let us by our deeds, or rather by our no deeds, declare that we will not keep any promise or fulfil any duty.’ Such a course as that would be as extravagantly costly as it would be shamefully wrong. Its natural results would be withdrawal from the Cape Colony altogether; but the British people are in no humour to give up any of their colonies. (Cheers.) There are too many interests, too much of pounds, shillings, and pence involved in the Cape Colony; there are too many friends and relations of English people to make that possible. If that be not done, things will be allowed by this *laissez-faire* policy to get from bad to worse, until at last, by a great and most costly effort, and perhaps a really bloody and destructive war, we should be obliged to do in the end, at a greater cost and in a worse way, that which we can do now. It is more difficult to do it now than it was two years ago; but it is not impossible to do it now. A gentleman said it was a question of fighting. I do not believe it is. But, though born a Quaker, I must admit that if there be no other way by which we can protect our allies and prevent the ungrateful desertion of those who helped us in the time of need—by which we could do our duty—than by the exercise of force, I say force must be exercised. (Cheers.)”

In my own remarks I laid myself out to give information—pointing out the beneficial work which England had accomplished in the government of the Cape Colony, making free citizens of those whom she found practically the serfs of a commercial company. I then went on to say:—

“England established assize courts away in the borderland; she declared—and this was her first offence, according to her opponents—that all who were not enslaved should be equal before the common law of the Colony. I am here to deny that the Cape Colony regards English rule with disfavour. The Cape Colony is a loyal colony to the British Crown and the English Government. (Hear, hear.) There is no difference in this feeling of loyalty as between the Dutch and English. There is, indeed, a small coterie who wonder why the steamers do not run from Amsterdam instead of from London, and who find many other matters for wonder besides; but there is really nothing that separates Cape colonists of Dutch descent as a community from Cape colonists of English descent; they intermarry, their interests are one; and they ought not to be separated in your minds, nor ought they to be separated in the mind of the Government. But allow

me to say that what is unpopular in South Africa is this—the uncertainty of our treatment by England. (Applause.) If you look at our financial condition, if you look at the grave face of many a Cape merchant, if you consider the state in which many of the affairs of the Cape Colony now are, I believe you will be able to trace their cause home to this one thing: the uncertainty of the policy of England towards South Africa. In the Transvaal I must say, in all fairness, that England is unpopular with regard to her native policy. That policy, which was our first fault, from a Dutch colonist's point of view, is still our fault, not in the Cape Colony, but in the minds of those who long ago turned their backs upon our education and civilisation. They do not like our ways with the natives. . . . Now you will find over the whole of South Bechuanaland numerous water-furrows, constructed for the purpose of irrigation; you will find houses built after the European model, and you will find gardens where the fig, the apple, the orange, the vine, are grown; for Dr. Moffat, when a youth, was a gardener, and some of his gardening skill was communicated to those whom he went to teach. (Applause.) What I want to know is this: Who will administer a just and righteous government in Bechuanaland, so that the rights of those people who have opened up those fountains, made those fields, and are ploughing there to-day—or rather, were ploughing until they were dispossessed,—shall be preserved to them? There are fighting men enough in South Africa to do all the fighting required; we do not want your soldiers out there—we want administration. (Applause.) Hitherto your treatment of South Africa has amounted to two things, and you have rung the changes on them—fighting us or letting us alone. You are letting us alone now; you fought us but a little while ago. What is really wanted is a third thing, which is neither fighting us nor letting us alone, but is helping the Cape Colony, helping the Europeans generally in South Africa, in the great work of governing the native population. (Hear, hear.) Assist us in administering our native affairs and you confer upon us a real good. Give us some of those intelligent, able men who go in such numbers to India and elsewhere—some of the best brains and finest blood of England. (Applause.)”

Sir Henry Barkly was the next speaker. His testimony was of great value, he having had charge of the Governorship of the Cape Colony, and the High Commissionership for a term of years.

Sir Henry began by giving valuable information concerning his own action at the time of the discovery of the diamonds. He intervened at the express request of President Pretorius to avert war. The selection of Governor Keate as arbitrator or referee in the matter of the boundary-line was the doing of President Pretorius. Governor Keate had already arbitrated in a boundary dispute between the Free State and Transvaal, giving his decision in favour of the

latter. In this second case, however, as soon as the Transvaal Government were aware that Governor Keate's award had gone against them and in favour of the Bechuana, they repudiated the award.

"In my judgment (Sir H. Barkly's), we have no alternative but to proclaim a British Protectorate over the country intervening between the south-western boundaries of the Transvaal Republic, as fixed by the Pretoria Convention, and the boundaries of our own province of Griqualand West. . . . I believe, too, that this might be done at little, if any, expense, as the Bechuana, as Mr. Mackenzie has said, would willingly pay a moderate hut-tax sufficient to defray the salaries of the magistrates and the cost of the police. Apart from any consideration of duty, moreover, it is essential, in the interests of civilisation and of commerce, that this route to the interior of the Dark Continent should be kept in our hands. It has been through the stations planted by our missionaries all along it, as far even as to Matabeleland, that the civilising influences of the Gospel have been spread among the natives, so that the way has been made safe and easy for the trader and the traveller. Does any one suppose that these stations can be maintained if we suffer the road to fall within the limits of the Transvaal Republic? ('No.') We need not recall the melancholy experience of the past in this very region—I would refer rather to the case of the Paris Evangelical Society, whose missionaries were refused leave only a short time ago to teach or preach to the Basuto-speaking population within Transvaal territory. (Hear, hear.) With regard to commercial intercourse, it is, too, of the utmost importance to British interests that the route should be kept under our control. The tariff of the Transvaal Republic is said already to have become all but prohibitory to trade with the Cape Colony." Sir Henry concluded, amid loud cheers, by moving the following resolution:—"That this meeting, recognising the importance to commerce and civilisation of the preservation of the great highways into the interior of South Africa, urges upon the Government the duty of keeping open the trade-routes through Bechuanaland, and of thus securing to the British traders and missionaries all the advantages of free intercourse with the native tribes."

Sir T. F. Buxton, in seconding this resolution, brought forward the following striking thought, which might with advantage be taken to heart by South African politicians out of the Transvaal as well as in it:—

"We know how, in the United States, they have lately been celebrating the events that recall the time, a century ago, which attended the declaration of their independence. I will ask you to consider what would have been the best advice that we could have given to those who worked with Washington. Do we not know that, as to all that relates to the general wellbeing of the country, to mere matters of wealth and property, the best advice for them would have been to deliver their country from all connection with slavery, in those days when they formed her constitution? (Cheers.)"

The Hon. R. Southey said :—

“I have much pleasure in supporting the resolution proposed by Sir Henry Barkly, and entirely concur in the opinion that it is of great importance that the road to the interior of South Africa from the Cape Colony should be kept open ; not only for the purposes of trade—which is much larger and more valuable to England than the public generally are aware of—but also as a way by which the Gospel might be carried from here to the vast regions beyond Her Majesty’s possessions in that part of the world. No reasonable doubt can be entertained that if we allow the Transvaal State to annex the territory through which the roads to the interior pass, not only will there be difficulties put in the way of our traders, but the missionary also will find it no easy task to obey the injunction to carry the Gospel into all lands, and to preach it to all people. (Hear, hear.) With regard to the trade, I may say, while administering the government of Griqualand West, I made it a point of duty to endeavour to ascertain its value, and from the best information I could obtain, I estimated it at one million pounds sterling per annum. (Cheers.) That sum represents the value of British manufactured goods carried to the interior, and of the raw materials brought from there for the English and Cape markets. I concur entirely in what has been so well said by the Right Honourable Mr. Forster. With regard to slavery, it may be admitted that the institution does not exist in *name* ; but in reality, if not actual slavery, something very closely allied to it does exist ; for in that country there is no freedom for the coloured races.”

Sir William M’Arthur, M.P., in proposing a vote of thanks to the Lord Mayor, said :—

“I have attended many meetings at the Mansion House, but I have never seen one larger or more enthusiastic ; and I believe that the feeling which animates this meeting is animating the whole country. (Hear, hear.) The course of action taken by Her Majesty’s ministers will be very closely watched. I myself am for peace, but I am also for that which maintains peace, viz. a firm and decided policy. (Loud applause.)”

CHAPTER VIII

THE TRANSVAAL STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN SOUTH AFRICA —THE DELEGATES IN ENGLAND, 1883-1884

THE idea of sending a deputation from the Transvaal to Europe in 1883 was in the first place chiefly connected with pecuniary affairs. The Transvaal Government wished to raise a loan. It was said there was deep and enthusiastic sympathy for the Transvaal in Holland, and the avowed object was to obtain this loan, if possible, not of English money (3841, 45). A certain movement for the formation of a National Transvaal Bank, supported by a Holland house, had fallen through, and the manner in which this had happened caused no little discussion in political circles in Pretoria. Money was also sought in Germany; or rather, proposals to the Transvaal Government were made from Germany by professional men who had offices in Pretoria.

On the 18th August 1882 Mr. Hollard, who was then in Berlin, asked the Transvaal Government, through his firm of Hollard and Keet of Pretoria, for a monopoly of banking business in the Transvaal for certain German clients of his; and added: "It is unnecessary to remind your Honour how advantageous it would be to this Republic to open commercial dealings with Germany" (3841, 47). This also fell through.

It came to be a general opinion in the Transvaal that their financial affairs were being somehow mismanaged by correspondence. The remedy for this was the appointment of a deputation to Europe.

In June 1883 Her Majesty's Government were informed that the Volksraad of the Transvaal had resolved

that the time had come for the reconsideration of the Pretoria Convention, and that the Transvaal Government had been duly authorised by the Volksraad to take the necessary steps. The question was put whether Her Majesty's Government was prepared to receive a deputation of which the President or Vice-President would form a member, and whether the conference would take place with Her Majesty's Government in London or with an Imperial Commission in Capetown.

Messrs. du Toit and N. Smit were first appointed by the Volksraad as a Financial Commission, and instructed to proceed to Europe. It was understood that these gentlemen would also be members of the Deputation concerning the reconsideration of the Pretoria Convention, the Transvaal President or Vice-President being added to their number. It was supposed at Pretoria that an Imperial Commission might possibly sit in Capetown with reference to the political questions, which could be attended by the Transvaal Commission on their way to Europe; and it was hoped (in July) that the business connected with the boundary-line, debt, and other matters, would soon be accomplished, and that a report on the subject would be ready for a meeting of the Volksraad in October. Lord Derby, however, not only held it desirable that the conference should be in London, but mentioned also that it would not be convenient to assemble before the end of October. The Transvaal Deputation left Pretoria early in September on their way to London *via* Capetown.

The Secretary of the Transvaal Government addressed the Premier of the Cape Colony in the month of August, announcing that a deputation from that State would proceed to England to discuss with Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies a proposed revision of the Convention of 1881; and he inquired "Whether the Colonial Government would accord the said Deputation an interview, during their stay in Capetown, for the purposes of discussing certain questions of general interest, affecting both governments—more especially our western boundary-line and the disturbances on that border" (3841, 58). In addressing the

Premier direct the Transvaal Government Secretary had again committed a breach of the Convention, which provided that such request should have been sent through the British Resident ; but the Acting High Commissioner waived this, and agreed that the Premier should also reply direct in a semi-official manner. Mr. (now Sir Thomas) Scanlen (3841, 57) accordingly informed the Transvaal Secretary that the Cape Ministers would be happy to give the Transvaal Deputation the interview requested—a step which was duly approved by Lord Derby (3841, 38). When, however, the Deputation reached Capetown, and had consulted with the friends of the Transvaal there, they declined the interview which they had negotiated through their own State Secretary—giving, as coming from them, the astounding reason that Cape Ministers were “not authorised by the Colonial Parliament” to hold such an interview with them ! (3841, 120) The “loyal” Cape Colony was not to be consulted at all, and its interests were to be ignored.

This is more fully explained by a petition from the office-bearers of the Afrikaner Bond, which was presented to the Acting High Commissioner, and by him forwarded to Her Majesty’s Government in October 1883. It professed to represent the views of

“Many thousands of Her Majesty’s faithful subjects, mostly of Dutch extraction, residing in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, who deeply sympathise with their compatriots of the Transvaal state.”

The burden of the petition was as follows :—

“That your Majesty’s petitioners beg humbly to express the hope that it may please your Majesty’s Government to favourably entertain the proposals which will be laid before them by the Deputation with reference to certain of the provisions of the Convention in question, more particularly in connection with the boundaries prescribed to, and the pecuniary obligations and the restrictions as to its liberty of action imposed on, the Transvaal State” (3841, 79).

In other words, grant the Deputation all they ask ! Let the Transvaal be again without boundaries, as in the time of the Sand River Convention ; and thus hand over to it the destinies of the whole country, and the welfare of the Cape Colony. Reduce or forgive them their debt ; and remove all

restrictions on their liberty of action. There can be no doubt that advice more detrimental to the whole of South Africa, or more disadvantageous to the Transvaal itself, could not have been given than is found in this petition of the Afrikaner Bond. Although it was conceived in friendliness to the Transvaal, for Her Majesty's Government to have granted its request would have been ruinous to the Cape Colony and the Transvaal alike; for the sway of the filibuster means the destruction of confidence between man and man, the ruin of trade, the flight of capital from the country, and the crushing of all lawful enterprise.

It may be worth while here to inquire as to the reputation and policy of the Transvaal Government, whose delegates on their way to England received this fraternal recommendation from the managers of the Afrikaner Bond at Capetown. The Transvaal is a country as large as France. Its population consists of some 50,000 whites, and some 600,000 or 700,000 natives. It is a fundamental Transvaal law among the Boers that no coloured person is the equal of a white person, either in Church or State. No coloured person can own land in the Transvaal in his own right. No coloured inhabitant of the Transvaal can move about his own country without a pass. White men, strangers or citizens, need no pass. There is no official recognition or registration of coloured people, either at birth, marriage, or death.

With reference to the disturbances on its western border, the attitude of the Transvaal Government had been most unsatisfactory. The chiefs on one side were those who had been brought forward by President Burgers, and through whose names he endeavoured to evade the award of Governor Keate. The chiefs on the other side were those who had called themselves "English," and had befriended Englishmen and loyal Cape colonists during the Transvaal war. At one time the Transvaal Government is ignorant of these disturbances—they are beyond its border, and those who engage in them are no longer its subjects. At another time it declares that the Transvaal Government alone is capable of giving peace to that country.

On 16th October 1882 the State Secretary of the Transvaal, in despite of the Convention with England, formally acknowledged the agreement of cession from the chief Massow to the freebooters, and accepted the same on the part of the Transvaal Government (3486, 35), and defended this course of action in a long letter of a very unusual tone, dated 6th December and addressed to the British Resident (3486, 43).

The Transvaal Government was afterwards somewhat more guarded in its reply to Mr. van Niekerk :—

“ Under existing circumstances, and until the necessary alterations have been made in the Convention, the Government cannot take any steps in the matter, but is prepared to take this request into favourable consideration so soon as opportunity is furnished for so doing by revision of the Convention ” (3841, 24).

This was addressed to Mr. van Niekerk while at Pretoria urging upon the authorities the annexation of Stellaland.

In November 1882 the Secretary to the British Resident found in the freebooter laager, and in active conference with the leaders at Rooi Grond, a prominent burgher of the Transvaal, whose residence was near Pretoria, and whom he knew as having been often officially employed by the Transvaal Government (3486, 57).

On 14th February 1883 a Special Commissioner was sent by the Transvaal Government to the western border to arrest thieves and freebooters, whether black or white. After this Commissioner met Mr. van Niekerk he refused to take any step without his sanction (3686 ; 53, 54). By sworn deposition it was declared that many Transvaal burghers had paid substitutes among the freebooters, and that this Commissioner had himself nine paid substitutes among Van Niekerk's volunteers, and that thus he expected to get nine farms (3686 ; 69, 70).

In the same deposition the names of some fifty burghers of the Transvaal are given, most of them landowners, who were also enrolled volunteers or freebooters, and many of them with sons and substitutes besides.

When the war with Mapoch was being carried on by the Transvaal Government, the districts from which the

“volunteers” of Moshette and Massow were known to be chiefly enrolled were exempted from sending men to the Government commando (3686, 25)—they were already suitably engaged.

In July 1882 the Secretary of the Transvaal Government, in reply to the request that the Transvaal Government should assist the Cape, Free State, and Imperial Governments, in putting down freebooting on its western border, remarked: “It appears to Government that the remedy proposed is worse than the disease” (3419, 54). In August he added that “It would be premature (or rash) in the highest degree, in the judgment of the Government, to undertake an armed intervention for the restraint of tribes which may quite probably prove to have right on their side” (3419, 81).

In December 1882 the High Commissioner wrote of the Transvaal Government:—

“I am unable to hold out any hope of inducing the Transvaal Government to restrain those of its subjects who are engaged in the acts of brigandage referred to. The resources of argument and protest have already been exhausted by Mr. Hudson” (3486, 28).

The High Commissioner, giving his impressions of the Transvaal policy on the western border, said (3486, 52):—

“If Montsioa and Mankoroane were now absorbed, Bonokwani, Makobi, and Bareki would soon share the same fate. Haseitsiwe and Sechele would come next. So long as there were native cattle to be stolen and native lands worth appropriating, the absorbing process would be repeated. Tribe after tribe would be pushed back and back upon other tribes, or would perish in the process, until an uninhabitable desert or the sea were reached as the ultimate boundary of the State.”

These extracts might be multiplied indefinitely. Enough have been given to indicate the character and aims of the Transvaal Government up to the time of the coming of the delegates to England.

The Deputation from the Transvaal—consisting of his Honour President S. J. P. Kruger, Rev. S. J. du Toit, General N. J. Smit, and Mr. Ewald Esselen, Secretary—reached London early in November 1883, and had their first interview with the Secretary of State at the Colonial Office on the 7th of

that month. Lord Derby was assisted by Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony, in the numerous discussions which took place with the Deputation, and the London Convention was signed on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, not by the Secretary of State, but by the High Commissioner. That document, however, bears date 27th February 1884, so that the deliberations of the Transvaal Deputation and the Colonial Department of Her Majesty's Government extended over the best part of four months.

The annual banquet to Her Majesty's Ministers was about to be given by the Lord Mayor of London at the date of the arrival of the Transvaal Deputation in England. Dr. Clark (now M.P. for Caithness), whose good offices to the delegates were afterwards specially acknowledged by the Transvaal Volksraad, along with those of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Derby, informed Sir Robert Fowler of the approach of the Deputation, and suggested that an invitation might be sent to them to attend the civic feast. Now Alderman Fowler had himself travelled in South Africa, and had used his own eyes and ears in acquiring information within the country itself. He had formed strong opinions adverse to the pretensions of the Transvaal, and had both expressed and upheld them. But here he was approached on a tender side. Generous and hospitable, with cheery face and honest open heart, it must have been to him a peculiarly unwelcome thing this same clever suggestion of Dr. Clark. That gentleman had, in fact, landed the excellent Lord Mayor on one horn or the other of a dilemma. If he invited the Deputation, what had become of his very strongly-expressed speeches in the House of Commons? If he failed to invite them, what had become of Englishmen's proverbial hospitality to strangers? Sir Robert Fowler chose that his enemies should call him churlish rather than insincere, and Dr. Clark's friends were uninvited. Of course no one blamed the Lord Mayor for mere want of hospitality; and those who were surprised and shocked at the sternness of the rebuff were by this very means prompted to inquire into the facts of so peculiar a case.

But what the Deputation probably resented more than

any social slight was the public unfolding of their own policy with its results to English commerce, to the well-being of our fellow-subjects in the Cape Colony, to the interests of the natives, and to the prosperity of South Africa generally. This confronted them in the columns of an evening paper which has rendered great service to South Africa, accompanied by a map, and with my own name as the writer. They had, no doubt, intended to proceed cautiously till they should have step by step secured that supremacy in South Africa which they thought was within their reach. Later on, but while the discussions still hung fire, an article appeared in a leading review from the same pen, exposing more fully and in detail the pretensions of the Deputation and of the Transvaal Government, and showing the necessity which lay upon the English Government to refuse to accede to their request. The supremacy desired by the Transvaal ought to be exercised by the British Government in the interests of all, and this could be done by a scheme of territorial government for native territories. The editor of the *Contemporary Review* having sent proof copies of the article to the two last Governors and High Commissioners, Sir Henry Barkly and Sir Bartle Frere, they in reply testified their approval of the scheme¹ therein brought forward. I also addressed the Secretary of State on the same topic, again giving the leading features of "Territorial Government" (3841, 124). In his reply Lord Derby said:—

"Your proposals for a combined and systematic administration of native affairs beyond the frontiers of the several colonies and states appear to his Lordship to be well considered, and a policy such as you have indicated would doubtless, if firmly and judiciously carried out, avert many difficulties and dangers" (3841, 136).

Thus the delegates found during their stay in London that while their assumptions were disapproved, an alternative policy had secured considerable approval from practical and intelligent people.

The High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony joined in the work of explaining the value of

¹ *Contemporary Review*, January 1884.

Bechuanaland to England and to the Cape Colony. Nor was the information which he gave confined to South Bechuanaland. Sir Hercules Robinson was deeply impressed with the importance of North Bechuanaland, the depot of the trade being Shoshong, and extending to Lake Ngami and the Zambesi.

As to Mashonaland, "gold is found there," the High Commissioner informed the Secretary of State, "not only in quartz, but in extensive alluvial deposits. Mashonaland possesses a soil of unsurpassed fertility, and is capable of yielding tropical products in great variety. The development of the natural resources of this country is, I believe, merely a question of time, and a valuable new market will then be opened up to British commerce if the trade be not diverted into other channels by a prohibitory tariff or vexatious restrictions. It seems to me that it would be a serious injury to British commerce, and to the interests of the British communities in South Africa, if the great highway from the Cape to the interior of the Continent were given over to the Transvaal Government. I enclose a sketch showing Shoshong, Khame's capital, and Gubuluwayo, Lobingula's capital, as well as the roads branching from Shoshong to Lake Ngami, the Zambesi, Matebeleland, and Mashonaland" (3841, 152).

It would have been well if all this had been seen and admitted by the High Commissioner at Pretoria after he had received my letter pleading most earnestly for the protection and care of Bechuanaland, and when a fellow Commissioner proposed that it should be pacified by the appointment of Residents. It was natural, however, to suppose that Sir Hercules knew more of the interior of the country now than he did then; and that his opinion now was one on which the English Government and people could rely. Thus the testimony of Sir Hercules Robinson was most beneficial both to English commerce and to the highest interests of South Africa at this crisis. He had got a firm hold of the whole question, and had pleasure in upholding his opinions, which had no doubt great weight in Downing Street.

The chief Mankoroane, having been informed that the Transvaal Delegates would discuss important questions concerning Bechuanaland, and which were of vital importance to himself and his people, left Bechuanaland and proceeded as far as Capetown on his way to England to represent his own case there. He was informed, however, that Lord

Derby had decided that he could not be admitted to the Conference in London, where the ownership of his own country was to be discussed and settled. Mankoroane then requested that I should be recognised as his representative, but was again told that neither personally nor by representative could he be recognised at the Conference in Downing Street; but any remarks which I might make on his behalf would receive the attention of Government. When I was informed of this decision, I accepted "the humble position" which had been accorded to the chief Mankoroane, and placed his case and that of Montsioa before the Secretary of State (3841, 92).

At their first interview with Lord Derby the Transvaal Deputation were requested to put in writing a formal statement of their grievances and their proposals. In this document, dated the 14th of November, the Deputation declared that they objected to the Pretoria Convention in its entirety, and claimed that the Sand River Convention should take its place. But in whatever form it was obtained, what they claimed was complete independence; such an extension of territory as would lead to permanent peace and liberty; and that all restrictions on the Transvaal as to its intercourse with native tribes on its borders should be removed. In reply Lord Derby informed them that the Sand River Convention no longer existed. Her Majesty's Government were not able to agree with statements in the document handed in either as to the past or as to the present state of affairs, but invited them to state more explicitly their views as to the western border line. The Deputation now put in a draft treaty, the second article of which gave the amended boundary-line of the Republic. The addition proposed to be made to the Transvaal was to include Montsioa, Moshette, Massow, and Mankoroane. In support of their proposal a historical statement was put on the table, which was to the effect that the Boers had conquered Moselekatse: Moselekatse occupied Bechuanaland, therefore Bechuanaland belonged to the Boers by right of conquest. They went on to strengthen their case by citing deeds of cession from certain chiefs, who, they said, were "paramount." The Keate award was mentioned as one

of the "encroachments on the Republic." Lord Derby informed the Deputation that their draft treaty was "neither in form nor in substance such as Her Majesty's Government could adopt" (3841, 121). There were certain chiefs who had objected, on behalf of themselves and their people, to be included in the Transvaal; and there was a strong feeling in England in favour of their independence if they did not come under British rule. The Secretary of State now brought forward a map showing the addition eventually granted to the Transvaal. But when first shown the map the Deputation could not agree to any such arrangement. It was a sad fall from their immense pretensions. It is true, Her Majesty's Government were giving away by their proposed boundary-line some 2600 square miles of native territory—concerning which they had no real evidence that its owners wished to be joined to the Transvaal. But this was nothing to the Transvaal demand, as shown in the map which they afterwards put in, and which included an additional block of 4000 square miles! For a time there was the possibility that no new arrangement would be practicable. It had come out in the correspondence that there was to be a British Commissioner in Bechuanaland. This was the very worst news to the Deputation; but when it was coupled with a map showing much less addition of territory than in the map which they put in, they took up the position that other questions, such as the remission of debt, should be settled first, and that the wishes of the chiefs should be consulted in the matter of the boundary-line! The boldness of this course was beyond all belief. They professed to be representing the interests of certain chiefs, when such was not the case at all.

In a sort of farewell letter, dated 18th December, Lord Derby told them that, "If they could not meet the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, their visit would not have been without result. The friendly interchange of explanations had already led to a clearer understanding on both sides of the considerations to which special weight must be attached; and you have received personal assurances of the willingness of Her Majesty's Government to make such concessions to your State as may be fair and practicable, and at the same time

have learnt the feeling of this country on those points to which public opinion has most earnestly directed itself." His Lordship added that a Commissioner would be appointed and sent out to make the necessary inquiry, after which deliberations could be resumed, as Her Majesty's Government felt bound to press for the settlement of this boundary question first,—it was the first article in the Pretoria Convention (3841, 137).

The fact was, it was not easy for those who had confidently expected to secure for the Transvaal the leading place in South Africa, to have to be content with less than a secondary position. This was quite unexpected by them. The inhabitants of the Transvaal had long seen the political and commercial advantages flowing from the possession of the territory to their west. But the Cape Colony had taken no interest whatever in the question; while the recent abstention of England invited to the belief that that country no longer recognised any interest or any responsibility which would interfere with the pretensions of the Transvaal to supremacy. Expecting to have merely to come and state their case and have their petition granted, the Deputation found that the English public had been put in possession of the facts of the case, and what was really involved in granting their request; and the English Government positively declined even to consider the propriety of returning to the state of things under the Sand River Convention. When the Deputation issued its synopsis of history, the Colonial Office declined to discuss the details, but expressed an entire divergence of opinion. Their manifesto¹ to the English people convinced no one, and its tone and style were calculated rather to beget suspicion than to allay it.

¹ The style of this document may be judged from the following extracts. The first represents the Transvaal weeping over the errors of other people in various parts of the world. "The horrible misdeeds committed by Spain in America, by the Dutch in the Indian Archipelago, by England in India, and even in the present century by the Southern planters in the United States—constitute a humiliating portion of the history of mankind, over which we, as Christians, may well blush, confessing with a contrite heart our common guiltiness. The labours of the Anti-slavery Society and the Society for the Protection of Aborigines, which have been here, as in other countries, the means of rousing the public conscience to the high importance of this touch-

The Delegates' denial of slavery was met by the Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, who brought forward some awkward testimony of recent date. But what was equally to the point was the suggestion in an evening paper that President Kruger should for ever silence his calumniators by demanding a Commission of Inquiry, which would be authorised to take evidence within and around the Transvaal as they might see fit. This challenge the Delegates took good care not to accept. There was no declamation, no calling of names, on the part of those who opposed the pretensions of the Transvaal. The Deputation had a monopoly of this luxury. They freely called names and tried to lead off public attention on side issues; but their opponents kept to the main question, and pressed it calmly and without any bitterness. Was the Transvaal to be the future dominant political power in South Africa—to the prejudice of the Cape Colony and of the whole of South Africa, as well as to the detriment of England? The reluctance of the Transvaal Deputation, therefore, to give up its ambitious schemes only led to the greater study of the question on the part of the English people; and to a firmer and more intelligent resolution than had ever been entertained before, to act the part as well as reap the benefits of the Supreme Power in South Africa. The firmness of Government was fully justified by the actual facts of the case before them; and their attitude was supported by a general consensus of public opinion. The protracted discussion of the Bechuanaland question in England by the Transvaal Deputation and those who put forward the other side of the subject, was of signal service to the highest interests of South Africa. English people came

ing matter, cannot be, according to our opinions, sufficiently lauded and encouraged." As to the charges brought against the Transvaal, they were met by a flat denial. They might be true as to actions done long ago. "On that account we humbly pray to the Lord our God to forgive us the sins that may have been committed in hidden corners. . . . Believe us, therefore, gentlemen, when we say that the opposition prevailing in some circles to our Government is caused by prejudice, and this prejudice is fed by misunderstanding. If you leave us untrammelled, we dare hope to God that ere a new generation has passed by a considerable portion of our natives in the Transvaal will be converted to Christianity—at least, our Government is preparing arrangements for a more thorough Christian mission among them."

to understand the question, and there was no difference of opinion on two points—that supremacy in South Africa was at stake, and that England, not the Transvaal, must exercise it.

So far as this adverse public opinion in England existed, it was the Transvaal Deputation itself which most effectually developed and confirmed it against their own pretensions. Had their cause been one which the English public could have approved, the visit of the Deputation to London would have secured its triumph. It was well known when they arrived in London that they had many friends, and the press and the public generally were quite ready to consider any just or reasonable claims in a favourable light. When the representatives of a separate Government visit England, as the Deputation did, in an official capacity, and sit for months in conference with members of Her Majesty's Government, and when, not content with their influence in the conference-room, they address themselves through the press to the public of the country, they ought to be prepared to abide by the issue. The decision of the English public was even more strongly against their claims than was shown by the attitude of Government in the London Convention. And this was because the two sides were before the public, and they saw the hollowness of the pretensions of the Transvaal. Indeed there can be little doubt that if they had stayed longer in London, and written more manifestoes to the English people, they would have found that a still more adverse current of opinion would have set in, and they would not have received a rood of fresh native territory. Already a protest against the enlargement of the Transvaal was sent up to Government from a public meeting held in Edinburgh.

I may here give President Kruger's own explanation of his failure in England as given to his Volksraad on the return of the Delegates to Pretoria. He said:—

“It seemed to him that the Raad was a little too severe in its judgment upon the British Government. He could not say that the British Government had not been willing to hear him, yet it had been induced to withhold justice from the Deputation by lies and fraud on

the part of traitors and intriguers, of whom Mr. Mackenzie was one. There were officials of Her Majesty whom Her Majesty must believe. He said that if Her Majesty really caused an impartial investigation to be made, they would learn the real truth. At present the Government went on the letters of liars. The Government in general, and Mr. Gladstone in particular, were influenced by the opinions of the English people, to whom they must give account. If it had not been for Mr. Mackenzie and the High Commissioner, everything would have been right. These liars had stirred up the people to stand in the way of the Government, and therefore the Deputation had approached the people with their memorandum. The whole Ministry had listened to them with attention; that was a fact, and so his Honour would not blame Her Majesty nor Her Majesty's Government. Yet he agreed that the liars and intriguers whom he had mentioned were the reason that everything was not settled as they wished. The High Commissioner and Mackenzie were the origin of the opposition experienced" (4213, 42).

It was, no doubt, out of deference to the feelings of President Kruger and his companions that the chief Mankoroane could not be received into the conference-room in Downing Street. Mankoroane could see the Acting High Commissioner at the Cape; his representative in London could see Lord Derby or Sir Hercules Robinson, but neither chief nor representative was qualified to sit in conference with the gentleman from whose official utterances I have just quoted.

After long delay, several interviews, and the exchange of letters, and after a further modification of the line so as to include Kunwana (the town of Moshette) in the Transvaal, the Deputation gave a conditional agreement to the line proposed by Her Majesty's Government. These conditions were as follows:—

"1. That the Government of the South African Republic shall not be bound to take part in a demarcation which is to be carried out by force of arms."

Lord Derby agreed to this, explaining that, "if found necessary to remove freebooters, that might be effected by the border police force intended to be established for the protection of the territory."

"2. That the chiefs Massow and Moshette shall, with their subjects, retain their *de facto* rights to land outside the said line."

Lord Derby in his reply completely ignored the "rights" of the freebooters. He says: "I do not understand that Massow has

either subjects or land outside the boundary proposed by Her Majesty's Government ;" and refers to the small "location" which the Stellalanders' own map was apportioning to Massow. As to Moshette, his occupied lands west of the boundary would be preserved to his people ; but he could not be allowed to transfer his rights to others without the sanction of Her Majesty's Government,—thus disallowing the rights of Goshen freebooters.

"3. That the Republic should not be held responsible for the difficulties which might arise by placing part of the subjects of Massow and Moshette outside the Transvaal."

"Her Majesty's Government need not hesitate to accept your third condition, because, unless such difficulties as you refer to should be caused by the improper action of Transvaal citizens, the State could not fairly be held responsible for them."

"If, then," Lord Derby went on to say, "you accept the boundary offered by Her Majesty's Government, it must be understood that you do so without any reservation, and under an honourable engagement that the State will co-operate loyally with Her Majesty's Government by enforcing order within its own borders, and by preventing its subjects from making encroachments on the native territories beyond the boundaries of the Transvaal State, as expressly provided in the 19th Article of the Convention of Pretoria" (3841 ; 158, 159).

It is to be noted that however far the Deputation may have gone in their personal statements and conferences in Downing Street in urging the claims of the freebooters, or "white colonists," as they termed them, they never in any formal manner mention them or recognise them in any way in their corporate capacity as "states" or "republics," but always as connected with one or other of the native chiefs, Moshette or Massow. According to the Deputation, the "white colonists" were the subjects of these chiefs, and had *de facto* "rights" as such. But we nowhere hear from the Deputation of the "Republic of Stellaland," or of that of "Land Goossen," or of the "United States of Stellaland." In the same way the "treaties" and "proclamations" and letters connected with these enterprises had all been before Her Majesty's Government for more than a year ; but the Colonial Office knew only of native chiefs in Bechuanaland who had rights to land, and whom they intended to protect, and of "freebooters," the great majority of whom were Transvaal subjects, who might or might not be expelled from

Bechuanaland. In February 1884 there were no "republics" or "states"; the Transvaal called certain individuals "white colonists," the "subjects" of Massow and Moshette; the Colonial Office and Sir H. Robinson called them by the one name of "freebooters." As to their number, Sir Hercules said that official information had been received by cable from Capetown, to the effect that there were only about fifty farms occupied by freebooters to the west of the new line, and that Vryburg consisted of about twenty houses (3841, 143). This information was probably correct.

When the Deputation had at length agreed to the amended boundary-line, and when the establishment of a British Protectorate in Bechuanaland had been definitely determined on by Her Majesty's Government, the High Commissioner, on the 8th of February, suggested that no time should be lost in selecting a Resident Commissioner to take charge of the territory, "especially as the telegraphic reports show that the freebooters of Stellaland are again threatening to attack Mankoroane." Both at the Colonial Office and elsewhere I mentioned my idea of the fitness for this office of two officers whom I had known in Bechuanaland, mentioning especially one of the two. The High Commissioner was kind enough to express the opinion that, "having thought over the names of all the suitable persons with whom he was acquainted," it appeared to him that I was "by far the best fitted for the post" (4036, 3). In addition to the Resident Commissioner, he recommended the appointment of an Assistant Commissioner, capable of organising and commanding a mounted police force of not less than one hundred men. Forming the opinion, from all I heard, that Her Majesty's Government were convinced of the necessity for a more intelligent and continuous policy in South Africa, that our position would be upheld there as the Supreme Power, and that the "Territorial Government" of native territories such as Bechuanaland was looked upon with favour, I resolved, in submission to God's will, to devote the rest of my life to assist in carrying out this great work. It was after weeks of deliberation that I came to this conclusion, although the formal offer and my formal acceptance are

dated on one day, the 21st February 1884 (4036, 6). The directors of the London Missionary Society, as private friends, encouraged me to take the step. At my request, and in consideration of my services to the Society, extending over more than twenty-five years, the directors formally undertook to grant to my wife the allowance falling to a missionary's widow should anything untoward happen to me in my work of quelling the disturbances in Bechuanaland. The nature of my engagement with the Government was such as to render necessary this precautionary measure on my part. I may say here that those directors have since shown in every practicable way their kind appreciation of my services in the cause of the peace of Bechuanaland and of South Africa.

But, returning to the Conference at the Colonial Office, while it took more than three months to settle the first article in the new Convention, which defines the boundaries of the Transvaal, it did not take three more weeks to agree to the rest of the articles of that document. The question taken up after the boundary-line had been decided was that of the Transvaal debt. This was now considerably reduced—the deficit incurred in the Transvaal while it was under direct British control, amounting to £127,000, being now subtracted. This left a balance of £256,000 still owing by the Transvaal, being the amount of the Transvaal debt at the time of the annexation, and the sum which had been advanced to meet allowed claims for compensation. But the interest on the full amount of the debt, £380,856, was to be charged till such time as the Transvaal Volksraad ratified the new Convention. In the end, the new debt was formally recognised to be £250,000—six thousand pounds having been struck off, perhaps to get round numbers (3947, 46).

One of the grievances of the Deputation had reference to the name by which their country should be known. The name recognised in the Pretoria Convention was "Transvaal State." But from the first the Transvaal Government declined to use any other than their old ambitious title of South African Republic—a title answering to the ideas of

those who hoped to exercise supremacy throughout the interior. But when the first article of the Convention was agreed to, and the supremacy was secured for England in behalf of the Cape Colony and of South Africa generally, Her Majesty's Government felt that it was of little or no consequence by what name the Transvaal Government should be known, and there was no difficulty, therefore, in agreeing that the name should be "The South African Republic," if the Delegates desired it.

The most unpleasant question to Her Majesty's Government now, was undoubtedly that of the suzerainty. That measure had been launched with many strong statements of approval from the highest political authorities. What was its history? The High Commissioner declared it as his opinion that, "if the suzerainty is abolished . . . the natives would, at all events, be in no worse position than they are in at present under a Convention which, as I have shown, the one side does not intend to enforce, and the other does not intend to observe" (3841, 107). These authoritative words recalled to my mind very forcibly the outspoken admission of my acquaintance: "We did sign something; but we never intended to keep it."

Of course if the suzerainty was abolished, the visible sign of it to the natives within the Transvaal—the British Resident—would also be taken away. This was most awkward in connection with the large promises which had been made to those natives, who stood to the Boers in numbers very much as ten or twelve to one. The ten natives had openly begged us to remain in the Transvaal; the one Boer declined, and we left the country. But in leaving, and in answer to the earnest remonstrances of the ten native inhabitants, we pointed them to the British Resident, through whom we should still be able to defend them from any injustice they might anticipate from the one Boer. All that could be done in London in the way of preserving self-respect was to extract a promise from the Deputation that they would behave well to the natives of the Transvaal. The pledge was, of course, given at once: they would observe towards them "everything prescribed by divine

law or human feeling." It was then declared by the Secretary of State that "It will be evident that the interests of the natives, and their relations with the Government of the Republic, are thus placed on a better footing than under the provisions of the former Convention" (3947, 60). Whether, therefore, the English Government appointed a Resident at Pretoria or removed him, it was the very best thing that could be done for the natives!

As soon as Reuter's Agency communicated to the Cape the fact of my appointment there was telegraphed back at once from Capetown a chorus of opposition to it—the only reason given being that the Transvaal and its sympathisers would not like it. It was known all along that the Transvaal Government could not be expected to be cordial in their approval of me in any capacity whatever, any more than of the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, although they had nothing to bring against the one or the other, except the earnestness with which we had opposed their pretensions to political supremacy in South Africa. This sort of feeling on the part of the Transvaal was looked for from the first; but it was felt that the successful administration of the affairs of Bechuanaland would be of such evident benefit to the Transvaal that groundless opposition would soon be exchanged for more friendly feelings.

After the arrival of the Cape telegrams it was evident that a certain party at Capetown would also go some length in gratifying the Transvaal opposition. My friends, however, felt assured that the patent fact that I had fought the battle of the Cape Colony would soon make an end of all Cape opposition to the appointment, especially as I had been nominated by their own Governor. I was told that it was not improbable that some of the messages were sent or inspired by those who had recommended friends of their own for the work. This sort of thing is not unknown, it seems; and the telegrams had not the slightest effect in Downing Street, where it was well known that there had not been time for any one to have ascertained "general opinion" at the Cape in the very brief interval between the receipt of the news and the despatch of the adverse telegrams.

No one could have been more friendly and cordial than Sir Hercules Robinson at the time of these unexpected telegrams.

The result of the protracted labours of the Conference sitting at Downing Street was thus announced on the 27th of February 1884, by Lord Derby to the Acting High Commissioner at the Cape :—

“ Convention signed to-day. New south-western boundary as proposed to the east of trade road. British Protectorate over the country outside Transvaal established with Delegates’ consent. They promise appointment of border Commissioners inside the Transvaal, co-operating with ours outside. Mackenzie British Resident. Debt reduced to quarter million. Same complete internal independence in the Transvaal as in Orange Free State. Conduct and control of diplomatic intercourse with foreign Governments conceded ; Queen’s final approval to treaties reserved. Delegates appear well satisfied, and cordial feeling between two Governments. You may make above known” (4036, 10).

It is very important to notice the date of this official announcement, as also the definite and comprehensive nature of the statement which was then made by Her Majesty’s Government.

Sir Hercules Robinson, who had been of great assistance to the Colonial Office during his stay in England, and especially in connection with the visit of the Delegates and the drawing up of the new Convention, returned to South Africa on the 7th of March. While in London he gave his very warm support to the scheme for the “Territorial Government” of native countries which I had brought before the Government and before the public. Sir Hercules was entertained at a banquet by his friends before returning to South Africa, which was attended by the Marquis of Lorne, Lord Derby, and other distinguished noblemen and gentlemen interested in our colonies and in South Africa especially.

According to the report of his speech in the *Times* of the 4th March 1884, Sir Hercules Robinson, having described the various elements of the population, and noticed the important fact that the native races were not decreasing but increasing rapidly, in explanation of the com-

plicated nature of the work of administration in South Africa, put forward as the aims of Government :—

“(1) To bring about between the variously governed European communities something approaching to uniformity of system and action upon matters of common concern ; (2) to allay and eventually to extinguish race animosities between the two European sections ; (3) to provide for the protection and gradual elevation in the scale of civilisation of the natives, while arranging for that expansion of the white race which was inevitable, and which, if properly regulated, would prove of great advantage to all concerned. These were the problems which had to be solved, and the last which embraced the whole question of frontier policy, was the one which had constituted for so long a time the main difficulty in the administration of the South African possessions. . . . If we would only steadily realise the conditions with which we had to deal and adapt our administrative system to them, the case was far from hopeless.”

Sir Hercules announced his support of the “Territorial Government” of native territories in the following words :—

“The question of frontier policy remained the most difficult one with which we had to deal. He believed that some simple and inexpensive form of Territorial Government was wanted, which would provide for the protection and political growth of the tribe, and for the cultivation of the unoccupied lands by Europeans until the territory became ripe for absorption in the colonial system.”

It was generally understood by those present that the High Commissioner's remarks on this important part of his subject had direct reference to the scheme which had been submitted to Her Majesty's Government by myself. The necessity for such a scheme arose from the inability of colonies or states to manage the affairs of native countries outside their borders, even when fairly successful in managing their internal business. On this subject Sir Hercules said :—

“Responsible government, he should say, as far as the Cape Colony proper was concerned, had been a complete success, notwithstanding the fact that the natives within the represented districts exceed the Europeans in the proportion probably of nearly two to one. Where responsible government at the Cape had broken down has been in the attempt to govern extra-colonial native territories, such as Basutoland and the Transkei. It was too much to expect that the Colony, when first started on the course of self-government, could at the same time take upon itself the administration of populous native territories beyond its borders. In placing

extensive native territories under the government of the majority for the time being in the popular branch of a legislature in which these native territories were wholly unrepresented, the system has broken down. The Colony has been obliged in consequence to restore Basutoland to the Imperial Government, and if it could, in like manner, see its way to free itself, at all events for a time, from the responsibility and burden of the Transkeian provinces, he should then look forward with great confidence to the future of the Cape." With reference to the recent Convention with the Transvaal, Sir Hercules Robinson said that "it could not but be considered as most liberal to the Transvaal. It gave to the Transvaal as much of Bechuanaland as could be handed over without abandoning our native allies and sacrificing our trade road from the Cape to the interior of Africa."

These important utterances were received with much approval by those whom Sir Hercules Robinson addressed, and also by the public when his speech appeared in the papers. Lord Derby expressly said in his remarks at the banquet that "he agreed with Sir Hercules Robinson in everything he had said." Thus the difficult question of frontier policy in South Africa had at length found a solution of which the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner publicly approved. The direction and management of the "expansion" or spread northward of Europeans was to be under the control of Her Majesty's Government, and not left to chance, filibusters, and speculators.

The Secretary of State, in sending after the High Commissioner to South Africa on the 14th of March copies of the new Convention, and of the collected correspondence connected with it, thus referred to the immediate duties which were before the High Commissioner in connection with Bechuanaland:—

"The steps to be taken for marking out and maintaining the new western boundary of the South African Republic, and for the preservation of order in Bechuanaland, have been considered with you before your departure, and I anticipate that on Mr. Mackenzie's arrival you will have been prepared to instruct him to enter at once upon his duties, and to notify to those concerned the establishment under him of Her Majesty's authority in the protected territory. I trust that the Government of the South African Republic will be prepared on your invitation to appoint a person without delay to beacon off the amended south-western boundary, in conjunction with the surveyor to be appointed by you. It is important that this boundary should forthwith be distinctly defined, in order to preclude doubts and disputes as to the limits of each jurisdiction; and if, unfortunately, the Govern-

ment of the Republic should not be able to take part immediately in this work, it may be well that you should have the line marked for your own guidance" (3947, 60).

Nothing could be more clear or business-like than these instructions. The Protectorate, as to its own internal work, was not to depend in any way on the attitude of the Transvaal Government. The High Commissioner was not to consult with the Transvaal Government on that point, but to attend without delay to the establishment of the Protectorate. The object in view in defining the boundary-line at once was the same object which had induced the High Commissioner to recommend, and the Secretary of State to agree to, the alteration of the western boundary-line of the Transvaal, and that was to include within the Transvaal the majority of the freebooters. It was well known that their claims extended into the Protectorate; and it was not proposed by Government that these claims should be refused when it was found practicable to grant them; but the new line at once disposed of an important part of the freebooting community, along with Massow and his native auxiliaries; and when they were included in the Transvaal, the work of administration within the Protectorate would undoubtedly be rendered all the simpler. To secure this object, therefore, Lord Derby instructed the High Commissioner to take immediate steps, and he was to define the line for his own guidance, even if the Transvaal Government did not see its way at once to assist in this work. Nowhere has a reason been given by the High Commissioner why this excellent recommendation of the Secretary of State was not carried out. The Deputy Commissioner was sent single-handed into Bechuanaland, the Protectorate was established, and treaties were signed, but no step was ever taken by Sir Hercules Robinson to separate from Bechuanaland those very men whose separation from it he had so earnestly advocated in London.

Mr. Forster, when I called to say good-bye, said to me that I had now my own policy in my own hands. "We have believed you in the reviews and on platforms. Now work it out in South Africa."

"There may be a mess," I replied, "where freebooting

has so long prevailed. Success may hang fire, but it is sure, and Territorial Government will secure the future peace and progress of the country. Only have patience and give me fair-play."

"Well, I hope you can look for the support of the Government now. We shall watch your movements with keen interest. May God prosper you!"

This was the farewell of a true-hearted Englishman,—a friend of South Africa and of our Colonial Empire.

But the farewell which affected me most was that of Sir Bartle Frere, who was then stretched on what turned out to be his deathbed. He was very ill, and not seeing people, but was so gratified that what he had proposed in 1878 as to Bechuanaland should be carried out in 1884, that Lady Frere asked me to call and see him before I sailed.

The countenance of this eminent officer was now thin, his voice was weaker; but light was still in his eye and the mind quite unclouded. "Here I am, Mackenzie, between living and dying, waiting the will of God."

I expressed my hope for his recovery.

"We won't talk about me. I wanted to see you. I feel I can give you advice, for I am an old servant of the Queen. I have no fear of your success now on the side of Government. Sir Hercules Robinson, having selected you, will uphold you with a full support. The rest will depend on your own character and firmness and tact. I am quite sure you will succeed. Your difficulties will be at the beginning. But you will get them to believe in you—the farmers as well as the natives. They will soon see you are their friend. Now remember this; get good men round you; get, if possible, godly men as your officers. What has been done in India has been accomplished by hard-working, loyal-hearted men, working willingly under chiefs to whom they were attached. Get the right stamp of men round you and the future is yours."

This was the last kindly action and friendly advice of a distinguished, noble-minded, and self-forgetful Christian man, who had befriended me as an obscure person—our meeting-

ground and common subject being the future welfare of all races in South Africa. I went forth to complete my life-work: he remained to die.

Before leaving England I had the pleasure of meeting a number of friends at breakfast in the Westminster Palace Hotel, at the kind invitation of Sir William M'Arthur, who had long taken a keen and intelligent interest in South African affairs. It was to myself a gratifying ending to the work of two years in England, and a contrast to my first meeting in the same building in July 1882. Gentlemen whom I had never met before stood up and were pleased to say that, through my writings and speeches, they now understood South African affairs as they had never done before, and trusted Her Majesty's Government would quietly and firmly go forward on the lines which I had recommended. The Hon. Evelyn Ashley, Under Secretary for the Colonies, kindly attended on this occasion, and made a speech, for which I felt grateful personally, and gave thanks in my heart on behalf of South Africa. The great principle seemed to be now openly recognised that Her Majesty's Government ought to assume responsibility for the peace of native territories on our colonial borders where native rule had broken down, and that some scheme of Territorial Government must necessarily form part of our future policy in South Africa.

Leaving the English aspects of the question which had been so far happily settled in a way which, as I hoped, would redound to the honour and advantage of England, as well as to the benefit of the Cape Colony and South Africa generally, I gave some attention on board ship to the South African aspect of the same all-engrossing subject,—and now more especially with reference to the supply of adequate force to support the administration of native and practically unoccupied territories by England. I was clear that force ought to be forthcoming; it was unreasonable to suppose that England could undertake such work alone and unaided, as a permanent measure. No doubt the administration of native territories was an Imperial respon-

sibility, which would be acknowledged by English statesmen generally, especially in view of the separated condition of the colonies and states of South Africa. But it was also quite evident that this administration of partially unoccupied native territories by England was a question of the first importance to all Europeans in South Africa. To all lovers of peaceful progress it would be in the highest degree welcome. There could be no doubt that young colonists (and old ones too) who were really interested in the welfare of the country would support a well-conducted English administration, if necessary, by their services in the field. It stood to reason that, if they did so, and desired to settle as farmers, or in other capacity, in the native territory for the orderly government of which they had taken the field at the call of the High Commissioner, they should have the preference in any government grants of land which might be given out in the district in question. I felt quite sure that there were good and true men enough in South Africa to put down mere filibustering. They needed only to be called out and organised and controlled under rules which, while they would not interfere with their local status or their fealty to their local Government, would constitute them members of a force to be held in reserve by the High Commissioner in case it should be needed in the general interests of South Africa. In each native territory a local police force would be raised, which in most cases would be adequate for the pacification of the district. But the hands of Deputy Commissioners, and of the High Commissioner, and of the party of order and good government throughout the country, would be strengthened if the High Commissioner's reserve force were known to exist for the specific purpose, and for that purpose only, of upholding law and order in disturbed native territories. I made some progress on the voyage in thinking all this out, and roughly sketching for my own satisfaction how such a force could be enrolled, attested, held in readiness, and assembled for action with perfect efficiency and with the minimum of expense to Government.

BOOK II

THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE—
INCIDENTS AND ADVENTURES AMONG THE
FREEBOOTERS



BECHUANA PITSHO OR TRIBAL COUNCIL.

CHAPTER I

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROTECTORATE—SIGNING THE FIRST TREATY

I WAS not many days in Capetown, and spent the time chiefly at Government House. Nothing could exceed the kindness of Sir Hercules Robinson, nor his anxious desire for my success. "I have only one anxiety," he frequently said—"that some ruffian may 'pot' you; otherwise I have no doubt of the result." The High Commissioner kindly said he would trust entirely to my judgment, and I had to press for written instructions, which were given in the following terms:—

"GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
"CAPETOWN, *April* 12, 1884.

"SIR—I have the honour to request that you will proceed to Bechuanaland as soon as you can conveniently do so, and on your arrival enter upon your duties as Deputy Commissioner, notifying to those concerned the establishment of Her Majesty's authority in the protected territory.

"The accompanying copy of the new Convention made in London with the Delegates from the South African Republic, and the map attached, will show you the new south-west boundary of the Transvaal, and place you in possession of the arrangements to which the Delegates have agreed, with a view to prevent encroachments, and to maintain order upon both sides of the border.

"I think it undesirable at this moment to fetter you with any positive instructions upon matters of detail. It will be better for me simply to indicate the main objects desired, and to leave you full discretion when you have made yourself acquainted with all the local circumstances, to adopt provisionally, subject to my subsequent confirmation, such measures as you may, in your judgment, consider most judicious with a view to establish the Protectorate upon a just and stable basis.

“As regards Mankoroane, the principal objects to be secured would seem to be the maintenance of order throughout the territory which this chief still retains, and the prevention or settlement of inter-tribal disputes. Mankoroane should also be prohibited from granting lands to Europeans which belong to the subordinate chiefs, and discouraged from giving away his own tribal lands, unless with the full consent of his Raad, and unless it can be shown that such lands are not required for the support of his people. It should be understood that the quit-rent on any lands in Mankoroane's country, which he may alienate, will be payable to the Protectorate for the purpose of aiding to defray the cost of the administration.

“With reference to Stellaland, you have already perused the two reports which I have received from Captain Bower as to the state of things which he found existing in that territory, and, if you should concur in the conclusion arrived at by him, that the white inhabitants of the so-called Republic cannot now be expelled, and that their farms do not seriously entrench upon the lands necessary for the natives, you will be at liberty to recognise the grants already issued, upon condition that these farms continue liable for the same quit-rents as those reserved in the grants, and that the burghers will engage to render military service when called upon, for the maintenance of order within the protected territory, and for the defence of its frontiers.

“Should you decide to leave the present European population of Stellaland in possession of their lands, it will be desirable that you should, as soon as practicable, make some provision for the administration of that portion of the territory. In such case you are authorised to appoint, subject to my confirmation, an Assistant Commissioner, to reside at Vryburg, and exercise authority over the white population in that neighbourhood.

“The case of the persons laying claim to the so-called Land of Goshen would appear to differ materially from that of the present European population of Stellaland. The farms assigned to Moshette's volunteers in Montsioa's country have never been inspected, surveyed, occupied, or improved. Moreover, the territory left to the chief Montsioa by the new Convention is so limited that no portion of it could well be alienated, and you may find yourself obliged to order the ejection of the persons now trespassing at Rooi Grond. In such a case it may happen that prompt and decisive action may be necessary, and should you feel yourself strong enough, you are authorised to take such action as may seem to you to be desirable, without delaying for a further reference to me.

“The question of native taxation must be deferred until I receive your report, but it is important that the native population should at the outset clearly understand that they will be expected to contribute towards the expenses of their protection; and you should in your first interviews with the chiefs explain to them that although the details of the scheme have not yet been settled, they must undertake to bear their fair share of the expenses of the Protectorate, and to pay such taxes as may be decided on.

“You are aware that Major Lowe has been appointed Assistant Commissioner to take charge of the police, and has been authorised to raise ten men for service in Bechuanaland. Should you consider it desirable to increase this force you may do so up to twenty-five, but that number should not be exceeded without previous reference to me.

“The information at my disposal is at present so incomplete, and the circumstances of the country vary so from day to day, that I do not feel myself enabled at this moment to give you more precise instructions as to the future administrative arrangements of the Protectorate. You are authorised to exercise your own discretion within the limits I have sketched out, and to make such temporary provision as may seem to you to be necessary for the preservation of peace and order within the territory.

“When you are in a position to submit to me a full report you may perhaps find it convenient to pay a short visit to Capetown, so as to confer with me personally on the subject of your proposals, and you are at liberty to adopt this course if you should consider that you can, without inconvenience, absent yourself for a short time from the territory.—I have, etc.

“(Signed) HERCULES ROBINSON,
“*High Commissioner.*

“John Mackenzie, Esq., Capetown.”

One of the results of the new departure of the English Government as to native administration in South Africa was the creation, under the High Commissioner, of the office of Imperial Secretary and Accountant. Captain Graham Bower, the private secretary of the High Commissioner, had a short time before received this appointment, and, when I reached Capetown, had just returned from a journey to Bechuanaland, which he had performed at the request of the High Commissioner. His information and views were at my disposal, and have since partly appeared in the Blue-books (4036, 34). They were the observations of a stranger after one flying visit to entirely unknown scenes and persons. I found that Captain Bower had at this time been impressed in the most favourable manner by the leader of one of the two parties of volunteers under native chiefs; the other leader he had not visited. Further, our Imperial Secretary had expressed his open approval of the validity of the claims of Mr. van Niekerk and his followers, and he had conceived a plan of action which he declared would lead to instant success. That plan was, briefly, to ratify at once and without question the land claims of one set of

freebooters—those in Stellaland—and then at their head proceed to Goshen and turn out of Bechuanaland by force the other set of freebooters. This plan was seriously and persistently pressed on me by Captain Bower with evident sincerity, and in undoubted friendliness and desire for my success. I told him I must go and see things for myself all round, and that I could not then see my way to accept his plan. Reflecting on the great urgency and persistency with which Captain Bower mentioned his full assurance that he could cause it to succeed, I considered it my duty to tell the Imperial Secretary that I would have pleasure in standing aside and giving him the fullest opportunity, with the High Commissioner's consent, of carrying out the plan which was in his mind. I also laid the matter before the High Commissioner, and formally offered that Captain Bower, who had just come from Bechuanaland, should return thither if the High Commissioner approved of his ideas. I did not hesitate to say that I thought the proposal that Stellaland should expel Goshen reminded me of the Scripture words about Satan casting out Satan, but I had no difficulty in giving way to Mr. Bower if desired to do so. The High Commissioner, however, at this time refused very decidedly to entertain the proposal of his secretary, and I should not have considered the subject worthy of notice here at all except for the mischievous influence of this unfortunate idea on the after history of the Protectorate. It can be clearly traced in my instructions, a copy of which has been given. I had pressed upon me a blank book of title-deeds for farms. I was advised at once to give one of these, with my signature, for every freebooter's title in Stellaland, and then at the head of my band of burghers, march on Goshen and drive every freebooter into the Transvaal. These men were to be my force as against troublesome natives also. All the while this was to be an English Protectorate, and I was listening to the serious advice of the first, and at that time the only, officer of that Native or Territorial Department, for the establishment of which I had pleaded by pen and tongue in England!

Two officers besides Captain Bower had entered Bechua-

naland before I reached Capetown. Major Stanley Lowe, an able officer of the Colonial Border Police, and whom I had known for years in Bechuanaland and its borders, was to be the head of the Bechuanaland police whensoever they were enrolled. Mr. Edward Chapman, long known in Bechuanaland and among many of the volunteers, was also specially engaged at my request for temporary service. On arrival at the Cape I found, to my great surprise, strong opposition to both these men. As to the opposition to Major Lowe, it was accompanied by strong recommendation of another person who was in no sense so well qualified to fill the office. But the opposition to Mr. Chapman is worthy of special attention. As soon as I reached Capetown I was gravely told that he was a firebrand, that his appointment had been a great mistake, and that I ought to telegraph and recall him at once. Having known Chapman for many years, I positively declined to condemn him unheard; but telegraphed to him that serious charges were being brought against him in Capetown of inciting to war, and that I should be glad if he would explain at once. It then came out that the report was entirely malicious and unfounded, and that, instead of encouraging to war, Major Lowe and Mr. Chapman together had succeeded in dissuading Mankoroane and his allies from proceeding to attack Massow after they were assembled to do so to the number of some 800 men. But Chapman had apparently too great influence with Mankoroane to please some people. There were great schemes on foot at that time to get the chief to grant not only land but this and that privilege, to the detriment of the country and of Her Majesty's Government. A person of good colonial education and connection was availing himself of a recently-bestowed position among the natives, to work diligently for himself, his relatives, and his friends. I present the reader with the facsimile (only reduced in size) of a scheme which this person projected for securing the metals in Mankoroane's country with grass and water, if you please, for all cattle necessary in carrying on mining operations. Mankoroane was to obtain a third of the profits, this white man was to get a third, and Chapman (whose favour must be secured)

Cession of Minerals & Precious Stones

I Mankoroan Molehabanue Paramount Chief of the Bathapin Country by and with consent of my Council do hereby grant cede & transfer unto

meur my Heirs & Successors, all and every right title and interest and authority in all Minerals and precious Stones &c. existing in my dominion with full concession thereof, privilege and power to search for, dig, and otherwise secured to themselves for a period of 99 years

And I hereby further concede and grant the right to said Parties and their assigns to use such lands and grazo such cattle mules horses &c. as may be necessary to carry out mining operations

And I exclude and prohibit all and every persons other than those with their assigns in favor of whom these presents are granted, save and except those who shall have authority from said Parties from in any way searching for mining or otherwise obtaining Minerals and Precious Stones.

In consideration of this Cession the Parties hereto agree to pay over to the Chief Mankoroan one third share of the net profits on the 31st Dec-ember of every year.

Thus done at Tanung this day of 1887

As Witnesses

Mankoroan ^{his} Molehabanue
 Paramount ^{mark} Chief
 Baccinyane ^{his} Molehabanue
 Bogani ^{his} Molehabanue
 Massa ^{his} Molehabanue
^{mark}

was offered a third. As it was not imagined that he would refuse an offer so tempting, the documents were drawn up, and, as the reader will see, only needed the crosses of the chief and a few councillors and the consent of Chapman. But Mr. Chapman declined a third of the minerals, and declined to be a party to robbing Mankoroane and the incoming British Government. Yet this was the man who was declared to the High Commissioner in confidential talk in Capetown to be a firebrand, and one who ought to be at once removed from Bechuanaland at all hazards. A matter of this kind could not but give me uneasy feelings. In leaving Capetown to encounter the difficulties of Bechuanaland itself, I felt that, remaining upright as an Imperial officer, my difficulties were likely to increase in Capetown.

It was understood that my present journey was to a great extent one of inspection and introductory work. The treaties with the native chiefs would give us a standing in the country. Some arrangement would be come to with the Stellalanders. As to the Goshenites, they were regarded as having no claim whatever. When I had gone over the country as far north as the Molopo I was to return to Capetown, and laying my information before the High Commissioner, confer with him as to the steps necessary for the future government of the country. What appointments seemed to me on the spot to be absolutely necessary I was to make, but only provisionally, until on my return I should be able to lay the whole matter before the High Commissioner. This seemed a very reasonable and desirable proposal, and I regarded the arrangement with satisfaction.

As Captain Bower had reported the presence of European ladies at Vryburg, I resolved to take Mrs. Mackenzie with me to Bechuanaland, which already had been our home for many years. My son, Dr. J. Eddie Mackenzie, accompanied me as secretary, without salary.

On our way through the Colony we had opportunities of meeting the colonists and hearing their views. One day while the mules were feeding I made my way to the neighbouring farmer's house, and the goodman, having no doubt seen me coming, met me at the door in his shirt-sleeves, and

invited me to enter. When I told him my name in answer to his question he turned round and had another look at me. "Do you change your mind?" I asked, smiling; and added while I still stood at the door, "It is not too late."

"Nie, kom binnen, mynheer—Nay, come in, sir," he warmly replied, showing me a seat.

"And you are the Mackenzie we have heard so much about," he added, looking me again full in the face.

"Well, I suppose so; my name is Mackenzie certainly. What have you been hearing about me?"

"Only what I read out of the newspaper. I don't credit all I read in the paper. But I want very much to hear from yourself what you propose to do in the country you are going to."

I set to work at once, for my time was necessarily short, and explained to that honest farmer in his own language what I had urged on platforms and through the press in England. The native had his rights—I would uphold him in the possession of them. But it was a wide country, and there was room for all. I wanted to see unoccupied land at the disposal of Government, and not the prize of the freebooter. We went over the whole question; my friend making several inquiries, which showed he was closely following me. When I rose to leave he held out his hand, and I felt that his heart came with it when he earnestly said, "I heartily thank you for making this difficult matter clear; to-day I quite understand it; it is true, as you say, that as Christians we must do the right thing; and I pray that God may bless you and give you much success."

Such interviews made me feel assured that the policy which England was commencing was one which would meet with the warmest approval of the better stamp of colonists, provided it was fairly brought before them. I was aware that certain papers circulating among them had been spreading very distorted views of the designs of England in Bechuanaland, and I took every opportunity to set the people right on the subject. I was not sure that at the previous elections the new departure on the part of the Imperial Government as to the management of native

territories, which involved such striking advantages to the Cape Colony, had formed the subject of a single address to Cape electors by Cape Members of Parliament. Had Sir Thomas Scanlen and his supporters fully informed and instructed the Cape electors as to what had been done in England, and what was proposed in Bechuanaland, Sir Thomas would have become the most popular man in South Africa, and the history of the Bechuanaland Protectorate might have been from the outset quite different. But in all these matters we receive according to our faith. Confidence was not reposed in the Cape electors ; they were not fully and in a painstaking way informed concerning the great advantage to the Cape secured by the action of Her Majesty's Government, and the minds which were not filled with the truth on this subject were carefully supplied with incorrect statements and the crudest doctrines by that part of the Cape press which did not approve of the growth of English influence in the country.

On reaching the Diamond Fields, on the other hand, I found that Kimberley people had watched with the keenest interest the discussion of South African affairs in England. They spoke to me intelligently of the "new departure" of Her Majesty's Government, and expressed their firm belief in its success ; as it would mean practically the gradual opening up of native territories to European settlers under Government control, and with due regard to the rights of the natives. It gave me great pleasure to meet leading colonists holding these views, which, however, since that time have been more generally diffused throughout the Colony. But while there was approval of the new step taken by Her Majesty's Government, I must also bear testimony that there was great doubt and anxiety expressed by the best people. "Will they stick to it?" was the great question. "Yes," was my invariable reply—"they will stick to it."

It took some days to purchase mules and a waggon, with all the necessaries for a journey in Bechuanaland. While attending to this in Kimberley, the difficulties awaiting me were brought very vividly to my mind by meeting friends and acquaintances from Bechuanaland—from Stellaland,

and from other parts of that country. One of the worst phases of the matter was the indecent haste with which certain men had pushed forward selfish projects, inimical to Her Majesty's Government, as soon as it was known that the Queen's authority was to be established in the country. One colonial politician and commercial man "nursed" a petition for immediate annexation to the Cape Colony. Another speculative person went on advertising farms in the rest of Mankoroane's country, which he offered to colonists on certain terms. Judged by their actions, there was at this time no section of society in the Colony more distrustful of the Imperial Government than a few colonists, not of Dutch extraction, who moved heaven and earth to prevent the establishment of Imperial authority in Bechuanaland, and to forestall it by arrangements of a most questionable description, which would have made native protection a misnomer, and the support of British administration by local revenue an impossibility. It was at this time that I received from a veritable Stellalander what he wished me to regard as a reliable account of the state of things. The volunteers of Massow, he said, were tired of their unsettled life. At first they had regarded my appointment with great suspicion, but further information had dispelled this in a great measure; and if I was not precluded from making some concessions to these men, I had every prospect of success.

While in Kimberley I also met a colonial business man and Member of Parliament, who had just returned from a visit to Stellaland. His picture of my prospects was gloomy in the extreme, and ended with the assurance—which was, however, uttered in the tone of a warning—that "he did not think I need fear any personal violence." My reply was not what he expected. I told him I was surprised that he should speak of violence to an officer of Her Majesty's Government in that way; that I had reason to believe there was not the slightest prospect of anything of the kind; but that if there was, he might depend on it I should hold him and others responsible who had been intermeddling with Stellaland and Bechuanaland affairs from the moment they were assured that Her Majesty's Govern-

ment had resolved on a Protectorate. As he had friends and correspondents in Stellaland, I should regard his professed friendliness as proved if he wrote at once to them, urging that in his judgment the best thing they could do was to welcome the Protectorate. The letter was written.

Staying over Sunday in Kimberley, I was asked to conduct evening service in the Presbyterian Church. Not knowing any reason why a Deputy Commissioner should not give an address on some helpful Christian subject, I consented, and spoke on our Lord's meaning in washing His disciples' feet. It was easy to go through a ceremonial feet-washing once a year; but the spirit of Christ's action was required of us every day. In no other country had Christian people such an opportunity of following in the footsteps of Christ by bearing with one another, and especially with the ignorant, the unlovely, and ungrateful.

I arrived in Taung, the residence of the chief Mankoroane, on the 30th April. The chief came out to meet us, accompanied by some of his headmen, his agent Mr. Donovan, and some Europeans. Mr. Donovan, in a complimentary speech, welcomed me to Bechuanaland. I found that Major Lowe and Mr. Chapman had done much good in the country since they had entered it; and they were able to give me much reliable information.

As I entered Bechuanaland the petition to which I have already referred, asking for annexation to the Cape Colony, was despatched by the Stellalanders. This document was declined by the Speaker of the Cape House of Assembly, inasmuch as it contained a gross attack upon an Imperial officer—that officer being myself. Copies, however, were sent from Stellaland to the High Commissioner, and they are published in the Bluebooks (4194, 2). Mr. Bodenstein, who headed the signatures in this adverse document, and whose brother was then Chairman of the Transvaal Volksraad, soon afterwards became one of my heartiest supporters, openly and publicly withdrawing all that he had said against me.

My chief duty at Taung, in the first instance, was to explain to the chief and people the establishment of Her

Majesty's authority in the country, and to obtain from him in due form a treaty granting to Her Majesty's Government jurisdiction in his country—over both Europeans and natives. At the request of the High Commissioner, Mr. Leonard, who was then Attorney-General of the Cape Colony, gave me instruction as to the objects to be secured in this treaty and the manner in which it should be drawn up.

I drew up the treaty in English and in Sechuana—reading the latter to the chief and his councillors and people: the former I read to the chief's agent and other Europeans. The chief's agent came to me after reading the documents, expressing his approval of the manner in which the treaty had been drawn up; but there was just one omission. I had made no mention of the land-claims—of course he meant only the *bonâ-fide* ones. I replied that I did not intend to do so: whatever was to be done as to the land would be done outside this introductory treaty, which merely secured jurisdiction for Her Majesty's Government in the country, but did not include sovereignty in land. Mr. Donovan pressed his point; but I was quite firm in my answer to a request which was altogether unreasonable and out of place. I was not surprised when I learned that this gentleman—who occupied the position of a law and general agent in a frontier town in the Colony, and who knew perfectly well what he was about in all its bearings—was doing his best with Mankoroane and with his headmen to prevent them from signing the treaty at all. Others tried what strong drink would effect, Europeans condescending to go about at night with black bottles containing brandy, to excite the minds of the chief and people, so that the natives might refuse the treaty, and thus be put in a false position from the outset, and be judged unworthy of any consideration. To me these agitators said that the treaty was a good one, and needed only one addition to make it perfect—the sanction of the grants of land. But when the same people spoke to Mankoroane and his headmen, they posed as their fast and disinterested friends, asserting that the treaty was a dangerous document. What did I promise them? What were they to get? It was quite plain what

they were giving away. Mankoroane was going to make himself a common person, and pay taxes, but what was to be the return? They should pause before signing the treaty. This was my first opposition in Bechuanaland, and it was neither from natives nor from Boers, but from Englishmen,—or, at least, from my fellow-subjects under the Queen.

The chief Mankoroane sent me a private message to say my mind was to be perfectly at rest—he would sign “the paper”; but he thought it a good opportunity to try some of his white friends to see wherein their friendship consisted. At length the chief said in public meeting: “How comes it that when the protection comes to me which I have so long and so earnestly asked, you who are English tell me I must not accept it? How is it,” addressing his agent publicly by name, “that you have often hastened the signature of documents so that we did not know properly what we were signing; but when the treaty with your Queen comes for signature you say I ought to beware? I am satisfied; the treaty is brought by Mackenzie, whom we have long known; and I shall now sign it.” The opposition now made what is called a graceful surrender, and some of them even came forward and affixed their names as witnesses.

The chief Mankoroane, a well-disposed and not unintelligent man, had now been several years at the head of a disturbed country. As the reader is aware, he had asked the administrative help of Her Majesty’s Government in 1878; this was now 1884. Much had taken place in the interval, to the ruin of Mankoroane and his people and to the loss of any government that might be established in the country. The land question in Mankoroane’s country in 1878 was a simple question; in 1884 it was complex enough.

It was evident to me from the beginning, although I positively declined to drag it into a treaty dealing specifically with other points, that there could be no settlement or peace in any part of the country till the disputes about land were formally investigated. From the first time I spoke in the public courtyard at Taung, I declared myself to be desirous, on the one hand, to see lands in the occupation of the chief and his people which would be adequate

to meet their wants; on the other hand, I would be no party to repudiate gifts or sales of land which had been really transacted by those who transacted the business of the tribe. The natives all knew I wanted them to take root and prosper in their own country, whilst if I pretended not to wish well to the white men no one would believe me; for were they not my own countrymen? After consultation with the chief and his headmen, I thought I could see my way to do something at a future time towards the settlement of a very difficult problem, and announced that every one who had any claim to land in Mankoroane's country, or to land claimed by Mankoroane, from whomsoever the title had been given, should lodge the same with the Assistant Commissioner, Major Lowe. I also stated it as my own opinion that an inexpensive Land Commission might be sanctioned by the High Commissioner to arrange the conflicting land claims, but that I had no intention of taking part in such decision while I had to do with the Commissionership. These arrangements gave general satisfaction—not, of course, to those who expected a goodly part of the country for themselves and their families, along with a large share of wood and minerals. These people could not be satisfied, and what true servant of the Crown could satisfy people of this stamp? But both the natives and the other Europeans were satisfied, and waited with confidence for the date which I had fixed.

The land question in Mankoroane's country embraced many diverse interests and conflicting statements with reference to Stellaland. Mankoroane took up the position that the land division which was shown by the beacons erected by the volunteers of Massow had never received his approval or consent. He held that the treaty of peace had never been carried into effect, and had fallen to the ground. What had been carried into effect by the volunteers acting alone and at variance with the terms of the treaty had never met with his sanction or approval, much less that of his headmen and people, and had never been submitted to arbitration of any kind.

Then there were a considerable number of land claims

which had been produced by the action of Mr. J. G. Donovan as agent for Mankoroane. I had to give special attention to this class of claimants on another occasion, and will describe them when I come to narrate the events of the period in question.

The third class of land claims, and the only one which carried any weight with it in the mind of the natives, was that of Europeans who had long resided in the country, or who had been granted certain farms for specific and acknowledged services. But I found that in some cases even these could not be granted without full inquiry and equitable arrangement, for the same farm had been given to more than one person by the same chief; the same farm had been given to different persons by different chiefs, and so on. I was deeply struck every day with the real loss which the country and its people had sustained through the giving up of Bechuanaland after the Griqualand West Force occupied it in 1879. Its affairs were then simple and easy of management and settlement. I had now to deal with the legacy of years of complication, mismanagement, intrigue, and self-seeking advice.

I found that the question of Mankoroane's "paramountcy" was one on which his European agent's susceptibilities were of the tenderest kind. Never had chief a vassal so jealous of his lord's honour and prestige. But in reality the value of certain documents of cession, etc., depended entirely on the interpretation of this same question of paramountcy, so that the ardour of attachment on the agent's part was not matter of sentiment after all. The object was to make me commit myself publicly to an admission of the reality of this paramountcy and sovereignty in land from an English legal point of view. This, of course, would have been preposterous, as importing foreign ideas into the native mind for the purposes of Europeans. I approached the subject from the native point of view entirely, and in connection with what I knew of the actual history of the country. The Transvaal and the English Governments had regarded Mankoroane and his predecessor Mahura as in some loose sense paramount or pre-eminent

among the Batlaping. But that was from the outside, and did not interfere with the actual state of the case in the Batlaping country. This question is treated of elsewhere, but is here mentioned on account of the difficulties which were placed in my way in connection with it by those who, professing to be the friends of the natives, were really endeavouring to get possession of their country as fast as they could. Having done so, they hoped to be supported in their ill-got possession by English men and money.

When Mankoroane heard that I intended to visit several of the chiefs to the north and north-west, he told me he could save me from such a long journey by calling all the chiefs to Taung. It was easy to see that the whisperings of designing men were sweetly mingling with the natural love for the extension of his house, which is a pleasurable feeling to native chiefs, and indeed to others besides. He declared that even chiefs of other clans would come at his bidding to Taung. This would gratify him, and extend considerably the area over which paper titles could be given. I heard that the chief had already spoken foolishly and threateningly on the subject, saying it would now be seen who were his friends and who were his enemies. Thus these people in the north would have been placed in the dilemma of disobeying Mankoroane's invitation, which in his circumstances they would have regarded as coming from me, or of recognising as their chief a man who did not even belong to their tribe! My visit to Morokweng and Ganyesa saved all this. I thanked Mankoroane for wishing to spare me the trouble of travelling, but said I had come away from Capetown with the idea of visiting all those parts. Perhaps Mankoroane regarded the presence of his son Molala, who went with me as far as Montsioa's town, as to some extent an equivalent for the proposal which I had set aside.

I could see clearly enough at Taung, what I found throughout the whole of Bechuanaland, a spirit of distrust in government of any kind, and a determination to right one's self, which were entirely new in the country, and formed the undesirable result of so many years' anarchy. The last important movement of this nature was the attack

on Molelaring by Massow and his forces, acting under the instigation of the Hart River Stellalanders, when several thousand cattle were taken, chiefly the property of Molala, the son of Mankoroane. I learned afterwards that several influential Stellaland people disapproved very much of this raid, and had indeed moved that the cattle should be returned. Others, however, who were declared to have instigated Massow to the attack, justified themselves by saying that it was an effectual way of clearing the country for its occupation by the volunteers, as Molala would never have vacated willingly. I found that Mankoroane had a considerable auxiliary force in his country, which, however, was not really under his absolute control. A certain number of Europeans and civilised natives from the Diamond Fields were living more or less the life of freebooters, like the Stellalanders. Some were stationed on the border of the Transvaal; others at Taung; Vryburg was said to have its contingent; and even as far west as Langberg, beyond Kuruman, this fraternity had its agencies. It was accidentally helpful to Mankoroane, inasmuch as it seconded his own efforts to keep his country unoccupied by volunteers, and enabled his people to reap their crops. The chief was no doubt aware of some of the thefts of stock which took place; but the majority were private enterprises of men who took advantage of the disordered state of the country. Of course a man's feelings or political opinions influenced him as to whether he could conveniently station himself in Taung or in Stellaland or elsewhere; the one thing which was plain to me was that in all such cases, this "cause" or that "cause" was adopted and used merely as an excuse for the "lifting" of cattle and horses. When Massow had stolen thousands of cattle, long after the treaty of peace, it seemed absolutely just and reasonable to the native mind for Mankoroane's followers to seize the small herds belonging to Massow's people, whether their owners were Korannas, Basuto, or European volunteers in Stellaland. This mode of reasoning was particularly unwelcome to the newly-arrived farmer, who had bought a volunteer's "rights" but who had not himself shouldered rifle in the native

service. The farm had seemed cheap, as to the money paid to the volunteer for it; it might turn out to be dear enough if stock were lost in this way.

I was also much impressed with the poverty-struck appearance of almost every one I met in Bechuanaland. War and cattle-lifting did not seem to have paid any one. Mankoroane's people had lost most severely. Those who were poor before were now destitute. Some men who a short time before had large flocks and herds, and who had had three or four ploughs going every season, were now without a head of live stock, and the lands which they had cultivated were included within the boundaries of Stellaland. Among the Europeans in Bechuanaland there was also every indication of grinding poverty. Probably no Europeans in South Africa had had such hard and rough times of it as had the volunteers under native chiefs in Bechuanaland—at least such was the conclusion which personal intercourse forced upon my mind.

After completing my business at Taung in the face of great opposition, I felt braced for the work which still lay before me. Before leaving Taung I wrote as follows to the High Commissioner on the 6th of May:—

“I can see my way so far to a settlement, although not one which will please all parties. But its success, in my opinion, will depend on its wise local management at the outset. I consider that immediate annexation to the Cape Colony, introducing the reign of stiff law and procedure utterly foreign to the ways of this people, would practically put the Bechuana where the Griquas were recently placed—in the hands of a few sharp agents, who are not worse than others of their kind, but who are sorely tempted in having for clients landed proprietors who are grossly ignorant and completely at their mercy. In this way a native would be charged a considerable sum to prove that his land was his own, to the satisfaction of a court. Thus in Griqualand West very many farms had to be sold by their owners before they could prove that they really belonged to them! And then comes the next chapter—discontent, disaffection, the sense of having been deceived, outrage, war. All these things we have seen, and, therefore, may learn from. So far as I have mastered the question of the settlement of this country, immediate annexation to the Cape Colony will be an evil to all parties except one—the land speculator.

“I leave to-day for Stellaland. . . . I hear of serious divisions among the Stellaland people themselves—no doubt as the result of the

political wire-pulling which has been going on. But I have no fear of success yet, with anything like fair-play ; and I am glad to report that there is some likelihood of that. While Mr. van Niekerk sends word to me privately that he cannot be with me at Vryburg, and that there are some of his people who are very unmanageable, an Englishman has appeared at this place this morning from Vryburg itself to make inquiries as to the date of my arrival there, in order that the 'Reception Committee' may duly honour the occasion. Let me conclude by expressing the hope that as Her Majesty's representative I shall succeed in making such arrangements in Stellaland as shall be practicable here, and not bring the blush of shame to honest Englishmen's faces anywhere."

CHAPTER II

SUBMISSION OF STELLALAND, MAY 1884

WHILE at Taung I had more than one communication from Stellaland. Mr. van Niekerk invited me to visit him at his farm on the Hart River, and a European messenger came from Vryburg to assure me of a welcome from the Stellalanders. Personally, I should have preferred to go direct to Vryburg, the headquarters of the Stellaland people, and meet there all those who were willing to meet me as the Deputy of the High Commissioner. But in deference to the opinions of others, I resolved to turn aside and consult with Mr. van Niekerk at his farm. I must own that no part of my Bechuanaland journey was undertaken with so much self-questioning on my part as this detour eastward to the Hart River; but I nerved myself with the thought that if this had to be done, it might as well be done cheerfully, and, if possible, to some good purpose.

I spent about a day with the head of Massow's volunteers. Mr. van Niekerk belongs to a class which is constantly increasing in number in South Africa—that of Dutch-speaking men who have embarked in commercial pursuits. I was informed that he had been engaged in storekeeping, and that this was his first appearance on the political arena. In the Transvaal war he had taken the side which had been adopted by almost all Cape colonists residing in that country—that of loyalty to Britain, and refusal to join the operations against Her Majesty's troops. At the time of the peace these men were promised protection, and so on; but their life has not been a pleasant one

in the Transvaal, excepting in cases where they have thrown themselves into the service of the Republic with the ardour of neophytes, and thus have atoned for the errors of the past and approved themselves to the dignitaries of the Transvaal. This seems to have been the course of Mr. van Niekerk. Having suffered through trusting the Imperial Government once, he seems to have made up his mind he would not trust it again. I afterwards learned that he had opposed the Stellaland petition for annexation to the Cape Colony; he had himself visited Pretoria in the interest of the movement for the union of Stellaland with the Transvaal. He was not distinguished among his followers for anything like personal daring, but rather as a man who could pull strings, and remain unobserved in the background. All this was not plain to me at the outset; but such was the man with whom I was consulting on Hart River.

Mr. van Niekerk, like every other member of the "loyalist" party in the Transvaal, was greatly astonished at the appearance of the Imperial Government in Bechuana-land. It would not be too much to say that, in most cases, distrust was as strong as astonishment in these people's minds. I narrated to Mr. van Niekerk what had taken place in England while the Transvaal Deputation were there; and how the English people had been led to study the question more, on account of the visit of the Deputation, than they had done before. He expressed his great disappointment at the division of Stellaland, which was indicated by the London Convention—some of the country falling into the Transvaal, and the rest remaining under the Imperial Government. He said he had earnestly desired the incorporation of the whole of Stellaland with the Transvaal; but now the Imperial Government appeared on the scene, not to take over the whole of Stellaland, but to retain part and hand over the rest to the Transvaal. Mr. van Niekerk mentioned his own efforts as head of the volunteers to keep them united; and now they were to be split up by this new boundary-line. I reminded him of the statements of the Transvaal Deputation in London as to the wishes of Massow and Moshette, explaining that the

country taken from Bechuanaland by the new Convention was in deference to those statements. I told him I saw no prospect whatever of the whole of Bechuanaland being joined to the Transvaal, as that was now well understood to be against the interests of the Cape Colony and of England. It was barely possible that Stellaland might remain undivided if the Transvaal did not agree to the new Convention; but this was not probable, as the liberal remission of debt by the English Government depended upon the ratification of the new Convention by the Transvaal Volksraad. After events will show that Mr. van Niekerk did not by any means share in my views that it was quite settled that Bechuanaland was not to belong to the Transvaal. In answer to Mr. van Niekerk's questions, I was quite willing to explain my own views as to the opening up and development of the country—saying nothing to him on the Hart River which had not been said and generally accepted in England. I was very careful to explain exactly the position of Her Majesty's Government, and the cautious manner in which it was reapproaching the question of native administration. Mr. van Niekerk was very complimentary to myself, which I expected in the circumstances; but I could see that the idea of peacefully opening up the country was one which made an impression on him. Here he had been breaking the laws of God and man to open up a small part of South Africa; and my scheme contemplated the peaceful opening up of the whole country.

"Believe me," said Mr. van Niekerk, "we had no idea you had such a policy as this." And then, his mind taking a characteristically practical view of the matter, "What a chance for colonists when such a course is adopted!"

"Well, Mr. van Niekerk," I said, concluding one of our talks, "you will, of course, come into Vryburg on the occasion of my visit to that town: you are the head of the people, you know."

"I am very sorry—it would have given me great pleasure to go, but a friend has borrowed my horses and has not returned them. I have no horses, otherwise I should be delighted to go."

"But, Mr. van Niekerk," I said, "you know I am not a stranger in this country or unacquainted with its ways. It would not occur to me that the matter of horses could form a serious difficulty to you. I trust you will reconsider your decision, and come."

"It is as I say about the horses," he replied, "but there is really no necessity for my presence. The public has quite recently elected a People's Committee (Volks Comité) to meet the present difficulties, and they are fully empowered to transact all necessary business with you."

I saw that Mr. van Niekerk had quite made up his mind not to go into Vryburg while I was there. His excuse about the horses was of course absurd. He could have borrowed horses on all hands. But, although he did not see his way to go to Vryburg, Mr. van Niekerk evidently wished that I should go away with a good impression of himself and his more immediate followers, and so he assembled a few horsemen and escorted my waggon for some distance from his farm. Having spoken hitherto of the affairs of Stellaland and of South Africa generally, Mr. van Niekerk, riding with me in my waggon, took the opportunity to bring forward the affairs of Goshen, asking me how I intended to act there, and assuring me that there were a few (he mentioned a certain number) good claims to land there, although not nearly so many as were put forward.

"Are you aware, Mr. Mackenzie, that I am master in Goshen as well as in Stellaland?" asked Mr. van Niekerk.

"Well, I was not aware of it," I answered, "but I can't say I am a bit surprised to hear what you say."

"It is, however, quite true," said Mr. van Niekerk, with the air of a man who is now revealing the most important information. "I hold Moshette's power of attorney, giving me supreme power over Nicholas Gey and all his people; and that is the reason why I put the question to you as to how you are to treat the volunteers of Moshette."

"That puts me in mind, Mr. van Niekerk," I replied, "of an engagement or understanding entered into by you with Captain Bower, to assist to drive the Goshen people into the Transvaal. How does that stand?"

Mr. van Niekerk lay back on his seat and enjoyed a hearty laugh at something which evidently amused him very much. At length he replied: "I remember Captain Bower proposed some such wild plan." Treating this as outside a business view of the subject in hand, he returned to his question as to what I intended to do in Goshen in the matter of the volunteer claims.

I had no difficulty in giving Mr. van Niekerk my answer. I said that I was quite prepared to consider the affairs of Stellaland with him and his people in Stellaland, and that I should be prepared to consider the affairs of Goshen with whomsoever I should find there. But, I added, I was not prepared to discuss the affairs of Goshen with him personally and before I reached that country.

He professed to see that this was reasonable enough, and the subject was changed. By and by we reached the farm where the escort was to return, and here I parted from Mr. van Niekerk, deeply impressed with the thought that Captain Bower had a far higher idea of Mr. van Niekerk than the head of Stellaland had of the Imperial Secretary. It occurred to me—and I mentioned it to my son at the time—that, as Captain Bower was ridiculed to me by Mr. van Niekerk, so might I and my ideas form the subject of a future joke. These forecasts were not wide of the mark.

While at Mr. van Niekerk's farm I was not far from Mamusa, the town of the unfortunate Koranna chief Masow, the titular head of the freebooting organisation over which Mr. van Niekerk and his advisers held the supreme authority. A short time before my arrival in the country Massow, or rather Mr. van Niekerk and his friends, in the name of the chief, published in the newspapers a protest against the London Convention, in which the chief was made to object to the new boundary-line, to the appointment of a British Resident, and to the recognition of the "so-called chief Mankoroane"; and that—

"We will not acknowledge, accept, or allow any cutting off of any part of our lawful territory, or the establishing of such boundary definition: that we will not acknowledge, accept, or respect any


arrangements made without our knowledge and consent : that we will not submit ourselves to any authority that may try to assume or usurp our authority : that we appeal to general principles of national rights, to law, and to humanity. We also call in the help of the white population of South Africa, who contend for truth and right, and whose fellow-countrymen and blood-relations have already established themselves in our territory upon lawful rights obtained from us," etc. etc. (4194, 20)

The personal influence secured by Mr. van Niekerk over the Imperial Secretary is brought out very strikingly by the manner in which the High Commissioner wrote to the Secretary of State concerning the above proclamation of Mr. van Niekerk and his advisers, issued in the name of Massow, that it was probably the work of the Goshen freebooters ! (4194, 9). Now there was a Goshen protest as well as this Stellaland one. The former is mentioned elsewhere, and will be seen to be in still stronger language, after the manner of Goshen (4194, 65). Of course the Van Niekerk of the Imperial Secretary's imagination could not have expressed such sentiments of disloyalty as are contained in this proclamation of Massow ; but, most unfortunately for Her Majesty's Protectorate, the actual Mr. van Niekerk did hold, and was well known in the Transvaal and in Stellaland to hold, exactly these views.


The grandiose and mischievous language of Mr. van Niekerk and his advisers, which in the above proclamation they put into the mouth of the Koranna chief Massow, ought to excite the indignation of all intelligent colonists, especially when considered in connection with the massacre of that chief and many of his tribe by order of officers of the Transvaal Government in 1885. Unhappy Massow ! without the slightest pretence to paramountcy in Bechuanaland, his name was used by designing men to accomplish their own selfish ends. He is approached as a sovereign by Van Niekerk and others as long as that course is deemed desirable or necessary. But when his land has been secured, his fond dream of paramountcy, greatness, independence, his suggested appeals to "law of nations and humanity," are all rudely dispelled by the quiet demand for Transvaal taxes ! A countryman witnessing a play could not be more be-

wildered than this unfortunate chief, when his own volunteer officer and subject appears on the scene as Transvaal Border Commissioner, and the "paramount chief" is informed (in 1885) that he and his people must consider themselves as living in a native location within the Transvaal; they have been placed there in London by papers which bore the chief's name, and professed to express his wishes. The much misled and flattered Massow could not change so fast as could volunteers and Transvaal commissioners. In his own town, to which so many journeys had been made by Van Niekerk and others, and where so many humble speeches had been delivered in sonorous Dutch, to have to pay taxes to the Transvaal! Massow refused, and was shot down unarmed by a Transvaal force, along with a promiscuous crowd of his people of all ages and of both sexes. No doubt the Transvaal Government has to be careful of anything like rebellion, surrounded as it is by so large a native population. But the case of the unfortunate Massow was surely peculiar. He was an insignificant, un-influential mortal. Shame, if nothing else, should have kept the local government from taking the field so soon against him. Considering the peculiar history and treatment of that chief by Transvaal burghers, which was well known everywhere in the Transvaal and in South Africa, surely a little more patience might have been shown, and the "great paramount chief" might have been more mercifully undeceived. His volunteers reap benefits through his name—the benefits secured, they shoot him. Shame on all who participate in acts which would disgrace any country—acts of betrayal, hateful in the eyes of both God and man.

We entered Vryburg on Friday the 9th of May. Some distance from the village a horseman met our waggon with a polite letter to say that Mrs. Mackenzie must not be alarmed at the report of rifles, as the Stellaland burghers were bent on firing a salute in honour of the representative of the Imperial Government. Soon after this a considerable cavalcade came in sight, headed by a man on horseback carrying the Stellaland flag, which was so large as to require both



MY WELCOME TO STELLALAND.



strength and alertness on the part of the bearer in order to manage gracefully both flag and horse. I had no flag or outward display of any kind. My waggon stopped; the Stellaland officials came forward under their waving flag, and bade me, as the Queen's representative, welcome to Stellaland. After I had replied, the procession moved on towards Vryburg, where, of course, we found the whole of the rest of the population at the doors of houses and tents, or beside their waggons, to see the arrival of the Commissioner. We were shown a suitable place for our encampment, and the escort dispersed with the understanding that I should meet the People's Committee and the public in the course of the day. Before they dispersed one of the party directed my attention to the Stellaland flag.

I remarked its great size, and that it looked quite dark at a distance.

"Still it is not quite the 'black flag' after all. Such as it is, you are of course aware that it has been brought out solely in your honour."

I replied gravely that I quite took it in that light.

The presence of Molala and his servant in my small party attracted some attention. It had occurred to me at Taung that his presence might help the natives to understand what I was doing in the country. I found that similar thoughts had been passing in the natives' own minds; and Molala himself was much pleased with the idea. "But how will the Boers take it?" asked a member of my own party. "There is not an intelligent Dutch-speaking man in the country who would not take this step were he in my place and had my work to do," was my reply. "It is best that the natives should know from the beginning the claims that are being put forward, and my method of dealing with them." Although I may not refer to the fact again, it is worthy of note that Mankoroane's son was with me in Vryburg when I met the Stellalanders; at Mafiking when I met Montsioa and his people; and at Rooi Grond when I went to meet the volunteers of Moshette, and was fully conversant with what happened at these places.

My first meeting with the People's Committee and pub-

lic of Stellaland took place soon after my arrival in Vryburg on the 9th of May. I took to the meeting, and read my Commission as Deputy of the High Commissioner in Bechuanaland, and read also a statement which I had written out, so that there should be no uncertainty in any quarter as to what had actually taken place. The opening sentences were as follow :—

“ I have also to announce that in the exercise of that power which has been entrusted to me, and in accordance with instructions from his Excellency the High Commissioner, I have entered into a treaty with the chief Mankoroane which enables me, as Deputy Commissioner, to exercise jurisdiction over all the inhabitants of his country. I hope to obtain similar treaties from Montsioa, Bonokwani, and from Bareki, so that the country under my charge would include the territories hitherto ruled over by these chiefs. You are aware that when the London Convention between Her Majesty’s Government and that of the South African Republic is ratified, it will affect this country in an important manner, by bringing a portion of it into the Transvaal. The northern boundary would be that between the Barolong and the Bangwaketse tribes ; on the south the boundary is the Cape Colony, and on the west the Kalahari Desert. In accordance with the Commission which I have now read, and by virtue of its power, I hereby declare that all the inhabitants of this district known as Stellaland are from this time under the jurisdiction and control of Her Majesty. God save the Queen. God send us a united, peaceful, and prosperous South Africa.”

I then made certain statements concerning land, taxation, etc., which I knew would be of interest. With reference to land my remarks were :—

“ I shall say at once that neither in England nor in this country have I advocated that the Stellalanders should be driven out of Stellaland. That policy has been advocated, as you are aware ; but it has never commended itself to my mind, nor is it the policy which I have been sent here to carry out. But inquirers usually go further, and ask if Her Majesty’s Government will recognise every individual title and uphold every grant of land which may have been made. On reflection, however, it will be evident to you all, that to do so to-day would be unwise on my part. Without impugning the legal form in which deeds may have been prepared, whether by native chiefs or by a European Committee of Management, it is evident that all these titles and claims must be carefully considered. I think you will agree that it is enough, to-day, to know the general principle which I hope to carry out. . . . Should annexation to the Cape Colony be deferred, and Territorial Government be administered under the High

Commissioner, it will be my duty to recommend the formation of a Land Commission for the settlement of the land question in this country."

As to law, I announced that as between white men the law of the Cape Colony would be followed, while among natives the same law would be kept in view, only the mode of procedure would be more simple, so as to secure the ends of justice. The taxation would depend on the amount required to carry on the local government, which would make as modest a commencement as was consistent with efficiency. The sale of land in Stellaland was to be recognised as legal; but restrictions were to be placed on the sale of land by natives. With reference to police I said:—

"I am sorry to hear in all directions complaints of stock thefts. There is nothing more disheartening to honest and struggling people than to find their best stock has been stolen by some restless and reckless man, who in his turn sells the stock for less than half its real worth. Major Lowe, who has accompanied me to Vryburg, and who is Assistant Commissioner and head of the police department in Bechuanaland, will take immediate steps for the suppression of these thefts. He has already conferred with Mr. van Niekerk, who has given him the benefit of his advice on this vitally important subject; and I trust that his men will always meet with assistance from the honest inhabitants of the country."

I concluded my statement by saying that, having informed them of the establishment of Her Majesty's authority in the country, I was willing to hear any statement which they might have to make, and to give explanations as far as I could do so. The leading speech was made by a Mr. van Riet, who had occupied a good position as a member of the Free State bar, and who was now giving Stellaland the benefit of his legal acquirements. He said my coming had taken them by surprise, especially as Mr. van Niekerk had not mentioned it to them. He concluded with a statement which was politely worded, but was nevertheless meant to be somewhat sarcastic, saying:—

"We heard you had been appointed Commissioner for Bechuanaland, and were prepared to hear you had passed from Mankoroane to Montsioa, in whose welfare the Imperial Government has interested itself; but we were not prepared for your arrival here in Stellaland."

I thought it best to answer this at once. I said I could not account for the surprise of any one at my arrival, seeing that I had come on the day mentioned by me in answer to their own inquiry sent by their messenger to Taung. Of course I did not know what Mr. van Niekerk had or had not written to them. I had my own duty to perform, as they were aware from the Commission which I had read. Wishing if possible to get rid of mere argumentativeness, I appealed to the last speaker and to the audience: "Come, now, is it at all likely that I should have come here without authority, and out of my own head?"

This brought a laugh and general assent as well.

Then stood up a Stellalander known among his comrades as "Klein Adriaan," in order to distinguish him from "Lang Adriaan" and "Groot Adriaan," all being members of the family of Delarey, which is well known in the western part of the Transvaal. "Klein Adriaan" was acting at that time as landdrost or magistrate of Vryburg, and was a man of some education. In the course of his remarks he vehemently demanded where was Mr. van Niekerk.

I replied that I was there to answer many and varied questions, but certainly not to be answerable in any way for the head of their own community. But I could inform them that I had left Mr. van Niekerk at his farm. I had been the bearer of a letter to one of them from Mr. van Niekerk. I had only to say that I had received no message for them from Mr. van Niekerk.

"The letter contains no information. Why did not Mr. van Niekerk come to Vryburg with you?"

"I more than once pressed Mr. van Niekerk to come in. His statement to me was that he had no horses—his horses had been borrowed and were still away."

There was a derisive murmur all round the room, with general expressions of disapprobation. "Klein Adriaan" stood up once more, and apologising for having so soon to ask a favour, wanted to know if I would not adjourn all business until they had communicated with Mr. van Niekerk and had insisted upon his appearing in Vryburg. "It is absolutely necessary that he should be here, so long as

he is our head, to hear the important announcement which you have made."

When I stated some distrust as to Mr. van Niekerk coming with promptness, I was assured there was no fear of that—he would be forthcoming on Monday.

I felt that this delay was rather favourable to my objects than otherwise. It afforded me time to get acquainted with the people, and hear their own version of Stellaland affairs. It became evident to me that while some wild spirits seemed to be just in their element, the majority were thoroughly tired of the kind of life which they had been leading, and spoke of it in hard enough language. I was saddened when I saw educated "nice-looking" young fellows appearing among the "volunteers" of a native chief in a supposed native quarrel, their real object being undoubtedly the possession of land through war and bloodshed. I could not but desire even more earnestly than ever that men's minds might be brought to consider how unoccupied land can be obtained for the advancing Europeans under the control of a stable Government, and not as a premium on filibustering. At the same time, the English Government having so long shut its eyes to the doings of the volunteers in Bechuanaland, my judgment acquiesced in the propriety of some measure of compromise in their case, provided they submitted to Her Majesty's authority.

On Sunday, at the request of some of the people, I held divine service in Vryburg—I believe the first time it was ever held there. I regarded myself as having laid aside the ministerial office for the duties which now occupied my attention. At the same time I felt that that was no reason why I should refrain from taking that active interest in Christian work which is the duty and the privilege of every Christian man according to his abilities and his opportunities.

On the Monday, Mr. van Niekerk having already arrived, the People's Committee met during the whole day. In the evening they invited me to meet them. I found that they had prepared a number of questions—going over difficult and disputed ground; and I observed that my replies, or requests for further explanation, were at once taken down.

My first impulse was to adjourn the meeting and bring forward on the following day my answers in writing. I concluded, however, that it would be best to go over all the questions—answering such as I deemed advisable at once, and asking for such information or explanation as I considered necessary.

The first question had reference to the debts of the Government of Stellaland. My reply was to the effect that, as a general principle, if we took over in a peaceful manner the assets of Stellaland, such as documents, title-deeds, public offices, etc., we should also secure the payment of their duly ascertained debts. Questions as to education, postal contract, having been answered, there came an inquiry concerning the appointments and salaries of the officials of the existing Government. I replied that I did not regard myself as in any way bound to any officer, or to retain any office as it was. That would be matter for consideration. But if any of them would be serviceable to the incoming Government, they would be appointed at such salaries as might be agreed upon. With reference to the decisions of their law-courts and the marriages which had been sanctioned by their Government, I reserved the first for legal advice, but as to the marriages, I thought that by a general proclamation afterwards their validity could be placed beyond all doubt. In this question there was of course the tacit but full admission on the part of the Stellalanders themselves of the unauthorised and invalid nature of all their doings as a so-called Government. The same subject in another phase came up in the next question, which had reference to the books, documents, and registrations in their government offices and the "rights" acquired through these. I promised that we should take over the documents and avail ourselves of the information contained in them; and as to the "rights" acquired, they would be treated by the law of the Cape Colony, and by such special provision as should be made for the purpose with the authority of the High Commissioner. I was then asked what I proposed to do with reference to the acts of the Stellaland Volksraad, the legislative body of Stellaland. This of course was a large question. The

Volksraad itself would cease to exist. As to money obligations I had already spoken. There would be the general desire to uphold what had been done in the peaceful circumstances in which we were coming in; but naturally I could not bind myself to details. Before becoming answerable for specific responsibilities I must know what they were. Mr. van Niekerk in this connection asked permission to hold a concluding meeting of the Volksraad for the winding up of their business. The proposal did not seem unreasonable, and I sanctioned his calling a final meeting of his Volksraad. The result of this meeting, which took place in June, may at once be here stated to have been the voting of £2400 to Mr. van Niekerk himself under the name of back-pay, along with lesser sums to other officers—amounting in all to the modest sum of £5492—with the hope that, the country having now passed into the hands of Her Majesty's Government, these sums might be sanctioned by me!

The questions relating to legal and medical practitioners and licences to shopkeepers, etc., having been disposed of, we came to the subject of the size and situation of farms as defined by the "Land Commissions" of Stellaland. The following explanation was given of the manner in which the farms had been measured. A horse was supposed to step 100 paces, or yards, in one minute, and this was fixed upon as their standard of measurement. Part of the farms had been marked off after thus "pacing" on horseback 60 × 40 minutes; other farms of inferior quality had been allowed 60 × 60 minutes. The former pacing was supposed to give a farm of 3000 *morgen*, equal to about 6000 acres. I replied that under the circumstances, the holders of the documents being satisfied with the measurements, the documents would be accepted as decisive with reference to the extent of the farms. To the direct question whether I would guarantee to the volunteers their titles to land, as granted under power from David Massow, my reply was that all land questions must come before a Land Commission. As a matter of personal opinion, I should say to-day that all the "original volunteers" would get their farms, or suitable compensation in shape of another farm, or in money.

The last question which we discussed had reference to the effect of my appearance in the country as the representative of the Imperial Government. Was the reading of my Commission and the making of a public declaration on the day of my arrival in Vryburg of any real efficacy? Was Stellaland part of Bechuanaland? The answer to those questions was, of course, quite apparent to those who asked them; but there was the desire on the part of some to establish a flaw because I had not issued a document and called it a "proclamation"—a course which they had so often adopted themselves. I said I had chosen the less demonstrative way of reading my Commission, and making a public and formal notification of the fact that Her Majesty had assumed authority in Bechuanaland—of which, to all intents and purposes connected with Her Majesty's Government, Stellaland was a part or district. The country was now under the authority of Her Majesty, as part of Bechuanaland. I had no choice in the matter, having been sent into the country for this express purpose. "Then does the Government of Stellaland cease to exist?" inquired Mr. van Niekerk. In reply, I said two governments could not exist at one time in the same country. It was my wish to receive over in a friendly way from the heads of the people all that would be necessary to enable the incoming Government to carry on its affairs. I should at once assume the reins of government, as Her Majesty's Government could not be both in and out of the country. As to immediate steps, I hoped to be able to entrust the management of their affairs to hands which would be at once suitable and acceptable to them.

I was not unconscious of an undercurrent of opposition to Her Majesty's Government, as shown in the discussion which had taken place. I could see that my answers gave general satisfaction. But there were discordant elements present, especially men who had taken a prominent part against the English in the late Transvaal war, and who were accustomed to allow themselves the most unpardonable latitude of speech when referring to Englishmen. The situation was one of difficulty, both to Mr. van Niekerk and myself, not

so much on account of local questions as on account of the state of political feeling at the time in South Africa. The desire of Mr. van Niekerk, as expressed in Stellaland and to his friends in Capetown—where those desires were regarded as no secret, but were openly announced in the Cape Parliament (4194, 102)—was that Stellaland should be joined to the Transvaal. To those holding this opinion the appearance of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland was most inopportune; but the end in view could still be accomplished diplomatically by a temporising profession of adherence to the policy of annexation to the Cape Colony. Once Bechuanaland was left by the Imperial Government in the hands of the Cape Colony, the coast would be clear enough. There was no power in the Cape Colony both able and willing to thwart the wishes of Stellaland and of the Transvaal combined. But in the meantime what was to be done with the Protectorate which had already arrived? What were they to do with the establishment of authority on the part of Her Majesty's Government? Evidently their object must be to prevent as far as possible any real exercise of the Queen's authority or recognition of Her Majesty's Government. That course would be serviceable in several ways. They might put forward a visit entirely barren of result as a proof of incompetence on the part of the Deputy Commissioner, as well as of the usual unsatisfactoriness of the English Government. If they agreed to nothing, the world would still be before them, and their status, such as it was, of a Government of Stellaland would have been unchanged by the actual appearance and departure from their midst of the deputy of the High Commissioner. There was such a thing as proving that our Protectorate was a trifling and feeble thing—a mere sham—from the first.

The same thoughts from different points of view must have been passing through my own and Mr. van Niekerk's minds after our meeting on the Monday. That meeting had been adjourned till the following morning, and before the hour of assembling on Tuesday each had made up his mind as to the course which he would pursue, and had also pre-

pared a speech to enforce his views. Mr. van Niekerk spoke first. He was very complimentary to myself, and made special reference to my self-restraint and my desire not to create animosity between the two races of Europeans in South Africa. Mr. van Niekerk then had the effrontery to place his obligation to the Stellaland volunteers as paramount to every other consideration. He said he knew well the sentiments of the people of Stellaland; and in order to avoid evil consequences that might affect the whole of South Africa, he made the request of me, not in the interests of Stellaland alone, but of the whole of South Africa, that I would *allow matters to take their course*, and go over to Montsioa's and elsewhere in Bechuanaland and then back to the Cape, thus allowing the Stellaland public time to receive an answer to their petition for annexation to the Cape Colony, as also giving him and myself the opportunity to make all necessary explanations to the public. This was in accordance with a statement made to the People's Committee at their own meeting that morning in answer to a direct question from one of their number, who asked whether, if they were satisfied with my replies to all the questions, they intended to submit to me? Mr. Bodenstein and Mr. van Niekerk united in saying that, according to their resolution, this was not the case (4213, 53). That is to say, I might promise what I chose as an Imperial officer, but certain men would not submit to Her Majesty's Government. Of course I knew nothing at the time of this conversation, but it explains the spirit and drift of Mr. van Niekerk's speech, which, I felt when he was uttering it, was addressed more to the partisan politicians of South Africa than to meet practically the condition of affairs in Stellaland.

I could see that there was considerable anxiety in the minds of the Stellaland people present as to what my answer would be. The line taken by Mr. van Niekerk had been pretty much what I expected, so that my speech partook of the nature of a reply, although previously prepared as a statement. My plan would secure all the good results described by Mr. van Niekerk as to Stellaland and as to South Africa, and it entirely changed the position of the

Imperial Government in the country. My statement and proposal were as follows:—

“GENTLEMEN—I have now answered your questions to the best of my ability as to what are the results to the country and its people flowing from the establishment of that form of rule which I have been sent to inaugurate. As I have already said, I wish the change to be as little as possible, consistently with the circumstances. I am aware that you have petitioned for annexation to the Cape Colony. Nothing which I am doing in Vryburg is against that annexation, but rather tends to further it on a right basis. In the meantime I have my own duties to perform, the performance of which I feel assured will be conducive to the highest interests of all. I have said that I was casting about for an Assistant Commissioner for this part of the country who would be trustworthy, would have the interest of the community at heart, and who would be acquainted with both languages. I trust I have found such an officer in the present head of your community, Mr. van Niekerk. Allow me to say that I have not spoken, not even hinted anything, to Mr. van Niekerk on this subject. I thought it was best and fairest to him and to all parties to leave him and myself perfectly free. But now for the first time, and in your presence, I give him formally, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, the offer of the Assistant Commissionership of this part of the country,—an arrangement which would continue him at your head as heretofore. I trust Mr. van Niekerk, after due consideration and in the interests of the people, which I have also at heart, will accept of this honourable appointment; and I feel sure that the people will approve of the arrangement. *But in any case, and until an Assistant Commissioner is appointed under Territorial Government, or the rule of the Cape Colony is established here, I now formally request Mr. van Niekerk, in the Queen's name, and by the authority vested in me, to take into his charge, and to be responsible for all documents, moneys, and things belonging to or connected with the superseded government of Stellaland.*¹ I take this step without consulting Mr. van Niekerk, trusting to his wishes to advance the public service and the peace and prosperity of the country. In case of annexation to the Cape Colony, the officials of that Government will find Mr. van Niekerk in charge, holding the documents and the local government provisionally in the name of the Queen. In case of the establishment of Territorial Government, I trust I shall have the happiness, and you the satisfaction, of enjoying the services of Mr. van Niekerk as our first Assistant Commissioner. I hold him, therefore, henceforth responsible for the peace of the district; and in any matter needing the assistance of the police, he will find in Major Lowe a most able and zealous officer. In making the arrangement which I now do,

¹ I am quoting from the original paper which I used in the meeting. I see the word “superseded” is not given in the Bluebook, possibly owing to an omission in transcription.

pending the decision of other authorities, I trust I shall be met in the same friendly, candid, and liberal spirit which I have endeavoured to show in the circumstances in which we meet. I offer the Assistant Commissionership to Mr. van Niekerk. Whether he accept or not as a permanent arrangement, I now, in the Queen's name, impose on him, the head of the people of Stellaland, the responsibility of the temporary management of the affairs of this district until its affairs are finally settled. As to the continuance of the present heads of departments during the interval referred to, I suggest no change, but leave the matter in Mr. van Niekerk's hands. And finally and earnestly I commend the country and the people to the mercy and the grace of God."

The excitement which was evident when I rose was even greater when I sat down, only on most faces it was of a more pleasant kind. Mr. van Niekerk's countenance plainly bespoke great gratification, and with very good reason, seeing that he, a dealer in a small wayside store, and more recently a freebooting leader under a native chief, had now received an offer of service under Her Majesty's Government. I had the fullest warrant and authority from headquarters to have made him the offer at his farm; but he did not then impress me as deserving of it. I then felt that if a man would not of his own motion come forward and face responsibility when it was his duty to do so, I could not see my way to employ him in any way. But when I saw him surrounded by his officials in Vryburg I thought I could see the possibility of a temporary arrangement being carried through with him as local head of the Government. But however well pleased Mr. van Niekerk evidently was with my offer, no word to that effect escaped his lips. He merely said "he would lay the matter before the People's Committee." I was quite satisfied with what I felt had been accomplished, and the meeting broke up. An attempt had been made to crush from the first the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, but I was glad to observe that this had been successfully opposed. My attitude, indeed, produced in some sort a transformation scene. I changed no officer, and yet all were changed, as they were now acting under the Queen, whose authority had been extended to Stellaland. The marked effect of my offer was probably increased by the fact that my intention was entirely unknown up to the time of my announcement.

In the meeting of the People's Committee, which was

held for the purpose of considering my offer, Mr. van Niekerk pointed out the fact that I had already taken unconditional possession of Stellaland as a part of Bechuanaland—had taken over the country and everything in it (4213, 53). The leading of this statement from him was quite plain. What was to be done? Mr. van Niekerk left himself in the hands of the representatives of his people. He had previously said they would not submit to Her Majesty's Government; he says so no longer, but points out what I had actually accomplished already in Her Majesty's name. There was the same recognition of an accomplished fact on the part of the People's Committee when they gave their deliverance concerning my nomination or appointment of Mr. van Niekerk as Assistant Commissioner for Stellaland. It has been said in Cape debates that Mr. van Niekerk declined an appointment which I offered him under the Imperial Government. This was stated by Mr. Rhodes by way of commendation of Mr. van Niekerk. But whether it is praiseworthy or not to slight the Imperial Government, the statement is not correct. Mr. van Niekerk declined nothing: he left himself in the hands of the People's Committee. Had they recommended him to become the permanent Assistant Commissioner, his attitude was that of submission to their judgment. The decision of the People's Committee was not to decline my offers, but to accept one of them. In the letter of their Secretary they referred to the words of my speech which are printed in italics, and sanctioned the provisional form of my nomination of Mr. van Niekerk as Special Assistant Commissioner. In doing so the Secretary expressed the thanks of the People's Committee "for the trust and confidence placed in Mr. van Niekerk" (4194, 31). It seemed, however, that the vote was not a unanimous one; thirteen were in favour of Van Niekerk's acceptance of the office, while four voted against it. One of the minority seized the first opportunity he could find to explain to me his opposition, which, he assured me, was not to the Imperial Government or to myself, but was an expression of his own and his friends' opinion that Mr. van Niekerk was not worthy to

fill the office. I did not then press for his reasons, but was satisfied with the explanation, which showed an apparently united meeting in its submission to the Imperial Power, although a minority thought I put too high an honour upon their own leader in continuing him at their head.

Thinking it was only right that Mr. van Niekerk should have something directly showing from myself the relationship in which he now stood to Her Majesty's Government, I addressed to him a short letter on the subject. The letter was addressed to him as "Special Assistant Commissioner." I handed him the letter myself. The inscription containing his new title was pointed out to him as he received the letter from me by one of his own officers in a congratulatory manner. Mr. van Niekerk smiled and said, "That is all right." The letter was as follows:—

"VRYBURG, *May 14, 1884.*

"SIR—I have to express my gratification that I am able to leave the affairs of this district in your hands.

"Instead of at once imposing on you the oath of allegiance, as the real interests of the public require, I shall content myself in the meantime by again stating that I leave the management of public affairs in your hands as Special Assistant Commissioner for Stellaland, with such help as may be necessary; and that I hold you responsible to Her Majesty's High Commissioner for the peace of the district.

"Trusting that all the people will work for peace, and for the prosperity of the country,—I am, etc.,

"JOHN MACKENZIE,
"Deputy Commissioner.

"G. J. VAN NIEKERK, Esq.,

"Special Assistant Commissioner" (4194, 20).

Mr. van Niekerk received from me his commission with apparent gratification—a feeling which I think he really entertained at the time. A question had arisen as to the immediate administration of the oath of allegiance to Mr. van Niekerk in his new capacity of Special Assistant Commissioner. The local legal advice was to the effect that if even a magistrate took a holiday, he administered the necessary oath connected with his office to his clerk, or other person appointed to act for him in his absence; and so, if Mr. van Niekerk was henceforth acting for the Queen, he must do so under an oath of allegiance and loyal service.

Mr. van Niekerk, however, waited on myself privately, and informed me that he had no reason whatever for not taking the oath at once, except that if he did so the ignorant part of the people might at once take a stupid prejudice against him as having been entirely converted into an Imperial partisan of the Imperial Government, and thus he might lose his influence with these ignorant people. The sentence in my letter just quoted conveyed my decision on the subject. This was the more readily and cheerfully agreed to by me, as Mr. van Niekerk, of his own accord and in the presence of several witnesses, offered to meet me when I returned to Taung, and there take the oath pertaining to his office. I may further mention that while in Vryburg I ordered papers to be produced, and gave orders concerning them, as the recognised head of the Government. In the same capacity I was courteously shown everything in the offices which I thought it necessary to examine. I had lengthened conversation with Mr. van Niekerk on what had taken place, and encouraged him to respond to the unusual action which in this instance Her Majesty's Government had taken. I said his character would be tested by what took place now. He expressed himself well enough and with apparent sincerity in reply. The gentleman who had met me with his sarcastic remarks at the first meeting, had since, with equal publicity, expressed the hope that the names of Mackenzie and Stellaland would no longer be at variance! Even the most anti-British men among them expressed their satisfaction at the turn which affairs had taken. I was not prepared for the fervency of Big Adriaan Delarey's shake of the hand when the arrangement was completed, nor perhaps quite pleased with the compliment he paid me when he assured me and others "that he could not have believed that he would be so thoroughly satisfied with me as he was."

At Taung my opponents and my friends had in the end signed the same document. At Vryburg all opposition was now happily overcome also. Thus, as far as I had gone, the Queen's authority was recognised as established in the country. Pledged to be back at Taung at a certain date

for the original purpose of examining the number and the nature of the land claims against Mankoroane, and now for the added purpose of receiving a report from Mr. van Niekerk of his doings among the people of his district in my absence, and of administering to him the oath belonging to his office, I left Vryburg to face what I always regarded as the most difficult part of my work—the settlement of affairs as between the volunteers of Moshette and the chief Montsioa. Taung and Stellaland had presented their own difficulties; now for the affairs of the would-be republic of Goshen. I left Vryburg on the 16th of May, with expressions of goodwill from all.

CHAPTER III

VISIT TO MOSHETTE AND TO THE FREEBOOTERS AT ROOI GROND

LEAVING Vryburg on Friday, the 16th of May, I reached Kunwana late on the following night, and here I rested over Sunday. Soon after my arrival a letter was handed to me, the postal adventures of which had been very remarkable. It was sent south by the chief Moshette to meet me on my way. When the messenger got to Mamusa, however, he was told by the Koranna chief Massow, no doubt on the authority of his volunteers, that I had been driven back by the Stellaland Boers, and that he need not go farther with the view of meeting me. Moshette's letter was accordingly brought back to that chief for further instructions, and it had been kept at Kunwana till I arrived there. In the letter Moshette expostulated against being "passed by" by the officers of the Queen. Had he not enrolled himself under Sir Charles Warren in 1879, and, in 1880, had he not addressed himself to the High Commissioner at the Cape? Although I had no special mission to the chief Moshette, I conceived it to be my duty to give him correct information as to matters of the greatest importance to himself and his people, and to answer, as far as my knowledge went, his own and his people's questions. I especially drew attention to the new boundary-line which includes Kunwana in the Transvaal. I was sorry to find that both chief and people had been living in a veritable fool's paradise, apparently entirely ignorant of what had been said and done in their name in England. Captain Bower's information about the new line was the first intimation which the "para-

mount" and "loyal" chief Moshette had received that his town of Kunwana was now included in the Transvaal. As to desiring that it should be so, there was only one opinion on the subject, and that was strongly adverse. This was in accordance with the view which I had expressed in London on this subject, when I insisted that the real views of Moshette and Massow ought not to be taken for granted, or held to be expressed in documents sent in by Transvaal volunteers, whose claims to form separate governments we were not recognising.

Before I started on Monday morning Moshette and his headmen came to my waggon, and asked me to hear what they had to say. As part of his people and the greater portion of his grazing land fell within Bechuanaland, I did not feel that I could refuse to listen to Moshette, although Kunwana, his chief town, and another portion of his country were destined to fall within the Transvaal. Moshette's headmen spoke first, and then the chief himself. One old man made an able speech. He said he had the highest opinion of the justice and fairness of the Queen's Government, but it always left a country when most needed. He was in the Free State as a young man when that country was made self-governing, and the Queen left it. He was in the Transvaal lately when the same thing took place. In his opinion there was no Government in the country like that of the Queen, but it had one fault,—it always went away. Another old councillor, using the freedom of Bechuana debate, attacked the chief Moshette, and declared he was selling his people and his country. Why should it be that white men from a distance should have to come to their town before they got to know what Moshette was doing with his country and his people? He was prepared to believe every word against Moshette, for he had no mind of his own, and agreed with each one in succession who proffered advice. I was struck with the light which this old man in the course of his speech threw upon another subject. The Transvaal Government represented that Moshette and Massow were displeased with the boundary-line of 1881, and in support of this they pointed to the fact

that these chiefs had knocked down the beacons as if wishing to abolish the line. So far the contention seemed well founded. But then the Transvaal Government went on to assert that the reason for the chiefs' dissatisfaction was that they did not wish to be separated from the Transvaal. I never met with any proof in support of that assertion. All my information led me to an opposite opinion. Here, incidentally mentioned by Moshette's councillor, I heard publicly stated what I had always been told was the real reason for their throwing down the beacons. They threw down the beacons because they were told that as long as they stood they showed that all the country to the west was Montsioa's, and that Moshette's country lay eastward of the beacons only, in the Transvaal. They threw down the beacons because they did not wish to be excluded from the rest of Bechuanaland and included in the Transvaal; and not because they wished the beacons to go farther west and include more country in the Transvaal, which was the contention of the Transvaal Deputation. And so the new boundary-line I found to be most distasteful to them all, not because it did not go farther west, but because it came too far west, and included too much of their country in the Transvaal.

I concluded the interview by informing them that I was going, according to instructions, to Mafiking, to meet Montsioa and settle about the Barolong country, and that it was for Moshette and his people to consider whether he would not go there also, and hear what was said about the country; or whether, if he did not go himself, he would send some of his headmen. I knew that Moshette was not likely to condescend to go himself, but I thought the presence of his people as witnesses from the first would be beneficial. Moshette said at once that he was not going to Mafiking, but after I left the idea was taken up by his people, and not only were messengers sent to Mafiking, but a formal submission was drawn up by the people themselves and forwarded to me as Deputy Commissioner. The presence of these headmen was one of the pleasing features of the gathering at Mafiking, and was more than once referred to

by Montsioa when speaking publicly to his people. The time of tribal feud, misunderstanding, and jealousy had been too long, and these evil passions had been only too assiduously fanned and encouraged by those who ought to have known better. It was my hope and expectation that a better time had come for the protection of the native man in his property, and for the control and guidance of the enterprising European in opening up the country.

The letter which the two headmen brought to me was signed by Moshette and eighteen of his councillors, and was to the effect that they wanted to be included in the Protectorate and under the Queen. "How unlucky they would be if, when others were recognised as children of the Queen, they should remain outside!" Moshette went on to say: "I have always said that I am a Mochuana (one of the Bechuana); why then should the boundary-line go to the west of me, and I remain outside of Bechuanaland? I do not like this—I do not like it. Then concerning what the teacher said, that Paul (President Kruger) said we were his people, he was laying a trap for us. We never said so. We never gave our hands to Paul. He has been endeavouring to make profit of me without my knowledge. But I refuse to be sold by words which are not mine. I say again I am a child of the Queen, like the others" (4194, 40). There can be no doubt that these were the wishes of Moshette and of his headmen. And yet a "protest" against the new boundary-line signed by Moshette appeared in a Transvaal paper in which very different sentiments are expressed. That document, which was in form of a memorial to the Chairman and other members of the Transvaal Volksraad, on the face of it, was not drawn up by a native, nor from a native point of view. It appeals to and seeks to intensify the most mischievous feeling of animosity as between one European race and another, and its object is to promote personal interests in land as opposed to the real progress and prosperity of the country. This document is not worth copying at length. It is to be found in the Bluebooks (4194, 65). The London Convention boundary-line is termed an absurd one, and Moshette is made to say that he neither

can nor will respect it. I give the 8th Article as a specimen of this precious document :—

“That through the making of the line in the before-mentioned modified Convention the Commission appointed by the South African Republic and Her Majesty’s representatives have made themselves guilty of the violation of the rights of petitioners, exactly as the English Government did against the South African Republic in 1877, in consequence of which so much disunion and bloodshed arose ; and that whenever the line is made, in place of insuring tranquillity, unrest, disturbance, disunion, and difficulties will be caused, the ultimate results of which cannot be foreseen. That the example set to petitioners by the South African Republic against the annexation in 1877, the value of which was fully estimated by petitioners, can have no other result than to set the example as to the course to be adopted by them, and in consequence of which the paramount chief Moshette has protested against the fixing of the boundary ; and upon which protest, by God’s help, he will hold and endeavour to make his stand, because the proposed line can have no other effect than to put an end to the existence of Moshette, his people, and his realm !”

My arrival at Mafiking on Tuesday, the 20th of May, was attended with great demonstrations of respect and joy on the part of the Barolong people. Old Montsioa himself rode out some distance from his town to meet the representative of Her Majesty, who was supposed to be bringing peace into his country. A number of smart-looking young men, well-mounted, attracted my attention. The footmen were in every picturesque shade and fashion of the European garb ; and there was also great variety in their fire-arms, from the old Tower musket to the breechloading rifle. Here, as elsewhere in Bechuanaland, most of the people were known to me ; and great confidence was felt in a movement which had withdrawn me from my former work, and entrusted to me the settlement of the affairs of the country. Among those who met me were the excellent Wesleyan missionary of the station, the Rev. C. Stuart Franklin, and Mr. C. Bethell, who had personally rendered Montsioa and his people such important service. I found also Mr. Rowland and Mr. Walker on the station—the former of whom had long resided at Mafiking and its neighbourhood ; the latter having only recently visited the town, and become deeply interested in the struggle in which Montsioa and his people were engaged.

Fully assured on all hands that I should meet with no difficulty and no obstacle in securing a treaty with Montsioa, I resolved to take the promptest measures with reference to the Rooi Grond volunteers. Their supposed chief, Moshette, was now an earnest and sincere suppliant for the Queen's help and protection for such part of his people as would come under the Protectorate; and two of his headmen had followed me to Mafiking with the document to which reference has already been made. Hearing that Mr. Gey van Pittius was determined on war, which, of course, now meant an attack on a British Protectorate, I resolved to do my utmost to prevent so foolish and so untoward an action. Without any delay, therefore, on the day after my arrival, I rode over to Rooi Grond, taking my Commission and instructions with me, desiring to give the same information at Rooi Grond that I had given at Vryburg. I was accompanied by my son, Dr. Mackenzie, as secretary; by Moshette's two headmen, who went, at my invitation, to be witnesses of what business I should transact with the volunteers of their chief; by two sons of Montsioa and his native secretary; and by Molala, the son of Mankoroane. Mr. Franklin also kindly accompanied us on this occasion.

Rooi Grond (Red Earth) is the name of a block of rich land of great value, from the fact that it can be irrigated by a running stream from a neighbouring fountain. It is a very awkward circumstance that this fountain is within the Transvaal, according both to the Pretoria Convention and to that of London, which makes no change here; and thus the arable land is divided in two—part falling to the Barolong and part to the Transvaal. As the value of the land on the Bechuanaland side of the line depends on the supply of water, a stream of certain bulk is guaranteed to the native lands by both the Conventions above named. As we rode along the native gardens were pointed out to me, which had been regularly cultivated till the recent disturbances. The property seemed to me to be very valuable indeed, and would probably form the site of a township under a stable government, and with the rights of water fully

secured. I found that on property so valuable the question of the boundary-line had given rise to much local discussion and discontent, and also to the utmost clearness as to where the line itself passed. I was shown at once and without hesitation the houses which were within the Transvaal and those which were built on the Bechuanaland side. As we approached we found that the houses and huts on the Bechuanaland side were all empty, and some of them had been destroyed by fire. Houses and gardens had been built and laid out in the first instance before there was a boundary-line to consider; a few had been erected since the disturbances, and had been occupied by prominent members of Moshette's volunteer organisation. These were chiefly on the Bechuanaland side, and were now empty. Probably none of these houses was more than, say, 300 or 400 yards from the boundary-line. Thus there had never been any occupation of Bechuanaland on the part of Moshette's volunteers except by their laager or fortified camp, which had occupied different positions. They had secured certain advantages in the actual warfare; but as to peaceful occupation there had been none. As I rode up to Rooi Grond and surveyed its position, I was deeply impressed with a sense of the enormity of the evil which the Transvaal Government had permitted, if not encouraged. So far as escaping law was concerned, I could see that the freebooters had chosen their base with great shrewdness. If they were successful in cattle raids they did not need to run any risk in defending the stolen cattle. All they had to do was to drive them over the Transvaal border, when their anxieties were at an end, as the natives always respected the line, because it had been laid down by the Queen's Government. If they met with a reverse, as had been the case more than once in the history of the disturbances, the freebooters rode across the boundary-line, and once in the Transvaal, were themselves in a city of refuge. On the other hand, should it be necessary for any burgher of the Transvaal to be "denied" for the purposes of "bluebook" correspondence, the man had only to walk a few hundred yards and be reported by the nearest Transvaal

official as having left the country, which fact would be duly and triumphantly announced in the next letter of the Government Secretary, addressed to the British Government—the absence of the man in question from the Transvaal being of course confined to the time spent in his visit to the house 300 yards over the line. After the formal report of his absence had been forwarded, he would be at liberty to return to the bosom of his family. Should it have happened that the Transvaal Government really wanted to arrest an evil-doer at Rooi Grond, they would no doubt have found it difficult to do so on account of the facility of crossing the line; but I did not hear of their having wished to make any arrests. These remarks are not made in the spirit of railing accusation, but with a view to give needed information on a phase of this question. The respectable inhabitants of South Africa, and of the Transvaal itself, feel themselves disgraced, as some of them have told me, by the existence and the history of the organisation at Rooi Grond; and I am sure they will join with me in the desire that the future progress of Europeans may proceed on better lines than those of volunteering for service under native chiefs, and dodging from side to side of a boundary-line.

We were met at Rooi Grond by seven of the volunteers, headed by Mr. Bezuidenhout, a Free State man, who was styled their Commandant-General. Having ascertained from me who we were, this officer civilly directed us to a certain house, which we found had been their kantoor or government office, but was now empty. Months afterwards I learned what took place when we were observed approaching. It seems the more moderate and intelligent among the volunteers, headed by the officer who now met us, desired to receive me publicly, hear what I had to say, and if possible make some arrangement with me. Mr. van Pittius, in the bitter spirit exemplified in the protest already mentioned, strongly objected to this course, and, indeed, advocated that I should only get five minutes' time to turn round and go back again. In these views he was supported by those who may distinctively be called the "roughs" of the

Transvaal party. Deputed to meet me, Mr. Bezuidenhout transacted the business in a polite and conciliatory spirit. He asked me if I wanted to see any particular person.

I replied that I had come for the purpose of meeting them all, and that I had an announcement to make to them as representing Her Majesty's Government.

With this reply our interviewers returned to those who sent them, and we off-saddled our horses, sent them to the water, seating ourselves on the ground and conducting ourselves as having arrived among people with whom we wished to be on friendly terms. This, of course, was plainly shown by our placing ourselves completely at their mercy, coming so few in number and entirely unarmed. We could see thirty or forty men at some distance from us and within the Transvaal. They were assembled, and evidently in discussion. We supposed that their protracted debate, which lasted considerably more than an hour, had reference to the course to be pursued toward the Imperial Protectorate. Before the hour elapsed, however, the volunteers took a remarkable step. We had observed their great surprise to find me accompanied by Moshette's headmen, who, it seemed, were also officers in the native part of the allied forces; and we noticed that the volunteers carefully greeted these men by name. After we had waited some time, observing all that was going on with great curiosity and interest, I was astonished to find a young man come to me from the laager, whom I had last seen at Mr. van Niekerk's farm. He professed to me to be on a journey and accidentally here. I was afterwards told that he was an enrolled volunteer both at Stellaland and Goshen. He professed to me to entertain great contempt for these ignorant Transvaal men, but said they had asked him as a favour to deliver a message for them, and he had consented. He must admit he was ashamed of the way they were acting, and a great deal more—but would I mind his taking Moshette's two men up to the laager, where the volunteers then were?

I replied that I was very much surprised that he or any man should come to me on such an errand. I understood that the business that morning was with me; that a

message from me had already gone to the laager and I had received no reply; whereas these men had merely accompanied me at my request. "But," I said in conclusion, as I found that my interviewer far exceeded me in his animadversions on the wrong-headedness of Mr. van Pittius and his followers, "Moshette's men are grown-up people, and perfectly free; if they choose to go up to the laager with you, they can do so."

The messenger went and sat down, native fashion, opposite Moshette's men and asked them to go up to the laager—they were wanted there.

The men at once, with real or well-assumed dignity, refused to go. They said they were there on no business of their own and on no business of Moshette—they were there accompanying Mr. Mackenzie.

So the fair-speaking, but double-enrolled freebooter had to return to the laager alone.

During the time we were waiting we observed considerable stir and activity among the men in the laager. Horses were caught; men moved about with guns in hand—the object of these movements not being very apparent. It occurred to me that possibly some wag among them, seeing they could not agree among themselves as to the course to be taken, had suggested that if they made sufficient demonstration, what with waiting so long and with possible nervousness, I might go away, and thus save them from the awkwardness of refusing to deal with me. I, however, had no intention of moving, being resolved to give them every chance which patience could afford them.

At length two mounted men rode down to where we were patiently sitting, and informed me that the authorities of Goshen did not wish to have any interview with me. In replying, I stood up, and showing them my Commission, informed them that my business did not need long time to accomplish. This was my Commission from Her Majesty's High Commissioner. Its purport was that Her Majesty's authority was established in Bechuanaland, and in the Barolong country as part of it; that fact I now announced to them in reply to their message and as my answer. "But



ANNOUNCING PROTECTORATE AT ROOI GROND.

we were not told to listen to anything of that sort," they said, moving off. "That may be," I answered; "you are the best judges of your own conduct; but it is my duty to reply to your message, and my reply is what you have heard, that the Queen's authority is established, and the management of affairs is in my hands."

By this time they had turned their horses' heads and were moving off, evidently not wishing to hear too much. The men rode off to the Transvaal side, and we saddled our horses and returned to Montsioa's town.

It will be remembered that from the tone of my instructions I was not expected even to visit Rooi Grond. In resolving on my own responsibility to do so, I felt I was not exceeding the terms of confidence in which the High Commissioner had given me great discretionary power in coping with events which might arise. Although the reader may feel that as a representative of Her Majesty's Government I had now reached the utmost limit of patient negotiation, I resolved to make one other move before I considered my duty complete as to Rooi Grond. After reaching Montsioa's town I wrote out and sent back to Rooi Grond the following intimation, which I know was duly delivered:—

PUBLIC NOTICE.

"To the Europeans now residing on the boundary-line between the South African Republic and the Barolong country, at a place known as Rooi Grond, and to all whom it may concern.

"Public notice is hereby given that it has pleased Her Majesty the Queen to establish a Protectorate in Bechuanaland, and for that purpose, among other steps, to enter into a treaty with the chief Montsioa, by which that chief concedes to Her Majesty jurisdiction and authority over all white people and black people within the Barolong country.

"In terms of my Commission as Deputy of his Excellency the High Commissioner, and in accordance with the treaty now mentioned, I hereby declare the whole of the Barolong country to be under the protection, jurisdiction, and authority of Her Majesty the Queen.

"I have also to intimate that the chief Moshette, by documents in my possession, in so far as his own and his people's rights are concerned, consents to and desires the establishment of Her Majesty's authority in the Barolong country aforesaid.

"Therefore, all persons residing, or desiring to reside, at Rooi Grond or elsewhere in the Barolong country aforesaid, are hereby requested

to lodge with me at Mafiking their titles, or copies of the same, on or before Tuesday next, the 2d inst.

“Special warning is hereby given that theft of stock in Barolong country, destruction of gardens, or other outrage on person or property, will be severely punished, and that the friendly offices of the Government of the South African Republic will be requested, and doubtless secured, for the recovery of stolen stock and the extradition of criminals.

“After a protracted period of disorder and disturbance, Her Majesty’s High Commissioner seeks the establishment of peace and order and good government in this country; and as his Deputy I now call upon all good citizens to uphold the Protectorate now established for the benefit of all; and to those who have not recently been good citizens I would say, let him who stole steal no more, but rather let him labour.

“(Signed) JOHN MACKENZIE,
“Deputy Commissioner, Bechuanaland.”
(4194, 50.)

It is of the utmost importance, in view of all that has since taken place, to observe the great length to which I here carried the policy of conciliation, especially considering the nature of my instructions. Critics unfriendly to the Imperial Government have pretended that I might have done more with the Rooi Grond people in the way of conciliation, and have even suggested that I made haste in leaving this district. They have never stated what, in their view, an Imperial officer should go on to do, when he is formally and clearly informed by those whom he waits upon that they decline to transact business with him. It will be seen that I did more, in that I sent the formal notice above quoted. Whether I did make undue haste to leave the district will appear in the course of our narrative.

CHAPTER IV

A TREATY AND A CATTLE RAID—FOLLOWING THE CATTLE INTO THE TRANSVAAL

WHATEVER may have been the feelings of disapproval of the British Protectorate entertained by Transvaal subjects and others occasionally assembling at Rooi Grond as their headquarters, I was left in no manner of doubt as to the joy and thankfulness with which the Protectorate was welcomed in the Barolong country itself. The signing of the treaty, in the courtyard of Montsioa, by the chief and his headmen was accompanied by every sign of gladness and good feeling. The speech of the venerable chief Montsioa was very cordial, and so cheerful in its tone as to show that he hoped and believed that the country would now get peace. Using the formula now for many years customary in proclamations of marriage in churches in Bechuanaland, Montsioa, amid the smiles of all present, announced an approaching political union, and exclaimed with energy, "Let objectors now speak out or henceforth be silent." There was no objector.

I explained carefully in the language of the people, as I had done at Taung, the nature and object of the Protectorate, and the manner in which it was to be supported.

Montsioa then demanded in loud tones, "Barolong! what is your response to the words that you have heard?"

With one voice there came a great shout from one end of the courtyard to the other, "We all want it."

The chief turned to me and said, "There you have the answer of the Barolong; we have no uncertain feelings here,"

probably referring to the manœuvring of certain white men at Taung before the treaty had been signed.

As I was unfolding the views of Her Majesty's Government that the Protectorate should be self-supporting, the chief cried out, "We know all about it, Mackenzie; we consent to pay the tax."

I could only reply to this by saying that that was just what I was coming to; but inasmuch as they knew all about it, and saw its importance, I need say no more on the subject.

Montsioa, in the first instance, did not like the appearance of Moshette's people in his town. I told him I was glad they had come; and he must reserve his own feelings and await the results of what was taking place. I was pleased, therefore, when in the public meeting in the courtyard, just before the signing of the treaty, Montsioa turned to the messengers of Moshette and asked them if they saw and heard nicely what was being done with the Barolong country? They replied in the affirmative, and thus, from a native point of view, became assenting parties. In this manner something definite was done towards effacing an ancient feud. The signing of the treaty then took place, the translation of which is given in the Bluebook (4194, 44).

After the treaty had been signed by the chief, his eldest son, his nephews, and his headmen, and their signatures had been attested by Mr. Bethell, Mr. Franklin, Mr. Rowland, and Mr. Mahon, the old chief requested that prayer might be offered up, which was accordingly done by a native minister. The ratification of the great event was further marked by the discharge of a volley from the rifles of a company of young men told off for the purpose; and the old cannon of Montsioa, mounted between the wheels of an ox-waggon, was also brought into requisition to proclaim the general joy and satisfaction.

But, alas! such feelings were destined to be of short duration. While we were thus employed at Mafiking, the openly-declared enemies of the Imperial Government, and of peace and order in Bechuanaland, had been at their

appropriate work elsewhere within the Protectorate. Before sunset the same evening I was surprised to hear the Bechuana war-cry sounded in Montsioa's town, and shortly afterwards I saw the old chief approaching my waggon, followed by a large body of men.

"Monare Makence! dikgomo di gapilwe ke Maburu" (Mr. Mackenzie! the cattle have been lifted by the Boers), was his first announcement. I shall never forget the scene at that moment. The excitement of the men, some of whom were reduced to poverty by what had taken place, and also their curiosity as to what step I should take, were plainly enough revealed on the faces of the crowd who, with their chief, now stood before me.

I learned that Mr. van Pittius had taken conclusive measures to heal divisions among his followers, by ordering his men out on a raid on the cattle of that country which, he had just been told, was under the authority of the Queen of England. He no doubt flattered himself that this step would effectually crush any rising feeling of revolt against his own extreme measures and policy; and would make all equally hopeless of pardon after an attack so wanton and so insulting. The freebooters had proceeded along the Transvaal border northwards till they reached Van Zyl's farm, in the Transvaal. It seems this farmer (who was one of the organised volunteers of Moshette) rode over the line into Bechuanaland, and returned with the necessary information to his fellow-volunteers, who were in waiting at his farm. The armed and mounted party of Boers now left the Transvaal and proceeded westwards some twelve or thirteen miles into Bechuanaland, where they collected a large troop of Barolong cattle, which they found grazing in that district. Along with these, they took a number of cattle belonging to another tribe resident in the Transvaal, but who had obtained from the Barolong the privilege of grazing in Bechuanaland. Taking it for granted that the cattle of their fellow-subjects were fair game if found in Barolong country, the freebooters stole them along with those of Montsioa; and although representations were made to the authorities in behalf of the Transvaal native owners, Ikalafing and his people, I am

not aware that any notice whatever was taken of such representations by Transvaal officials. The peculiarity of the situation—as I learned at once—was this. The cattle had been taken at a point not so far from the nearest part of the Transvaal border as the cattle stations were from Mafiking, so that when our messenger arrived, having come fifteen miles to bring us word, the Barolong cattle and their captors were already safe in the Transvaal. It is true, they were still far enough from Rooi Grond, and could be easily intercepted, but such a movement could now only take place within the boundary of the Transvaal.

“Mr. Mackenzie,” said Montsioa, “you are master now—you must say what is to be done. We shall be obedient to your orders.”

“We have put our names on your paper, but the Boers have our cattle all the same,” said one man.

Another shouted out with vehemence, “Please don’t tell us to go on respecting the line. Why should we do so when the Boers don’t?”

“Who speaks about a boundary-line?” said another speaker, probably a heavy loser. “Is it a thing that a man can eat? Where are our cattle?”

As I have already said, I shall never forget the scene in which these and similar speeches were made at my waggon as the sun went down peacefully—the sun which had witnessed the treaty-signing and the rejoicings at Mafiking. Its departing rays now saw the cattle of the Barolong safe in the Transvaal, and one of the cattle-herds, the Barolong owners, and her Majesty’s Deputy Commissioner looking at one another at Mafiking.

It would be of no interest to narrate the succession of thoughts which occurred to the mind, as the details of this well-planned theft were gone over by the cattle-herd. Righteousness, fairness, lawfulness—what could and could not be done: the mind soon grasped every phase, and before the man had finished I had made up my mind what I should do.

“Chief,” I said, addressing myself to Montsioa, “what you say is quite true: the papers are signed; and I am

witness to your gladness in signing them. Although I am still alone in the country, I cannot tell you that it shall be all the same as if you had not signed a treaty with the Queen. I should sink through the ground with shame were I to say that to you Barolong, who have lost your cattle. The cattle of Montsioa got a new herd to-day and a new master. I shall go and look for the lost cattle that passed into my keeping to-day. I shall act for the cattle-owner and the cattle-herd, and take up their tracks to-morrow; and if I find these tracks lead into the Transvaal, I shall go to the nearest magistrate and demand them back again as cattle no longer herded by Montsioa but by Her Majesty the Queen."

There was a hum of approval, with a sharp inquiry from Montsioa—"Did I really mean to go myself?"

"Having no one to send, I must go myself," I replied.

The old chief, in a generous way, half dissuaded me from the attempt. The Boers were not to be trusted. What was he to say if I did not return?

"That will be all right, Montsioa," I said; "every one will know that I have gone of my own accord. My wife I shall leave with you, under care of my son."

Poor old fellow, brave-hearted although "only a native!" He went away home full of heartiness, promising to lend me his cart and harness for an early start next morning. It was arranged that one of the herds of the stolen cattle—a fine, lively, athletic fellow—should act as my guide. I was agreeably surprised when I found that Mr. Franklin was also quietly making preparations so as to be able to accompany me. This action on his part gave much satisfaction to the people, by whom he was greatly respected and beloved; and my wife was also thankful to him. Besides the cattle-herd and witness of the raiding I took with me my Cape servant Jan, only recently engaged in Kimberley, but a most faithful and willing fellow. We had four horses to pull Montsioa's Cape cart, and were able to travel at a rapid rate. Placing ourselves entirely in the hands of the herd-boy for guidance as to the road, we were taken first to a place well within the Transvaal, where we were shown the "spoor" or track of

the stolen stock of all kinds, with the horse-tracks of the mounted raiders. Satisfying ourselves as to the recent character of the spoor, and proceeding with it so as to be clear as to its general direction, we now made straight for the village of Zeerust, the residence of the landdrost or magistrate for the district of Marico. This part of the Transvaal is thinly populated; we passed without stopping at the farmhouses on the road, and after dark arrived safely in Zeerust.

Seeing a house better lighted than the others, and a native girl standing at the door, we asked her where the hotel was. She was greatly amused at our question, and said in Dutch, "Why, of course, this is the hotel."

Here we were, then, in a district town of the Transvaal, the headquarters of the freebooters when they put off their freebooter garb and appeared as the loyal, patriotic, and peace-loving burghers of the Transvaal Republic. Many of these men were personally known to me, and I had been on terms of friendly acquaintanceship with them for many years. I was known in this district at many a farmhouse, to which I had often been earnestly called, during my visits to the locality, to allay the sufferings of those who were sick, and who had not at that time the advantage of a medical man in their district. I knew the houses and the families of the well-to-do and industrious farmers—well-built, comfortable, and many of them well-kept, and pretty. I knew also the farmhouses of the men who did not stay at home, did not improve their farm, but who always rode a good horse and carried a fine rifle. One hunt after another filled up their year. In some cases the wives stayed at home and carried on the work of the farm; but they usually tired of this, and made a point of going with their husbands for the higher living of the hunting-field. In such cases the farm was left in the hand of some relative or of some "bijwoner" or dependent, who thought of the matter from a personal point of view—remembering the adage about making hay while the sun shines. The "place" itself would be heavily mortgaged to the store-keeper where the supplies were obtained for the various

hunts; for hunting, however charming and attractive to those engaged in it, did not often "pay," and those trusting to it alone from year to year were, almost to a man, heavily in debt. I was told that one of these sporting farmers in that neighbourhood (and a leading freebooter) had recently removed the iron roofing from his house and left the unprotected walls and rooms exposed to the elements in order to pay off one of many debts.

Putting questions to our landlady, widow of an English clergyman, and to fellow-travellers in the public room of the boarding-house or hotel to whom that night we were unknown, I was able to realise with some vividness the condition of a district with which I had been so intimately acquainted in bygone years. I came to understand why certain men had enrolled themselves as volunteers even of a native chief. It provided occupation for themselves, their horses, and their guns in the meantime, and for the future it gave some hope of a farm in payment of their services—the proceeds of the sale of which would at least for a season satisfy the clamour of store-keeping creditors. Patriotism, triumph of the Afrikander, the badness of the English and their foolish squeamishness as to native treatment, these and other themes might be dilated on; but the real reason for volunteering was that already given—congenial occupation in the meantime and the hope of a valuable farm as a reward.

Remembering what is said about the early bird, and knowing I had a very stiff day's work before me, I took the liberty next morning to make an early call on Mr. Otto, the landdrost of the district, at his private residence. I found that Mr. Otto was from the Cape Colony, and was intelligent and apparently open to reason. As landdrost of Marico he had been more or less the choice of his district, and to the same degree would feel bound to represent and uphold the wishes of the inhabitants. Then he told me he had received strict orders from Pretoria "not to meddle or mix himself up with the disturbances at Goshen." I assured him I was fully alive to that. Had it been otherwise I should not have addressed myself to him, but to the British

Resident at Pretoria and Her Majesty's High Commissioner. My visit was a movement of a totally unexpected nature, and created a situation which had its ludicrous aspect. Indeed I must admit that my request for the landdrost's interference on this occasion must have seemed to the people of Zeerust remarkably like a hope that Satan would cast out Satan. But I had given credit to this officer of government of a desire to discharge the ordinary duties of his office, and had taken the course dictated by common-sense, of giving Montsioa the best help which I could render, which was to lodge a complaint on his behalf with the nearest magistrate of the Transvaal, and to set the usual laws of the Republic in operation against theft of stock. I told the landdrost that I had called privately, in the first instance, because I wished to give him every explanation; and as we were to be neighbours, so to speak, I wished to be on terms of friendliness and good understanding. I also reminded him of the protestations which had been made on behalf of the Transvaal Government with reference to its innocence in connection with the Rooi Grond affair. Now was the time to prove this: by coming to him, I had placed within his reach a signal opportunity for earning the gratitude of his Government by clearing it from the suspicions of complicity which were resting upon it. I was sure that the respectable people of the Cape Colony would feel only thankful to him if he would take up a firm position on the side of law and order.

"I do not ask you," I said, "to say a word as to politics. I bring to your notice a case of theft of stock. I say it is done by people now in your district. In fact, this morning, while we are speaking here, the captors and their cattle are not far away. You can easily verify my statement. What I come here to request is that the ordinary machinery of a civilised Government against theft be put in operation by you in this district as to men and stock now in this vicinity."

I had him fast as in a vice. Every word was true.

"Certainly," he replied, "I must admit what you say,

that I am here to arrest evil-doers and to restore stolen property when possible."

"Then, Mr. Otto," I broke in, "that is exactly all I am here for. That is the business which I want to bring before you formally at your office; but I thought it was only fair and courteous to you, as well as doing justice to my own presence here, to wait on you and explain privately the exact business which brings me into the Transvaal. There are many political questions—for instance, as to the validity of a certain treaty, as to the destruction of gardens, as to the burning of houses. I do not ask you to have anything to say to such questions. I ask you to arrest thieves and intercept stolen cattle now in your district, and to do this by the ordinary Transvaal law which you are here to administer."

I was then told that I might bring my herd-boy and come myself, as having seen the spoor, to the court-house as soon as it was open.

Before business hours arrived I was met by several people whom I had known years before, and who were farming or engaged in business in the Transvaal. We now found that some of the people at the hotel were from Natal.

"Mr. Mackenzie, I'm sorry to have to say it to you, because we have all known you so long; but, honestly speaking, I hope you won't succeed. The English Government doesn't deserve to succeed, after what they have made us all, Englishmen and loyal colonists, suffer in the Transvaal. We all trusted; and we were deceived. For a long time scarcely a day passed when we were not insulted by the more ignorant Boers, till we were almost tired of our lives; and yet we could not go away, having invested our all in the country."

Many such speeches were made; I give only one. I assured them in reply that the day was not far distant when people would have a better common understanding in South Africa. I said I hoped the English Government was on the way to exercise more influence, and of a better kind, than it had ever done in that country. In the future this Govern-

ment would not be against progress and growth—thus in effect placing these movements in lawless hands—but, I hoped, would itself control the development of the country.

“If we could only believe that, we should be inclined to forgive the past. It is too good news to be true. They will say so for a time, and then give it up.”

“At any rate,” said one, with a cynical smile, “we shall have cheap meat in Zeerust for a while, until Montsioa’s cattle are disposed of.”

During the morning, while standing with some gentlemen in the street of Zeerust, I observed a horseman approaching whom I thought I knew.

A gentleman of the place answered my look by informing me that it was “old V——” who was coming on. I knew that he was one of the heads of the Rooi Grond people—a member of the Bestuur or Executive. As he had frequently been in my house, and I had often partaken of his hospitality, I went forward to meet him, especially as I saw him also coming toward us and holding out his hand.

After shaking hands he drew back with apparent surprise, and said, “But who are you—you are not Mackenzie?”

“Well, Mr. V——, seeing that I recognised you at once, I don’t see why you should be in any doubt as to who I am.”

“I am sorry,” he exclaimed; “you should not have had my hand had I known.”

I was persuaded that this was all acting, as he knew me quite well when he came forward to greet me, so I said, “Pray, why, Mr. V——, might I not have the honour to shake hands with you nowadays?”

“Because you have told so many lies about us in England. I hear you have filled the newspapers with them.”

Prompted by sheer curiosity, I now said, “Come, now, Mr. V——, give us an instance. We have all heard your statement. Give an instance.”

But the old man struck spurs into his horse and rode off. People came forward who heard, or were told, of this occurrence, and begged me not to take notice of anything that “old V——” might say. No one minded him; he

had lost all his influence, etc. My comforters, I may explain, were not limited to English-speaking people.

When the court was opened, I went forward with Montsioa's herd-boy, giving my evidence, and standing by him while he gave his. The case excited attention. Several well-known freebooters were in the court-house, as well as old V——, who frequently "put in his word" during the examination of the native, but never in a disorderly fashion. Every man in that room knew all about the raid, and who were in it. Several other men connected with the cattle-lifting hovered about outside the court-house, occasionally looking in and listening at the open window.

The case was clearly stated; and the probable locality of the stolen stock was indicated. The evidence was taken down as business of the court; the court-interpreter being a man formerly well known to me as a Boer hunter in Bechuanaland. In the course of the forenoon I met the magistrate, who said to me,

"Do you expect to get all the cattle back, Mr. Mackenzie?"

"I am here to ask for and claim all the cattle which were stolen. Knowing what takes place on these occasions, as to shooting down some for food, and so on, I may have an opinion on that subject; but, as a claim, I, of course, claim all that were taken."

"Well, I have just heard from a reliable source where they are; and I am taking steps to get them. I have now good hopes, Mr. Mackenzie," said the magistrate.

"In that case," I replied, "I assure you, your action will be one of the most beneficial in South African history, and all lovers of peaceful progress will treasure your name on account of it."

"You can now leave the affair in my hands with perfect satisfaction," said the landdrost; "I can see my way to send you back the cattle."

And so I parted from the local representative of the Transvaal Government. Mr. Otto was perfectly sincere when he made those statements. He fully intended to do his duty like a man. I had no doubt of it, and went away hoping for the restoration of some of the stolen cattle.

An amusing incident was told me by my servant Jan, as we were inspanning the horses before our departure. Some time before, while I was standing in the street talking with several gentlemen, a Boer (probably a freebooter), passing Jan, and seeing he was a stranger, demanded whose servant he was.

"I am Mr. Mackenzie's servant," said Jan, taking off his hat.

"Tell your master I'll shoot him," said the Boer.

"But, please, baas (master)," said Jan in his humblest tone, "does baas see that gentleman there in the street?" pointing to where I was standing.

"Yes, I see him."

"Well," said Jan, "that is Mr. Mackenzie; shoot him."

As the servant's head was still uncovered, and he used every term and gesture of respect, his interlocutor could not apparently make out whether he was half-witted or very quick-witted, and so passed on.

So many inquiries were made of one and another of our party as to our route back to Mafiking, that it became noticeable. We had a district to pass through occupied almost entirely by freebooters. We discussed freely the relative merits of several routes, but did not select one till we had started. We reached Mafiking again on Monday.

Returning from Zeerust, I resolved, before leaving that part of Bechuanaland, to place the details of my action, and the circumstances of the Transvaal border at Rooi Grond, not only before the High Commissioner at the Cape, but also before the British Resident at Pretoria, in order that he might without delay give correct information to the Government of the Transvaal on behalf of Montsioa and the Protectorate. However favourable the disposition of the landdrost, I could not but realise the fact that the people of his own district would strongly oppose the procedure which he was to adopt, and whether others would come forward and help him to carry out his promises, remained to be seen. In any case it was absolutely necessary that a full account of what I had done, and the circumstances in which I had acted, should be in the hands

of Mr. Hudson, the British Resident at Pretoria, at the earliest date. But not only was the business of great urgency, but as Montsioa was permitted by the Pretoria Convention, and, indeed, encouraged, to address himself to the British Resident, I felt that in this matter, in which I was acting in a special manner for the chief, there could be no mistake in writing direct to Mr. Hudson, sending at once to the High Commissioner at Capetown copies of all I wrote. The High Commissioner fully bore me out in what I had done, and informed the British Resident, in answer to his telegram for guidance, that in general I was to address myself through the High Commissioner; but in urgent matters I could address the Resident direct, as I had then done. The following is the letter which I addressed on this occasion to the British Resident, and which, without doubt, threw a flood of light on certain matters that had been hitherto shrouded in mystery (4194, 42):—

“MAFIKING, *May 28, 1884.*

“SIR—In discharge of my office as Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland, I have visited the Barolong country, and in behalf of Her Majesty entered into a treaty with the chief Montsioa. I had no business to transact with Moshette, but that chief, in a letter which he sent forward some days' journey to meet me, and again in another signed by himself and his headmen, desires to be under the Queen (as he expresses it) ‘like the other Barolong.’

“The day after my arrival here I visited a place called ‘Rooi Grond.’ I found some thirty or forty white men living on the boundary-line. Some of the houses are on one side, some on the other. I noticed that those on Barolong ground were empty, and some had been burned, I was told, by the order of Montsioa. These would come under the designation of huts rather than houses. I should say, without actual measurement, that no house on Rooi Grond, on the Barolong side, is more than 300 or 400 yards from the boundary-line. Practically, therefore, so far as escaping law is concerned, these men could be in Barolong territory in a few minutes were the Transvaal to seek to arrest them, as they recently escaped into the Transvaal when Montsioa visited the Rooi Grond.

“After paying this visit to Rooi Grond, I addressed to the Europeans there the enclosed public notice (see p. 232).

“On the evening of Thursday the 22d, news came to this town that a theft of stock had taken place from the cattle-posts of Montsioa at Tlaping, some fifteen miles north of this place, and from ten to twelve miles from the Transvaal border. I enclose deposition of one

of Montsioa's men on this subject. Immediately after hearing of this theft I started for Zeerust, taking with me another of Montsioa's people, who also knew where the cattle spoor was. We crossed the fresh spoor on our way, after we had entered many miles into the Transvaal. I laid the matter before Mr. Otto, the landdrost, who was at first of opinion that he could not interfere, as he had received stringent instructions not to mix himself up with border disputes, and that he must first write to Pretoria for instructions. I explained, however, that I was not bringing a political question before him, but a theft of cattle. Armed men had proceeded from within the Transvaal to Montsioa's cattle-posts, and had stolen a large number of Montsioa's cattle, bringing them again into the Transvaal, where they then were. Montsioa was at peace with the Transvaal Government, and, in assuming charge of the Barolong country as Deputy Commissioner, I particularly wished to have a good understanding with the Transvaal Government, and especially with its representatives at Zeerust and Lichtenburg. Transvaal men had taken these cattle,—cattle and men were then in the Transvaal, and in his district,—I asked him, therefore, to set the ordinary law of the Transvaal in operation and recover the stock. The landdrost freely admitted his duty in cases of theft of stock, and promised in this case to put the law in operation. I may incidentally mention that, according to reliable reports, four or five cattle-posts of the Bahurutse, who live at Linokana, in the Transvaal, have also been taken by those who took Montsioa's cattle, and at the same time. This would seem to make it plain that this event is merely a question of lifting cattle. I was sorry to learn that this method of obtaining supplies had proved too much for the honesty of several of the inhabitants of the districts of the Transvaal near the borders. Indeed, an Englishman in Zeerust, while deploring the state of the country, told me with a smile, and as a set-off, that at any rate they would have cheap beef in Zeerust for a few weeks. Still I was glad to be informed, on what I regard as the best authority, that the most respectable burghers have not been mixed up in this Rooi Grond affair, but that they are anxious that the law of the South African Republic should be asserted and the disturbance brought to an end, in so far as these men are harboured by the Transvaal.

"I address you, therefore, with great confidence on this subject, and ask you at your earliest convenience to lay the matter before the authorities at Pretoria. The question, after all, is simple enough. The residence of the men who carry on these operations is in the Transvaal. Mr. Nicholas Gey usually resides in the Transvaal; none of them reside 500 yards from the Transvaal. When the cattle were taken, the nearest point of the Transvaal was sought and the stock driven thither.

"You will observe that in the public notice I addressed to the Europeans at Rooi Grond I stated my willingness to consider and settle such cases as they might bring before me, so that they are not driven to force in order to obtain their rights or their property.

"Montsioa and his headmen press upon me the unfairness of the

present state of things, which admits of the emerging of a hostile force from the Transvaal, and its retreat thither with booty, but which forbids the crossing of the boundary-line by the Barolong on the spoor of their own cattle. My reply was that I had confidence that the Executive of the Republic would uphold its own laws within its own boundaries, and that if it did so the disturbances would cease. Hence my personal visit to Zeerust, from which I expect good results will follow. My object in writing to you now is to request that you would be good enough to lay this matter before the Executive of the Republic. As Her Majesty's Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland, I beg to direct their special attention to the body of armed and mounted men who assemble occasionally at Rooi Grond for hostile purposes. Besides cattle-stealing, they hold courts, give sentences, hold prisoners, and yet reside in the Transvaal. I am credibly informed that this armed body of men is comprised, perhaps not of burghers, but certainly of inhabitants of the Transvaal. I feel sure the Government of the South African Republic will not protect organised plundering within its borders, nor any hostile organisation which is not under the control of its own laws.

"I am sanguine enough also to express the hope that the Executive of the South African Republic will co-operate with the Native Department which is now assuming charge of Bechuanaland; all the more because, although it is now under the control of the High Commissioner, Her Majesty's Government are anxious that the representatives of all the states and colonies in South Africa should share with the High Commissioner in the administration of this and other outside territories.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) "JOHN MACKENZIE,
"Deputy Commissioner, Bechuanaland.

"To Geo. Hudson, Esq., British Resident, Pretoria."

On my return to Mafiking I found other business awaiting me. After the signing of the treaty, Montsioa came to me and said he knew the paper which he had signed was meant to be very efficacious, but if I went away and left him, what had he to show for it? He therefore requested me earnestly that from the first some one might be with him, as the representative of the new Government which had come into the country. An Assistant Commissioner would be necessary for this part of the country, and it occurred to me that a Mr. Wright, whom I had known for some years in the country, and who had already applied to the Colonial Office for such a post, was living at Zeerust, where he was qualifying himself to practise law in the Transvaal. He was favourably known in Bechuanaland as

an upright man. He knew every man in Marico, and probably every man who was or who was not a volunteer; and he was familiar with Transvaal ways as well as Transvaal law. It was somewhat singular that I could place my hands on a man so near and with such qualifications, as he could speak and write Dutch correctly, and also knew the native language. I had sent for Mr. Wright before I heard of the cattle raid, or made up my mind myself to visit Zeerust, where he resided. We had passed one another on the numerous tracks which intersect the country, and when I returned to Mafiking I found Mr. Wright waiting for me. He agreed to accept the provisional appointment which I offered to him, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner. As it was said by those within the vortex of Cape Colony politics that I was going about the country like a firebrand, and that my views would certainly lead to war, it is only fair that I should reproduce my letter of instructions to Mr. Wright, which is as follows (4194, 45):—

“MAFIKING, *May 27, 1884.*

“SIR—I am glad you were able to come to confer with me, and that you still desire to enter the service of Government in Bechuana-land. The appointment which I have offered to you is that of Assistant Deputy Commissioner in the Molopo district of the Barolong country. I can only make the appointment provisionally, subject to the approval of his Excellency the High Commissioner. The salary of £400 per annum, beginning from the date of your return to Mafiking, is preferred also provisionally and subject to the same approval. It will be desirable that you take up your residence here as soon as possible, and commence your duties.

“After the conversations we have had together here, it will not be necessary for me to refer at length to the work which you have undertaken. I may mention the following facts for your guidance.

“You find the chief Montsioa in actual possession of the country. Moshette, recently Montsioa’s enemy, is to-day grazing his cattle in a tract of Barolong country which Montsioa has succeeded in defending and holding from the volunteers of Moshette.

“Moshette himself, who seems for some time to have awoke to the consequences of his action, wrote to me when I was still some days’ journey from his place, and since that time he and his headmen have addressed me. In both letters Moshette desires to be under the Queen like the other Barolong. His headmen also express the same desire, and profess not to know or approve of the grants of land claimed by Moshette’s volunteers. This is no new feeling, for Mo-

shette's headmen declared to me that, when they found the volunteers marking out the country which they, the volunteers, said Moshette had ceded to them, but in which their own cattle were grazing, they prevented their doing so, and taking them to Moshette, he also declared that they were not to have that country. Two messengers from Moshette were sent here to attend the great meeting when Montsioa entered into a treaty with the Queen.

"Makobi and Jan Masibi are chiefs who are also living in the country of Montsioa—the former leaned rather to Moshette's side, while professing neutrality; the latter was favourable to Montsioa. All will yield obedience to the Territorial Government, and will pay the taxes to be levied, concerning which you will receive further instructions.

"Last Tuesday I visited Rooi Grond, and found only a few white men there living on the Transvaal boundary-line. The houses on the Barolong side were deserted, and some had been recently burned by Montsioa's men after they had given the occupants time to remove their property. The impression produced upon my mind by what I saw was that, were the laws of the Transvaal put in force on the east side of the boundary-line, speedy peace would be the result, as the volunteers have no footing on Barolong ground.

"The recent theft of stock from Montsioa exhibits the weakness and the strength of the opponents of Montsioa. In point of fact, a theft of cattle took place last Wednesday by men of the Transvaal, who, mounted and armed, crossed the boundary-line, and having obtained their booty, drove the cattle rapidly into the Transvaal, into which they knew the Barolong would not follow them armed. This was not an action of any political moment, but merely an act of cattle-stealing by inhabitants of the Transvaal. You are aware that as soon as I heard what had taken place I proceeded without delay to Zeerust, accompanied by a Barolong man who had followed the track of the cattle and knew where it had gone. This man gave his evidence before the landdrost, who has promised to follow up the case, and give back the cattle. I trust Montsioa will be able to remove his cattle to more distant parts of his country, where it will be easier for him to protect them. At the same time, those cattle thefts are not to be dignified by the name of wars; they are acts of theft which, I trust, will become more and more unprofitable to those who attempt them. Do your best to secure co-operation from the landdrosts of Zeerust and Lichtenburg, whose duty it is to put down theft within their districts. Endeavour as far as you can to direct the attention of the respectable inhabitants of the Transvaal border to the direct evil brought on the Transvaal itself by such action as that which has taken place.

"I enclose a copy of the treaty which the chief Montsioa has signed. You will see that the chief has conferred large power upon the representatives of the Queen. At present you will not interfere with his adjudication as chief in his own town among his own people. Montsioa is likely, however, to ask your advice and help in difficult cases. White men are likely to come to you when they have

cases against natives and strangers from other native towns. Do not settle their affairs without reference to the chief, so that your action will be more or less that of co-operation with him. Necessarily white men's cases will be brought to you for settlement. It will be well for you, even in such cases, and especially at the beginning, to consult the chief, as the parties and the history of their case will probably be known to him.

"In conclusion, it is well for you to be informed that it was Montsioa's urgent request that I should not 'leave him alone' any more, as he expressed it, but that a servant of the Queen should at once be placed here. I trust you will daily direct your efforts to the protection of the Barolong people and territory from outside invasion, discouraging all aggressive movements on their part; to the cultivation of friendly relations with the authorities of the neighbouring districts of the Transvaal; to the healing up of tribal jealousies; and to the general development and progress of the Barolong country.—I remain, etc., (Signed) "JOHN MACKENZIE, *Deputy Commissioner*.

"J. M. Wright, Esq."

I was waited upon at Mafiking on the 29th May by one of the Rooi Grond or Goshen volunteers, who came as the messenger of a section of that body. He said the visit was not known to those who were opposed to their views, but some had braved the consequences of opposition to Van Pittius and the more rabid Transvaal section, and had signed a document addressed to me which was cautiously worded lest it should fall into unfriendly hands; but which, he informed me, really meant that those who signed it were heartily tired of the present mismanagement of affairs, and that, for their part, they wished to place themselves under English rule. The document, which was signed by nineteen men, was as follows:—

"VOLUNTEERS' REST, LAND GOSHEN,
"May 27, 1884.

"HONOURED SIR—We, the undersigned inhabitants and persons interested in the annexed country of Captain Montsioa, and volunteers under the paramount chief Moshette, friendly request your Honour herewith to take no further steps in reference to us until we have been to the chief Moshette, inasmuch as he is our chief, and we must consult him.

"It is our intention, if possible, to go to Moshette to-day, or as speedily afterwards as possible.

"Hoping that your Honour will satisfy this, our earnest request, etc.

"To his Honour J. MACKENZIE,

"*British Resident of Bechuanaland, Mafiking.*"

I had a long talk with the bearer of this letter, who was a well-educated young man from the Cape Colony. Seeing that reference was made to the chief Moshette, I showed him one of Moshette's letters to me in which he expressed the desire to come under the Queen. Whatever his white volunteers might decide upon, the mind of the chief was clearly expressed. After being thus assured of the attitude of Moshette my interviewer said that the request for delay in the memorial ceased to be applicable, and expressed his intention to agitate for the signing of a memorial by the volunteers generally. With reference to this I at once said that such a memorial would receive due consideration. I felt that under the circumstances this was as much as these men themselves would expect, having just returned from raiding cattle within the Protectorate. In order that the gist of our conversation should not be left to his own or my remembrance of it, I sent by him the following letter in reply to the document which he had brought:—

“MAFIKING, *May 29, 1884.*

“GENTLEMEN—The day after I arrived here I rode up to Rooi Grond with the idea of meeting all who are residing there, but those who managed your affairs that day declined an interview.

“I then addressed a letter to you, intimating on the envelope that it was a ‘public letter, to be opened by those present.’ In that letter, among other things, I intimated that ‘all persons residing, or desiring to reside, at Rooi Grond or elsewhere in Barolong country aforesaid, are hereby requested to lodge with me, at Mafiking, their titles, or copies of the same, on or before Tuesday next, the 27th inst.’ This date has already passed; but as I understand this notice has not been made public, I am willing to receive any statement which you may have to make. In case I should have left before the arrival of your communication, please to address me to the care of the Assistant Commissioner, Mafiking, who will forward the same to me; and I promise you that your communication will receive due consideration from myself and from his Excellency the High Commissioner.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) “JOHN MACKENZIE, *Deputy Commissioner.*

“To Jasper Vermooten, Esq., and others at Rooi Grond.”

In forwarding to the High Commissioner in May an account of these miserable border raids at Rooi Grond, I took occasion to make the following remarks regarding the state of the country, and especially with reference to the attitude of the Transvaal:—

“The number of those acting under Mr. Gey van Pittius is not, as you will notice, very formidable, and I cannot but believe that through the interference of the Transvaal Government the Rooi Grond Force, disowned by Moshette, driven into the Transvaal by Montsioa, may be compelled to disband. Should the Transvaal Government insist on the immediate disbandment of these men, whose enrolment as volunteers of a native chief was an open breach of the law of the Transvaal, our work in Barolong country would be comparatively light. I trust your Excellency may be able at once to secure this very reasonable object from the Government of the Republic, especially as it has already disclaimed in published documents all connection with these volunteers or freebooters, speaking of them all as a community living outside the Transvaal, and especially naming Mr. Gey van Pittius as having been at one time a burgher and member of the Volksraad—afterwards neither the one nor the other, because no longer residing in the Transvaal. It is true the information of the Transvaal Government Secretary in making this assertion was not correct. Mr. Gey van Pittius is still a domiciled citizen of the Transvaal, and the Mr. van Zyl, at whose farm the cattle-lifting party halted, while Mr. van Zyl himself reconnoitred the Barolong cattle and their herds at Vaalpens Pan in Bangwaketse country, is now a Transvaal subject, and his farm well within the Transvaal. But these things could not have been clearly understood at Pretoria. Now, however, it will no longer be mere complicity on the part of the Transvaal with hostile operations against Montsioa carried on by outsiders. After the light which I have been able to throw upon the true state of affairs in my communication to the British Resident at Pretoria and to your Excellency, the entire and real responsibility of the Transvaal Government to the chief Montsioa and to Her Majesty's Government for the losses which that chief is sustaining must be apparent to all. And the responsibility will be more firmly clenched if in answer to your Excellency's representatives the Rooi Grond organisation is not at once broken up” (4194, 60).

As already stated, I found Mr. Christopher Bethell at Mafeking. He had been sent there originally by Sir Charles Warren during the military occupation of the country in 1878-79. After the Force retired he remained in the town hunting and trading, and acting as Montsioa's adviser. I was aware of the ability which Mr. Bethell had shown in the conduct of certain affairs near Kuruman which had been entrusted to him; and on his expressing a desire to be of some service to Government again, I had pleasure in saying that I should recommend him for a place in the Bechuanaland Police, which were then, as I thought, being raised by Major Lowe; that his appointment required the ratification of the High Commissioner, but he was to regard

himself as provisionally appointed. Poor Bethell! He did not live long enough to learn that his appointment was not favoured in high quarters, for the strange reason that he had been the friend of Montsioa, and that he was too much of a partisan! I could not follow this reasoning. It seemed to me that his proposed local position as a subordinate officer of police under the Assistant Commissioner at Mafiking would have had no connection whatever with politics, but only with the prevention of theft and other outrage within the Protectorate; and for this work he was well qualified. It seemed to me also that the fact of his having been the helper of Montsioa (a chief whom we ourselves afterwards defended with an army) was a reason in favour of my proposed appointment and not against it. Mr. Bethell was not all that I or those who loved him would have wished him to be, but he was a brave and capable Englishman, and had more than earned the position to which I nominated him. Perhaps the best criterion for judging the true character of this young English gentleman is to be found in a telegraphic message (3686, 97) sent by him in the capacity of Montsioa's agent to the High Commissioner at the Cape in June 1883. The Northern Boundary Commission of the Cape Colony had extended its labours, and taken cognisance of the political condition of Bechuanaland. Their view was that Mankoroane's country should be annexed to the Cape Colony, and Montsioa's country brought under colonial protection, expelling the Boer volunteers from Goshen, but granting titles to Massow's volunteers. Although this measure was favourable to the chief whom he represented, Bethell strongly opposed it, because, as the following telegram shows, he held it would be "too great a premium on freebooting":—

"From Bethell, Barolong Agent, Kimberley, to Private Secretary to High Commissioner, Capetown.

"6th June.—Have to-day seen Cape Commission. Have informed them of Native Confederation. They have given me their opinion, viz.:—Annexation of Mankoroane and Stellaland and Protectorate of Barolong, with expulsion of Moshette's Boers. I have informed them that I am ready to accept Protectorate of Barolong with expulsion of

Moshette's Boers, but cannot agree to annexation of Mankoroane's country, giving Stellaland Boers titles to the country. This is too great a premium on freebooting. I am ready if his Excellency guarantees Protectorate over Barolong, and Protectorate or annexation Mankoroane with expulsion freebooters, to send message which will stop the allies' operations, but must have Imperial guarantee. Estimates of men required to clear country absurd. Two hundred police, country proclaimed, would be ample. I have other suggestions; should like use of cypher code. Failing settlement, outbreak early in July. All respectable Boers in South-Western Transvaal strongly opposed to freebooters."

In short, the one disqualification of Christopher Bethell in Capetown was that he was an Englishman; and had helped to defend a native chief who had befriended Englishmen and loyal colonists. Van Niekerk and Delarey were deemed worthy at Capetown of an approval which, to our shame be it recorded, our highest authorities denied to Bethell.

The time spent in Mafiking and its neighbourhood had not been without result. I had visited and described Rooi Grond; I had gone even into the Transvaal in search of stock stolen from those under British protection; and had endeavoured by the fairest and most legitimate means to find out and place before Her Majesty's Government the facts connected with the disturbances with which we should have to contend. For the information of the Transvaal Government I had proved conclusively that freebooters' courts were held and fines imposed, or imprisonments undergone, within the Transvaal country itself, and yet without any reference to its authority; and that war was levied from the Transvaal upon Bechuanaland, and all the booty was removed into the Transvaal as to a place of safety. On the other hand, there was this possibility, if the Zeerust magistrate would only carry out his promise to me, that the sad reputation of the Transvaal in the past might be redeemed by better conduct henceforth.

Within the Protectorate itself something had been done. The natives were everywhere thankful and strangely hopeful of peace, the strength of these feelings being increased by their personal knowledge of myself extending over many years and their confidence in me. The old Barolong feud

was in a fair way to be healed in the presence of the Queen's authority. A capable Assistant Commissioner and an Inspector of local police had been found and provisionally appointed. The country was still subject to inroads of freebooters; but I felt I must leave that in the hands of the High Commissioner and Her Majesty's Government, as the habitat of the freebooters was the Transvaal country and not Bechuanaland. With reference to exerting personal influence over these Goshen freebooters, I had done more than I had been instructed to do. I had approached them in a friendly way, and again and again offered fair consideration of their claims. When I left Mafiking there was a movement among them to memorialise the officers of the Protectorate, and I encouraged them to do so. Unless he consented to grovel as their comrade, or to be dictated to as their servant, I am not aware that any man could have done more than I did to avert the necessity for the exercise of superior force at Rooi Grond.

CHAPTER V

THE TREATY SIGNED IN WEST BECHUANALAND—A ZIGZAG POLICY AT DOWNING STREET

IF I had stopped at Montsioa's town and gone no farther into the Barolong country, I should have been like a messenger from the king in Edinburgh, who had been sent to treat with a disturbed and distracted Highland district, but who had failed to reach the headquarters of the clan. If a man were to treat successfully with the Campbells, it is quite certain he could not stop short of Inveraray. The Inveraray of the Barolong clan lay to the west; and so on the 30th of May my mule-waggon was on its way westward, our course leading us along the banks of the Molopo River, or more strictly, river-course. There were also, to my mind, special reasons in the past history of the dealings of the Transvaal on its western border why treaty-signing, when done at all, should be done thoroughly. We have had abundant warning how much mischief could be done by getting behind treaties or awards, and by putting forward the pretensions of one chief as against another—the whole movement being used for selfish ends, and with utter recklessness as to the general peace of the country. By birth, Montsioa might not be chief of all the Barolong; but then neither was Moshette, whom the Boers, for their own purposes, so persistently put forward as "paramount chief." I knew well who was the reputed Barolong chief, so far as birth went—a young man, from whose "house," however clear its claim to highest rank in the tribe, wealth and influence had been ebbing away. I felt that it would not be

difficult for me—known as I was to all the chiefs and their headmen—to obtain readily from them signatures to a treaty in which they would speak for themselves and for those living under them. Thus if all possible “paramount chiefs” signed one document of submission to the Queen, one possibility, at least, of intrigue and trouble would have been taken away, and the peace of the country so far secured. This was my chief object in my journey westward from Mafiking, and I was completely successful. On each occasion I assembled the people and carefully explained in their own language the object of the treaty; and full discussion always took place, after which the signatures were cheerfully given.

So determined was I to make this matter complete, that I went myself and obtained the signature of the chief Bonokwani at Morokweng, as he lay in his house very ill with smallpox, of which he shortly afterwards died. As the old man put his cross on the paper he whispered in his weakness, “My heart was glad when I heard you had arrived; I have long trusted to your advice, and I thank you for coming to see me and for not being afraid of the wounds.”

The chiefs at Pitsani, Morokweng, and Ganyesa put their names to one document, a different date indicating when the signatures were recorded at each place. The document itself, which was addressed to me as the “Messenger of the Queen,” was brief and comprehensive:—

“We are thankful for your coming into our Barolong country. Here we also give ourselves over to the Queen—to obey the laws which she will bring. We are the people of the Queen, and we hope for peace and stability through her. This is the language of us all here” (4194, 63).

The first village on our westward way was that of Disaneng—often called Jan Masibi’s—after the headman of the village. I was well acquainted with many of the people here. They were not Barolong but Batlaro from the south, who had asked and obtained the sanction of Montsioa to their settling in his country. Most of the families contained those who had become Christians; and

the village church occupied a prominent place in the village.

Perhaps the most disgraceful event in the war against Montsioa was the murder of fifteen prisoners taken by the Boers in their attack on this village of Disaneng, where the petty chief Jan Masibi resided under the jurisdiction of Montsioa. In the end of January 1882 an unexpected attack was made on this village by some eighty Boers and thirty or forty natives, some of the latter as well as the Boers being from the Transvaal: the rest of the natives were Moshette's people. The men of the village took up a position in the cattle-pen of the village, which formed a strong defence. Motlanke, a native minister, trained by myself under the auspices of the London Missionary Society, believing that, as the attacking party far outnumbered the defenders of the village, the latter must in the end be overpowered and killed, resolved, on his own responsibility, to try what negotiation could effect. He went first to the native contingent of the attacking party and inquired for their leader. They directed him to the Boer contingent, and said that their true leader was a Boer. He then went to this Boer leader and interceded for the villagers, saying, that as all the stock and other property of the people of the village had already fallen into the Boers' hands, would they not spare the lives of the men. The Boer commandant replied that, if the native minister could induce Masibi and his people to come out and lay down their arms, their lives would be spared. Motlanke accordingly went to the cattle-pen, explained what he had done, and put the responsibility of coming out upon Jan Masibi and his men.

"If it were the English," said Motlanke, "I should urge you to come out; but as I do not know the custom of the Boers, I leave it to yourselves to come out or not. I have furnished you with the opportunity."

Jan Masibi and the eighteen men who were with him elected to trust to the word of the Boer leader rather than to fight it out, and followed the native minister to the Boer Force. They were told to lay down their guns, bandoliers, etc., and to remove the distinctive cloth round their hats.

Having disarmed the men, the Boer leader turned to the native minister and thanked him, saying, with a smile, "You are the right sort of native minister: you are truly a man of peace; for the cattle-pen is strong and I should have lost some men. But I have changed my mind as to what I said: these men have already killed some of my horses and wounded one of my men—they must also die."

To this the native minister replied, "If you have changed your mind, let matters be as they were before. Give the men back their guns and let them return to the cattle-pen, and I shall go back to my own house."

This idea, however, was scouted with derision by the Boer leader.

Then was performed a most noble action on the part of the native minister. Passing over to where the disarmed and now condemned men stood, Motlanke said to the Boer commandant, "If you kill them, kill me also; for I shall have become their betrayer if I live and they die."

This, to the honour of our humanity, was an action which appealed to the Boer leader's mind. He replied, "Now you conquer me; you have saved their lives. I shall not kill them, but take them to Moshette."

Motlanke contented himself with this; and the men were bound and taken away. But what happened? Out of nineteen men, fifteen were some days after taken away bound in a waggon from the combined laager of Moshette and the Boers, and put to death in the open field. The men were perfectly blameless, except in attempting to defend their home and country. In considering the question of responsibility for this deed, we must note two facts. When Motlanke asked Moshette's native officer who was master, he was directed to the Boer leader. This person acted as master—the responsible leader of the whole Force—and offered terms. Secondly, the same position had been already taken up by the assembled Boers in their relation to Moshette, when the secretary of the British Resident visited the camp near Mafiking. Mr. Rutherford, they said, need not ask Moshette anything: they would answer for him (3486, 65). Are they prepared in the same way to answer for the lives

of those fifteen men who, when they thought that their lives had been spared, and that, as they were told, they were being removed to Kunwana because food was scarce at the laager, were so mercilessly slaughtered on the way? There can be no question as to the truth of what is here stated. I have had the opportunity of seeing Motlanke and hearing him describe what took place. He sent a detailed account to me in writing before I saw him personally. Depositions were also made before Mr. Rutherford, secretary to the British Resident in Pretoria (3486, 55), and before Mr. Bethell at Kanye (3486, 8), and the accounts substantially agree. The Transvaal Government at one time consented to send one of its officers to the western border, in company with Mr. Rutherford, to inquire into this matter, but afterwards declined to do so. Perhaps, to some minds, this would invalidate the evidence collected by Mr. Rutherford. To a great many more, however, it will be an additional proof of tacit acquiescence, if not complicity, in what was going on.

I regarded the district intersected by the Molopo as a most valuable stretch of country. There were everywhere evidences that it had been occupied by large troops of cattle belonging to the Barolong, most of which had been captured in the disturbances. There were occasional forests of acacia, which were here and there quite dense. Water was obtainable in the bed of the river everywhere as far as we went with it; only I noticed that the farther we proceeded westward the deeper were the wells before the water was reached. But the deepest which we saw was not deep for a well, being only about twenty feet.

My next visit after Disaneng was to the Barolong chief Makobi, at a place of considerable natural strength called Pitsani. Makobi had endeavoured to comport himself as a neutral in the recent troubles, but not with complete success. One of his younger sons had actually joined the Boers under Moshette. It is true he was a worthless scapegrace, who was usually in mischief of some kind; nevertheless he was the chief's son, and Montsioa and his people entertained very bitter feelings about the attitude of Makobi.

At Makobi's town I was confronted with a case which I thought fairly appealed to the recently established authority of the Queen in Bechuanaland. Two Europeans—a trader and his friend and companion, a traveller—had been robbed in the Kalahari by the scapegrace son of Makobi, to whom reference has already been made. The traveller and the waggons were then at Morokweng; the trader had come forward on horseback, as he told me, to obtain assistance from me. I found out, however, that he had also gone past my camp to Rooi Grond, and had begun to place his case in the hands of Mr. Gey van Pittius, who eagerly offered assistance. The trader would appear to have repented himself as to what he was doing in the middle of the negotiations, for he wrote to the head of the Goshen volunteers that, as he was an Englishman, and there were now English protection and authority in Bechuanaland, he would make his case known to the Deputy Commissioner. The case, as it came before me, was one of the greatest difficulty. The criminal was a chief's son; my time was precious; and the trader had certainly gone wrong in having anything whatever to do with the volunteers of the Transvaal. I resolved, however, not to resent the half-hearted way in which the trader had conducted himself, which I afterwards learned was greatly owing to the influence of his travelling companion—not an Englishman—who also wrote in the *Zuid Afrikaan* that, had he not been ill, he would certainly have brought the Goshen volunteers to settle this matter within the Bechuanaland Protectorate. I found the trader had lost about £1500 in goods of various kinds; his friend's loss was about £30. They were both willing to take back their own goods or other produce at fair valuation. I found that while a part of the stolen property had come to Pitsani, perhaps one-half of it had gone to Morokweng, for Makobi's son had been aided and abetted by headmen from Morokweng who were hunting in the Kalahari. Then I was told, and this was admitted by the Englishman, that he had appeared in the heart of the Kalahari against the express commands of the Barolong. He had been welcomed by their vassals, and had traded with them. This was of course a distinct breach

of native custom, and was accordingly resented by some of the vassals' masters in the illegal manner described. I found on inquiry that the old chief was ashamed of his son's conduct; so were his brothers; so were the headmen. But would their professions of regret bear fruit? Without a policeman or a gun, could I get these people to make good the loss to this Englishman, who, if he had broken any of their laws, ought to have been brought to the chief and tried by him, and not robbed in the desert? I resolved to test the sincerity of those who had just professed their pleasure in being under the Queen, and their confidence in myself.

I satisfied myself that one-half of the amount might be charged against Morokweng and one-half against Pit-sani. I asked Makobi, therefore, at once to make up the sum of £750 and hand it to the trader while I was there. This was no light demand, but it was complied with. The value of the stolen property was returned in cattle, which were taken, by the chief's orders, from his son and his accomplices, and which I appraised as they came in, to the satisfaction of both sides, and in waggons which were put in to make up the above large sum. The trader expressed his thanks—and well he might! At Morokweng the same steps were taken; and when I left this town—for I could not delay longer in these regions—the balance of the debt was being made good. As, however, smallpox was at the time making frightful ravages there—one of the victims shortly after my departure being the chief himself—I was prepared to hear that the trader was not so well satisfied with the repayments at Morokweng. While at great inconvenience and discomfort I was endeavouring to right these Europeans, who were both intelligent and well-connected people, the near relative of one of them, the editor of the *Zuid Afrikaan*, was actually inciting its readers to violence and bloodshed in Bechuanaland. Publishing a report that I had forwarded some ammunition to Montsioa to be used by him in defence of his town from the renewed attacks of the Transvaal volunteers of Moshette, the editor expressed it as desirable that part of the lead should find a lodgment in Mackenzie's person!

The question of serfdom as practised by the Bechuana tribes from time immemorial was brought before me in this trader's business. It was not a matter which I should have gone out of my way to bring into prominence at that time, as it is one of those questions of detail which would be necessarily included in the settlement of the wider question of Imperial policy. A case of this kind, however, having occurred, it became my duty not only to arrange the present difficulty, but to give correct information to Her Majesty's Government (4194, 58) concerning the few scattered tribes of the Kalahari, to describe their serfdom, and to express the hope that while the Protectorate secured justice for the Bechuana in their contact with Europeans, it would also in the course of time give justice to the serfs of the Kalahari in their contact with their Bechuana masters. And I mentioned that I was credibly informed that already some of these vassals were themselves the owners of cattle, horses, and sheep—wore European clothing; in one village they were said to have erected a church, and their young people had learned to read Sechuana books. And all this in the heart of what Europeans called the Kalahari Desert! The Kalahari has since been vividly described by Mr. Farini, whose personal experiences and observation confirm the opinion which I have long held, that a great part of the Kalahari in the hands of European enterprise will yet prove to be a valuable pastoral country. These modest aspirations, which implied no haste or excited action, were surely warranted by the circumstances of the case, but were not received with favour. There seems a fatal disinclination on our part to consider or take in hand remedial or preventive measures—I suppose because they would do most good, and would also pay the Government best. We wait with folded hands and shut eyes till an outrage takes place; then get money as an expression of the indignation of the English people, and having in some rough way adjusted matters in a single locality, shut our eyes again and fold our hands. I do not know what arguments may have been before Lord Derby, or by whom they were advanced, but one of the least satisfactory of all his Lordship's decisions (4213, 26) was that we were to shrink from

having any charge of the Kalahari, with its numerous game and its few vassals. In order that the "responsibility" connected with the protection of Bushmen and antelopes might be avoided, the treaty signed with Bonokwani at Morokweng was actually given up by Lord Derby on the 30th of August—a month after it was known in London that the treaties in Western Bechuanaland had been obtained. When this was decided on, no doubt such arguments were brought forward as made it appear to the Secretary of State imprudent for him to proceed as far as the Inveraray of Montsioa's clan. It may have even seemed a master-stroke of policy to recede from the Protectorate of Bechuanaland except for a few miles along the Transvaal border.

But this singular notion was not entertained very long, and the next change was a sweeping one, extending our Protectorate again not only to Morokweng, from which we had receded, but hundreds of miles to the west of it—including those Kalahari serfs and the antelopes and the wide expanses in which these roam,—which will one day, no doubt, be a country covered by the stock of quiet pastoral farmers! Whoever recommended the shrinking of our Protectorate when the good of the Bushmen and serfs in the Kalahari was mentioned, and wished to restrict it to the close neighbourhood of the Transvaal border, and yet desired to levy a native hut-tax for the expense of the Protectorate, he does not seem to have stood face to face with the actual condition of Bechuanaland and of South Africa, but to have acted as if a single hasty glance were all that was necessary, and as if no continuous thought or attention was required from any officer of Her Majesty's Government by the condition of that country.

As we were personally known in every town and village to which this tour had led us, our visit was not only of interest to us, but a great source of pleasure and satisfaction to the people. They wanted to know the real condition of the country under the new arrangement; and they were satisfied that I told them the truth. Divided among themselves, and jealous of one another, they were all desirous of being under the Queen. They were all willing to pay a tax.

One chief, indeed, stipulated that his money should not be mixed up with that of his neighbour on one side, as they were not good friends; but he had no objection to having his money mixed with that of his neighbour on the opposite side, for they were on friendly terms! I explained that the tax was not the tribute of serfs; it was the contribution of the subjects of the Queen towards the support of Her Government in Bechuanaland. Fear and distrust gave place to confidence in every town and village.

Whilst I was occupied with the men my wife sometimes visited the native villages, especially directing her attention to the homes of those who had been under our care and tuition at the Moffat Institution, Kuruman. She was thus able to see how they managed their homes, and how they conducted themselves in the villages to which they had been sent. It was probably while engaged in this work that she was seized with illness, which proved to be a mild form of smallpox. Although this was alarming at first, the attack soon passed off, without further inconvenience, except such as resulted from the quarantine which the patient herself insisted on observing towards her friends at Kuruman.

I had now completed the tour of Bechuanaland when, on the 21st of June, I addressed the High Commissioner from Kuruman on the defence of the Protectorate (4194, 55). The whole of the tribes of South Bechuanaland now occupied a defined position under Her Majesty's Protectorate. There was only one element of uncertainty—the attitude of the Transvaal Government. If the Government at Pretoria resolved loyally to uphold peace within its own borders, and to insist upon the dispersal of armed bands of its inhabitants collected on its western border, all troubles would be at an end; and I should only have to face the ordinary difficulties of the administration of the Protectorate—which, of course, would be quite enough. If the High Commissioner found out that the Transvaal was not keeping the peace within its own border, and would not do so, that was a question which would demand the consideration of those who had framed the London Convention. As to the Bechuanaland Protec-

torate, personal influence had as yet succeeded everywhere except at Rooi Grond, which was within the Transvaal. I was, therefore, prepared to lay the results of my tour before the High Commissioner, according to our understanding. There was just one matter upon which I had still to collect definite information for the use of the High Commissioner, and that was the land grants of Mankoroane and other Batlaping chiefs unconnected with Stellaland. I had requested that copies of all these should be lodged with Major Lowe, and I had also called a public meeting to be held at Taung on the same question. Having in view my journey to Capetown, I now left Mrs. Mackenzie within the familiar precincts of the Institution at Kuruman, and reached Taung in time for the meeting which had been postponed by me till the 30th of June.

From the letters of Major Lowe addressed to me on my tour, and from information which I received from him after my return to Taung, I found that thefts of cattle and horses were very numerous. In some instances Mankoroane's people were implicated as the culprits; in other cases the stock was taken by Boers and others from Mankoroane and the Batlaping. A number of loose unemployed Europeans, colonists, and colonial Kaffirs were well known to be engaged in this cattle-stealing. Major Lowe had succeeded in inducing Mankoroane to give up stock stolen by his people, but the chief was much discouraged, and became restive when Major Lowe was unable to induce white men and other enemies of Mankoroane to restore his stock when stolen by them.

From the evidence of a certain Hollander taken before Major Lowe, there were reasonable grounds for surmising that if not the chief, at any rate some not far under him in rank were accessories in these raids. For instance, a certain number of horses were on one occasion given up by Mankoroane which the Hollander confessed that he had stolen at the suggestion of a brother of Mankoroane; this brother had retained some and given the rest to the Hollander, who transferred his share of the plunder to a storekeeper to whom he was indebted. One great difficulty

connected with stock-stealing was this,—that whether the stolen stock remained at Taung or not, the thieves were almost sure to drive it through or past that place. This was good policy, because the “spoor” or track was thus sure to be obliterated by the large number of stock constantly grazing near Taung. Then those in pursuit,—it was correctly judged by the thieves,—seeing the spoor led to Taung, would take it for granted that the thieves and the stock were there, and would accordingly lodge a complaint with the authorities. While they were thus spending time the thieves had driven the stolen stock over the border. Major Lowe informed me that a case had occurred in which the owners of cattle had seen their property in the Transvaal, and had gone to the magistrate prepared to make the necessary depositions, but they could get no redress. This was at Christiana, and bore a resemblance to my own experiences at Zeerust. On the other hand, no such complaint could be brought against the authorities of the Cape Colony, for Mankoroane had actually succeeded in getting back some of his stolen cattle after they had been bought by colonial cattle-dealers. Such was the unhappy condition of Taung in June, and before a police force was assembled. Actual war there was none, but as yet we had no policemen to cope with cattle-thefts in a wide territory; and the unfriendliness of the Transvaal presented the same insuperable obstacle here as on the border of Montsioa's country. In the meantime I sanctioned Major Lowe's employment of one or two native policemen—more in the position of detectives than as policemen; and their services were found to be valuable.

There was a great concourse of people when the day arrived (the 30th of June) on which the public meeting was to take place at Taung to inquire into the land question. The business began by my requesting Major Lowe to read over the names of all claimants or grantees; the name of the land or lands which they claimed; the nature of the claim, whether for service rendered or otherwise; and the chief's name who had made the grant. Mankoroane, I need not say, was not happy during an exposure of all land

transactions so open and so thorough. He was greatly annoyed and surprised at first; afterwards he seemed pleased that I had laid the whole matter before his people. It was evident to my mind that the chief and a few headmen had put their "crosses" to a certain number of documents more or less privately, so far as the body of the people of the tribe were concerned. This was very clearly shown as name after name was read out, and the native listener became aware that perhaps his own farm had been signed away without his knowledge.

Luka Jantje was there with a party of his men—the representative of a rival house to that of Mankoroane. His presence showed confidence in the Protectorate—that under it justice would be done to all. Other petty chiefs were there to represent their own rights and those of their people. As it was their country and their farms which were chiefly affected by the extensive "grants" of Mankoroane, their indignation was very great as the reading went on. Nor was the indignation confined to the strangers. Mankoroane, in his own courtyard and before his own people, was being brought to book for acts which the bulk of his people knew nothing about. Then farms had also been "granted" by other men acting as chiefs, who, it was declared, had no right to make such gifts. The consequence of this exposure of the real state of the land question at Taung was that one headman after another spoke in anger against what had been done by their chief, and some went as far as to use threatening language towards Mankoroane.

"Think not," said these councillors with clouded faces, "that a chief can live after he has destroyed his people."

To put the best face on things, the chief stood up at the end of the meeting and said that this was my meeting, but that his meeting would be on the following day, and that he would then make his statement. Everybody was curious to know what that statement would be, and how it would be received by his people and by the white men who were claimants to land. Next day there was again a large attendance. It is probable that Mankoroane during the night had received a good deal of that mischievous "advice" which

had delayed business on the occasion of my first visit. To my astonishment, and that of a great many of his own people, Mankoroane commenced proceedings by informing me that he would now show me how many had still hope in him—Mankoroane—and not in Government. I at once recognised the hand of an enemy in this line of remark. To teach the chief to oppose himself to the Protecting Power, and yet to expect to benefit by protection—to teach him to guard his supremacy, and yet to use it only in giving away his people's land—while the expenses of the Protectorate were not so much as thought of; to profess an interest, now in the native chief, and now in the success of the Protectorate, while the real object was to secure certain selfish aims—such was the inimical policy with which I had once more to contend at Taung.

“All ye white men who have hope in old Mankoroane,” shouted the chief at the top of his voice, “stand on one side.”

In obedience to this command some scores of white men—English-speaking and Dutch-speaking—stood up in a row.

“These, you see, are my people, Mackenzie, although they are white men. They say they hope in me and not in Government.” This was whispered with a pleased countenance, and was not overheard by his people. It was now quite evident that designing men were misleading the chief to his own inevitable ruin by endeavouring to induce him practically to repudiate the Protectorate—before which some were no doubt afraid that their land claims would not stand good.

It was a hot day, and the Europeans were kept standing some time. I was waiting to know if the chief's programme was exhausted and if this poor spectacle was all the explanation that Mankoroane had to offer to Her Majesty's Government and to his own people as to the great confusion which prevailed in the country concerning the possession of many valuable fountains and farms. Here was nothing but a silly attempt to assert greatness and independence of the Protectorate.

Wishing to help the chief and at the same time forward

business, I thought I saw a way of turning this strange demonstration to account. I accordingly asked the chief if he agreed to the validity of all the land claims of the white men as they stood there.

His countenance changed at once. "By no means," he replied; "there is So-and-So—he claims a farm for ammunition which he never gave me"—and went on to state important facts connected with the claims of several.

I suggested, after hearing the chief and some of the headmen speak in agreement on the point, that it would be a good plan to take the fullest advantage of the present meeting of the white men; and that I thought the claimants might be examined one by one by Major Lowe, assisted by headmen selected by the chief; and that after hearing what both sides had to say, the result should be inscribed in Major Lowe's book, opposite the names of these men, pending a future Land Commission. This was accordingly done, and was the first humble attempt at assisting the chief to settle his land difficulties. The most unfounded claims would thus at once be weeded out. Those possessing claims which were undisputed in such circumstances would probably feel confidence in bestowing care, or even in laying out money on their farms.

The chief and his councillors thought my suggestion a good one; so that whatever might have been the hopes of mischief-makers, the strange demonstration ended in the practical co-operation of chief, people, and European grantees, under the Protectorate.

When the tribe came to understand the serious condition of affairs, they held frequent meetings for the discussion of the land question. I attended these meetings and took note of the points of general agreement. Several white men holding land under the chief, or hoping to do so, were permitted to speak, and gave their opinion. In the end a statement was drawn up, embodying the various points upon which all were agreed—a document which I regarded as of the utmost importance, because I was a witness myself that it really embodied the decision of the chief and people.

“Statement of the Chief and Council of Batlaping concerning Land.

“1. We have agreed to give certain white men fountains (farms) in our country—viz. those who have helped us, who have lived with us, and who have fought for us. These men are known to us, and we can bear witness concerning them at the appointed time.

“2. These gifts of fountains (farms) and their title-deeds are not things which can be bought according to our custom; our meaning is that they live and plough there.

“3. The agreement which the chief entered into with Mr. J. G. Donovan was concerning men who would help the chief in war. After they had done so, it was said they would be placed on the boundary of the country from Kopje Enkel towards Kunwana, and would be given farms there. This agreement has been borne witness to by Mr. Greef and Mr. Chapman, who also certify that such were its words. But seeing that these men never made their appearance, we declare that the agreement is destroyed—it was destroyed by Mr. Donovan inasmuch as he did not bring the men concerning whom we spoke with him. Thus the agreement no longer exists.

“4. We do not approve of Mr. Donovan’s action in advertising the farms in the newspapers of the white men; and as to the white men who through these advertisements have been led to give out money on account of these farms, we say, let them get their money again; let Mr. Donovan return all the money to those who have given out the money.

“We speak thus, the Chief and Council of the Batlaping.

“MANKOROANE MOLEHABANGWE.

“His X mark.”

In the preceding document reference is made to certain agreements made with Mr. J. G. Donovan, who had acted for a few months previously as the chief Mankoroane’s agent. When this new agent came into power the fortunes of Mankoroane were at a low ebb indeed, and there was little hope in Bechuanaland for help from England towards the settlement of the country. But what volunteering had achieved for the one side the same method might perform for the other. It was therefore proposed to Mankoroane that English and Cape Colony volunteers should be enrolled on his behalf, whose work it should be to drive back Massow’s volunteers into the Transvaal. Having done this, it was proposed that the country, which was beginning to be known as Stellaland, was to be given to his Colonial helpers by Mankoroane. It was represented to the chief that he would then have English-speaking neighbours instead of Boers; and Man-

koroane agreed to the project. The first document which was drawn up, however, stated too plainly what the "volunteers" would have to do for their farms, and would place those responsible for its publication within the reach of the Colonial law as being guilty of a breach of the Neutrality Proclamation. The form of the announcement was therefore modified, but the engagement itself in the native mind remained the same.

This futile effort on the part of a private person, who was also a British subject, to raise an army to fight for Mankoroane, and help him to drive back the Stellalanders, was not productive of any result visible to the natives. No army arrived, and they therefore unanimously contended that the agreement had consequently fallen to the ground; and no land was due under that agreement. The mischief, however, did not end here.

It was next given out by the agent that a very large force would be necessary to drive back the Stellalanders, and that if Mankoroane and his people retained certain valuable farms in Stellaland district, there would not be land enough there to pay for all the force which would be necessary; and so a request was made that Mankoroane would grant authority to his agent to issue titles to farms in the western district also of the Batlaping country, extending as far west as the Langberg, about one hundred and sixty miles from Taung! The chief was encouraged to do this by being reminded of tribal differences which had obtained, and which were known to have embittered his mind against some of the people whose lands he was urged to empower his agent to "give out" in farms. Now this document was dated Taung, 28th March, exactly a month after the Convention was signed in London, and after it had been announced and become known everywhere, that Bechuanaland was to come under the protection of Her Majesty. Notwithstanding the universal knowledge of this fact among Europeans, Mankoroane was induced to sign a document on the 28th of March for the purpose (as he and his headmen undoubtedly thought) of enabling his agent to enrol a new army for the rescue of his country

from the hands of his enemies! But according to the actual wording of the document itself which they then signed, they empowered their agent to dispose of one hundred and fifty farms, and to beacon them off, in the western part of Batlaping country! The agent well knew that this course would dispossess native occupants of many years' standing, and thus produce in the country a fresh disturbance.

This proposal was mischievous all round—to Mankoroane and the natives as well as to the incoming English Government. To the natives it had been explained as a method of obtaining men to fight for their chief and country, and especially to assist them in driving out Masow's volunteers; and all payment depended on that operation. On the other hand, to the Colonial people who read the advertisement, it appeared to be a method of obtaining native land; and I was informed that people at a distance were encouraged to take farms as a speculation, who could neither have occupied them as farmers nor defended them as volunteers. When the first document was signed there might possibly have been some semblance of feasibility about it, although even then it was unwise in the highest degree. But the second document loses even the semblance of being beneficial to the natives, if we except the chief himself, who, along with his agent, was to share the money procured by the disposal of the land of so great a part of South and West Bechuanaland. "Knowledge is power" often to do evil, as was the case here. "It needs a long spoon to sup with the devil." This Mankoroane found when, instead of signing an agreement to pay for a new army, he had signed away in ignorance a block of country for white farmers, as if he (the chief) had suddenly turned land speculator and colonist, inviting people from the Colony to come and occupy native farms! So far as I could gather, nothing was further from the chief's intention than to do anything of the kind. Naturally enough, the agent had not found his spoon long enough for his supper on this occasion any more than had Mankoroane. The movement which began in a project professedly for the benefit of Mankoroane and his people, ended, as we have seen, in the public

advertising of Mankoroane's lands in the Colonial papers, and ended also in the production of a number of paper claims to the best farms, made out in the names of the agent's own relatives and friends. This sort of thing has been done before in South Africa; and it would no doubt be done again were it not that, as I trust, the Imperial Government will accept of the gift of unoccupied lands from native chiefs, and preside over their occupancy by Europeans.

It has been shown elsewhere that as the land of a tribe does not belong to the chief personally, but to the chief and his people, the signatures disposing of tribal land would require to be comprehensive of the divisions of the tribe having a right to the land, and be well attested by unprejudiced witnesses. When the party receiving the native land is not a private individual but the Imperial Government, a great boon will have been conferred all round—on the natives who will have protection in the remainder of their land; on the European settler who will get a title without any unpleasant odour attached to it; and not least, on the smart document-writing man himself, who, confronted with his equals in intelligence, as the disposers on behalf of the Imperial Government of the unoccupied lands of the country, will in future be saved from an exceeding great temptation.

In the statement which I drew up regarding native land customs, and in the provisional and introductory arrangements which had now been come to publicly by the chief and his people in my presence, I felt that I had really done something towards the pacification and settlement of the Batlaping country. I regret that my despatch on the native land question in the Batlaping country did not appear in its place in the Bluebook. I concluded that it must have fallen aside in the office in Capetown.

One of the characters living at Taung at this time was a man known as "Scotty Smith." His name was associated with many stories, some of them of the Robin Hood or Dick Turpin class. He had been in prison, and had not always waited there for a formal discharge. But he went about freely through Stellaland and the Transvaal, and was well

entertained by the farmers—some said through fear, others because the farmers admired a plucky man, as "Scotty" was admitted to be. There were several Europeans and colonists and some Colonial natives who had been more or less acting in concert with "Scotty Smith." His place at Taung was thus described to me by an intelligent native of the country: "I was never in such a white man's house as that of 'Scotty.' I saw nothing for sale. I saw no tools or any articles which they were making as tradesmen. I could see only guns and riding accoutrements. We cannot understand 'Scotty Smith.'"

Concerning this man, however, Major Lowe had reported to me that after the establishment of the Queen's authority, "Scotty Smith" had parted from his men, and had apparently resolved to obey the Government of the Protectorate. It was known, indeed, that his men, before parting from him, had charged him with cowardice in yielding to a Government which was then represented only by Major Lowe and two or three policemen!

One Sunday evening, as the Europeans dispersed from the service which I had been holding, my attention was attracted to a quiet-looking man who had sat behind the others, and was one of the first to rise and go away. "Don't you know him? That is 'Scotty Smith,'" was the reply to my inquiry.

When we heard from Capetown and elsewhere of the recent accessions to the numbers of the Rooi Grond volunteers from the Transvaal, it became absolutely necessary to ascertain the truth. We were to relieve Montsioa; but we were not to do so with our eyes shut. We must ascertain the actual condition of the enemy. How was that to be done? I was told by those who knew that "there was one man in the country who could go anywhere, and whose presence or disappearance never seemed to create surprise—that was 'Scotty Smith.'"

I accordingly arranged to meet Smith. It was on a lovely evening, the moonlight almost as bright as day. Something like the following conversation took place:

"Good-evening."

"Good-evening, sir."

"What part of Scotland do you come from?"

"From Perth, sir."

"You come from a bonnie place."

"Yes, Perth is a bonnie place, sir."

"Before saying more I should like to know your real name—Smith is not your name?"

"Scotty" smiled. "No; my name is Lennox—George Lennox. You will have heard a deal against me. I am not defending myself; but one thing I will say—you have never heard that I have broken my word or distressed poor people."

"Well, George Lennox, I hear what you say, and I know what you mean. If in my heart I had thought hopelessly of you or very distrustfully, I should not be standing here. It is quite true that I have heard what is said about you; while I believe you have been at all my meetings in the courtyard, and know exactly what my object is in the country. Now speak honestly and steadily the word which you will uphold. Will you willingly help me if I can show you how you can do it?"

"Yes, I am willing to help you, sir," said Lennox without any hesitation.

"But suppose," I rejoined, "that I wanted you to do what was difficult, even dangerous. Keeping always in mind the objects which you know me to have in the country, would you still feel inclined to assist me?"

"I am quite willing to take orders from you," said Lennox, clearly and firmly; "and as to anything dangerous, I will risk my life for you. Don't mistrust me; I say it and I mean it."

This was an unexpectedly strong expression of friendly feeling from such a quarter, and I felt certain it was genuine. I had been told in Vryburg in May that I had been shaking hands with some "queer people." I now gave my hand to one of the queerest—a man, however, who I felt at the time took it in good faith, and who certainly did not break his word to me. "Scotty Smith" actually underwent what he here promised to do. Shortly after our talk he suddenly

disappeared from Taung, but of course no one was surprised. He turned up among our enemies, literally risking his life for the Imperial Government. While rendering very important service, he incidentally showed ability and endurance of a high order. Again, no one was surprised when some time afterwards he quietly appeared and met me in Vryburg. Few, indeed, noticed him at all. Having seen me privately, he at once left for Taung. I then resolved to retain him in the service of Government, well aware that there were few abler men for certain purposes in South Africa. He was to be sub-inspector of the native division of police, which I hoped to form and place under Mr. E. Chapman. I should not have mentioned these details but for the further history of "Scotty Smith's" connection with the Imperial Government.

CHAPTER VI

THE WORD OF VAN NIEKERK AND HIS WORKS

THE affairs of Stellaland came again under my notice while I was at Taung in the beginning of July. It will be remembered that Mr. van Niekerk had of his own accord offered to meet me at Taung after I had performed my tour in Barolong country, to report to me on the affairs of Stellaland, and to take the oath connected with his office as Assistant Commissioner. Mr. van Niekerk was not forthcoming, but I found instead a Deputation of Stellaland people representing the Volksraad and the People's Committee. They were able to inform me how it had fared with them as a community in Stellaland after my departure from them in May.

A public meeting had been held at Vryburg on the 20th of May, when the following resolution was agreed to:—

“That, seeing that the people of Stellaland have addressed a petition to the Cape Parliament praying for annexation to the Cape Colony, they are in honour bound to await until they have received a reply to the said petition.” Mr. van Niekerk, in forwarding this resolution to me, added that the meeting had “requested him to take no further steps until such answer was received.” He added, “That he relied upon my earnest desire for a satisfactory settlement of the general question, and hoped that this would meet with my approval.”

The Stellaland Volksraad had afterwards met at Vryburg in the beginning of June, in accordance with the permission and sanction which Mr. van Niekerk had asked and obtained from me in May. I have already referred to the large grant of money voted by the Volksraad at this meet-

ing to Mr. van Niekerk, and to other smaller sums, concerning which I proposed to make arrangements that fair scrutiny and auditing should take place. At this meeting the Volksraad further "fully approved of all that had been done between Mr. Mackenzie and Mr. van Niekerk and the People's Committee. Mr. van Niekerk thanked and praised the Raad for this resolution." It may be necessary here to explain to the reader that the Stellaland Volksraad was an elected body consisting of eight members, and was constituted in imitation of the Volksraad of the Free State and the Transvaal. The People's Committee, numbering twenty-five members, had been more recently elected, and for a specific and urgent purpose—to assist Mr. van Niekerk in conducting the affairs of Stellaland in connection with the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland. It happened that certain trusted Stellalanders were members of both the Volksraad and the People's Committee. It is a matter of importance to notice that both bodies, with Mr. van Niekerk in their midst, in May and in June cordially recognised Her Majesty's Protectorate as established in the country.

The first appearance of the cloven foot on the part of the anti-English party in Stellaland was in an advertisement sent to the newspapers in the form of a "Government Notice," and signed "By Order" by Mr. van Niekerk's private secretary as "Government Secretary." The notice was to the effect that a telegram having appeared announcing that the authority of the Queen had been established and recognised at Vryburg, and that Mr. van Niekerk had accepted office as Special Assistant Commissioner, "our friends in the Free State, the Colony, and the Transvaal were requested not to believe these lies." Now the young man who was acting as Mr. Van Niekerk's private secretary was not himself present in Vryburg when I first met the Stellalanders as Deputy Commissioner. No meeting took place at which such a contradiction of facts as the above was agreed to. He was either warranted by Mr. van Niekerk to send this announcement, or he did it on his own responsibility. Inasmuch as the announcement purported to be from Mr. van Niekerk—and he never publicly

contradicted it—he is responsible for it, and thus for double-dealing such as is seldom known. He accepts office under the Imperial Government, and enters into formal engagements as an officer provisionally serving Her Majesty; and his secretary writes to the *Afrikaner* papers to deny, in coarse language, the truth of this. The Queen's Government had not been recognised at Vryburg—he had not accepted office—it was "lies." Mr. van Niekerk's private secretary was of European birth and not an Englishman, and perhaps even more bitterly opposed to the English Government than his employer. But a flat contradiction like this of events which were transacted in public, and before many witnesses, showed clearly that the anti-English party had been "cornered" by my action in Stellaland and reduced to desperate straits.

In his own letters, Mr. van Niekerk seems to have taken a different line. He had a hardship—an Imperial office had been thrust on him—he had assumed it temporarily in the interests of peace (4124, 99).

When the newspapers reached Vryburg containing this notice "By Order," an explanation was at once demanded by the Stellalanders from Mr. van Niekerk. I was informed that on this occasion he denied all knowledge of the letter—the young man had sent it himself. But in another quarter Mr. van Niekerk treated the affair differently—picturing the effect of the contradiction in Capetown with interest and even amusement. The People's Committee of Stellaland unanimously sent to the same newspapers an authoritative contradiction of the advertisement of Mr. van Niekerk's secretary. This was all done in my absence from Stellaland, and shows the reality of the arrangement which had been made. When the matter came under my notice I felt that the action of the People's Committee had been so satisfactory that nothing further was needed from me. I afterwards found that the contradiction "By Order" had made some impression, especially on the *Afrikaner* mind, and I therefore obtained and published in the Colonial papers sworn depositions from several of those who were present and were witnesses of Mr. van Niekerk's

undoubted acceptance of the office of Assistant Commissioner. The advertisement from Mr. van Niekerk's private secretary, so coarsely assailing the action of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, would, in ordinary circumstances, have lost for Mr. van Niekerk the confidence of all Imperial officers. I have reason to believe that the utmost suspicion and distrust were at first produced in the mind of the High Commissioner by his double-dealing and desertion of the Imperial cause. But, as I have already pointed out, our relations with Van Niekerk, the leader of Massow's volunteers, soon ceased to be "ordinary circumstances," and I had ample reason to know that he was trusted and quoted by Imperial officers after this event as if it had never happened.

The same sinister Transvaal influence was otherwise observable in Stellaland, but was admirably opposed by those at the head of affairs. At the meeting of the People's Committee on the 27th June, a farmer gave information that one of its members had raised a body of thirty men and left Stellaland to fight for the men of Goshen against Montsioa and Her Majesty's Protectorate. It is greatly to the credit of the members of the People's Committee—some of whom were friends and neighbours of those who had taken the side of the Transvaal volunteers of Moshette—that they at once issued a warning which was published in the newspapers, and a copy was sent to each Field Cornet in Stellaland. In this document the public were "warned against participation in the disturbances in Land Goossen under heavy penalties, even should it be the loss of land rights and confiscation of property" (4194, 120). As this resolution was come to at Vryburg in my absence, and after the departure of Mr. van Niekerk, it was certainly highly creditable to the members of the People's Committee of Stellaland. They stood on the side of peace and order as against boastful hostility to justice and the Protectorate of Her Majesty. To me personally this resolution of the People's Committee, considering the nearness and influence of the Transvaal, was very gratifying. Nothing could have been more unpopular than the Imperial Government when I

entered Stellaland; now here was a body of men representing the inhabitants who were not merely content but anxious that the Imperial power as represented by me should be upheld; and who deprecated any hostile action towards it by any of the people of Stellaland. The men who gave their adhesion to our Government when it first appeared in their midst, and who took the side of order when a fresh outbreak of hostilities took place in their neighbourhood, did not by such action establish any title to be reckoned as saints or heroes; but they certainly did establish a title to be reckoned as on the side of the Imperial Government, and as worthy of our protection and whatever encouragement or consideration we might be able to give them.

Mr. van Niekerk remained more than a month in Stellaland after I left Vryburg for Montsioa's country. He was frequently heard to state his approval of what had taken place during my visit in May, and to express the conviction that to come under the Imperial Government would be more advantageous for Stellaland than to be at once annexed to the Cape Colony. From sworn depositions of his own officers, who were then constantly meeting him, I gather that up to the 21st of June he purposed to visit me at Taung according to his promise. But it appears that early on the morning of the 22d June "Groot Adriaan" Delarey arrived at Vryburg, and also a messenger from the Transvaal, and without saying good-bye, Mr. van Niekerk suddenly left Stellaland for his home near Christiana, in the Transvaal. Mr. van Niekerk addressed letters to me and to the People's Committee before leaving Stellaland. They were letters which practically resigned, on the part of Mr. van Niekerk, into the hands of the Stellaland People's Committee the management of public affairs so far as responsibility to the Stellaland public was concerned. He said to me:—

"I am obliged to inform you that it will be impossible for me to be at Taung on the 30th inst., seeing that the inhabitants of Stellaland have taken a resolution that the Government shall take no further steps until such time as they shall have received a reply to their petition addressed to the Cape Parliament. I will, however, hand a copy of your letter to the Secretary of the Volks Comité for

the purpose of considering this matter, so that if they deem it necessary, they will be able to send a deputation to meet you on the day appointed at Taung" (4194, 121).

I did not regard this as a candid statement. Mr. van Niekerk was found by me at the head of some kind of government in Stellaland which I was told was of a representative character. I expressly left him the liberty to continue to work, with the assistance of those who were really his own officers. He did so, retaining the officers in the position in which I had found them under him when Her Majesty's authority was recognised at Vryburg. Taken in connection with his letter to the representatives of the Stellaland people, of whose favourable sentiments to me and to the Imperial Government he was well aware, there was some ground for regarding these documents as indicating that Mr. van Niekerk did not intend henceforth to take an avowed and open part in the Stellaland affairs. What he would do henceforth would be from the Transvaal. At first he had wished that the representatives of the Stellaland people should settle matters with me in his absence, and now he takes his departure, formally leaving the matter in their hands. Mr. van Niekerk also sent copies of letters which had passed between himself and me as to the meeting at Taung to the People's Committee, and addressed them in the following terms:—

"These letters I send you as information for the Volks Comité, with request that said body is immediately informed with the contents thereof, for the purpose of deciding whether they consider it necessary to send a deputation from their midst to Taung."

Leaving Stellaland as he was then doing, there can be no doubt that by these letters Mr. van Niekerk placed the management of its affairs, so far as he was concerned, and so far as the representation of the wishes of the public of Stellaland might be concerned, in the hands of the People's Committee in connection with myself. This was more emphasised in a paragraph in his letter to me, in which he said:—

"I am further desirous of informing you that it is impossible for me to be personally responsible for the peace in this country. I will,

as I promised, do my utmost to secure peace and prevent disturbances, and shall implicitly rely upon you to follow the same course" (4194, 121).

After receipt of Mr. van Niekerk's letter to its secretary, the People's Committee was immediately called together to consider its contents, Mr. van Niekerk himself having already taken his departure from Vryburg. The fact of his having left them and the country would seem to have impressed those who remained in charge with the desire to draw more closely together. It was proposed at the outset that the members should take what was called "the oath of allegiance." The name of Her Majesty was not mentioned in the words used. No party or class name was used. They swore to be "faithful to the public of Stellaland, and to use all endeavours for the preservation of peace and the promotion of the welfare of the country, according to the purposes for which we have been elected by our fellow-burghers." Recognising their representative character, they afresh pledged themselves to serve their constituents faithfully, and this oath was called the "oath of allegiance." The object undoubtedly was to lead prejudiced or doubting minds step by step to loyal service to the Queen. The editor of the Blue-book in which this oath is given has quite missed the meaning of the oath, and suggested an idea entirely antagonistic to the attitude of those who joined in it, when he unnecessarily inserted "(re)public of Stellaland" for "public of Stellaland" (4194, 116). Every one who took this oath held that that "republic" had already passed away by the declaration of Her Majesty's Protectorate.

This People's Committee were, of course, only the representatives of the freebooting volunteers of Massow, or of those who had bought up such titles; but no one can read the minutes of their meetings at Vryburg during my absence, or after my return to Vryburg, without being fully convinced of their straightforward desire to render their best service to the Protectorate which had been established. In order that each member might recognise his responsibility, it was carried that on important subjects a record should be kept of the votes of the members. It has been

asserted that this Committee was a mere "town party" as opposed to a more numerous "country party," and that it contained few Dutch-speaking men. This was an entire misstatement. Those members of the People's Committee who did live in Vryburg were elected representatives of those who lived in the country, whilst all the members were alike owners of land or claimants for it. It was natural that the educated or "official class" should be well represented on such a Committee, as they were no doubt selected by the others on account of their aptitude for business. But, notwithstanding this, more than half of the members belonged to the farmer class. As regards birth, it may be recorded that on the whole People's Committee there was only one Englishman, and perhaps two others of English extraction; two or three others were Germans or Hollanders; all the rest were Dutch-speaking colonists. And yet Her Majesty's Government was asked to believe that the Imperial Government in Stellaland was supported only by the "town party."

After discussion, the People's Committee of Stellaland resolved, in accordance with the resolution of the public meeting of Stellalanders held in May, to take steps to find out what were the prospects of annexation to the Cape Colony. In acting in this way the People's Committee were not only in accordance with the resolution of the public meeting, but also with the view of Mr. van Niekerk as communicated to me,—that no step should be taken until the prospects of annexation were ascertained.

It was accordingly resolved by the People's Committee that a Deputation should proceed to meet me at Taung, and an invitation was also sent to Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey junior, to meet them at that place. But although the Deputation was to proceed to Taung, no business whatever was to be done with me until one of their number had proceeded to Barkly West, the nearest telegraphic station, and had ascertained the prospect of annexation by direct inquiry from Capetown. If the reply should be that Colonial annexation was imminent, then it would not be necessary for the Deputation to transact any business with me. On the other

hand, if there were no near prospect of annexation to the Colony, the Deputation were instructed by the People's Committee to request me to review with them the matters which had been discussed at Vryburg. In case they should resolve, after hearing from Capetown, to transact business with me, the Deputation were directed once more to invite Mr. van Niekerk to join them at Taung; and it was suggested that a certain date might be appointed within which he could make his appearance, and if he failed to do so, it would be fully ascertained that Mr. van Niekerk did not intend to fulfil his previous engagement. Such were the reasonable instructions which the People's Committee of Stellaland gave the Deputation which they sent out to meet me at Taung. The seven members of the Deputation were chosen by ballot from the People's Committee. There could be no doubt that these people represented alike the Volksraad, the People's Committee, and the community of Stellaland.

According to their instructions, the first thing which the Deputation had to do was to find out what prospect there was of the annexation of Stellaland to the Cape Colony. One of their number went on to Barkly West and entered into telegraphic communication with a member of the Cape Parliament, who was regarded by Stellalanders as having in charge the furtherance of annexation of Stellaland to the Cape Colony. On his return to Taung from Barkly West, this member of the Deputation called his fellow-members together to discuss the answer which had been received. On hearing his statement, the decision of the Deputation was that the prospect of Colonial annexation was indefinite and uncertain; and that their duty in the meantime plainly enough was to establish their position under the Imperial Government. The Deputation therefore presented themselves to me, and announced that they had so far complied with the wishes of the Stellaland public and of the People's Committee and the Volksraad. In order to complete their instructions, they requested me as Deputy Commissioner to hold a meeting with them. I consented to this, the business being the same as that formerly transacted at Vryburg; no new point was brought forward. One of the

Deputation made a strenuous effort to induce me to consent to the formal acknowledgment of their "rights," legal standing, etc., as Massow's volunteers. I was quite clear on this point, and declined to do so, explaining that that would introduce a statement of opinion at variance with published deliverances of the English Government, which did not recognise their "rights," or their organisation as a government. It has been more than once declared by mistake in Capetown, in official statements, that I had recognised the "rights" of these men, whereas I expressly declined to do so. The Deputation unanimously agreed to accept the general promise which I made concerning the land. The form in which this was finally expressed was as follows:—

"I ratify the claims to the farms which were drawn by lottery by the original volunteers under David Massow, or otherwise that farms of equal value or fair compensation be granted to those volunteers or the holders of their titles" (4194, 125).

I thus reserved to Government a free hand as to the land settlement in Stellaland. I was not prepared, considering past circumstances, to advocate the expulsion of these men. But it was quite another thing to state or imply approval of what they had done, or to accord sanction or recognition to their organisation as an independent government. Knowing Bechuanaland as I did, I felt that a friendly settlement of the land question was even then not impossible. I was always clear as to the absolute necessity for a Land Commission, and was distressed when I found that the High Commissioner did not agree with this. I went so far as to recommend to him three honourable and trustworthy gentlemen for the discharge of this important work, all of whom were then in South Africa. It was quite impossible that the country could be at peace so long as there were so many conflicting land claims. The greater the confusion and disorder as to the ownership of lands the greater the necessity for authoritative settlement. I was quite aware that we had then no sovereignty in the country, but I was aware also that the native chiefs and people would readily have given to me their formal assent and necessary power, as each one was anxious for a

settlement. In the end, however, as we shall see, Her Majesty's Government, yielding to the earnest and repeated representations of Sir Charles Warren, did appoint a Land Commission of three British officers.

An impression was conveyed to the Secretary of State (I do not know how) that my land settlement recognised "indefinite claims to money compensation" (4213, 47). This was a mistake. I only reserved for Government the power to give in money or in land the appraised value for any farms wanted by Government; while I reserved the power to give money for such a farm, I did not promise to do so. A graver misapprehension crept into the High Commissioner's mind about my land arrangement, which I think the reader will pronounce a very plain, common-sense transaction. On the 23d March 1885 the High Commissioner informed Sir C. Warren: "Mr. Mackenzie offered to give compensation in land or money for farms not confirmed" (4432, 196). I am unable to give any explanation of so grave, and yet so absurd, a mistake. To promise a Land Commission, and yet stipulate that if it disallowed any farms their owners would get compensation in land or money, would have been an instance of gross corruption. On the contrary, I contemplated that those whose titles should be disallowed by the Land Commission would, of course, get nothing: the land would revert to its former owners or to Government. The information which I received that many wrongly-obtained titles existed in Stellaland was to me one great reason for the Land Commission. By blindly ratifying all Stellaland titles this land would be lost to Government.

At the request of the Stellaland Deputation I sent messengers to Mr. van Niekerk, who was at his farm near Christiana in the Transvaal, informing him of the steps which the People's Committee and their Deputation had taken, and requesting him to be good enough, before the 15th of July, to come to Taung and take the oath pertaining to his office of Commissioner. His reply was decisive, and showed that, in whatever way it had been produced, a great change had taken place in his views; or otherwise,

that in May he had been deceiving his own people and myself. Now he appeared to throw off all pretence and to speak his real sentiments. His letter was dated "Kroomellenboog, 7th July"—the letter of a Transvaal subject writing from the Transvaal. He said :—

"I beg to state that under no circumstance am I prepared to take the oath of allegiance."

He then refers me to the resolution taken at the public meeting in May, of which he had already sent me a copy, and to which he now makes a serious addition not contained in his former letter. In his first statement the minute of the public meeting was to the effect that the people of Stellaland "were in honour bound to wait until they have received a reply to the said petition." In his letter of the 7th July he inserts certain words not contained in the minute as previously quoted to me, making out now that the reply must be "from the Cape Colonial Government." As a matter of fact, he was well aware of the manner in which this petition had been forwarded to the Cape Parliament; and that the reply which had been received was from the recognised friend of the annexation of Stellaland in the Cape Parliament, to whose charge the fate of the petition had been committed; and that this reply had been obtained from him in strict accordance with the instructions of the People's Committee of Stellaland. The Deputation would appear to have perfectly fulfilled all that the public meeting of May required; and now, in order to account for his disagreement with the Deputation, the very terms of the minute of the meeting are actually changed by Mr. van Niekerk. It was time, however, to throw off all restraint, and so Mr. van Niekerk went on to say :—

"Even if the answer to that petition should prove unsatisfactory, and the majority of the people should desire to accept the government proposed by you, I should refuse to take the oath or accept the position offered by you.

"I now again beg to inform you that I do not hold myself responsible for the peace of this country, and herewith formally protest, in the name of the people of Stellaland, against the resolution taken by the Deputation of the People's Committee above referred to, considering no answer has yet been received to the above-mentioned petition.

"I further protest against any interference on your part within the boundaries of the Republic of Stellaland until such time as I may call a public meeting to ascertain the wishes of the people, when a copy of the resolutions of that meeting will be forwarded to you for information.

"In the meantime I beg to impress upon you the necessity of refraining from taking any steps that may cause a breach of the peace."

This language was used by the man who in May last had accepted office under the Queen, had publicly acknowledged that the Protectorate had been established, and professed to me with his own lips his willingness to take the oath of office at once, but that if there were some delay, he would be better able to make necessary explanations to the ignorant people before doing so; and that he would meet me at Taung in June, and there take the oath. This is July: from the Transvaal he now writes of Stellaland affairs with protest and warning, as if he were still master there! Mr. Gey van Pittius and Mr. Gert van Niekerk now occupy the same position. They both write from the Transvaal, of which they are domiciled inhabitants, in open hostility to Her Majesty's Government.

It was natural that I should feel deeply the double-dealing of Mr. van Niekerk. He had failed me as a man, and had betrayed a publicly imposed and publicly accepted trust. But there is always a sense of relief in connection with a disclosure such as that contained in Mr. van Niekerk's letter. Better an open enemy than a false but trusted friend. In Van Niekerk's case I felt as I wrote to the People's Committee at Vryburg from Taung—

"The change which has taken place in the views of Mr. van Niekerk is no doubt to be regretted; but it would seem to present no obstacle to the carrying out of public engagements. Although Mr. van Niekerk has changed his views, and has retired to the Transvaal, the People's Committee and the public remain,—with whom, and with whom alone, I have to do. The letter," I added, "of which I enclose a copy, of itself cancels the appointment of Special Commissioner which Mr. van Niekerk accepted from me."

Mr. van Niekerk's day of grace, however, so far as I was concerned, had not even yet expired. Ignoring all that had taken place at Vryburg in May, and in which he had taken a prominent part, Mr. van Niekerk had actually

warned me against interfering with the Republic of Stellaland! I replied on the 17th July to the effect that his letter had surprised me. I had met him at meetings of the People's Committee; at its meeting he himself had accepted office under me. I then went on to say:—

“I have my own duty to perform in this country, to which I must go forward, turning aside neither to the right hand nor the left. In connection with your differences and disputes as inhabitants and office-bearers in Stellaland, I think the best way is to bring you together, so that you may understand one another. I, therefore, have the honour to call you and all the office-bearers in your district to a special meeting at Vryburg on Monday next, the 21st inst. My own object is peace and justice. I have promised the volunteers their farms: I have promised to meet the lawful obligations of the Stellaland Government. I therefore call upon you as upright men to meet me at Vryburg, that, if possible, a right understanding may be brought about between you and the People's Committee. . . . Remember you yourself offered to meet me here. Instead of you the People's Committee came. They acted in the name of the public. If they did not represent the public, let that be shown at Vryburg in a friendly and yet clear manner.”

Such was my answer to Mr. van Niekerk's attempt to “bounce” me from discharging my duty in any part of the Protectorate of Bechuanaland. I invited him to come to Vryburg, give and receive explanations in public meeting, and work harmoniously with the People's Committee. The Stellaland people assembled in large numbers at Vryburg, but Mr. van Niekerk did not leave the Transvaal. Thus ended my connection with a man who was then and afterwards playing a deep game—all the more deadly an enemy of English influence in South Africa because falsely professing to be its friend. I would accord to Mr. van Niekerk a lower place than Mr. van Pittius. The latter was an open enemy without pretence; the former smiled in your face, while he ridiculed and betrayed you behind your back. So had he treated Captain Bower to me; so had his private secretary, “By Order,” in formal advertisement in the Colonial newspapers, treated the establishment and recognition of Her Majesty's authority in Stellaland—“it was all lies”: so had Mr. van Niekerk himself belied his own actions and promises to me in Vryburg.

When I asked Stellaland people for an explanation of Mr. van Niekerk's strange conduct, one answer was that he had committed himself to the Transvaal officials, and was pledged to uphold the anti-English school of politics. It was suggested that he did so with the greater zest on account of his previous treatment by the Imperial Government in the Transvaal as a loyalist. Others who knew him declared he was a born plotter, and was characterised by general trickiness and want of courage. When I happened to mention the matter to single individuals, I invariably got another reason, which I was always assured was the real reason. "Van Niekerk will never live under the English Government unless, indeed, he is made quite sure that he won't be brought to book for his share in Honey's affair." "Had it not been for that one fact," said those who thought more highly of Van Niekerk than the others, "he would have met you at Taung and fulfilled his other obligations. But no one can say who is master as between him and Big Adriaan Delarey: they seem to rule one another by turns." Such was the strange story told me in July by individual members of the Stellaland community. Whatever might be the truth of what I heard I could not doubt for a moment that it was the serious belief in Stellaland itself. And so my work was to be opposed and hindered on account of outrages which had taken place in those dreary years when freebooter-law was supreme in Bechuanaland. The following telegram from Mr. Rhodes to Captain Bower when the latter was about to leave Capetown for Bechuanaland throws an unpleasant light on this dark subject, and seems to confirm the view above stated:—

"15th August.—Bring up, if you can, right to proclaim amnesty, provided they accept Protectorate. You can use it or not, as circumstances occur, but will find it of great use" (4252, 4).

The probable reason why this amnesty was not "used" was that the party referred to entirely refused, as we shall see, to recognise the Imperial Protectorate.

As soon as it was made certain by his own signature that Mr. van Niekerk declined to accept office under the Queen under any circumstances, I requested at once from

the High Commissioner the services of an Assistant Commissioner for the district of Stellaland. I indicated that he should be a broad-minded Christian man, Dutch-speaking, and a man of business (4194, 83). In a private letter to the High Commissioner I suggested that he should make application for advice in this selection to a certain well-known Dutch-speaking colonist, universally respected throughout the country and intimately acquainted with educational and other public works. It has been asserted by one or two people in South Africa and in England that one reason for my success in Stellaland was that I promised offices quite lavishly. This is entirely incorrect. I created no new office. I retained Mr. van Niekerk's officers, whom I found in actual charge, as a temporary measure, and when he declined to come forward and fulfil his own promises, I wrote at once to the High Commissioner, as mentioned above, for an officer to fill Mr. van Niekerk's place as Assistant Commissioner. To have forwarded such a man at once to my assistance in Stellaland at this juncture would have been of incalculable benefit. It would have had the tendency to enlist the sympathy of the better classes in the Colony on the side of order. Beyond Stellaland the representations of such a man must have told on the right side throughout South Africa; while within Stellaland he would have easily conserved the influence which I had already succeeded in obtaining. Strange to say, my proposition met with no attention whatever, although it had always been agreed that I should have an Assistant Commissioner in Stellaland, and I was authorised to offer the office to Mr. van Niekerk. Why no steps were taken to obtain a suitable person for this post at a juncture when his presence would have been of vital importance, I could never understand. I can only suppose that the advice and influence which were destined to lower the name and character of the Imperial Government had already made considerable progress at headquarters. It was clearly a mistake on the part of the High Commissioner to ignore my urgent request. It was, however, an attitude only of a negative character—a failing to support his own Deputy when he made a special request. This was soon to be followed by

actions positively and fatally playing into the hands of the enemies of the Imperial Government in South Africa.

During the period of my second visit to Vryburg in the month of July, it was announced to me that Mrs. Honey, the widow of one of the volunteers, who had met his death in a violent and mysterious manner, had come to Stellaland from the Free State to request that steps should be taken for the punishment of her husband's murderers. I could not expect Mrs. Honey to exercise thought as to what was or was not an opportune time for making such a request. She received through her friends an expression of my sympathy. But at our formal interview I replied to Mrs. Honey's request for justice that "I was not in a position to go into an inquiry concerning the death of her husband." This was the only wise answer which could have been given at the time. Still it cost me an effort thus to put off the widow in her weeds asking for inquiry into the violent death of her husband—a man in the early prime of life whom I myself had seen a few years before, and who seemed to have been intelligent, if careless; engaging and generous, if flighty and unreliable.

In another part of this book an account is given of the death of James Honey—when we come to the time at which the evidence became public. I merely wish here to impress upon the reader that my information concerning this dark deed and my interview with Mrs. Honey were long after my nomination of Mr. van Niekerk as Commissioner, and after he had first accepted and then thrown up that office. It has been asserted and published by unscrupulous men in South Africa, and when disproved there, it has been repeated unblushingly in England, that when I made the offer of office to Van Niekerk I knew all about his asserted connection with Honey's death. One person gave the idea in its grossest form—that having first seen and put off Widow Honey, I went and offered a commission to Van Niekerk! I am afraid the officer who was responsible for this misinformation was aware that his statement was not correct. To such straits did an evil policy reduce British officers and gentlemen. My offer to Van Niekerk was in May; my interview with Mrs. Honey was in July.

The following letter, fresh from the mint of Groot Adriaan Delarey, with my reply to it, will throw some additional light on the affairs of Stellaland at this time, and also on the character of the actors. Be it remembered that in the previous February 2000 head of Mankoroane's cattle had been stolen, ostensibly by Massow, but really with the approval and co-operation of those freebooters who were afterwards in the month of March professedly engaged in stopping cattle-stealing at the request of Captain Bower!

“HART RIVER, *July 9, 1884.*

“The Honourable J. Mackenzie, Esq.

“HONOURABLE SIR—I herewith take the liberty of informing you that it grieves me to say that thieving is going on most terribly. As you, honoured Sir, have promised that you will put a stop to all thieving; but now it seems to me as if the thieves are set at liberty. We have put our trust on the promise before mentioned, and allowed our cattle to run day and night, and now we are robbed of the same. So, honoured Sir, if you cannot put a stop to the thieving, I am compelled to take 300 men and fetch the stolen cattle and horses. For it is hard to allow my people to be robbed by Mankoroane's Kaffirs and to bear the loss of the same.

“I have continually sent my people for their cattle and horses, and they have not received them, so I kindly ask you to answer me on this letter, and whether Mankoroane intends giving up all stolen cattle and horses; yes or no.—I remain, your humble servant,

“A. J. G. DE LA REY.

“P.S.—The bearer of this is going for his horses; you can answer me by him.”

My reply to Mr. Delarey was as follows:—

“TAUNG, *July 9, 1884.*

“DEAR SIR—I received your letter about stolen stock. The bearer of this will explain to you fully my meaning, and my earnest desire that theft should come to an end.

“On this side the chief declares that his things, when stolen, are never given back.

“There is a great deal of stock which merely passes this place—the thieves taking it farther on. The owners follow, come here and spend time, the thieves and their friends in the meantime disposing of the plunder at a distance. Of course there is stolen stock here, that is undoubted, but a great deal is brought here first as a blind and then driven farther.

“The true remedy is in a police force. I have got a few men already and expect more. I have asked the Deputation from the Volks Committee to recommend an Inspector of Police for Stellaland. They

recommended Mr. Hasset, who accepted and promised to look out some young men as members of the force.

"I thus explain to you patiently how I am keeping my promise. You are quite aware that I am not able to say, 'Peace, be still.' I must use means, and that takes time. I still say that, with obedience to law, and calling in the aid of the police, instead of each man righting himself, we shall soon give the thieves an unpleasant time of it. I have still good hope that, as President Brand expresses it, 'Alles zal recht komen.'

"To A. J. G. de la Rey, Esq."

The disagreement between the High Commissioner and the Cape Ministers concerning Bechuanaland is elsewhere referred to, and the unhappy results are pointed out of the undue haste for Colonial annexation which Sir Hercules Robinson then unfortunately showed. The High Commissioner informed me that on the 15th July—

"Ministers, after conferring with the Transvaal Delegates, submitted to Parliament a resolution in favour of annexation of Bechuanaland, which has been carried in both Houses" (4194, 127).

This resolution was vague enough, and merely shelved the whole question in the Colony for a year, thus leaving its management and its difficulties in the hands of the Imperial Government. This was not fully realised by the High Commissioner, who regarded Cape annexation as so assured and so imminent that liability or responsibility was to be avoided by the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland in the interval. The vague document on which such sanguine hopes were built by the High Commissioner of escaping from Imperial responsibility, was as follows:—

"That, in the opinion of this House, it is expedient, pending the ratification of the Convention of London by the Volksraad of the South African Republic, that the Colonial Government be authorised to open negotiations with Her Majesty's Imperial Government with the view to submitting to Parliament next session a measure for the annexation to the Cape Colony of the territory on the south-western border of the South African Republic, now under the protection of Great Britain" (4194, 85).

Before leaving Taung for Vryburg on 17th July—being still without any force in the country—I suggested to the High Commissioner that—

“It would do good if Mr. Upington telegraphed both to Niekerk and to the Chairman of People’s Committee that all should in the meantime submit to Imperial Government. These two parties are hopelessly divided as among themselves. Such telegrams with copy sent at once to me would strengthen Mr. Hill’s recent message to the People’s Committee. Niekerk’s party may profess what they like at a distance. All Stellalanders whom I meet say they are working against Cape Colony. If this is false, such a telegram as I request would help them to come to a good understanding with the others. I wish to influence both parties for good. I have arranged for express to carry answer to Vryburg” (4194, 126).

On the 19th of July the High Commissioner informed me by telegram that—

“Telegrams are being sent from this to-day by influential persons to Niekerk and Hasset, advising quiet and cordial acceptance of Imperial rule pending annexation” (4194, 127).

The Premier communicated to Mr. Bodenstein, as representing those who had signed the petition for annexation to the Cape Colony, a copy of the resolution of the Cape Parliament. Mr. van Niekerk was also addressed by his parliamentary and other Cape correspondents, as was Mr. Hasset, the Chairman of the People’s Committee. Both these officials were earnestly requested, in view of the resolution of the Cape Parliament, to submit in the meantime to the Imperial Government. Mr. Bodenstein and Mr. Hasset had submitted to the Imperial Government, and continued to do so. But so far as Mr. van Niekerk was concerned, this request was completely ignored. He declined my invitation to meet his fellow-officers at Vryburg—he now refused to listen to the recommendation of his Capetown friends and correspondents. He can use them, but he can never be used by them. It is not Mr. van Niekerk who is to submit to the Imperial Government when the time comes, but the Imperial Government that is to submit to Mr. van Niekerk.

With consistent hostility Mr. van Niekerk now went a step further, and while residing in the Transvaal published in the newspapers certain proclamations directed against Her Majesty’s Protectorate in Bechuanaland. In these he offered to give the farms of the adherents of Mackenzie to any volunteers who would come to his assistance from the

Transvaal or Free State; and announced that they would take by force cattle from Mankoroane in payment for cattle said to have been stolen by his people. And yet, in spite of such avowed enmity, we shall find that there were men who dreamed of still employing Van Niekerk in the Imperial interest.

CHAPTER VII

THE EXCHANGE OF FLAGS IN STELLALAND, JULY 1884

I ARRIVED the second time in Vryburg on the 18th of July. I had every reason to be gratified with my reception by the people of Stellaland. A large party of men rode out to meet me; a smaller party came half way to Taung, knowing that I travelled unarmed. I was told that while Mr. van Niekerk and "Groot Adriaan" had from the Transvaal abolished the People's Committee, the latter body at a recent meeting in Vryburg had deposed Van Niekerk. On arriving in Vryburg I was publicly welcomed by the Chairman of the People's Committee, Mr. Bodenstein, who spoke very kindly of myself and of what he called my policy. This was especially gratifying to me, because Mr. Bodenstein had been much opposed to me and to the Imperial Government before my arrival; and his name was first on the petition for annexation to the Cape Colony—the document which had been cast out by the Speaker of the House on account of its unsupported charges against me as to my conduct against the Transvaal in London. Mr. Bodenstein passed among his fellow-countrymen as a man of some education—had been landdrost in the Transvaal before coming to Stellaland, and had acted for some time as landdrost in Vryburg. His brother was at that time Chairman of the Transvaal Volksraad. Thus personal contact had so far brushed away needless prejudice; and it afterwards gave me great pleasure to administer the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty to this aged man, who said it was a step which he was well pleased to take, although he had been one of those who thought they would never do so.

I learned that Mr. van Niekerk and his adherents on the Transvaal side were busy misinforming the people, and trying to lead them to open outrage. Messengers came in and informed us that certain native towns in the Hart River district had been instigated to attack the Protectorate, the usually potent bait of booty in cattle being held out to them. But many of these natives were people who knew me; they understood in some dim way that what I was doing was for the good of the country, and they refused to join in the projected raid. It was said that one party of them was tempted so far as actually to take the field, but the men were afterwards called back by their chief. My messengers were also quietly going about amongst these people, giving the true statement of events and exhorting to peace. Mr. van Niekerk's agents had equally little success among the white population while I was at Vryburg. They planned public meetings; but some of them no one attended, and the meetings were not held; while others were attended by so few as to be only tokens of weakness. At the same time I could not but feel that I had to contend directly with a considerable amount of sheer lawlessness and border ruffianism.

"Big Adriaan" Delarey was represented to me as a most lawless man, even when living within the Transvaal, and was a terror to his neighbours; and numerous stories were told of his high-handed and reckless doings. His influence over Van Niekerk was no doubt very great. The "proclamations" against the Imperial Government were issued by Van Niekerk, having been written by his private secretary; but the threats, locally circulated, came fresh from the Delarey mint. Since I came into the country in May, the story had been propagated in the Transvaal that I was to be taken and conveyed over the line—that is, left outside Stellaland. It will be remembered that Moshette's messengers returned home in May, assured by Massow that this had taken place,—I had been driven away. The same threat continued to be spread in July that I had met in May, only now I was not alone—I had the body of the people with me.

The people assembled to meet me at Vryburg were of one opinion as to the method by which peace was to be established in the district. Several influential men proposed to leave Vryburg and go round the country, opposing the armed and hostile movements at Goshen and at Hart River—giving information, and asking those who were able to come to Vryburg, to do so in order to be present at the next public meeting. Those who might not be able to come in were to be informed of what was taking place, and urged to sit still and not listen to any disturbing rumours whatever. Accordingly, several leading men left Vryburg for the country for the above purpose, while I employed my time in meeting those who visited the town.

On the 28th July an influential and decisive public meeting of Stellalanders took place. I was much encouraged by the outspoken way in which the speakers—some of them educated men—gave expression to their change of views and their firm adherence to the Imperial Government, and to myself as its representative. I had every reason to be assured that, so far as the majority of Stellalanders was concerned, I had secured their adhesion.

Three resolutions were passed at this meeting. The first was one of welcome to myself; the second thanked the Cape Colony for the attitude it had taken with regard to Bechuanaland, and for deciding to take the annexation of Stellaland into consideration next session. This resolution also concluded with words of welcome to the Imperial Government, and called upon all lovers of peace in Stellaland to co-operate under Her Majesty's rule for the maintenance of law and order, and the promotion of the prosperity of that country and its inhabitants.

The third resolution was to the following effect:—

“Whereas certain inhabitants of the South African Republic, namely, Mr. Gert Jacobus van Niekerk, and Mr. Adriaan Johannes Gusbertus Delarey, J.'s son, are using all endeavours to incite the inhabitants of Stellaland to oppose law and order in this territory, now under Her Majesty's rule; and whereas said persons hold public meetings for the aforesaid treasonable purposes at places situated within the boundaries of the South African Republic, according to the Convention of February 1884. Now, therefore, this meeting

requests the Deputy Commissioner to forward a copy of this resolution to Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, requesting that the unlawful acts of said persons be brought to the notice of the South African Republic."

It may be interesting to give extracts from some of the speeches. The reader must remember that only a few months before the Imperial Government was openly condemned all over the country by the "patriots," while the "loyals" everywhere hung their heads. I copy from notes which were taken at the time for the information of Government, and which, but for our unfortunate change of front immediately after the meeting, would no doubt have been published in the Bluebooks, as being of the utmost interest and importance.

Mr. Bodenstein, Chairman of the People's Committee, explained at some length his recent tour in the eastern part of Stellaland, part of which was included in the Transvaal by the new boundary-line. Having received from the Cape Premier a reply to the petition for annexation, Mr. Bodenstein sent round a messenger announcing a meeting to take place, at which these telegrams would be read and other information given. The messenger was expressly sent to Mr. van Niekerk, "Groot Adriaan" Delarey, and P. van Vrede. Mr. Bodenstein waited at the place of meeting till two or three o'clock in the afternoon, but none of these Transvaal worthies came to hear the news from the Cape, although they were figuring in Capetown as so eager for annexation to the Colony. Mr. Bodenstein stated that afterwards Groot Adriaan and A. Pretorius arrived. They said they had a letter from President Kruger, but showed Mr. Bodenstein only one from Van Niekerk, dated "Bloemhof, South African Republic," and professing to be written "By Order" to Delarey, asking him to stop Bodenstein's meeting, which was called expressly for the purpose of explaining the message from the Cape Premier, and declaring that he (Van Niekerk) (from within the Transvaal) had abolished the People's Committee of Stellaland! Mr. Bodenstein went on to say that Delarey and he agreed there and then to draw up a "protest," and to accept Mr. Mackenzie's Government pending the final decision of the Colony, but Delarey then suddenly announced that he must not stay longer—he must return at once "to stop the Basuto." Mr. Bodenstein asked for an explanation, when Delarey said the Basuto were going to attack Mankoroane, and they were determined to get back their stolen cattle!¹ Delarey also said during this conversation with him (Mr. Bodenstein) that the Hart River people intended to invite Mr. Mackenzie to their

¹ The reader knows that a few months before thousands of cattle had been stolen from Mankoroane, and none had been returned.

meeting ; and he could either meet them in their public meeting or as a commando at Taung.

Mr. Bodenstein said further that most people to whom he spoke declared they would not attend Van Niekerk's armed meeting ; they would rather come here to Vryburg. Commandant Delarey (not Groot Adriaan) had said to Mr. Bodenstein that he would have nothing to do with Van Niekerk's meeting, and was thankful for what he (Bodenstein) was doing. Mr. Bodenstein said his attitude in the eastern district had been to remind the people of their signatures to the petition for annexation to the Cape Colony, and to advise them to stick to that view. He warned them that if they became hostile, and joined with those who wished to be united to the Transvaal, they would be the losers ; and if Mr. Mackenzie adopted another course and showed his power, he (Mr. Bodenstein) was not afterwards to be blamed by them, as he had now shown them the telegrams from the Cape Premier, and fully explained the true position of the country. Mr. Bodenstein added that he was sorry to have to come to the conclusion that there were some people, chiefly living on the Hart River, who were trying to stir up strife. They had made statements to the effect that Commandant Joubert of the Transvaal was coming with four hundred men to assist those who were dissatisfied, and who would prefer the Transvaal rule. Such statements, he had assured the people, were entirely without foundation, and were only circulated to further the ends of interested parties, and to those who were thus dissatisfied he recommended submission—the majority of the public being well satisfied that the present arrangement would be for the benefit of the people and country. He trusted they would all welcome Mr. Mackenzie among them as he himself did, knowing and feeling that the troubles of Stellaland would now be brought to a close, and that we are now beginning to see the silver lining to our dark cloud.

These words—given very much as they were spoken—are of importance. Here was an influential Transvaal farmer throwing all his energies upon the side of peace. There were the men of disorder—Van Niekerk and Delarey—opposing him ; and yet he had good hope of being able to cope with them. They boasted of letters from President Kruger, promises of help from General Joubert. Perhaps they had received no such letters ; but their pretensions showed clearly enough their strong Transvaal sympathies, and the falseness of their professed desire for annexation to the Cape Colony. “Browbeat the Imperial Government—trifle with the Cape—stick to the Transvaal”—this was in effect the policy of Van Niekerk, as described by Mr. Bodenstein when he spoke to us, fresh from that Hart River district of which the reader must yet hear much that is unpleasant.

Mr. van Riet (attorney from the Free State) said that he would not speak of the telegrams which had arrived, for they spoke for themselves. They must understand them or they did not wish to do so. With regard to the rumours afloat (spread by Van Niekerk's people) that the telegrams were forgeries made in Vryburg, he could only say, "Evil be to him who evil thinks." They knew that he had taken great trouble with reference to the petition for Colonial annexation, and they all knew that he said it was better to go to the Cape Colony than to the Imperial Government under Mr. Mackenzie. But to-day he was glad that Mr. Mackenzie was there, and glad to vote for the resolution of welcome to him, because what he knew that day he had not known before. They all knew that they expected that when Mr. Mackenzie came here he would drive them out as a band of robbers; but *onbekent is onbeminde* (unknown is unloved), and this was applicable also to the British Government. Mr. Mackenzie had had the power to do them harm, but he had done them good. He had treated them well and kindly. He had proved he was above all questions of nationalities. He respected the Afrikanders, the Germans, the English, and the Dutch—one as well as another. He had shown what he was by his deeds. He had the prosperity of the land and people at heart, and for this reason he supported the resolution. He welcomed Mr. Mackenzie as a private man; he welcomed him as Her Majesty's representative. He thought it was their duty to co-operate with Mr. Mackenzie for all good purposes, to be faithful to Her Majesty the Queen, and to do all they could to assist in the good government of the country. They had also another duty—to advise their friends to co-operate with them. Let the people beyond the border rage and fume as they liked, it was for them to submit to law and order, and not bring more misery to the country. It might be said by so acting they were not "patriots." They had, however, to be mindful of their future, and to remember that "the history of the world is the judgment of the world." After generations would be grateful for the step they were taking that day.

Mr. Mazain (Cape colonist, middle-aged, well-connected).—I am satisfied with the new order of things, and am glad to welcome Mr. Mackenzie among us. I was a resident in British Kaffraria, and consider it was the very worst day that country ever saw when it was annexed to the Cape Colony. Under the Imperial rule they were far better off than under the Cape Colony.

Mr. Hendrik van Rooyen said he had a list of signatures of the people of his district who were satisfied with the work of the People's Committee and with Mr. Mackenzie. He had also drawn up a paper for signature by those who were not satisfied with either; but of the latter there were only two, and they were ashamed to sign. The list, therefore, to which he referred comprehended all the people of his ward.

Mr. C. J. Bothma said the prevalence of smallpox in some parts of his ward had prevented his holding a meeting. But he had gone about among the people, and found that the majority of the people were well

satisfied with the work of the People's Committee. A few said there was no other chance—they now knew that they could not be annexed by President Kruger, and so must submit to whatever Government came in.

Great importance was attached by all the leading Stellalanders to the third resolution, which formally brought the misdeeds of Van Niekerk and Delarey before the High Commissioner in order that he might communicate with the Government of the Transvaal on the subject, as both these troublers of the peace of Stellaland were domiciled burghers of the Transvaal. Mr. van Riet made the following remarks on this subject, which were cordially received by the meeting:—

“All of us suffer from the actions of these men. If they only spoke among themselves it might not do us any harm, but they hold armed meetings and keep this country in a continual ferment. Being on the road between us and the Free State and part of the Colony, they stop people from coming here and greatly injure the country. And yet both Van Niekerk and Delarey live in the Transvaal—generally on the bank of the Vaal River. Mr. van Niekerk,” said Mr. van Riet, “has drawn two portraits—one of himself and another of Mr. Mackenzie and the People's Committee, sending his letters and telegrams to Capetown. In Mr. van Niekerk's portrait of himself he is represented as holding out to the Colony the symbol of peace in his hands, and as one who sheds tears over the misery of Stellaland. This is his own portrait as drawn by himself. On the other hand, the portrait of Mr. Mackenzie and the People's Committee is a terrible one, so that I do not like to describe it. Mr. Mackenzie's portrait, drawn by Van Niekerk, is that of a man who glories in blood and smoke and terrible things. The portraits ought to be exchanged and Van Niekerk be unmasked. It ought to be shown that it is not Mr. Mackenzie who makes disturbance, but Van Niekerk himself. I should like to have this revenge on Mr. van Niekerk for thus misrepresenting us. I should like him unmasked, and his picture drawn with the sweet face of 'Groot Adriaan' peering over his shoulder, while some 'loot cattle' stood in the distance, which had been kept back from distribution among their captors; while the poor deluded followers of the two friends would be shown in a corner of the picture fighting away for what they are told to call 'freedom.' When this true picture is drawn and seen, then the world will know who are really the men of strife and war. I want the Stellalanders in public meeting to pass this resolution, because if this were not done, Van Niekerk would go on accusing Mr. Mackenzie as before. But if we, the people of Stellaland, openly come to this resolution, then Van Niekerk has no longer a single straw to clutch at; the resolution will show to all that the

Stellaland public knows him ; and we shall thus benefit ourselves and the country of our adoption."

The above striking description of the incidents of freebooting is worthy of general attention, both in South Africa and in England. It is to be noted that among the freebooters there were those who preyed on their own kind. I feel sure that the Christian public of the United Kingdom and of South Africa will resolve that the freebooters of Bechuanaland shall be the last of the species in South Africa, and be killed out by intelligent progress under the control of the Central Government.

Perhaps the speech which most fully expressed the mind of the meeting was given by a Free State farmer, who described himself as a "patriot" and yet a supporter of Mr. Mackenzie. His speech was given in the colloquial Dutch, and was much applauded. Referring to the connection with the Cape Colony as future, and therefore uncertain, while that with the Imperial Government had been already accomplished, he put the case in this pithy way:—

"If a man gets a horse on trial, and he rides it and finds it to be a 'tripler' (a pleasant-going horse), is it likely he will part with it for another untried horse? So with us ; we have the Imperial Government ; here is Mr. Mackenzie, and we like him ; let us go on with him first before we think of another."

This was loudly applauded. Now, putting aside any influence of personal contact, there was no doubt much to be said for this view of the case from a merely selfish and shrewd business point of view. I daresay they felt that the titles which I saw my way to grant would be real titles, and respected even in England, while most of the Free State and Cape Colony people hated the idea of joining the Transvaal if it could be avoided. Then considerable advantage came to the Stellalanders through my own influence with the natives. The natives regarded me as their sincere friend. The Stellalanders were not slow to take advantage of this while I was in Stellaland, and even after I left the country. When a Boer went to occupy a new farm, and his doing so was disputed by a native owner, the former immediately told the native that he had been expressly allowed


by Mr. Mackenzie to occupy that farm. Viewed in this way there might be some reason—without any tribute to my own conduct—why the freebooters might think they were “in luck” in having a person like myself as Deputy Commissioner.

The following are a few sentences from the remarks which I made at this important meeting:—

“I wish to say a few words before breaking up. My object in this country is to produce peace, harmony, and goodwill. South Africa, to my mind, is in many respects like America. All sorts of people come here, and it is our duty, when in this country, to conduct ourselves as good citizens of South Africa. As to our ancestors, it is pleasant to think that all of us have something to be proud of in that respect. I am addressing Hollanders: there are others proud of Holland along with you, and who admire the stand which your forefathers made for their liberty. As to England and Scotland, the native countries of some of us—you know they were enemies once, meeting as enemies on the borders, and continually armed and prepared for attack. All that has long passed away. As a Scotsman I am proud of the past history of England; and Englishmen are equally proud of the noble deeds of Scottish history. And so here, in a new country, and coming from various parts of Europe originally, it is possible for us to call up for our emulation the noble and worthy deeds of each fatherland; and for our warning, the wrong-doing and oppression with which history abounds. One of my aims here is to establish a police, and I shall be glad to enrol some of your sons and your younger brothers. If the doctor passes them, and they take the usual oath on entering such a force, I assure you I shall make no inquiry as to who their forefathers were; and I hope the different members of the force will live as good comrades. I thank Messrs. Bodenstern, Potgieter, and Mazain for the great trouble which they have taken in visiting the farmers at distant places, and explaining to them the real condition of the country. I also thank others who have laboured in the same way to counteract the efforts of mischief-makers and remove all misunderstanding from the minds of the people. I have also to thank your People’s Committee for its steady help in the past. We shall have difficulties in the future, but with a good understanding among ourselves here we shall overcome them all. I shall still continue to ask advice from your leaders in carrying on the business of Stellaland. I came here a stranger to many of you, and I have to express my pleasure in thinking that we now understand one another. I think that goes far to secure the peace of this part of the country, however disturbed other parts may be.”

I may be allowed to explain here that, as I have no liking for demonstration or display, there had hitherto been

no outward token indicating the establishment of Her Majesty's Protectorate. So far as the natives of Bechuanaland were concerned, they were familiar with flags as used by officers and other hunters and travellers at their encampments. The Stellaland and Goshen volunteers had each a separate flag—one flying at Vryburg, the other at Rooi Grond. I had not provided myself with anything in the way of bunting. But when the Deputation from the Stellaland People's Committee had concluded their business with me at Taung, they made the request that when I returned to Vryburg I would authorise the hoisting of the English flag in token of the establishment of Her Majesty's Protectorate in the country. On the 9th of July I informed the High Commissioner of their request, but put them off, saying I did not like display. The first meeting at Vryburg took place on the 18th July, on my arrival there. Loyal and gratifying speeches were made by leading men—not Englishmen, and not men living in the town of Vryburg; and again the request was made by the Stellalanders that "our flag" should be hoisted. I again put them off. At the meeting of the 21st (to which Mr. van Niekerk and his friends had been invited) a considerable number of people were present, and again the request was made for the hoisting of the flag, clearly and distinctly pleaded for by Dutch-speaking people. They said they understood my personal feeling, but they—Dutch colonists—were different; they liked to see their flag flying. They had pulled down the flags of Stellaland and put them aside. The flagstaff had now no flag whatever. Why should this be, as everything was now settled, and they were satisfied with the explanations I had given and the engagements which I had made? There was no honest answer to this; so I promised that when the great meeting took place on the following week, the flag of the Protectorate should be raised; but that in the interval all veldt-cornets and other office-bearers should come in and take the oath to Her Majesty, upon which they would in the meantime retain their position as district officers. This was done, one after another coming in and taking the oath; and this did not cease till I left Stellaland. One of



EXCHANGE OF FLAGS IN STELLALAND, 28TH JULY 1884.

the more distant farmers was on his way to Vryburg to give in his personal adhesion when he heard I had left for Cape-town, upon which he returned to his farm.

And so more than two months after the establishment of the Protectorate, and at the meeting at which the preceding speeches were made, the flag of the Protectorate was first hoisted. A friend in the Colony had very kindly supplied my lack of bunting, and the flag had arrived in time for the great public meeting. I concluded the speech, of which I have given a few sentences above, by saying :—

“And now, with your leave, gentlemen, I wish to perform a significant act. I have not been in haste to exhibit any outward sign that Her Majesty’s authority has been established in Bechuanaland. Whether the country remain under the Imperial Government or is annexed to the Cape Colony, the flag under which we now are will continue to be that of Her Majesty. All your officers have taken the oath of their respective offices under the Queen’s Protectorate. In view of these facts I will now ask you to accompany me to the flag-staff, that we may together openly acknowledge the flag under which we now live. I did not bring this flag flying, or make haste to hoist it. I do not now hoist it as a forceful action, for, as you are all aware, I have had nothing in my hand in Stellaland heavier than a riding-whip ; but as you have been accustomed to your own flags, which you have now hauled down, the right conclusion of all that we have done will be the public hoisting and recognition of the flag of the Protectorate.”

A sergeant of police was about to officiate in hauling up the flag when two young Dutch-speaking colonists came forward in presence of the crowd, and begged me to let them have the honour of hoisting the flag with their own hands. I willingly granted their request ; and no incident could show more forcibly how well disposed such people are in South Africa, when anything like scope or fair-play is allowed to the better part of their nature. The flag of the Protectorate was hoisted by the hands of these colonists, while three hearty cheers were given for the Queen—the great volume of the cheering coming from the throats of Dutch-speaking colonists ; and the Stellalanders then gave three cheers for the Deputy Commissioner who had come amongst them without a friend in the preceding May. In accordance with their traditions and customs, I asked one of their

number, who was an officer in the Dutch Reformed Church, to offer prayer. Standing close to the flagstaff, this man led the people in their own language in asking the blessing of God to rest on what was then transacted. The enemies of order and of England in South Africa were soon able, through our own blunders, to punish both myself and some of those who gathered round me that day in Stellaland, for our loyal service to the British flag. But, thank God, that critical chapter in South African history came to an end with the appearance of Sir Charles Warren and his expedition; and it may surely be hoped that that was the last occasion on which a Dutch-speaking colonist, or a Deputy Commissioner, or indeed any one whatever, will be punished for his attachment to the Imperial flag in South Africa.

After prayer had been concluded, during which every one of the large company stood with uncovered head, Mr. Bodenstein, as Chairman of the People's Committee, came forward and said:—

“I consider it my duty to inform the Deputy Commissioner that there are two flags in Stellaland, and the business of the country has hitherto been done under them. Both of these we hand over to your care. We ask you to take charge of them, if you will, and we shall then have no further trouble on their account. Personally I feel convinced that in the future the people of Stellaland will remember with gratitude the day when you first came amongst them.”

I accepted the care of the flags, saying that, taking over the country as I had done, I should have pleasure in preserving their flags in a place of safety. That place of safety was in Government House, Capetown, to which I conveyed them myself.

I have here narrated what actually took place in the matter of the flag; I shall elsewhere refer to mis-statements of a serious nature, connected with what is here described. These culminated in the singular remark by Mr. Rhodes in a telegram to the High Commissioner's Secretary:—

“You can understand all their bitterest prejudices were excited by the raising of our flag—like a red rag to a bull—and the hauling down of their own” (4252, 3).

The Stellalanders hauled down their own flag unknown to me. With my sanction they themselves also raised the flag of the Protectorate—which is also that of the Cape Colony, as some people need to be reminded. The hostile and jealous feelings as to the success of the Protectorate in Stellaland, here described by Mr. Rhodes, were no doubt entertained by Van Niekerk and Delarey, and are shared by a few loud-talking people all over South Africa; but the number of those who look on the flag of England as a “bull on a red rag” is not so great as their hodmen would lead us to believe.

After one of the public meetings a farmer came up to me and said: “Mynheer Mackenzie, I have attended all your meetings, and I like well what you have said. I have been a ‘patriot,’ but if you really represent Her Majesty’s Government in what you have been saying, I shall acknowledge myself henceforth a ‘loyal.’”

“But my great object would be to make true patriotism and true loyalty compatible in the same man,” I explained to my interviewer.

“There is another thing, Mr. Mackenzie,” said the farmer, after a pause; “you have come among us like a shepherd. Now a shepherd has to take care of black sheep as well as of the others, and you know the proverb that there are black sheep in every flock. Is it not the duty of a shepherd to take care of the black sheep as well as the others?”

“It is certainly his duty to do so,” I replied.

“Well, good day, Mr. Mackenzie,” said my friend, and left me.

I mentioned this remarkable conversation to those who were likely to know what was meant by this parabolic language—the general drift of which, of course, was apparent. I was told that the farmer was no other than S. P. Celliers, “Commandant-General” of Stellaland, and that probably his words were meant to elicit my views about the murder of Honey, as to whether it was my intention to institute an investigation into it. I was informed that although he had merely acted as the messenger or medium of communication

between the principals in this affair, Celliers's conscience was ill at ease, and hence his guarded inquiry. What struck me at the time was, that from a lawyer's point of view, if an inquiry ever took place into the violent death of Honey, the "go-between" would be sure to be put into the witness-box.

I have already mentioned that the People's Committee, at their meeting on the 27th June, and during my own absence from Stellaland, had passed a resolution, warning all Stellalanders from joining in the disturbances in Montsioa's country, and announcing that stringent measures would be taken against those embarking in such a hostile course, "even to the forfeiture of their farms" (4194, 120). I was shown that this was in accordance with a by-law of the volunteers of Massow, and was acknowledged by all Stellalanders. It would seem that all Stellaland volunteers were aware that their titles to their farms, such as they were, were liable to be confiscated if their holders left Stellaland without permission from the authorities, or otherwise engaged in actions of a hostile or treasonable nature to their organisation. It was now held by the People's Committee of Stellaland that after the establishment of Her Majesty's authority in the country, and the friendly arrangements which I had made with the sanction of the High Commissioner, it would be treasonable and at his peril for any Stellalander to fight against Her Majesty's Protectorate, either in Stellaland or in Goshen. After the meeting now described, it was suggested to me that a proclamation issued by me as Deputy Commissioner, following on lines of the warning already given by the People's Committee—exhorting to peace and warning as to the consequences of waging war against a British Protectorate—would turn the scale in the case of some people living in the eastern part of Bechuanaland who had been a good deal under the influence of Messrs. Delarey and Van Niekerk. I had already asked (4194, 53) and obtained the sanction of the High Commissioner to issue a proclamation "warning Stellalanders and inviting co-operation" (4194, 54). I accordingly drew it up (4213, 33) in the following terms:—

“PROCLAMATION by JOHN MACKENZIE, Esq., Her Majesty’s Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland.—Whereas Her Majesty has been pleased to extend her protection and establish her jurisdiction over Bechuanaland, which is bounded on the north by the limits of the Barolong territory north of Molopo River ; on the west in the Kalahari Desert by the limits of the territory occupied or used by the Barolong and other Bechuanaland tribes ; on the east by the boundary-line of the South African Republic ; and on the south by the Cape Colony, thus including the country recently known as Stellaland. And whereas disturbers of the public peace are misleading the public, and inciting the ignorant to disturbance, cattle-stealing, and war :

“Now, therefore, I, John Mackenzie, by the powers vested in me as the Deputy in Bechuanaland of Her Majesty’s High Commissioner, do hereby stringently forbid the assembling of armed men in any part of Bechuanaland for unlawful purposes ; and make further known that all who thus unlawfully assemble, or are guilty of treason, rebellion, riot, public disturbance or other unlawful opposition to Her Majesty’s Government after this proclamation shall be punished with confiscation of their landed and other property, or such other punishment as shall be lawfully imposed on them according to the nature of the crime. And, finally, I call upon all good and true inhabitants of Bechuanaland, of every nationality, to be faithful and loyal to Her Majesty’s Government, and to assist me in the maintenance of peace, law, and order.

“This done at Vryburg, district Stellaland, Bechuanaland, this first day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four.

“ God save the Queen.

(Signed) “ JOHN MACKENZIE,
“Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland.”

I requested the publication of this proclamation in the Colony. So far as I was personally concerned, and so far as the People’s Committee of Stellaland were concerned, we were agreed as to our policy and mode of procedure in this matter. I had failed in overcoming the opposition of the Transvaal Goshen volunteers as Mr. Rhodes afterwards failed, but here in Stellaland I was aware that there was a considerable body of white people who were undoubtedly loyal to the Imperial Government and to myself as Commissioner. We were agreed that all who were favourable to Her Majesty’s Government should be united, and that our best efforts should be directed to the work of increasing our number by means of spreading correct information. The hostile people to the east of Stellaland were really Trans-

vaal burghers, and would be included in the Transvaal when the new boundary was defined.

When the High Commissioner informed Lord Derby that I was issuing this proclamation, he described it to the Secretary of State as "inviting co-operation of Stellalanders" (4194, 34), but omitted to mention that it was also "a warning to Stellalanders" against joining those who were actively opposing the Protectorate, for which he had given his sanction. Thus the Secretary of State had not the whole case placed before him in this telegram. Stellalanders were actually joining in open hostility to the Protectorate at Rooi Grond; they were also trying to stir up a similar attack at Hart River under Van Niekerk and Delarey. In these circumstances "warning" was surely necessary. I expected "co-operation" from my friends, and I hoped to influence the wavering; but to expect co-operation from pronounced and open enemies of the Imperial Government was first advocated by Captain Bower, Mr. Rhodes, and then by the High Commissioner. Their experience of the results of indulging this unusual hope is not such as will encourage this habit of mind either in themselves or in others.

The history of this proclamation was somewhat peculiar. In deciding to issue it I was greatly influenced by the advice of Mr. Bodenstein and other Dutch-speaking Stellalanders, whose intimate knowledge of their own friends and neighbours was beyond dispute, and whose loyalty to Her Majesty's Government I had now no reason to question. The reference to confiscation was made entirely in deference to their example in the local notice already issued by them in my absence, and to their statement concerning the local by-law. At their suggestion I also sent an order to the Colony for the printing of slips containing a Dutch translation of the proclamation, which my advisers wished to circulate among the wavering people on the East Stellaland border. Had I remained in Stellaland it was my intention to divide these slips among the leading men of Stellaland for circulation.

The ideas underlying my recall and the appointment of my successor come out quite clearly in connection with this

proclamation. Its publication had been sanctioned by the High Commissioner, but when the change of front took place it was withdrawn by him and never appeared in the Government Gazette. And no wonder; for how could it be published by the High Commissioner if he now gave in his adherence to Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes, and believed that the turbulent men, against whom the proclamation was directed, were the true friends of England and of the peace of Bechuanaland? If both Stellaland and Goshen were to be pacified by the aid of such men as Van Niekerk and Delarey, of course I was wrong in warning against seditious people as enemies. It is now well known that nothing advantageous happened to the Protectorate through the help of Van Niekerk or of Delarey; and I am obliged, in justice and honesty, to say that it was never more than a childish idea to expect it.

As to the printed slips of the proclamation in Dutch, I believe they duly arrived in Stellaland after my recall to the Cape; and were received by my successor, Mr. Rhodes, and were burned by him. The reader must duly consider what is implied in this act. Let him read the proclamation again which I have quoted entire. That proclamation was burned by a gentleman whose object was to secure peace and good government in a British Protectorate. Now no names were mentioned in the proclamation: evil-doers and evil deeds were alone specified and warned against, and threatened with punishment. Mr. Rhodes burned the proclamation, and then cast himself into the power of those who were openly hostile to the Protectorate, and opposing it to his face. To oblige these men, he kindly revoked my proclamation against sedition, and all other actions of mine. For months Mr. Rhodes was very useful to Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk; but, truth to tell, no one can show what Mr. Rhodes or the Imperial Government obtained in return except degradation.

The reader of these pages will hardly believe what opprobrium was heaped upon me by the anti-English newspaper of Capetown for proposing to issue the above proclamation. I had verily committed the unpardonable

sin in daring to threaten freebooters bearing Dutch names. If they had had English names they would be only "cattle-thieves," and could be treated accordingly. Now my warning had no class reference, but was to the effect that those who opposed Her Majesty's Protectorate might find that the conditional promises made by me to uphold their claims to land in Stellaland would be cancelled by their hostility. We would not fight a man, and give him a farm too, in a native Protectorate. It was gravely contended that my proclamation was at variance with the principles of Roman-Dutch law. Now whether this law allows the confiscation of land for sedition or not was not the point. These men had no Roman-Dutch title, but were under a native chief and bound by a by-law of their own, which gave emphasis to my warning. But the newspaper in question was not alone in its remarkable opinion as to Koranna Roman-Dutch law. Mr. Rhodes, who, I was told, had burned the proposed proclamation, tried, in his place in the Cape Parliament, to justify its suppression. But in order to do so he, too, found it necessary to quote Roman-Dutch law, and actually did so, as if the worthless titles of a Koranna chief to another chief's land could be regarded as having the sanction of Roman-Dutch law, or as if there were such a thing as a valid legal title to land in all Stellaland. At the same time Mr. Rhodes found it convenient to ignore the fact that Van Niekerk and Delarey had also availed themselves of this by-law and issued a "proclamation" on the 31st July, in which an armed meeting, avowedly hostile to Her Majesty's Government, was called for the 25th of August ensuing; and it was therein threatened that Stellalanders (now under Her Majesty's Protectorate) who did not on that day proceed to the Hart River and submit themselves to the Transvaal party, would have their ground confiscated, and be themselves dealt with by "military law" for "high treason." It is worthy of the closest attention that no one in Capetown official circles ever challenged this wonderful impertinence to the Imperial Government; nor pointed out this equally wonderful breach of the Roman-Dutch law, as interpreted by Mr. Rhodes and the *Zuid Afrikaan*. Neither the English nor

the Dutch language seemed to supply to these parties terms strong enough to characterise the bold, bad man who had dared to say that, in any circumstances whatever—in open rebellion against Her Majesty or otherwise—a certain class of freebooters could be denied their land! Not one word from such people against freebooting—their opposition was all directed against the Imperial Government. It was, however, very absurd that such crooked views should be brought forward in Capetown, in the case under consideration, and in the supposed interests of the Dutch-speaking people of Stellaland, when it was those very Dutch-speaking people and no other—theirselfes residing in the disturbed district—who urged me to issue the proclamation in question!

While I was still at Taung, the High Commissioner desired to know from me the “precise position of Stellaland.” I could do no more than refer him to my telegrams and despatches for a true picture of the state of things up to that time. I added:—

“The only new thing in Stellaland known to me is the unmasking of Van Niekerk. He has openly joined the Transvaal party and, I am informed, promises the speedy annexation of Stellaland to the Transvaal. He has been very false and very harmful to our cause, and uses annexation to the Cape Colony only as a stick to beat us with. He is said to be dead against such annexation and works only for the Transvaal. I am told that Europeans, Cape Colonists, and Free State people in Stellaland are with us, and it is said Van Niekerk will find himself in a minority” (4194, 126).

This view was established by what I afterwards saw in Stellaland itself. Excepting those Stellalanders who were at that time actually engaged in assisting Van Pittius, and their friends who were busily plotting on the Hart River under Van Niekerk and Delarey, the body of the people in Stellaland were quite satisfied to be under the Imperial Government. I promised to send information to the High Commissioner as to the exact condition of the country after I had been some time in Vryburg; but before my report reached him, of the true state of things as ascertained by me personally on the spot, he requested me to leave Stellaland, and had in fact committed himself to an entirely different policy with reference to the Protectorate.

BOOK III
BACKING OUT

CHAPTER I

THE UPHOLDING OF THE PROTECTORATE

I COME now to a division of my subject in which it will be my duty to state, as clearly and as briefly as possible, a dismal story of blundering and misfortune. The events took place, and vitally affected the history of our connection with South Africa, and their causes are not yet eradicated from men's minds either in the Imperial or the Colonial official world. This unpleasant part of our story must be most carefully studied for our instruction and our warning in the future. My object and that of the reader must be to uphold the right, and to stick to it; to expose the wrong, which is also always the impolitic; and to be charitable towards those whose errors are recorded.

“What do you propose we should do if we adopted your views and sent a Commissioner into Bechuanaland, and he were insulted by the Europeans who are enlisting under native chiefs and disturbing the peace of the country?”

This question was asked me in 1883 at an interview which I had with one of the leading politicians of our time—a gentleman who had not previously seen his way to advocate much active effort in Bechuanaland or in South Africa by the Imperial Government, but who had recently given greater attention to the subject.

“In the case you suppose,” I replied, “England can only do in Bechuanaland what she must be prepared to do in every land and on every sea to which duty and interest combine to lead her. But in Bechuanaland the evil has been so wide-felt and so protracted, the absence of local and satis-

factory remedies so complete, that I don't think there is any likelihood of our Commissioner being insulted. One would rather expect that, if instructed not summarily to drive these men out, but to make if possible some arrangement with them, he would be well received."

When the Bechuanaland Expedition, under Sir Charles Warren, was leaving England in November 1884, this gentleman made a speech in his place in the House of Commons which was of as much value in South Africa as if a second expedition of equal numbers were following upon the first. He said: "We are determined at all hazards to use our whole strength, if it were necessary, to maintain the obligations into which we have entered. These obligations are so sacred that they leave no alternative but to carry out what the House and the country have determined to be done." These words of Mr. Chamberlain left no one in doubt. There could be no mistake—England was in earnest. And this did not imply any interference with the self-government of any state or republic. It was to perform the high duty of the Supreme Government in South Africa, and establish order where all local South African Governments had declined or failed to do so. Had such a declaration been authorised, and had it been uttered by Sir Hercules Robinson with the sincerity of conviction as soon as he landed in Capetown in the preceding April, no Bechuanaland Expedition would have been necessary; for no government or state in South Africa had the slightest intention of opposing the Imperial Government by force in its administration of a Native Territory, to which it had been invited by the native owners.

When the late Mr. Forster, before the establishment of the Protectorate, pressed the condition of Bechuanaland on the attention of the House of Commons and of the English public, he earnestly urged that there would be no war provided the South African disturbers of the peace were really persuaded by our attitude of the earnestness of England, and her determination to see justice done to friendly chiefs to whom we were under obligation, and her determination to uphold peace in a district which was the highway northward of Christianity and of commerce. Never were words more

strikingly fulfilled than those of Mr. Forster. When the Protectorate was first established a large number of people in South Africa refused to believe that England was in earnest. The professional politicians at the Cape were almost unanimous in this view. They agreed that it was a passing breeze of public opinion, to which the English Government had felt bound to listen. Let England meet with serious difficulty and she would not go on. Then I am sorry to say that the earlier attitude of Her Majesty's High Commissioner in carrying out the Protectorate must bear the blame of increasing the distrust which was already so deep. But as soon as it became quite evident in South Africa that England was determined to see this matter through, all opposition collapsed, as Mr. Forster had predicted.

The reader is aware that in order to form a correct idea of the state of Bechuanaland, and the likelihood of opposition to our Protectorate, the High Commissioner, while still in London, cabled to Major Lowe—who was also asked, at my suggestion, to become head of the Bechuanaland Police, and who had had for many years intimate knowledge of the country—to give reliable information on these subjects. Major Lowe's reply was:—

“State of Bechuanaland bad, owing to excessive stealing and reprisal, and uncertainty of intentions of Transvaal and our Government. There will be opposition; extent depends on Transvaal and Free State Government acting with energy, and honestly preventing Stellalanders receiving assistance, and our employing force sufficient to overawe or crush Stellalanders at once” (4036, 17).

This was another way of stating Mr. Forster's view as given in the House of Commons. Major Lowe did not look for entire submission or acquiescence; but the exhibition of a certain force would convince the filibusters that we were in earnest, and when that conviction was produced there would be no more opposition.

Thus, when the Protectorate was resolved upon in London, neither the High Commissioner nor Her Majesty's Government entertained the idea that there would be universal acquiescence with our wishes in Bechuanaland. The small class of what might be termed professed filibusters

would possibly have to be met on their own ground and opposed by force. Local arrangements, however, might be made on the spot, which would minimise the influence of such professional disturbers of the peace, and induce the majority to submit.

It would be uncandid on my part if I did not here fully state that, from my knowledge of both the freebooters and the natives, I hoped that the personal influence and efforts of a well-selected Deputy Commissioner would secure this general submission, and thus lead to a settlement which would be carried through without a large demonstration of force. I held this opinion both before and after my own appointment as Deputy Commissioner. I am free to admit that I underestimated in England the intensity and the extent of the distrust in the Imperial Government which I afterwards found to be universal in South Africa. I was, of course, aware that there was great uneasiness, and I conceived it was part of the work of the Protectorate to re-establish the Imperial Government, in the confidence of the colonists as well as of the natives. This work had been committed to the High Commissioner in Capetown and South Africa generally, and to myself as his Deputy in Bechuanaland. If I am asked whether the High Commissioner succeeded in inducing fresh confidence in the minds of colonists in the Imperial Government, in connection with its newly-assumed and most beneficial work in Bechuanaland, I am compelled to reply in the negative. The position of the Imperial Government in South Africa was never lower than it was between the date of my withdrawal from Bechuanaland and the great public meeting in the Exchange of Capetown; and for that loss of influence the mistaken attitude of Her Majesty's High Commissioner was the direct and obvious cause. As to my own humbler and more limited work in Bechuanaland, the reader can form his own conclusions from what has been already related of events which transpired there. How much might have been accomplished had a feeling of general confidence in Her Majesty's Government been gradually re-established in South Africa generally will be evident to any one who

considers the difficulties which I did surmount in Bechuanaland.

It will be necessary, however, to a clear understanding of the position of affairs, that I should explain as far as I am able the reasons which would seem to have influenced the High Commissioner in his unfortunate attitude towards the Protectorate between June and October 1884. And this makes it necessary to refer again to the visit of Captain Bower to Bechuanaland, at the High Commissioner's request, in the previous March. Although it is not pleasant to do so, I am compelled to state at once that this visit of Captain Bower before I entered the country had not the beneficial result which he, no doubt, meant it to have. His information was seriously—even remarkably—incorrect, and his conclusions were of a singularly visionary and unreliable nature. His entire approval of the claims of the Stellaland freebooters was combined with a warm and even amusing praise of the people themselves. To this was added an unconditional disapproval of everything connected with the Goshen freebooters. How his views leaked out I am not aware, but these opinions were known in Bechuanaland as those of Captain Bower before I entered it. Of course the only difference between the freebooters of the two districts was that the one party had been more successful than the other. Both had succeeded in getting bogus treaties; and if further success only were requisite, the resources of the Transvaal had not been exhausted, and could soon make Van Pittius as successful as Van Niekerk. Captain Bower's reports tell their own tale (4036, 34). The way his feelings had been touched by the well-laid plans of the freebooters was matter of open recital and amusement in Bechuanaland; and, I suppose, will remain so for some time to come. Perhaps the most ludicrous picture ever given out of a child's story-book is Captain Bower's description of the freebooter Van Niekerk and his followers, at Captain Bower's serious request, watching over and protecting Taung and the chief Mankoroane—a chief whom they had attacked without cause, and robbed of his cattle and the best part of his country. Capetown argu-

ment would say, Is it not true, because Lord Derby thanked Van Niekerk for doing it? The answer is that a hoax is not the less, but the greater a hoax on account of the number and the dignity of those who are deceived by it. Niekerk and Delarey protecting Mankoroane is a picture to be thought of with the same feelings that we entertain for the story of the mouse abstemiously watching roast cheese, or for the cat benevolently regarding the abstemious mouse. Up to a certain point Captain Bower was probably deceived; but when it is incredible to suppose that deception was still possible, I am not able even to imagine a reason for Captain Bower's action or opinions. Mesmeric influence is the phenomenon within the range of my own knowledge which most resembles the amount and the nature of the ascendancy which Mr. van Niekerk undoubtedly exercised over Captain Bower after his meetings with him at Hart River in March 1884. There was great mutual admiration produced by this personal intercourse; Captain Bower thought he had discovered a hero; Administrator Van Niekerk, in sober fact, found a government officer more useful to him than it had ever occurred to his free-booting mind, even in its dreams, to imagine. He may now deny his own public actions; he may openly slight and oppose the Imperial Government, but he cannot forfeit the esteem and confidence of Captain Bower. The reader of these pages will see that this is not by any means an overstatement of this singular conquest of one man by another. The result was nothing short of a calamity to the Imperial Government, and to the cause of order and good government in South Africa at a crisis in its history; for, most unfortunately for the character and standing of Her Majesty's Government in South Africa, the views of Captain Bower came gradually to be those of the High Commissioner, as they were those of their confidential friend and adviser, Mr. Cecil Rhodes. If Sir Hercules Robinson ceased heartily to support the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, it was because he was over-persuaded that there was another and easier method—a "Colonial" in place of an "Imperial" policy. Of course a true "Colonial"

policy could only be carried out in connection with the responsible Colonial Ministers ; but instead of this an irresponsible Member of the Colonial Opposition obtained the position of adviser to the High Commissioner on Bechuanaland affairs. We shall see that the course which Sir Hercules Robinson followed, as thus advised, sacrificed the position and character of the Imperial Government, whilst it failed from the first to evoke the approval or support of the colonists.

In the course of my own local work in Bechuanaland, I was from the outset constantly reminded in the most unexpected and unpleasant way of this visit of a few days to the country by Captain Bower. I found, to my surprise and disappointment, that my local recommendations and appointments were all opposed by Captain Bower, who, after his hurried visit, did not hesitate to press his views against mine on purely local affairs—such as routes, stations, local officers of police ; although I had a thorough knowledge both of the country and of the men whom I was selecting. So far did this sort of thing go that Captain Bower actually recommended me to appoint “ a good Boer ” to represent the Protectorate at Taung, instead of Major Stanley Lowe. Even when the High Commissioner yielded to my local knowledge (4194, 54), the Imperial Secretary persisted in his views, and demanded of Major Lowe, my Assistant Commissioner, an explanation as to why a central position (Motito) should be chosen by me for temporary headquarters instead of Pudumo,—a place actually on the much-disputed border between Stellaland, the Transvaal, and the Batlaping of Mankoroane ; and why, in sending relief to Mafiking, I proposed a road at some distance from the Transvaal instead of the one recommended by the Imperial Secretary, which ran parallel to the border of that hostile country, within a few miles of it everywhere, and at one point, Kunwana, actually entering the Transvaal itself (4194, 76). If I had sent waggons, with ammunition and other supplies for Mafiking, along the route proposed and pressed by Captain Bower, I should have tempted an attack from the Transvaal hostile border all the way from the Hart River district

to Rooi Grond. But my caution was apparently quite incomprehensible to the Imperial Secretary. It would have been impossible for the reader to understand clearly either my own position in Bechuanaland or that of the High Commissioner at Capetown, without this special reference to the position and action of Captain Bower—which were of a nature not usual from one filling the office of secretary.

Although I regarded the question of Rooi Grond and Hart River as one which in its nature had passed for settlement to the High Commissioner and the Transvaal Government, I had a strong opinion as to the method by which that settlement might be effected. Fortunately for my own success, I had personally no distrust of the perseverance of Her Majesty's Government, because I had confidence in the support of the English people; but on that very account I thought there ought to be as much co-operation and sympathy in South Africa as could be evoked. I felt, therefore, that now was the time to propose the scheme for a force of volunteers under the High Commissioner. Accordingly, having completed the tour of the Protectorate, I drew up a paper on the subject, which I forwarded from Kuruman to the High Commissioner (4194, 55-57). It was a statement as to how the good and orderly people in South Africa could be enrolled under the High Commissioner for the suppression of disorder. Protracted abstention on the part of England had produced distrust in the country; but there was still loyalty enough and goodness enough, which only needed to be organised and directed. My proposal met with unqualified disapprobation from Sir Hercules Robinson. If the reader turn to his strictures which accompanied my proposal to England, he will find that they amount to an adverse but very weak criticism of volunteering as such. He thought the right stamp of men would not come forward in South Africa, because they might lose good situations if they did so. If they did offer, the High Commissioner wanted to know how they could reach the scene of operations in time! Indeed, the criticism went below this, and became merely verbal. We did not want "a Reserve Force" (the term which I had used)—we wanted an

active force! Now it is, of course, always in contemplation that every Reserve Force may become an active force, or part of one, otherwise the expression would be without meaning. At the time I was writing I had sanction to raise only twenty-five policemen for Bechuanaland; and there were then actually in that country not more than half a dozen. Now, such a small number would not meet the case; and I ventured, therefore, to give my views as to how an adequate force could be quickly raised in South Africa, in even greater numbers than were required. Whilst others had boldly asserted that those wishing for the continued reign of filibustering in South Africa would unite to frustrate the efforts of the Imperial Government, I assured the High Commissioner that the order-loving people, without distinction of race, would support Her Majesty's Government and the High Commissioner if they were only shown how to do it.

In this matter the reader will find a notable instance of a man receiving according to his faith. Sir Hercules Robinson, our High Commissioner in South Africa, to whom the affairs, capabilities, and possibilities of the country ought to have been well known, in effect depreciated and underrated its good and order-loving feeling, and even ridiculed a proposal which was avowedly based upon the existence of this feeling, and which contemplated the enrolment of volunteers under him as High Commissioner. Capable of carrying on as Governor the business of the Cape Colony, assisted by his responsible advisers, he did not perceive or conceive of his great opportunity at this time as High Commissioner of South Africa. The idea, indeed, was to him more a matter of amusement than anything else; and its realisation under him as a personality was therefore simply impossible. The people were there; they were urgently needed; but there was no one to call them out. Sir Charles Warren, who was also well acquainted with South Africa, when requested by Her Majesty's Government, while still in England, to sketch out how the disturbances in Bechuanaland were to be arrested, laid special stress on the services of Colonial volunteers; and accordingly under

him a large number of enthusiastic Colonial volunteers were enrolled, not by any means confined to one race of Europeans. The proposal was made by me in June, and at once condemned by the High Commissioner, or rather by the Governor of the Cape Colony. It was again brought forward by Sir Charles Warren in October in England, received the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, and was successfully carried into practice in South Africa in December of the same year. The zeal of these young volunteers in offering to serve in the cause of the Imperial Government and of order, was only equalled by the prompt manner in which they were enrolled, equipped, and forwarded to their destination. All the difficulties seen by Sir Hercules Robinson in my proposal were thus proved to have no real existence.

Sir Hercules Robinson has left on record his estimate of Cape society at this time in its disposition towards the Imperial Government in a telegram which he addressed to me on the subject (4194, 54), and it is of importance to quote it :—

“You are under a complete delusion if you think you can obtain help at present either from the Government, the Parliament, or the public opinion of this colony.”

The Governor of the Cape Colony may have been right in his estimate of the mind of his Colonial Government—his opinion about the Parliament is less reliable ; and, as was soon abundantly shown, he was altogether wrong and misinformed as High Commissioner as to the drift of the healthy and enlightened public opinion of the Cape Colony and South Africa at this grave crisis in its history.

The next request which I made was for the loan of at least 100 picked men from the mounted police of the Cape Colony with their officers, to be under the orders of the High Commissioner. At this early date (June) I stated my opinion that the lawless minority of freebooters would not consent to subside of their own accord. Those who had submitted were in danger of being discouraged if we did not put in a more masterful appearance. In time we could enrol men, but time was precious (4194 ; 52, 61). In reply to this

request I was informed by the High Commissioner (27th June) that there was no Colonial force available, and if there was any, the Ministers would not lend them (4194, 53). But there was a Colonial force available, the High Commissioner himself being the judge; for a short time after telegraphing to me as above, he himself wrote to his Ministers requesting the service of 100 Cape Mounted Rifles to supplement the 100 policemen then being raised and equipped for Bechuanaland. The High Commissioner thus stated his case to his Colonial Ministers (29th July):—

“The Cape Mounted Rifles are available; and whilst they would cost little more in Bechuanaland than they are doing in the Colony, their employment might be viewed as the fair share of the expense of the Protectorate promised by the late Government” (4213, 10).

The result of this application showed that the High Commissioner's estimate of the views of his Ministers was a just one—they refused the loan of the men to the Imperial Government. It is only fair that the Cape Ministers should be allowed to explain their unfriendly action at this time. The Premier, Mr. Upington, speaking at a press dinner given in Capetown on the 2d September, is reported in the papers to have referred to this matter as follows:—

“Let the recall of Mr. Mackenzie rest upon those responsible for his appointment and withdrawal; and when the papers are before the public they will see who it is that is responsible. What was it that the Colonial Government was asked to do? Will gentlemen present here to-night believe that the Imperial Government in its Protectorate of Bechuanaland was sincere? What was the duty of the Imperial Government? It was to support their Protectorate by the power of their arms. That was the position they should take up if their position was a sincere one.”

It is quite evident that Mr. Upington did not believe in the sincerity of the Imperial Government in assuming the Protectorate of Bechuanaland. The attitude of the High Commissioner since the commencement of the Protectorate had failed to inspire him with confidence in Imperial steadfastness; and it is thus quite evident that it was distrust of the Imperial Government on the part of the Colonial Ministry which prevented their granting the loan of their police.

That distrust was felt in June: it kept on growing, and in September was expressed openly as above at a public dinner in Capetown by the Colonial Premier. Whatever local (Afrikaner and Transvaal) pressure may have been brought to bear upon the Ministry to induce them to refuse these repeated requests for assistance from the High Commissioner and from his Deputy in Bechuanaland, the British statesman must carefully note the fact that such repeated refusal did take place. The Cape Ministry positively refused to lend 100 men—declared by the Governor of the Colony and High Commissioner to be available for the purpose. Other colonies had cheerfully assisted the Imperial Government in struggles which had no reference to their own local benefit, but simply for the support of the empire. But in this case the chief benefit was eventually to be reaped by the Cape Colony itself. The work for which the loan of a regiment of Colonial police was asked was to establish order in Bechuanaland on the northern border of the Cape Colony, and to quell disgraceful freebooting which had gone on there for years. The lesson which this and other events are calculated to teach us is—not that we should distrust the sympathy and good-feeling of the Cape Colony towards the Imperial Government, but that we should avoid the vacillating policy which had produced so profound a distrust; and that in South Africa, as nearer home, the English Government is called upon carefully and clearly to distinguish between questions of local and general government—those which belong to a colony or state, and those which affect the general wellbeing of South Africa. And the reader of these pages will find many other proofs that it is inconvenient in the highest degree any longer to entangle questions of general South African importance, and which are in the hands of the Imperial Government, in the meshes of the local party politics of the Cape Colony.

Although the High Commissioner was not successful in his prayer for 100 men from the Cape Ministers, one is pleased to notice and suitably acknowledge the assistance which these gentlemen were able to render to the Bechuanaland Protectorate even while it was in my unworthy hands.

Major Lowe was supplied, through the authority of the Cape Colonial Government, with (I believe) 32 rifles and 36,000 rounds of ammunition and a few revolvers which were in the Colonial Ordnance Store at Kimberley (4194, 76). One feels that a modest action of this nature, which would probably be known at the time to only one or two officials in Capetown and Kimberley, ought to be rescued from the obscurity of a mere bluebook acknowledgment. The High Commissioner, on behalf of the Imperial Government, might not be able to secure all the assistance that he asked for, but Cape Ministers resolved to prove that they "bore no malice" by their contribution or loan or sale of all the muskets, etc., which were in their Ordnance Store at Kimberley. At this distance of time their Transvaal friends will probably forgive them for this rather questionable action.

When I learned that the Cape Ministers would not help in the pacification of the country, and that the High Commissioner would not agree to call out a considerable number of volunteers, I felt that Her Majesty's Imperial Government was still to remain under a cloud in South Africa. Men in Capetown might remove that cloud, but a Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland could not possibly do so. Glad to be in the atmosphere where the highest work had to be done for Her Majesty's Government, I was thankful when the tour of Bechuanaland was accomplished, and, according to my understanding with the High Commissioner, the time had arrived when I should have an opportunity of proceeding to the Cape to consult about the future of the Protectorate. To my intense surprise, I was forbidden to come to the Cape at this time (4194, 79). My successors were never so forbidden, but came and went repeatedly. I had completed my introductory work in Bechuanaland and was ready with my report. There was from the first a personal understanding between Sir Hercules Robinson and myself that, having been a missionary, I should not be asked to take direct charge of a police force as its leader. This undertaking was now broken, as if another person were addressing me; and although Major Lowe, the officer who was appointed when this arrangement was made in London,

was at his post and capable of discharging its duties, I was ordered to go back at once to Montsioa's.

At first the ideas of the High Commissioner as to the defence of the new Protectorate had no reference to coping with its real enemies by the high and adequate means which lay to his hand, but were apparently centred upon what his Deputy could carry through by personal influence. At the earliest date after my inspection of the country I had respectfully informed him of my inability, as Deputy Commissioner of Bechuanaland, to cope with the open and active hostility of the Transvaal to the Imperial Government—it was a question for him as High Commissioner. His first injunction to me as to actively defending the Protectorate was in these words:—

“You should proceed without delay to the neighbourhood of Montsioa's, accompanied by Major Lowe, and, if possible, Assistant Commissioner Van Niekerk, and if necessary organise a sufficient temporary force of police and burghers to expel the intruders” (4194, 52).

I could not regard this as the statement of an intelligent and well thought out scheme for overcoming opposition to Her Majesty's Government in Bechuanaland. It was entirely impracticable. Mr. van Niekerk was himself one of the Goshen freebooters—how could he assist in expelling them? I was told also to rely upon such police or burghers as I could raise locally in Bechuanaland (4194, 53). This advice from the High Commissioner at this important crisis was probably based upon the peculiar ideas of Captain Bower that Stellaland freebooters might be utilised to expel their Goshen friends. One of Captain Bower's views of Bechuanaland was to distrust Mr. C. Bethell, whom he had seen for an hour or so at Mafiking. I found this also re-echoed in the injunction from the High Commissioner that I should go myself to Montsioa's, so as to ensure that the subordinate in charge of the police would act with due discretion (4194, 54). The High Commissioner seems to have forgotten that there were then no available police, and that he was mistrusting the one Englishman in Bechuanaland who had proved himself during the past three years eminently capable of discharging the duties which he was ready

to perform at my request as an Imperial officer. Evidently the enrolling of the force must precede our taking it to Rooi Grond. I had urged this early in May, but the High Commissioner had done nothing in the matter; and so, on the 29th June, I informed him that I was sending Major Lowe to Kimberley for ammunition and for more men; and for guns and saddles for the men already enrolled.

I was greatly surprised to receive repeated orders from Capetown to proceed personally to Montsioa's. There was an entire want of fitness about it which still excites wonder. Personal influence had had a full and fair trial at Rooi Grond. I had faced the whole thing once, and felt there was no hope in attempting further negotiation with Mr. van Pittius as long as he was backed up by the Transvaal. There was the probability that if I remained "in the neighbourhood" of Rooi Grond I should become Mr. van Pittius's prisoner; or if I went to Mafiking I should be practically cut off from the rest of the Protectorate. With Lowe enrolling more men—with Bethell and Wright at Mafiking, I thought a personal interview concerning the Protectorate at this juncture with the High Commissioner was highly desirable. In a private note I reminded the High Commissioner of the clear understanding about police work, to which he had so readily agreed in London. I said that if he had changed his mind, and would explain to me still more clearly what I was to do "in the neighbourhood" of Rooi Grond, I should at once go there as an act of obedience to an order. I heard no more of this very singular order; but, strangely enough, I did not receive permission to visit Capetown.

The only assistance which Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa found himself able to offer to his Deputy in Bechuanaland was to state that he could enlist a few police in Capetown; but, he added, this would involve delay and additional cost (4194, 54). The High Commissioner was quite unaware of the resources of Kimberley, or of its enthusiasm in the Imperial cause. At this very time Major Lowe had 500 men presenting themselves when only 100 were sanctioned; and Colonel

Gough afterwards raised and commanded a fine regiment in the Bechuanaland Field Force called the Kimberley Horse.

It was stated in the House of Commons, in answer to a question concerning the death of Mr. Bethell, that the success of the Rooi Grond volunteers and the death of Mr. Bethell were owing to the delay which had taken place in raising and organising the Bechuanaland Police. We have seen that the real reason for the triumph of freebooting was the conviction in Capetown and in Pretoria that England would not uphold the Protectorate. But the non-appearance of the police in Montsioa's country up to the end of July, when Mr. Bethell was killed—although the Protectorate was established in May—may have been regarded as a fresh proof of our insincerity or our incompetence, and in any case demands explanation. The leading facts connected with this subject are on record (4194, 74-78; 4213, 58), and are as follows.

When Captain Bower visited Bechuanaland in March, Major Lowe had just been appointed Assistant Commissioner and head of the Bechuanaland Police. Captain Bower authorised him to raise four, and then ten men. When I reached Bechuanaland in April I authorised Major Lowe to raise at once the full number then permitted by the High Commissioner—twenty-five men.

On the 14th of May, writing from Vryburg, I urgently requested the High Commissioner that Major Lowe should be authorised to enlist fifty or sixty men at once, and to purchase saddles and bridles for the men in Kimberley, so as to secure good articles and to get them without delay. As I regarded the matter as urgent, I requested the High Commissioner, in my absence in the Barolong country, to communicate with Major Lowe direct, at Barkly West, and thus save time (4194, 21). At the same time I forwarded to the High Commissioner a report on the police force to be used in Bechuanaland, which Major Lowe drew up at my request, after consulting Mr. van Niekerk on the subject. On my return to Taung from the Barolong country in the end of June I found, to my great disappointment, that my

request had not been acceded to by the High Commissioner, and Major Lowe had not secured the sanction which I had asked for, either as to enlisting fifty or sixty men or as to procuring accoutrements for those already enlisted. I found about twenty men at Taung doing police duty with their own old saddles, or with borrowed ones. Major Lowe had purchased twenty-six horses, but felt he could go no further without direct orders. This was the state of things in the beginning of July, and it was at this time that I received the High Commissioner's order that I should at once proceed to Rooi Grond to cope with the disturbances there, and take with me Major Lowe and Mr. van Niekerk and what men I could collect! I at once replied, in answer to this remarkable order, that it would be necessary to send Major Lowe into Kimberley to enrol men and procure horses and ammunition and other necessary equipment (4194, 53). On the same date I recommended certain persons as officers, who were known to myself or to Major Lowe, and who were accustomed to border police work. No notice was taken of this, and for a month no appointment was made or confirmed except that of Mr. Dunne. As Major Lowe had on other occasions satisfactorily organised and equipped bodies of men in Kimberley and its neighbourhood, he calculated that the time needed for securing a small number would not amount to more than ten days. I authorised him as soon as he reached the first telegraph station to communicate with the Imperial Secretary, and so obtain the High Commissioner's guidance and assistance in procuring what he required for the equipment of the force. I suggested that to save time one of the officers nominated by me should act under Major Lowe's directions in the purchase of horses in the Kimberley and neighbouring districts. I was aware that Major Lowe was an excellent judge of horses, and had for years been accustomed to judge of police requirements. Trusting that these arrangements would be carried through, I telegraphed to the High Commissioner my intention "to send on all available men as soon as possible to Montsioa's, *vid* Motito. Lowe will follow and take command." Of course I did not intend that men

should be "available" till others had come from Barkly to fill their place; nor could I send them without saddles or arms. We were anxious to move at once to the relief of Montsioa, but knowing the country and its circumstances, we were resolved that no step should be taken which could not be supported.

Three days after his arrival in Kimberley, Major Lowe had selected and enlisted the specified number of men, and forwarded them to Barkly West, where they were destined to wait for their horses and accoutrements. These men were examined by a medical officer before enlistment, and on account of the large number of applicants who thronged Major Lowe's office, those selected were in every sense picked men, and this was afterwards fully attested by Captain Dawkins, a capable officer, who inspected them. Instead, however, of allowing Major Lowe to equip these men as he had been accustomed to do, which he would have managed with economy and expedition, this work was placed by the High Commissioner, on the advice of Mr. Rhodes, in the hands of a contractor;—and here we have the cause of the delay. It happened that one of the members of the firm selected by the Imperial Secretary was then in Capetown attending the Cape Parliament as representative, along with Mr. Rhodes, of a Colonial division. As to military or police affairs, the one gentleman knew probably as much or as little as the other, and yet the recommendations of Major Lowe had to give place to those of Mr. Rhodes; and the services of this experienced military officer had to give place to those of an inexperienced storekeeper at Kimberley, who employed some one else to do the work for him. Major Lowe protested, but in vain. The consequence was a complete breakdown on the part of the contractors. They were unable to procure the requisite number of horses, and many of those purchased by them when presented were found quite unsuitable and were rejected. In the end the contract was abandoned and the work had to be put into the hands of the officer whom I had recommended at the outset. The other items of equipment supplied by the contractors were

reported to be inferior. As an officer informed me, "The men's breeches were done before they reached Taung." The saddles were very bad—girths too short, stirrups quite soft, etc. etc.

While rubbish of this kind was being supplied to the police force, and weeks were wasted when days only were needed, it was determined that the enrolment and equipment of the men should be entirely and strictly in accordance with the "office" requirements of the Imperial Government. At an early date the Imperial Secretary offered Major Lowe the help of Captain Dawkins, the Governor's military secretary from Capetown. Major Lowe declined with thanks, saying he hoped to be ready to leave Kimberley as soon as this officer could arrive there from Capetown. Captain Dawkins, however, was sent, and with Major Lowe constituted a "Board" for the sole work of testing the equipment of the already enrolled sixty-seven men. Although Captain Dawkins was both able and willing to assist Major Lowe, they could do nothing for weeks but wait on the contractors. Major Lowe's first telegram on the subject of the enrolment was on the 6th of July. According to his calculation, on the 16th he would have completed his work and would have been on his way northward. As things were managed, Captain Dawkins returned to Capetown, which he reached on the 5th of August, leaving the Bechuanaland Police still waiting at Barkly West for their horses! The interference of the Imperial Secretary and Mr. Rhodes, and the advice tendered to the High Commissioner, and followed by him in the matter of the equipment of the Bechuanaland Police Force, were not in any way advantageous to Her Majesty's Government.

On the 9th of July, while the enlisting was going on in Kimberley, I formally asked the High Commissioner that the number of policemen should at once be brought up to 200. Some of this number I hoped to find in Stellaland, having had a distinct promise to that effect by the Deputation from the People's Committee (4194; 83, 114). The following was my answer from the High Commissioner, dated 12th July:—

"I cannot ask Her Majesty's Government to sanction any further expenditure until I have received definite replies to the points referred to in my telegrams to you of 6th, 8th, and 10th. I require to know what is the precise position of Stellaland. Are they with us, or against us, or neutral? Can our police neither be stationed in the country along the Transvaal border nor pass through it? Her Majesty's Government have no intention of fighting Stellalanders. If they had, 1000 men would be insufficient. For what purpose, then, do you require another 100 police? and where would you locate them? The expenditure which you have already undertaken, irrespective of Stellaland, will not be less than £40,000 for the first year, and you have said no word as yet about revenue. If the present police were doubled, as you suggest, the expenditure for the first year would not be far short of £80,000; and to expect the Imperial Government to expend this merely for the purpose of checking cattle-stealing is simply preposterous. All Mankoroane's and Montsioa's cattle are not worth one year's proposed expenditure; 100 efficient police located in convenient positions, and aided by a burgher commando, raised in the country, should check cattle-stealing and suppress disturbances in Montsioa's country. If this is not feasible, through the hostility of the Stellalanders, as I said in my last, the position in Bechuanaland will call for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government" (4194, 84).

I need not say that the receipt of the above telegram was a heavy blow to me as an officer endeavouring to uphold the Imperial Government. The reference to income in the circumstances of the Protectorate was surely not worthy of an experienced Administrator. What had we as yet done in Bechuanaland for which we could reasonably ask any man, black or white, to pay us? Besides, I had not entered into any arrangement as to the collection of revenue, as it was distinctly understood that such measures were to be instituted after consultation with the High Commissioner on my return to Capetown, after I had completed my tour of the country. I had already reported that there was no reluctance among the people to paying a tax, and that all were aware that a tax would be levied. It is certainly not clear what more I could have done at this time in the matter of revenue.

But the gravest thing in this telegram was the strange way in which the work of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland was referred to. The High Commissioner knew what was really at stake. Our supremacy in South

Africa was then trembling in the balance. It was not politic to say so at that time, and I did not say so when asking for more men; but for me to suppose that the High Commissioner was sincere in saying that he saw in the Bechuanaland Protectorate only a matter of protecting the cattle of Montsioa and Mankoroane, was what constituted my great difficulty. I seemed to be in correspondence with a stranger—not the distinguished Administrator whose views had so recently been endorsed in England by both Government and people. Whatever might be the value of Montsioa's and Mankoroane's cattle in money, if we let them go, and after them the country on which they were grazing, our northern road would be lost, and our character deservedly ruined as the leading Power in South Africa.

And yet here was the unreserved declaration by the High Commissioner that "Her Majesty's Government had no intention to fight the Stellalanders." If this meant the loyal body of people living in Stellaland, there would be no necessity to fight those who had already submitted to us. If it meant the openly hostile section on the Hart River,—who were small in number but one in aim and effort, and often in actual membership, with the more numerous Rooi Grond volunteers,—then the announcement of the High Commissioner implied, so far as he was concerned, the speedy abandonment of the Protectorate; for, as I had already declared concerning Van Pittius, Delarey, and Van Niekerk, after visiting the country, "any settled Government must fight these men. These are the very men we looked forward to fighting if necessary" (4213, 12). Clearly enough, therefore, if the High Commissioner would not oppose the Transvaal section in Stellaland—however hostile they might be—because they had reached a certain number, much less would he fight the Transvaal volunteers at Rooi Grond, who were known to be at least four times as numerous as the actual adherents of Delarey and Van Niekerk. I may be mistaken, but I have always regarded the statements of this telegram as unguarded and unwarranted. So far as the standing of the Imperial Government

was concerned, there can be no doubt that the "backing-out" spirit which this telegram displayed took away the last chance which there was of establishing the Protectorate without the exhibition of considerable force. Its total abandonment was not far off in the mind of the officer who would not grant 200 men for its defence.

The High Commissioner mentioned the cost of the men per annum, and stated an imposing sum. But my idea was that if a sufficiently large force had been brought in to impress upon the mind of everybody concerned that we were in earnest in establishing the Protectorate, a much smaller force would speedily have been capable of fulfilling all requirements. If the freebooters were aware that there was a Reserve Force somewhere, and a determination to use it, the smaller number of police mentioned by the High Commissioner would no doubt have been enough. But how did he propose to beget that conviction in the freebooters' minds, or rather in the minds of Transvaal and Cape politicians?

The truth would seem to be that at this juncture the mind of the High Commissioner was more set on projects for enabling the Imperial Government to escape from responsibility than on the best methods of raising from its degradation the name and character of that Government as the Supreme Power in South Africa. Viewing with undue alarm the difficulties in the way of the Protectorate, and not being able to perceive the true method of meeting them, the High Commissioner vainly sought to devolve them at once upon the Cape Colony. He strove, therefore, most strenuously to induce Sir Thomas Scanlen's successors to fulfil Sir Thomas's undertaking as to co-operation, and more especially at once to annex the Protectorate to the Colony. In the heat of this argument the High Commissioner certainly went to the verge of inconsistency with his own arguments in England for the establishment of the Protectorate. He now minimised the interest of England in Bechuanaland in the most wonderful manner. We had really no particular interest there—commercial or otherwise—except to see justice done to two native chiefs; and that

could have been accomplished quite satisfactorily in London but for the intervention of Sir Thomas Scanlen in behalf of the Cape Colony and its interests in Bechuanaland! (4213, 8). This, as the Ministers and everybody else knew well enough, was not strictly correct, and the High Commissioner made no converts to his Capetown view of the Protectorate—the impression of his London utterances being still too fresh in their minds. The object of the High Commissioner was plain enough; but, unfortunately for the securing of that object, he could not compel men to draw from his argument the exact inference which he desired—that, and nothing else. What he wanted to compel in his Ministers' minds was the conviction that what had been said in London about Territorial Government of outlying Native Territories by himself and by the Imperial Government was all moonshine—the Protectorate was really caused by the intervention of Sir Thomas Scanlen; therefore the Cape Ministers were in honour bound either to annex or to pay a certain sum of money; and if Ministers refused, the Imperial Government would throw up the Protectorate (4213; 7, 8). What Sir Hercules Robinson easily succeeded in producing in men's minds, by the use of such an unfortunate argument, was the conclusion that the Imperial Government was about to "back out" and abandon the Protectorate. The bare hinting of such a thing in Capetown accorded only too strongly with men's preconceived ideas and prejudices as to what was to be expected from Her Majesty's Government. "Give it up!" they would say to one another as they ground their teeth; "'back out!' What else could we expect?"

Now, it was never understood that the existence of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was to depend upon a contribution in money from the Colonial Government. Such a contribution would have been a great encouragement, and was only reasonable in the circumstances. Indeed, for considerations of the highest local policy, the Cape Colony should have hastened to tender a reasonable quota; for in that easy way she could have served herself heir to the immense and valuable regions to the north. But the alter-

native, in case of Colonial refusal, was not as the High Commissioner, no doubt for the purpose of argument, said it was—the abandonment of the Protectorate. The alternative was that which took place—the upholding of the Protectorate by England, assisted by those who loved law and order in South Africa.

There remained, therefore, in the end for the High Commissioner the one honest attitude, which ought to have been announced by him from the beginning of the Protectorate in April—reliance upon the Government of England to uphold its Protectorate in Bechuanaland if it were opposed. Had this firm confidence been publicly avowed from the beginning—had necessary steps been taken for its fulfilment so as to secure the well-disposed, the respectable, and the progressive on the side of the Protectorate—had the policy announced in England been steadily pursued in Capetown by the High Commissioner, the paltry opposition of place-men and speculators to the Imperial policy in native territories would soon have been overcome, and the High Commissioner would have found the reward of his firmness and broad-mindedness in that confidence in himself and the Imperial Government which it was his highest duty to create. In short, the enthusiasm of September and October ought never to have been wanting from the date of the High Commissioner's landing in Capetown in April. For the recent attitude of the Imperial Government justified it, and, as a matter of fact, it was not eradicated from the hearts of the people by the neglect of which they complained, but needed only to be evoked by intelligent, straightforward, and continuous policy on the part of those who represented the Imperial Government.

I need not go into detail as to how the High Commissioner afterwards granted me permission to raise the second 100 men in Stellaland (4213, 12) after I had expressed the strong opinion that he would regret having refused them (4213, 12). He now sought to make out that I had had permission to raise these men long before! But his own telegram of distinct refusal of the 12th July, quoted at length above, is a complete answer to that. If I had

had previous sanction, why was that not gentle refusal written ?

It has already been seen that I was able to enrol some thirty young Stellalanders, who took the same oath as the other police enrolled in Kimberley. These men were perfectly reliable in South Bechuanaland, and some of them made it known to me that they were prepared to march to Montsioa's if ordered. But in their circumstances I felt that this was too great a strain to put upon them as a body, as those who went to Montsioa's would certainly find themselves opposed to Stellaland men, who had gone to reinforce the Rooi Grond ranks. There was, however, police work in South Bechuanaland for which they were well qualified, under good oversight.

After I had got sanction to enrol 200 men it was pointed out to me that, besides a few white men who had been Mankoroane's volunteers, there were also Colonial natives living in Mankoroane's country, many of whom had served under the Griqualand West Government, and who would no doubt be willing to enlist. Most of these people had guns and horses of their own. In view of the great delay that was taking place in equipping the police, and the certainty that, owing to want of ammunition and food, if relieved at all, Mafiking must be relieved soon, I resolved to make up the balance of the 200 men now authorised by enlisting some of Mankoroane's volunteers according to the suggestion of the High Commissioner, supplementing their number with such Colonial natives as might be recommended by those who knew them. When I asked Mr. Chapman, a reliable and experienced gentleman, to take charge of this irregular contingent, he consented with pleasure, and said he would quite as soon march with them to relieve Mafiking as with any other part of the police force. "We shall not be the most ornamental, nor shall we be the most useless part of your police," said this gentleman, who knew the men he was speaking about.

In his report on the Bechuanaland Police, drawn up by Major Lowe at my request and forwarded for the High Commissioner's approval in May—from which also the

latter afterwards quoted with approval (4194, 83)—it was proposed that from the beginning there should be a contingent of natives in the Bechuanaland Police. It was suggested by Major Lowe that a certain proportion—say 16 per cent—of the force serving in East Bechuanaland among a mixed population should be natives; while for West Bechuanaland Major Lowe recommended that one-half of the force should consist of natives (4194; 23, 24). The despatch-riders, sent by Mr. Rhodes, who reached Rooi Grond early in August, reported that there were 400 Boers and 300 natives in the field; and Moshette was said to be then deliberating as to whether or not he would join his old allies at Rooi Grond (4213, 78). It is well known that throughout the Colony, the Free State, and the Transvaal the policemen are very frequently natives. A Transvaal Commandant in my place, and with my work before him, would certainly have enrolled suitable natives, and so would any capable officer in South Africa; indeed many of the natives referred to had already served under Colonels Lanyon and Warren. Be it remembered, in Bechuanaland our enemies were attacking natives who were defending themselves with our sanction. We were fighting for natives against other natives and the white volunteers enrolled under natives—white men who had been accustomed to fight alongside natives in native quarrels for years. And yet, strange to say, although the idea had been before him for months in Major Lowe's report, the High Commissioner treated my announcement of the enrolment of a small native contingent as a perfectly new idea, and disapproved of it on political grounds; and on his return to Bechuanaland Captain Bower dispersed both the Dutch-speaking and the native parts of the force which I was collecting to relieve Montsioa. Many of the natives no doubt were again enrolled under Sir Charles Warren, who had the sanction of Her Majesty's Government for their enlistment. I cannot help remarking here that men are never so ridiculous as when they imitate clumsily; and here British officers, in opposing the enrolment of natives, were making themselves far more "Dutch" than the Dutch themselves.

An officer, who may be a fair average Englishman, may cut a sorry figure when he attempts to don the "veldt-schoen" and think and act in South African Dutch. It is only highly sympathetic natures that can, in a complete manner, enter into the thoughts and feelings of others. Common sense, however, is neither English nor Dutch, but is common to both.

CHAPTER II

CHANGE OF POLICY—TRIPPED UP

THERE is public evidence to show that, as early as the 7th of July, rival advice to mine on the affairs of Bechuanaland was being received and acted upon by the High Commissioner unknown to me (4194, 75). The advice of Mr. Cecil Rhodes of Kimberley was taken in most important matters connected with the enrolment of the police for Bechuanaland, the High Commissioner entirely overruling the official representations of my Assistant Commissioner Major Lowe. This officer had on more occasions than one successfully accomplished the work which I had now, with the High Commissioner's sanction (as I thought), entrusted to him in Kimberley. We have seen the evil results of preferring Mr. Rhodes's advice to the course proposed by Major Lowe in the matter of the police. The fact to be borne in mind by the reader here is that early in July, and while Mr. Rhodes was in Capetown attending to his duties as a Member of the House of Assembly, he had attained such influence at Government House that, although without any experience in such matters, his advice was preferred by the High Commissioner to the recommendations of Major Lowe, the experienced officer in charge.

It was no doubt at this time that Mr. Rhodes became acquainted with the views of the High Commissioner concerning Bechuanaland, having also had many opportunities of advocating his own (4213, 16). It would appear that on the conclusion of the session of the Cape Parliament Mr. Rhodes went to Kimberley, where he is a director of one of

the diamond mines. Correspondence was kept up, however, by Mr. Rhodes from Kimberley with the High Commissioner on the affairs of Bechuanaland. It was afterwards complained by a member of the Cape Ministry that the High Commissioner, instead of asking for advice on this important question from his responsible Ministers, had put himself into the hands of a member of the Cape Opposition. At this time great telegraphic activity was manifested in Barkly West, the district which sent Mr. Rhodes to Parliament, and the residence of some who were very largely interested in Bechuanaland land.

On the 24th and 25th of July telegrams were published in the Colonial newspapers with the glaringly evident object of producing a scare concerning the new Protectorate. It was stated that my provisional efforts at Taung (already described) to assist the chief Mankoroane with his land difficulties, until such time as a Land Commission could sit, "had given great dissatisfaction to all persons interested." This statement was incorrect. It was said also that "the Boers at Rooi Grond were looking out for waggons with ammunition which were sent to Montsioa in charge of a small body of police last week." This statement was also untrue. This telegraphing mischief-maker went on to say on the above date:—

"It is reported that Mr. Mackenzie hoisted the British flag at Vryburg, but it was pulled down again. All the police have been ordered to Vryburg at once."

This statement was entirely false. At this date there had been no hoisting of the flag, and of course no pulling of it down. The telegram was the invention of designing men. On the 29th of July something even stronger concerning the same fictitious event was sent from the same source:—

"A trader, just arrived here" (Barkly West) "from Taung, reports that Mr. Mackenzie last week attempted to hoist the British flag at Vryburg, but was prevented by Mr. Niekerk, who turned up with about 200 armed men, and told him they would not allow it. He is reported to have had thirty police with him, and was expected to make another attempt. The majority of the Stellalanders are deter-

mined not to come under Mr. Mackenzie's Government, but are desirous of annexation to the Cape Colony. If Mr. Mackenzie persists in forcing his Government matters will become serious, and the Transvaal, as well as the Free State Boers, will join in the disturbance. Many are already on their way for that purpose," etc.

These statements with reference to my work in Stellaland were pure inventions—with no foundation whatever. The idea is sublime that, having thirty policemen while Niekerk had 200 men, I "was expected to make another attempt" at hoisting a flag, as if that were something to achieve. The grossly plain object of the telegram was to damage my character as Commissioner, and through me that of the Imperial Government. At this time, be it understood, there was no Van Niekerk in Stellaland. He was at his farm in the Transvaal. The "trader" from Taung, who could speak authoritatively about people in the Transvaal and Free State, might or might not be a real personage. What strikes one is the coincidence that the thoughts and ideas of the telegram are those of Mr. van Niekerk himself. While the loyal body of Stellalanders acquiesced in the Protectorate he, after a time, called it "forcing the Imperial Government" upon the people. The same expression, by the way, had been used by a certain speaker in the debate in the Cape Parliament. Now this remarkable idea that the announcement of Her Majesty's Protectorate in Bechuanaland was "forcing the Imperial Government" upon the people, and would be resisted, occurs also in the telegram from Barkly West; and it is further added that Mr. van Niekerk was likely to be assisted by men from the very districts to which Van Niekerk and Delarey were at the time sending invitations and holding out promises of loot. Perhaps "the trader" saw Van Niekerk before he passed through Taung.

But the labours of the unaided newspaper telegraphist to create a scare by such telegrams would of themselves have been unsuccessful. They had no effect in Stellaland, for we knew nothing of them for days after their publication, and therefore could not specifically contradict them, if indeed we had thought it worth while. But they were not to fall to the

ground unheeded. They received the necessary authorisation and emphasis from Mr. Rhodes. Telegraphing from Kimberley on the 25th July to the High Commissioner, he directs attention to the first telegrams quoted, and says:—

“This looks like a split on race lines: if true, certainly means trouble” (4213, 15).

No inquiry, however, was made in Stellaland, either from Capetown or Kimberley, to ascertain the truth of this report. But, for calling attention to newspaper telegrams containing a hearsay statement regarding Stellaland, from which district both Mr. Rhodes and the telegraphist were separated by a long stretch of country, and for making a commonplace enough comment upon the telegram, Mr. Rhodes received the thanks of the Imperial Secretary, and was asked—

“Please keep us (the High Commissioner and the Imperial Secretary) informed of anything you hear which throws light on the situation.”

This was a strangely large order from the High Commissioner and his secretary to an irresponsible private person with no special means of information, and who was then living far from the country concerning which he was thus invited to write.

On the 29th of July Mr. Rhodes at Kimberley was actually appealed to for “news” by the Imperial Secretary concerning Bechuanaland. Be it remembered that at this time I was in constant telegraphic and postal communication with the High Commissioner. He was fully aware in Capetown that no such events as those described in those false telegrams had taken place. If he had doubts on any point why not seek information from me, and not, unknown to me, from an irresponsible person? Not content, however, with what he heard direct from his responsible officer, the High Commissioner telegraphs to Mr. Rhodes—

“Have you any news?” (4213, 15)

Mr. Rhodes replies on the same date (the 29th July),

referring again to the newspaper telegrams already quoted of the 24th and 25th of July :—

“ You will have received news of row at Vryburg on attempt to hoist British flag.” [There was no such hoisting : there was no such row.] “ It seems to me that this action and that of Land Court at Mankoroane should have been delayed. In latter case every disappointed claimant has been an active agitator against Mackenzie. The feeling in Stellaland is only anti-Mackenzie. If assured of Colonial annexation they will remain quiet ” (4213, 15).

We have here from Mr. Rhodes a clear re-echo of the assumed position of the Transvaal section of Stellalanders who were located at Hart River, and of the Barkly West “ news ” correspondent. The body of loyal Stellalanders, as the reader is aware, were quite content with Imperial rule and with myself in the meantime, and regarded Colonial rule as a probability of the future. From these suggestive words of Mr. Rhodes, and indeed from the fact that he telegraphed concerning my work at all, it is evident that he considered something could be done in Bechuanaland which I was not doing, but which he saw his way to accomplish. I suppose nothing seemed easier to Mr. Rhodes at this time. He gave out that the Stellalanders objected to me ; and he, of course, was another man. They objected to the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, but then so did Mr. Rhodes himself. They were said to want the Cape Colony, and Mr. Rhodes thought he was the man to give it to them. He would “ make believe ” that he represented the Cape Colony. His success, therefore, was quite certain. Now this whole project, conceived in Capetown and brought forth in Kimberley, was founded on false doctrines as well as incorrect information ; and no abiding results could be looked for from such methods. Every statement then adopted and made concerning my action by Mr. Rhodes was false. They appeared first as the assertions of some unseen newspaper correspondent. But by means of these utterly erroneous rumours Mr. Rhodes made out a charge against an Imperial officer. He did not think it worth while to address a question to me, or to ask for information from me direct. He knew how to advise the High Commissioner better than I did,

although I was on the spot while he was 200 miles away. And the High Commissioner, or his secretary, was eager for his "news." I never knew of this correspondence at all till it was published in the Bluebooks. I believe most readers would find it difficult to credit that a correspondence of so unusual a nature had actually taken place, as narrated above, were it not that the undoubted records of it exist.

How difficult it is to arrest or nullify a false report! The perfectly false story in the preceding telegrams about my "attempting to hoist the British flag" at Vryburg, and its being "hailed down again," was gravely brought forward months afterwards in the House of Lords, accompanied by a reference to myself on the part of the noble lord who introduced the subject, which would have been highly appropriate had the story itself been true. Not only, however, was the story untrue, but if there can be degrees of falseness, this report contained in it a gross form of falsehood, because it misstated my entire attitude and policy in the country, while it brought forward a false charge against the majority of the Stellalanders. The leading facts and dates may be thus summarised.

After transacting business at Taung with the Stellaland People's Committee, I informed the High Commissioner on the 9th July that—

"The members of the Deputation were very hearty at the conclusion of the discussion. They urged me soon to visit Vryburg and to hoist there the British flag. Such was the request of Dutch-speaking as well as English-speaking members of the Deputation" (4194, 113).

Weeks intervened, during which I was in communication with the High Commissioner, and I received no caution against hoisting the British flag if I judged it desirable to do so. The probability is that the High Commissioner then regarded my information concerning the flag as a gratifying indication of the progress of my work in Stellaland. On the 22d of July from Vryburg I made further reference to the hoisting of the flag in a telegram to the High Commissioner, stating that I had again put off the Stellaland people, but that I might consent to their request at the next meeting, which was to take place on the 28th inst.

(4213, 11). This information from myself from Stellaland ought to have been sufficient to assure the High Commissioner that the Barkly West telegrams of the 24th and 25th were without any foundation. This telegram reached Capetown on the 24th of July, and was answered by the High Commissioner on the 25th. That answer, which made no reference to the flag, reached Vryburg on the 28th—the very day of the large public meeting at which the exchange of flags took place. In sending this telegram the High Commissioner evidently thought he was answering everything of importance which I had submitted to him with reference to the affairs of Stellaland. He thus still regarded the hoisting of the flag as the natural and proper outcome of what I was doing, and therefore made no remark upon it. It is impossible to suppose that he then regarded such a step as fraught with any of the fearful consequences afterwards conjured up, or indeed with any danger whatever, otherwise he would have warned me at once when I first mentioned the subject. In his telegram of the 25th July he went into matters of detail, such as money obligations, to which I replied again on the 28th; but there was no reference whatever to the flag. Had any Stellalanders privately or publicly objected to the hoisting of the flag, the case would have been different; as it was, they openly, repeatedly, and enthusiastically requested that it should be hoisted. Then it is worthy of notice that my telegram of the 22d July specified a certain date (the 28th) as that on which I was likely to consent to the hoisting of the flag. When other matters in that telegram were replied to, and still no mention of the flag, I regarded myself as free to act according to my judgment, and to allow my friends, the Dutch-speaking Stellalanders as well as the Englishmen there, to hoist the flag of the Protectorate.

On the 30th of July the High Commissioner addressed to me a telegram which was really caused by that of Mr. Rhodes from Kimberley quoted above. Having already replied to all my telegrams, he introduced his remarks (suggested by Mr. Rhodes's telegram) by the mention of a private note from me in which the subject of the flag had been referred to.

This has the look of being uncandid and misleading. A private note may have been then received from me, and it may have mentioned the subject of the flag, but why pass by my official communications of the 9th and 22d of the month—one of which had been six days in his hands—whilst the other introducing the question of the flag-hoisting had been before him for weeks? When he telegraphed to me on the 30th July the High Commissioner had good reason to believe from my telegrams in his hands that he was declaiming against my doing what had been most probably already transacted. In sending that telegram the High Commissioner makes it appear that he was opposed to my hoisting the British flag in the Protectorate. This was not at all the case, otherwise he would have said so before, when I formally mentioned the subject. It would appear, however, that the receipt of Mr. Rhodes's Kimberley telegrams produced something like consternation at headquarters in Capetown. Hence my hasty recall; hence the telegraphed Commission to Mr. Rhodes as to a deliverer; and hence the following remarkable telegram anent Her Majesty's flag, all in one dreadful day:—

“30th July.—Touching what you say in your note of 22d just received as to hoisting English flag at some future time, I think it right to warn you that you would not be warranted in taking such a step. Hoisting the British flag is technically the symbol of the assumption of sovereignty. Bechuanaland is only native territory under a British Protectorate; and you are not justified in altering the status without the express sanction of Her Majesty's Government” (4213, 12).

This telegram tells its own story of needless panic. A little calm reflection would have prevented the great mistake here made, both as to law and matter of fact. Instances would have readily occurred to the High Commissioner's mind in which the British flag had been raised in Protectorates where there was no assumption of sovereignty. Besides, in an important matter in which grave censure was bestowed or implied, legal guidance might have been appropriately asked, which would no doubt have prevented the telegram from being sent at all in the form in which I received it at Vryburg, and in which it is found in the

Bluebook. It is true, no Order in Council had yet been issued, but the whole work of the Protectorate had to go on in anticipation of that ratification. Everything done in Bechuanaland at this time was of this anticipatory character, from a legal point of view, and not any one action in particular. As to sovereignty in land, Her Majesty's Government did not of course then possess it in Bechuanaland, and yet I had been authorised to ratify provisionally Stellalanders' claims to land. Then jurisdiction had been expressly and formally assumed by treaties—of course in anticipation of future ratification. In the same way submission had been made and accepted, oaths of faithful service had been administered and taken. The flags of freebooting Stellaland had been handed over. To tell an officer, in circumstances such as these, that he was not warranted in gratifying the wishes of the public by hoisting the British flag at all in a British Protectorate was a course which was not calculated to advance the position of the Imperial Government either in Bechuanaland or in South Africa. But the attitude of the High Commissioner at this time really pointed not to the upholding but to the abandonment of the Protectorate. There were other signs which showed that he thought seriously of this course. He had, for instance, announced that if we could not march our police through Stellaland close to the extended border of the hostile Transvaal our whole position in the Protectorate must be reconsidered (4194 ; 83, 84), although there were other roads by which the police could move without placing themselves so near as to invite attack from the Transvaal, and still be most helpful in Bechuanaland. The High Commissioner's statement about the road probably meant that he would not advise the upholding of the Protectorate under any serious difficulties (4213 ; 8, 9). We hear nothing from him at this date of "obligation," or of the "name" or "honour" of England. Still it was quite plain that if the British flag could not be hoisted within the Protectorate after it had been established three months, our Protectorate itself was a sham, and might be a delusion and a snare.

The "backing-out" course adopted after I left Bechua-

naland was destined to lower the British flag and hand over again the flag of the freebooters to Van Niekerk and Delarey. Much might be lost by such yielding by the High Commissioner—nothing could be possibly gained. There were thousands in South Africa willing to uphold the cause of order in Bechuanaland under the Imperial Government, and to keep the way open through that country, for Christianity, civilisation, and commerce. The people and the Government of England had resolved that the Protectorate should be a real one, and that the way into the interior should be in the hands of the Imperial Government. The mischief was that this was not perceived by the High Commissioner—not till it was shouted to him from many an enthusiastic meeting throughout the great centres of population in the Cape Colony, and not till it was conveyed to him by every mail from England. Then the idea of the “honour” and “name” of England occurred to him, and began to find official expression in Capetown. Then the “upholding of the Protectorate”—which was really another expression for the supremacy of England in South Africa—was no longer declared by the High Commissioner to be a question of the cattle of certain native chiefs, and not worth the services of 200 policemen, but was declared to be imperatively demanded alike in the interests of England, the loyal colonists, and the natives. It was then that the High Commissioner asked for the services of Sir Charles Warren; and the Bechuanaland Expedition was the result. But in the interval between the appearance of Mr. Rhodes in Bechuanaland and the coming of Sir Charles Warren, the British flag and the Imperial name were to have a distressing history in Bechuanaland—a history which would have been avoided if the truths seen by the High Commissioner in October had been seen by him in April, or even in June and July, when his attention was repeatedly directed to them by his Deputy in Bechuanaland.

It is amusing to notice Mr. Rhodes's fault-finding remarks about the British flag after his arrival in Stellaland. In his anti-Imperial zeal he seemed quite to forget that the flag of the Cape Colony was the flag of England, and expressed

great disappointment that I had not hauled down the English flag on receipt of the High Commissioner's telegram! Had that telegram come before the hoisting of the flag, its receipt must have influenced my conduct. But the case was quite different when it arrived days after the flag of the Protectorate had been flying. Inasmuch as he found it flying on his arrival at Vryburg, Mr. Rhodes said he did not deem it advisable to cause it to be hauled down. This, he said, "would be interpreted by Niekerk's party as a sign of complete surrender." Just so; and that is the very reason why Mr. Rhodes should have lowered the British flag at once, for his surrender of the Protectorate to Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey was to be complete.

Mr. Rhodes, as we have seen, gave his opinion of me as an Imperial officer on the 29th of July from Kimberley; on the following day Mr. Upington did me the same honour in a minute addressed to the High Commissioner. I wish to rescue the following sentence of the latter gentleman from being buried in a Bluebook:—

"Ministers would again respectfully urge that, in their opinion, the most serious, if not the only, obstacle to the maintenance of peace in the Protectorate is the continuance in the office of Deputy Commissioner of Mr. Mackenzie, who is not only an unpopular but an injudicious officer" (4213, 18).

So far as I know, this statement had no other foundation than the telegrams already quoted. One is placed in a dilemma by assertions such as those when they are made in a formal ministerial minute, for one cannot suppose that such a charge would be lightly made in a Government document. Either, then, the common report in Capetown was true as to the pledge recently given to the Transvaal Deputation while they were there, that I should be punished for my opposition to the Transvaal claims in London by securing my removal from office, or the statement in the minute was well founded, that I was an officer so unpopular and so injudicious as to merit the interference and censure even of the Ministers of a Government other than the one whose servant I was. This statement, therefore, obviously called for an appeal to fact, and we should expect facts to be given

when the charge was made; and it would then have been for Her Majesty's Government, whose servant I was, to take those facts into consideration. But no fact was ever given in proof of the assertion as to my injudiciousness or my unpopularity. Then this unusual ministerial minute contained the expression of opinion that my presence in Bechuanaland was the most serious, if not the only, obstacle to the maintenance of peace—of course implying that if I were removed peace would necessarily follow. The severest language would alone suffice to characterise a statement so evidently insincere and without foundation, and which had the effect of withdrawing attention from the real causes of the disturbance and outrage. It was notorious that the disturbances in Bechuanaland had gone on for years and in my absence from the country, and no disturbance could possibly be traced to my influence or policy. On the contrary, I had sincerely tried the policy of conciliation at Goshen, and had even left Bechuanaland and visited Zeerust in the Transvaal with a pacific object. I had failed single-handed to stem the tide of general distrust of the Imperial Government in South Africa, and of Transvaal opposition both to that Government and to justice and fair-play. I have stated correctly what success I had in Bechuanaland, and where and why I failed. It is at least absolutely certain that my presence was pacific everywhere, even on the testimony of such men as Van Niekerk and Delarey. But if my presence in Bechuanaland was the cause of disturbance, did peace follow from my removal? On the contrary, on my departure the Imperial Government suffered the greatest humiliation in the persons of its officers, while the Protectorate itself, both at Hart River and Rooi Grond, was left in the hands of its avowed enemies. Mr. Rhodes cited the reports which he telegraphed to Capetown against me, and we have seen that the reports were entirely false. The Cape Ministers, however, in their minute, disdained anything more inconvenient than round assertion, entirely unsupported by evidence of any kind. Although the High Commissioner absolutely and formally declined to take his Ministers' advice on the affairs of the Protectorate till they had paid a contribution in money towards its sup-

port, he would seem to have made one exception to this rule, in receiving their unsupported charges and their advice concerning his own Deputy.

Mr. Upington more than once afterwards publicly disavowed having been the cause of my recall from Bechuanaland. He had some ground for saying so. But he did his best with that object in view. He shares the honour with Mr. Rhodes, and with the author of the concocted telegrams on which the whole action was founded. But Mr. Upington's strong and repeated disclaimer on this point had probable reference to what I found was the common belief at Capetown,—that the whole scheme for the withdrawal of the "Imperial factor" from Bechuanaland and the make-believe Colonial policy which was to be substituted had been arranged, as to general outline, before Mr. Rhodes left Capetown. This rumour would not merit mention were it not that the Blue-book contains no uncertain indication of the existence of some understanding or arrangement concerning Bechuanaland made by the Imperial Secretary with Mr. Rhodes before the latter left Capetown for Kimberley. When he was asked by the Imperial Secretary on the 29th July if he could leave at short notice for Bechuanaland if required, Mr. Rhodes replied:—

"As I had no news from you, I had arranged to leave on Thursday for Capetown *en route* for England" (4213, 15).

The reader is thus left to believe that at an earlier date he had expected some such instruction concerning Bechuanaland as had only then arrived; but the silence of his correspondents had led him, he said, to alter widely his plans, and to resolve to go to England. However, this resolve was short-lived. Mr. Rhodes, on the same day, goes on to say:—

"Perhaps it is just as well I should leave, and will see you in Capetown, when I can tell you the exact position, and definitely settle my plans. I have gained, I think, a fair knowledge of situation. Please reply and tell me position on your side, and what you wish me to do."

This appears to mean that Mr. Rhodes at Kimberley had been acting under instructions—had expected more definite

orders, which he now asks. He considered he was able to report officially, formally, and reliably on the affairs of Bechuanaland after he had approached it no nearer than the Diamond Fields, and without once consulting myself or any officer connected with the Protectorate. He had gained, he thought, a fair knowledge of the situation! On false telegrams and hearsay reports, the origin of which was probably quite well known. But the process of my tripping up was not yet quite complete. My friend the High Commissioner moved with evident reluctance. In reply to Mr. Rhodes's question as to the "position" at headquarters, and what he was wished to do, he was told:—

"Governor proposes to give Mackenzie leave to come down here for purpose of conferring with him, and to ask you to go to Vryburg to act for Mackenzie in his absence. Do you think this course desirable, and will you consent, or do you think Mackenzie may be safely left in Stellaland?" (4213, 15).

The fate, then, of an officer selected and sent out by Her Majesty's Government to do a special work was to be practically decided and sealed, unknown to him, by the opinion of a single person just commencing his own public life as a Cape politician, who wrote at a distance from Bechuanaland, who, as it happened, was going upon unsupported and false newspaper reports, and who in these circumstances was quite ready to step into the vacant office. The High Commissioner may have hitherto held back, but this telegram shows that he had now fully given way to his advisers. To "give Mackenzie leave" was "not good enough" for Mr. Rhodes now, and he was encouraged to say so by the suggestiveness of the Imperial Secretary's telegram. Mr. Rhodes, therefore, proceeded to give his ultimatum concerning me, sealing my fate. From his diamond mining offices in Kimberley he telegraphed his impressions and views to the High Commissioner at Cape-town concerning my influence and work at Vryburg in these words:—

"I consider Mackenzie's presence at Vryburg likely to cause disturbance. He is opposed by large party. Am willing to proceed on understanding if I get matters quiet, and I think his return likely to

cause strife, due weight be given to my opinion. The only chance now is to make it appear as much as possible a Colonial administration. . . . Wire at once, as I am leaving to-morrow" (4213, 15).

Here Mr. Rhodes describes most aptly for himself and his correspondents their new policy—a make-believe Colonial administration. But (with what sincerity we know not) Mr. Rhodes had still before him his plan of visiting England. They might stop him, however, by wiring at once. It will be observed that Mr. Rhodes now telegraphs with a certain importance and peremptoriness, as knowing his ground pretty clearly by the helpful leading of the Imperial Secretary's telegram. Mr. Rhodes gravely declares from Kimberley that my bare presence at Vryburg was likely to cause disturbance! I must be taken out of the way. He therefore stipulated that his future views concerning me should have "due weight." It is plain enough to any one who looks at the circumstances and the men that if Mr. Rhodes had already made Mackenzie out to be dangerous without any evidence whatever, and while writing at a distance from Bechuanaland, as a mere commentator on hearsay reports,—if in such circumstances he had succeeded in getting people at headquarters at Capetown to believe him, his triumph in that direction would certainly be complete when the officer whom he was supplanting should be removed from Stellaland, and the reports concerning him and his policy proceed entirely from one who had already condemned him. In short, he who could bring himself to send the telegrams from Kimberley appearing in Mr. Rhodes's name in the Bluebooks would never, if he chose, want something to telegraph against any man or woman on God's earth; and those officers who would attach any importance whatever to such telegrams without due inquiry,—much less transact Government business as guided by them,—adopt methods unusual in Her Majesty's service, by which they might easily ruin the character and career of usefulness of any officer with whom they had official connection.

The answer to Mr. Rhodes was wired at once, as he had requested. It made Rhodes master of the situation in the following terms:—

“Governor accepts your offer with thanks. Thinks you had better proceed at once to Vryburg, as your coming down here is unnecessary, knowing as you do Governor’s views” (4213, 16).

One thinks there might have been some appropriate reference to the sudden and unexpected shattering at the last hour of the journey to England, but one must not look for everything in telegraphic correspondence.

Mr. Rhodes made haste to assume at once other responsibilities. In another telegram of the same date (30th July) he says:—

“You must cable me formal authority for acting, and advise police to take orders from me.”

“Cabling” had probable reference to Mr. Rhodes’s estimate of the importance of his entrance upon office, which should be at once announced to and sanctioned from London. Mr. Rhodes now said he was ready to proceed at once, and concludes this telegram with the peremptory and exciting words—

“Reply sharp. The whole matter may depend on immediate action.”

He had only just telegraphed on the same day about visiting Capetown:—

“I think I ought to see the Governor. It seems clear the whole position requires to be reconsidered.”

But then that was before he was formally asked to go to Bechuanaland (4213, 16). After the formal offer, he at once telegraphed—

“I agree to proceed at once.”

The Imperial Secretary replied “sharp” on the same day, that Mr. Rhodes’s Commission would meet him at Barkly; and it would appear that it was actually sent off in the panic of the 30th July. It conferred on Mr. Rhodes power to act for me in Bechuanaland in my absence, and declared also that—

“It is expedient also to appoint an officer, who shall, during the presence of the said John Mackenzie, exercise authority equal to and in conjunction with the said John Mackenzie” (4213, 16).

It expressly confined Mr. Rhodes's labours by the expressions "in Bechuanaland," "within the said territory." Mr. Rhodes received no written instructions from the High Commissioner. It has never been plainly stated what he was sent to do in Bechuanaland, in contradistinction to what I was doing, or what were the methods by which he was to accomplish his ends. All this, however, would appear to have been understood between the High Commissioner, the Imperial Secretary, and Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes, we are told, while still in Capetown, "knew the views of the High Commissioner"; we must suppose, therefore, that what he went to do had been agreed to by previous arrangement. The late Mr. Forster, in kind reference to myself at a public meeting in London, demanded clear information as to the exact nature of the change of policy which led to my resignation, and what were the instructions to my successor, but without result. These changes were announced to me in the following telegram, which I freely admit came upon me as a profound surprise:—

"30th July (No. 2).—Very serious reports current here as to state of Stellaland and danger of collision. Nothing would justify you in taking on yourself the responsibility of involving us in a conflict between the two parties. The consequences would be disastrous throughout South Africa. I find it so difficult to understand precise position that I wish you to come down here at once to confer with me about it, as you proposed a short time ago. I have asked Mr. Rhodes to proceed from Kimberley to Vryburg, and he is authorised to act as Deputy Commissioner in your absence. He is in full possession of my views, as I talked over the position with him before he left Capetown. I wrote to you on the 28th private note explaining difficulties here, which you apparently do not realise. I fear there is now no prospect of the help from the Colony which I still hoped for when writing on Monday" (4213, 13).

I never received, although I more than once asked for, an explanation of the source of the "reports" above referred to, and am bound to come to the conclusion that they were neither more nor less than those from Mr. Rhodes already described. I have never been able to make out what was meant by the second sentence in the above telegram. "The two parties" refer, I suppose, to the loyal people of Stellaland and the hostile people of the Transvaal

under Delarey and Van Niekerk. "A conflict between the two parties"—this could only mean that one or the other should be the aggressor: either I must lead the loyal Stellalanders against the Transvaal people on the Hart River, or the latter must attack us at Vryburg, otherwise there could be no conflict. In addressing me in this strain it would appear that it was feared that I was going to do something: I was going to "take upon myself" a "responsibility," and that responsibility was to "involve the Imperial Government in a conflict" between the Transvaal party and the loyal party in Stellaland. Now what was it feared that I should do? Up to that time I had acted entirely according to my instructions; I had created no disturbance, but had exercised much long-suffering towards those who were bent on opposing the Protectorate. I had announced no intention of doing anything whatever of a hostile or aggressive nature. My proposed proclamation, warning against any attack on the Protectorate, and the request that the High Commissioner would communicate with the Government of the Transvaal to restrain its inhabitants on its western border, were essentially pacific measures, and were necessarily included in the most rudimentary idea of a Protectorate. In fact, so far as Stellaland was concerned, my attitude at that time was quietly to hold on as we were, till the ratification of the London Convention by the Transvaal Volksraad freed us from any pretence to connection with the Hart River party—a connection which they were so anxious to perpetuate in the interests of the Transvaal; and before I received the above telegram, I had adjourned the Stellaland Committee till the 15th of August, at which date I expected to have full information on the Transvaal boundary question.


What was the real state of Bechuanaland at this time? What were the signs which indicated that a change of Deputy Commissioner would secure or further a settlement of the country? In the end of July, as elsewhere narrated, there was a force actively attacking the Protectorate from the Transvaal at Rooi Grond—the men being recruited from the Transvaal as far inland as Pretoria, and also from Mr.

van Niekerk's district of Hart River (4213, 11). At Hart River district Mr. van Niekerk, like Mr. van Pittius, was publicly defying Her Majesty's Government, and enrolling men against it; and it was publicly intimated, in the interests of the freebooters at Hart River, that a fresh raid was to be made on Mankoroane's cattle-posts. Up to the time of Mr. Rhodes's appointment, Mr. van Pittius had been successful in getting adherents; but Mr. van Niekerk had not succeeded. The leading men of Stellaland were loyal to the Imperial Government, while, as pointed out elsewhere, the Hart River people—soon to be joined to the Transvaal—were adverse to the establishment of any Government in Stellaland except that of the Transvaal. At Barkly West there were freshly-enrolled police, who had been detained there more than a month waiting for their horses. At Taung there were policemen, and a large native community which the Stellalanders were never able to dislodge from that place, even before police came to them. At Vryburg there were some thirty policemen and thirty more enrolled Stellalanders, who had taken the same oath as the other policemen. And throughout Stellaland there were the farmers who had openly expressed satisfaction with the Imperial Government as represented by me, and had undertaken to do burgher duty for the defence of Stellaland when called upon to do so.

Without knowing what false reports were in circulation concerning my work in Bechuanaland, I had telegraphed from Stellaland to the High Commissioner on the 28th July:—

“You will be glad to hear that I consider Stellaland difficulty no longer exists so as to cause anxiety. Our only difficulty is the Transvaal. In Stellaland we are successful” (4213, 21).

The native town of Mafiking had been attacked by the Transvaal volunteers in open defiance of the Protectorate. But Mafiking was only eight miles from their place of refuge in the Transvaal. Vryburg was a long way to the west of the border; and besides I felt it was highly improbable that the men enrolling under Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk to uphold the claims of the Transvaal, would ever march from the Transvaal against Dutch-speaking



A PAAUW (BUSTARD), CLAIMED BY BECHUANA CHIEFS (see p. 29).

people like themselves at Vryburg, whose only fault was that they had preferred the Imperial Government to that of the Transvaal Republic. No such event had ever transpired before in South Africa; and I felt sure it would not take place in Stellaland. I still feel the same confidence. I remember the outrages of Van Niekerk and Delarey in Vryburg on the 18th September, but these were committed on people who had been disowned and deserted by Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, and left to the mercy of the Hart River party. With reference to Taung I had no fear. Mankoroane and his people had been able to hold it unassisted, whereas they would now have the support of the police.

When my telegram of the 28th July reached Capetown on the 31st of that month, Mr. Rhodes had received his Commission, and my recall was on its way to me. The Imperial Secretary informed Mr. Rhodes of my statement in the following language:—

“Mackenzie telegraphs that things in Stellaland are satisfactory. Either he is living in a fool’s paradise, or the recent reports are very misleading” (4213, 17).

From this the reader will see that there can be no longer any doubt that my recall was based upon the unauthenticated and, in point of fact, utterly false reports forwarded to Capetown and emphasised by Mr. Rhodes.

On being informed by the High Commissioner of Mr. Rhodes’s appointment, I telegraphed at once my views with reference to Stellaland as follows:—

“I do not think a new hand or new plans desirable in Stellaland just now. Our position is well defined in people’s minds and there is general satisfaction. I cannot answer for results if doubt is thrown on what I have done. Remember the real alternatives here just now are the Imperial Government or the Transvaal” (4213, 23).

Such was the condition of Bechuanaland at the end of July. Our only danger was the Transvaal. Stellaland was in no real danger, nor was Mankoroane. On the other hand, Montsioa was in the most imminent peril, and I had been waiting for weeks to complete the various parts of a concerted plan to send him relief. But in spite of all

my efforts, this readiness was not secured up to the date of my leaving Vryburg for the Cape. I could only suppose, therefore, that Mr. Rhodes's appointment had special reference to Rooi Grond, and telegraphed my view to the High Commissioner as follows :—

“There is one brilliant and useful action which Rhodes might do as Acting Deputy Commissioner, and which I have failed to do. He might succeed with the Rooi Grond men by personal influence, and induce them to disperse without giving them land and without fighting them. I shall direct his special attention to this. If he succeeds he will have done a great work; if he fails after earnest trial, it will let more daylight into this aspect of our work than has yet shone on it. It is said I have failed because I am specially disqualified for such work. Let a leading Cape politician have his innings in my absence” (4213, 23).

The reader must remember that at this time the enemies of the true progress of South Africa were collecting their volunteers on the western boundary of the Transvaal,—Van Pittius, Van Niekerk, and Delarey. The anti-English politician, the rude frontier farmer, and the inveterate freebooter were all on one side. Public opinion in England had decisively pronounced against the pretension of these people to hold the highway into the interior; public opinion in the Colony, as I had repeatedly urged upon the High Commissioner, would be eager to do the same; in Bechuanaland itself, where alone my own work had recently been, there was a valuable nucleus of loyal people in the locality to be defended. What step at this juncture did the High Commissioner take? What helpful sentiment did he succeed in evoking—what force did he bring into the field to overawe the enemies of order? He called out nothing against them. The High Commissioner changed his Deputy and his policy. The Imperial Government retires, and the advantages gained in London are now thrown away. He had potentially the support of England and of the loyal people of Cape Colony on his side, but that fact was not perceived by him, or by those who unfortunately shared his councils. The change of Deputies would be without meaning unless there was also a corresponding change of doctrine and policy. Although we have

no formal instructions to Mr. Rhodes to guide us, we have what Mr. Rhodes did in Bechuanaland, and what is recorded of his views in Bluebooks. For instance, on the very day on which he received his appointment as my colleague and probable successor (30th July), Mr. Rhodes puts a question to the High Commissioner from Kimberley which leaves us in no doubt as to his intentions: he asks, "May I advise Niekerk at once?" (4213, 16). How could the British cause occupy lower ground than when that sentence was written, or when that course was previously agreed upon in Capetown? It meant that we should ignore and leave dormant all the good influence at our disposal in South Africa, and simply surrender to our known and open enemies, heedless of every future question. Never was there a plainer instance of blind unwisdom.

The selection by Sir Hercules Robinson of a member of the Cape Opposition to succeed me in Bechuanaland, without any reference to his Ministers, was certainly not the step by which the Governor and High Commissioner could have best furthered the object which he had now exclusively in view of at once annexing Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony. The reader will have observed that the appointment of Mr. Rhodes to assist or to supersede me had probably been thought of some time previous to his actual nomination. On the 30th July the Ministers came forward and mentioned their intention of sending, on certain conditions, an officer into the Protectorate to report on its condition, previous to submitting proposals for annexation. They were informed in reply of the appointment of Mr. Rhodes, upon which they drew back, expressing their good wishes for their political opponent's success, but stating that they regarded themselves as having no responsibility in the matter (4213, 29). Thus the High Commissioner secured no more co-operation from the Cape Ministry to assist Mr. Rhodes as Deputy Commissioner than they had given in support of myself.

The arrival of my telegram from Stellaland, giving an account of the large and enthusiastic public meeting, and stating the quiet condition of Stellaland, induced the High

Commissioner to modify his reply to Mr. Rhodes as to addressing Mr. van Niekerk. The answer to Mr. Rhodes on the 30th was—

“You may advise Niekerk or not as you may think expedient, but it might be a question whether it would not perhaps be better to delay doing so until you see Mackenzie. You will probably arrive as soon as any messenger you can send” (4213, 16).

I suppose this means in effect: We are now in your hands; if you write at once formally to Van Niekerk we agree; but you must consider appearances. See Mackenzie first. After all, little or no time will be lost. You are of course bound for Van Niekerk's place, and you will reach it—having seen Mackenzie—as soon as any messenger you could send. On the 31st Mr. Rhodes was told more definitely—

“It will be best that you should see Mackenzie, and satisfy yourself as to the true state of the case before pledging yourself to any definite course” (4213, 17).

Some of the Stellaland people were suspicious when I announced to them that I had been asked by the High Commissioner to visit Capetown. Men came one after another asking what did it mean. One of the best of them said, “After your complete success among us, it surely cannot mean that Mr. van Niekerk, unable to thwart us here, has succeeded through his friends in filling the High Commissioner's mind with falsehoods?” The idea was dismissed as improbable in the highest degree. I told them it was said to be the visit to Capetown which I was always looking forward to.

Another Stellalander said, “You have adjourned the meeting of the Committee till 15th inst., when the Convention will have been ratified, and the Hart River people formally annexed to the Transvaal. Mr. Rhodes will have nothing to do in Stellaland but to sit still.”

“Mr. Mackenzie,” said yet another, “I believed in the Imperial Government through you—a thing I never thought of doing. I do not like this; I am restless. Why should

you go away? And what is Mr. Rhodes to do more than you have done?"

"For God's sake do not delay in Capetown. We need you here. The farmers have trusted to you and to your words. Come back soon!"

Such were some of the farewells of the Stellaland people to whom this call to Capetown was the cause of surprise and misgiving. I cheered them up as best I could. "Mr. Rhodes would work with them as I had done. It was for this purpose he had come. I believed I could remove difficulties by visiting the Cape, better than by correspondence. They must stick together and do their best for Mr. Rhodes as they had done for me."

CHAPTER III

WITHDRAWAL OF THE IMPERIAL FACTOR FROM BECHUANALAND

I ARRIVED in Capetown from Bechuanaland on the 13th of August. Quite unexpectedly that city and its beautiful neighbourhood became my place of abode for the next five months, during which I was the recipient of much hospitality and kindness. I must own that although there was something that from the first was mysterious to me about the movements and policy of Mr. Rhodes, I did not, on leaving Bechuanaland, suspect for a moment any grave change of policy or set plan to dispense with my services on the part of the High Commissioner. I had met with difficulties, which were not unlooked for. I had also met with undoubted success. My opponents had been the openly avowed or more deadly unavowed enemies of the Imperial Government. The Bechuanaland which would be under Her Majesty's Government was already in my hand, although menaced by the Transvaal. I was prepared to continue to act as Deputy of the High Commissioner in Bechuanaland. It was for him and for Her Majesty's Government to induce the Transvaal people to respect the border and to live at peace towards the Protectorate. And so in perfect good faith that our relations were unchanged, and that there was sincerity in the words of the High Commissioner that my visit to Capetown was to be merely one of consultation after my tour of Bechuanaland, I procured a return ticket when I reached the first railway station.

Notwithstanding the nature of some of the recent telegrams from the High Commissioner, I need hardly say that

I reached Capetown animated by the same feelings towards Sir Hercules Robinson as those with which I had departed for Bechuanaland some months before. While I was still in Bechuanaland, Sir Hercules had kindly asked me to be his guest at Government House during my stay in Capetown, as this would enable us to discuss the affairs of the Protectorate at odd hours and corners of time. This arrangement lasted till my resignation was accepted by the Secretary of State. So far as I am concerned, there shall be nothing written in these pages out of keeping with the terms of friendliness which subsisted between the High Commissioner and myself, and from which I, on my part, have not receded. It is for the public interest, however, that the opinions and changes of opinion of a distinguished public servant of the Queen—leading to the gravest changes of policy and action—should be carefully pointed out, always excluding everything of a merely personal nature.

I found that Sir Hercules Robinson did not hold the views in August which he held in London in February, either as to Territorial Government or as to Bechuanaland. He seemed to have had already too much of both. The High Commissionership, to him, was of the nature of an excrescence outside his routine duties as Governor of the Cape Colony. It would have been pleasant to manage the Protectorate if all had gone well; but the thing was too difficult. He wished well to the theory of Territorial Government of Native Territories—some day it would be adopted; but “how to get out of” the present difficulty was the great question. This was to be done, not by facing it, but by dexterously slipping out of it. At this date the High Commissioner informed me that he could not see his way to request the Imperial Government to employ force in establishing order in the Protectorate, and in turning out such freebooters as refused to submit to the Imperial Government. This was in direct contradiction to the understanding before leaving England. He was impressed with the unpopularity of the Imperial Government, and with the fact that it had been recently publicly spoken against by certain Colonial politicians who were not Dutch-speaking. The Protectorate

must be left in the hands of Colonial men—the best possible bargain being made for the chiefs and their people. In short, it was a case of complete collapse, as when you shut an umbrella or pull out the pole from a tent. So great, indeed, was the change that, if nothing “happened,” Bechuanaland would soon belong to the Transvaal, and British influence would at once be confined to the Colony; so that it would have been more graceful and more satisfactory for Her Majesty’s Government to have yielded to the Transvaal Delegates in London the whole of their request, than to submit to it in South Africa after having attempted a Protectorate. I expressed in the strongest terms my surprise that any one should hope for help, either to the Imperial Government or to the Cape Colony, from Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey. It was ill-judged to sink so low as that implied, and we should gain nothing by it. We should hang on to their coat-tails while they wanted us; when they had done with us they would shake us off.

Being asked by the High Commissioner what I recommended at this grave crisis, I said that I recommended nothing that was not before our minds in England; only that the Protectorate should be upheld, and that the Transvaal Government should be called upon to restrain its subjects from open menace and violence against those who were under the Queen’s protection. I was clear as to two things—that the English people were in earnest about our position in South Africa and in Bechuanaland, and that they would desire to uphold it. I was equally clear that our only malady here in South Africa was distrust of the English Government. Whenssoever the Transvaal and its friends at the Cape were convinced that we would uphold our Protectorate in Bechuanaland, their opposition would cease, and the Transvaal would leave the freebooters to make what terms they could. At present the Transvaal was not in reality fighting for the freebooters, but for the leading position in South Africa.

My formal and earnest recommendation, therefore, on reaching Capetown as Deputy Commissioner, was to stand by the programme with which we left England; to ask Her

Majesty's Government, in the interest of England and the Cape Colony, to uphold the Protectorate; and thus give the intelligent and loyal people of the Cape Colony a fair chance to speak out on behalf of the side of order and quiet progress, and in opposition to disloyalty, blustering, and freebooting. There would be no war. There would be no interference with the Government of the Transvaal or any South African Government; we should array no sentiment against us; but by the establishment of order and the opening up of the country we should confer a great benefit on all. If this course were adopted, I expressed my willingness to return at once to Bechuanaland; and thought that the announcement of this quiet but firm policy would reassure loyal people everywhere in South Africa; and especially those in Stellaland, who were browbeaten by Van Niekerk and Delarey from the Transvaal. This was said in August. It was true, but it was not then perceived to be so.

I had lived sufficiently long in South Africa to have acquired several friends in different parts of the country. Some of them resided in Capetown. But I found on my arrival there from Bechuanaland that my recent course of action, both in England and in Bechuanaland, had made me many new friends among Cape Colonists, who were pleased to express gratitude for what they said I had accomplished and striven after in behalf of the country. I found that friends, new and old, had earnest advice to offer as to my present position, and the course which I ought to take. It was to this effect: "Do not be induced to resign; don't play into the hands of those who have their own little games to work through the Governor and through you. You have met with nothing that was not expected. You have certainly done nothing to cause you to resign. It would be a false step; and your friends in England would misunderstand it. You have no idea of the scares which have been established about Bechuanaland. We here can quite see the drift of the game that is being played. Our local politicians see their way to make some capital for themselves out of Bechuanaland; and you stand in their way. They can make nothing of you for their purposes, therefore they must get

rid of you. The Governor is your friend; but we are afraid a despicable promise has already been given by our own politicians to the Transvaal Deputies to have you removed at all hazards, and on any pretext, in order to punish you for your opposition to the Transvaal in England. Don't imagine that our present political guides will stick up for you because you stuck up for the Colony. Don't look for it. If the Governor is firm you are all right; but we have our suspicions that more than one plan has been made, and all to your disadvantage. Therefore, if approached on the subject of resignation, offer to stand aside for the purpose of the trial of any other policy or experiment, but don't resign. Even the English Government may misinterpret your resignation at the present time."

Although I was admittedly recalled to Capetown on account of certain unfounded newspaper "reports," as already mentioned, the High Commissioner, in bringing the matter before me in a formal manner, made no reference to these rumours, but mentioned only the adverse strictures of his Ministers, which had apparently been founded upon the same mischievous telegrams, and the opinion of the Transvaal Government. The situation was most unusual. As, however, I could not help seeing that my own chief had ceased to desire to carry out that policy to which he had so recently pledged himself in England, and had now committed himself to the devious ways of a "backing-out" and "make-believe" Colonial policy, I reluctantly and with much shame concerning the ignominious position into which the Imperial Government was sinking, tendered my resignation to the High Commissioner in the following terms:—

"CAPETOWN, *August 19, 1884.*

"SIR—On my arrival in Capetown from Bechuanaland, your Excellency informed me that the Government of the Cape Colony and that of the Transvaal Republic objected to my appointment as Deputy Commissioner in that country. On requesting to be shown some grounds for this disapproval, your Excellency has been good enough to enclose in your communication of the 15th inst. copies of minutes from the Ministers of the Cape Colony, and the telegraphic summary of a letter addressed to your Excellency by the Government of the Transvaal, in which my withdrawal from Bechuanaland is strongly urged.

“ That I have stood in the way of the Transvaal Government in any efforts which it may have put forth, or thought of putting forth, to interfere with its own burghers who, from the Transvaal country as a base of operation, have for the last three years levied war on the neighbouring chief Montsioa, is an assertion altogether unfounded; and I am sorry and ashamed that public men in responsible positions should be able to bring themselves to make such a statement.

“ With reference to the opinion of your own Ministers, based, as I must believe, on the false reports which have been so persistently circulated by interested parties, I have to remark that, while I am far from putting forward any claim to perfection in any relationship of life, I distinctly deny that the term ‘injudicious’ (which your Ministers use) can be fairly applied to my policy or conduct as Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland. It is known that, however divided among themselves, all the native tribes trust me. Then, as the result of patient personal intercourse, I am happy to say that, before I left Stellaland, similar trust was reposed in me by the great body of the inhabitants of that country, especially by men from the Cape Colony and the Free State, as well as by all the Englishmen. Whilst I have been discredited by wild rumours and unfounded reports, your Excellency is aware that a recent telegram from those who are at the head of affairs at Vryburg, urges my speedy return to Stellaland.

“ All that I have accomplished in Stellaland has been with the co-operation of the duly-elected representatives of the people: nineteen out of twenty-six members of the Volks Committee cordially supported me. Public meetings were held at my suggestion, to give information. I attempted nothing high-handed or repressive. I gave especial pains to secure goodwill and co-operation between Dutch and English-speaking people in Stellaland, and succeeded to a gratifying extent, both among the burghers and the police force, which was composed of the two nationalities. It is notorious in Stellaland that I have set my face against all race distinctions among Europeans, and it is equally well known that among others my government has been openly supported by Afrikaners, who described themselves as ‘patriots.’ My well-known position is, that the interests of the English and Dutch-speaking people in South Africa are perfectly identical; and, therefore, that we should forget these distinctions, and all think of ourselves as South African citizens. This being so, I am compelled to argue that men, who persistently and groundlessly oppose me while well aware that such are my views, as shown in all that I have written or spoken or transacted, must themselves have an opposite policy at heart, and must cherish the intention of raising one class of Europeans in South Africa over the heads of all the others. I hold, therefore, that where the feeling against me is not mere unreasoning prejudice, it represents a spirit most deadly and disastrous to the true interests of South Africa.

“ It is known to your Excellency that I did not at once consent to undertake the duties of Deputy Commissioner, much less eagerly grasp at it, when your kindly-repeated offers placed it within my reach. To-day I have corresponding feelings. What I did not lightly

assume I would not lightly lay aside. I rejoice to think that I still enjoy your Excellency's confidence, and that of Her Majesty's Government. With the knowledge and experience which I have gained of the peculiar difficulties in Bechuanaland, I should have no fear of being able gradually to overcome these difficulties, and to establish peace and order in the country.

"But, inasmuch as the Colonial Ministers regard my continuance in office as 'the most serious, if not the only obstacle to the maintenance of peace in the Protectorate,' and seeing that the Transvaal Government declare that my presence in Bechuanaland is the reason why they have not put down the bloody attacks on the chief Montsioa, who is now under the protection of England, I desire to remove this publicly-declared barrier to peace and order and co-operation; and for this reason, and this reason only, I have now the honour to place in your Excellency's hands my resignation of the office of Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland.—I have, etc.,

(Signed) "JOHN MACKENZIE" (4213, 61).

The High Commissioner, in a despatch addressed to the Secretary of State, expressed his appreciation of my action as follows:—

"GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CAPETOWN,
"August 20, 1884.

"MY LORD—I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter which I have just received from Mr. Mackenzie, tendering the resignation of his office of Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland, and stating fully the reasons which have led him to adopt this course. I enclose also a copy of my communication to Mr. Mackenzie of the 15th inst., to which he refers.

"2. I think the reasons which have influenced Mr. Mackenzie in taking this step are sound, and that his decision testifies to the earnest and unselfish spirit which induced him to face the difficulties connected with the establishment of a Protectorate in Bechuanaland. It has been a great disappointment to me personally to find that Mr. Mackenzie's retention in office is so unfavourably regarded by the Government of this Colony and by that of the South African Republic. But as a prejudice against him undoubtedly exists, I feel that his continuance in office would be an obstacle to that cordial co-operation between these Governments and the Imperial Government which is essential to a peaceful settlement of the Bechuana difficulty.

"3. I propose, therefore, to address your Lordship by telegraph, suggesting that Mr. Mackenzie's resignation be accepted" (4213, 61).

In the telegram here referred to the High Commissioner kindly requested that he might be allowed to "deal liberally" with me, and mentioned the "expenses of journey" to my mission station (4213, 2).

This last remark was made without consulting me, and was likely to have some influence with Her Majesty's Government. As a matter of fact, my place at Kuruman had been filled up, as the work which I had been doing there had of course been going on during my absence in England; and after I accepted Government employment the duties were formally handed over to another. There were also reasons against my going back to Bechuanaland at such a crisis, if I had no power or position in connection with Government. The natives would certainly continue to lay their difficulties before me, and although I might decline to enter into any question whatever, if anything went wrong, the native, or the white land claimant, or the Government official, would probably hold me responsible. So, although my family was at Kuruman, I resolved not to place myself in a false position by returning to Bechuanaland. Besides, I found work waiting for me at Capetown, which my judgment said was the right work of the hour for me to do, and that I was called to do it.

It will now be necessary to return to Montsioa's country, and consider the events which transpired there after my departure.

The optimist calculation that no force would be needed in establishing order in Bechuanaland by the Imperial Government would have been verified, but for two distressing reasons—the general distrust in the sincerity of England throughout South Africa and the unconcealed contempt for her of the volunteers of Goshen and Hart River. The Transvaal Delegates had lost Bechuanaland in London, and the country itself had now actually passed into the hands of the Deputy Commissioner from the border of the Cape Colony to the Molopo. But all was not lost yet. The Protectorate could yet be made a fiasco, for England would not uphold it. Therefore the enemies of England must act in concert. Intrigue, menace, open hostility, every instrument must be used, with the object of inducing England to withdraw from the Protectorate; and this withdrawal would amount to abdication of the supreme position in South Africa.

The news of the defiance of Her Majesty's Government by the freebooters of Rooi Grond, and of the events connected with my own visit to Rooi Grond and to Zeerust, would have been attended with great results if only it had come at once before the public either in South Africa or in England. The warmth of condemnation of the same men and the same courses, which took place throughout the Cape Colony and England in September and October, might have been expressed months before had the facts been known. But my own communications from Bechuanaland were confined to those addressed to the High Commissioner; and the apologists for the freebooters were early in the field with distorted accounts of what had taken place.

With reference to the Transvaal Government, I have always felt that my action at Rooi Grond and my visit to Zeerust ought to have been regarded by them in the light of a compliment, for was it not an appeal to their upright character? Instead, therefore, of feeling inconvenience or "annoyance" at my visit to the landdrost of Marico, as was reported by the British Resident at Pretoria (4194, 48), they ought to have thanked me for giving them such a golden opportunity of showing to the public of South Africa and of England that their constant professions of peacefulness and of uprightness were sincere and practical; and that they had both the will and the ability to perform what, after all, was only the rudimentary duty of any Government worthy of the name.

But the Transvaal Government were in the humour to discuss questions of etiquette instead of arresting cattle thieves. Although they were in the habit, under the Pretoria Convention, which was still in force, of receiving through the British Resident any authentic letter or representation from a native chief, they stated to the Resident that—

"They could not recognise representations made only at the instance of the Bechuanaland Commissioner" (4194, 48).

And when, after a delay of ten days, my representations were backed by the authority of the High Commissioner, no answer was made to him to any part of my communication.

They then coolly "wanted to know" from the High Commissioner whether my appointment as an Imperial officer was in virtue of the new Convention signed in London (4194, 49). What they wanted to make out was that the internal administration of the Protectorate was in some way depending on their consent, whereas the opposite was the truth: they had declined any responsibility beyond their own border, and the boundary-line itself was the only question which was really affected by that consent—the boundary-line and the debt. If they accepted the new Convention they had more land and less debt; if they refused, then the Pretoria Convention would remain in force with its narrower boundary-line and its larger debt. Long before all this discussion took place the stolen cattle had been apportioned by their captors within the Transvaal at Rooi Grond, and had been sent to their farms or resold as the volunteers judged best and safest. The landdrost of Zeerust was told in orders from Pretoria to stick to his old instructions, which were in effect to shut his eyes to inroads on Bechuanaland made by the men of his division. Thus the Transvaal Government missed their golden opportunity for at length taking a stand on the side of right and law and order; and practically proved to all thoughtful men that it was not only harbouring but practically abetting freebooting. This is further shown by the action of the landdrost of Lichtenburg, in which district many of the Rooi Grond volunteers resided. Assistant Commissioner Wright wrote to him on the subject of these stolen cattle of Montsioa, and also of the frequent thefts of grain from Montsioa's gardens, which was always carried into the Transvaal. No answer whatever was given to the Assistant Commissioner's letter by the landdrost of Lichtenburg—the messenger was told by word of mouth, "There is no reply" (4194, 112)—another proof that the Bechuanaland difficulty was really a Transvaal difficulty from the commencement. After the establishment of the Protectorate, recruiting for Rooi Grond was carried on in Pretoria itself, and the British Resident informed the High Commissioner that the Transvaal Government was aware of it (4194, 80).

On the day on which the "proclamation" of Gey van Pittius was published in Pretoria the British Resident there drew to it the attention of the Transvaal Government, requesting that they would prohibit subjects of the Transvaal from participating in these disturbances, and afterwards pointed specially to the fact that Mr. Gey van Pittius was undoubtedly domiciled in the Transvaal. This was also of no practical avail. The Government of the Transvaal confined its action to the issue of a renewed proclamation, in which "any one is stringently prohibited from engaging in these hostilities," and the local officers of Government are again enjoined, in terms of previous acts, "strictly to see to it," and "that they immediately report to the Government all persons contravening the same"! Thus the action of the Transvaal Government at this time, even in a written proclamation, was simply to request a written report from its local officers! When Mr. Rhodes afterwards at Rooi Grond expostulated with General Joubert for his want of action in the midst of the attack on the Protectorate then going on, Mr. Joubert replied that he was not a Veldt-Cornet—to make arrests. It will be noticed, however, that the Transvaal Government wanted only written reports from the Veldt-Cornets; who, therefore, were expected to make the arrests, does not at all appear. What is quite plain to any one is that the Transvaal Government at this time had no intention of restraining their own burghers and other inhabitants within their own borders, and of thus giving their promised help in the pacification of the country.

There can be no doubt that the attitude of the Transvaal authorities, with reference to the Rooi Grond freebooters and the unyielding policy of Mr. van Pittius and his followers, were based on the belief so strongly held elsewhere that the English Government would not uphold the Protectorate in Bechuanaland. Thus the same opinion which animated Mr. van Pittius and the authorities in Pretoria was expressed freely in the most influential circles in Capetown. England would soon tire of Bechuanaland, and the question would be left for settlement between the Transvaal and the Cape

Colony—in which case the Transvaal felt quite confident of having its own way.

The utter insincerity of the Transvaal Government at this time in its attitude towards the Imperial Government was shown clearly in the excuse which they gave for the fresh outbreak of hostilities in Montsioa's country. Although burghers of the Transvaal had carried on organised warfare in that country for years, the Transvaal Government actually endeavoured to connect my appearance in the country as an Imperial officer with the last of these outbreaks. By attacking me as Deputy Commissioner they endeavoured to withdraw attention from their own neglect of duty. No objection to myself as an individual had been made in London by the Delegates in connection with my appointment as Deputy Commissioner, but inasmuch as it was now proved by me that as a Government they were harbouring an organisation which was attacking the Protectorate, the Transvaal Government actually gave as the explanation of their inaction that they "could not" co-operate with me in any effort towards peace! (4213, 72). Everybody knew that, as the High Commissioner afterwards put it,—like himself, I was not a *persona grata* with the Transvaal Delegates, on account of the information which I had given in England as to the value of Bechuanaland to England and to the Cape. But surely this was no reason why the Transvaal Government should persist in glaring breaches of its own engagements to Her Majesty's Government. The hollowness of the excuse then made was afterwards strongly brought out in the treatment of my successor Mr. Rhodes. The Transvaal officials and the Transvaal burghers at Rooi Grond were quite as heedless of Mr. Rhodes as they had been of myself, and perhaps more so. Now the real reason for the attitude of the Transvaal towards both Commissioners was that they felt assured that Her Majesty's Government would not support the Protectorate; and the Transvaal Government were therefore most anxious to uphold their claim to the possession of Bechuanaland, as opposed to the Cape Colony. The Transvaal Raad openly ridiculed the idea of assisting in restoring order within their western border, according to the terms of

the London Convention. "A loud laugh of derision was raised at the notion." Such was the official report to Her Majesty's High Commissioner (4213, 25).

Thus the freebooters, both at Goshen and at Hart River, shrewdly thought that they had intelligently measured their liability to be interfered with by the Transvaal, and accordingly paid no attention whatever to the proclamation of that Government—a course which was probably expected all round, at Pretoria and Capetown as well as at the seat of the disturbances. The Transvaal Government "proclaimed strongly" against freebooting; and the High Commissioner, while wasting time pressing for Colonial annexation, "represented strongly" that mere paper proclamations would not do, and that Her Majesty's Government would hold the Transvaal Government responsible for the invasion of a British Protectorate. Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Gey van Pittius believed as much in the sincerity of the Transvaal "proclamation" as in the High Commissioner's "representations"—that is, they did not believe in either, but conceived of themselves as really the masters of the situation. The Transvaal would never interfere with them, nor would the Cape Colony; and as for England upholding law and order, that, it was held on all hands, was not matter for serious thought or anticipation.

Even after he had had ample time for reflection, the establishment of the Protectorate had no deterring effect on Mr. van Pittius or his followers at Rooi Grond. Mr. Wright commenced his duties as Assistant Commissioner at Mafiking on the 5th of June. He acted in a most judicious manner, visiting the freebooters in the open field where they were assembled in a hostile manner on the 11th June, and also at Rooi Grond on the 12th; on each occasion endeavouring, but without success, to induce them to desist from acts of open hostility within the Protectorate. Mr. van Pittius acknowledged to Mr. Wright that he had received my communication announcing the Protectorate in May,¹ but had refused to treat with me because I had not recognised their standing as a separate Government (4194, 68). They positively refused to recognise Mr. Wright as an Imperial officer,—

¹ Page 233.

a course in which, I am ashamed to say, they were afterwards followed by Mr. Upington, when he and Mr. Sprigg visited Rooi Grond. In spite of Mr. Wright's expostulations on the 13th and again on the 20th of June, the freebooters entered the Protectorate and attacked Montsioa's people, killing some fourteen Barolong, and themselves losing six men. It was thus quite evident that Mr. van Pittius and the majority of his followers scouted the notion of any serious interference in behalf of order on the part of the Imperial Government. Mr. Wright actually met them within the Transvaal on the second occasion; and it was evident that they were quite confident of the support and approval of the Transvaal Government in the course which they were pursuing; and with such support they had no fear of any other power whatever. They were clearly bent on carrying things with a high hand, and on the lines of the "protest" of which they, and not Moshette, were the real authors. Thus, under the specious pretence of "patriotism" and dislike for the Imperial Government, these men were prepared to throw the whole country into war. What Van Pittius and his followers meant by "patriotism" was the slice of native land which they longed to get into their hands; and all South Africa must be convulsed in order that a few reckless men might obtain land as a payment for bearing arms alongside native troops in native feuds! To such degradation had South Africa sunk, after its practical abandonment by Her Majesty's Government.

"All true sons of South Africa," says Van Pittius in his 'proclamation,' published in Pretoria on the 24th of June, "were invited upon the understanding that all persons newly arriving as volunteers shall share in the land booty to be conquered, which with God's help we hope to bring to pass" (4194, 109).

So closely were piety, plunder, and presumption conjoined in the avowed object of attacking a country under the Queen's protection.

The hostilities directed by the Transvaal people of Rooi Grond against Montsioa came to a point, after repeated minor engagements, on the 31st of July, in an engagement fought near Mafiking. The freebooters had entered the country of

Haseitsiwe, and from thence brought away some 3000 head of cattle belonging to Montsioa and Haseitsiwe. They were said to be 202 in number, and about 80 men were left in charge of their laager at Rooi Grond. When passing Mafiking on their return to Rooi Grond they drove a number of captured cattle within sight of the town, in order to draw out the native owners, for they knew that native men would be unable to sit still and see their cattle driven past by their enemies. The division of Transvaal people who were with the cattle were driven back by the Barolong upon the main body of freebooters, who were afterwards joined, before the day was decided, by the reserve from Rooi Grond. The Barolong were defeated, losing 100 men,—Mr. Bethell and another Englishman, Mr. N. Walker, being among those who fell. The Transvaal side lost over 30 men. The day after the engagement an official of the Transvaal Government made his appearance at Mafiking with six others as a deputation from the Transvaal Government, producing a letter which was signed "Paul Kruger." Commandant Snyman, who was the speaker, urged Montsioa to yield himself to the Transvaal. The British Government would never help them, and it was vain for them to trust to it. England had no soldiers, and would never fight for the Barolong against the Transvaal (4213, 34). Montsioa declined the overtures of Mr. Snyman.

The circumstances attending the death of Mr. Bethell are worthy of record. When the Boer reinforcements arrived they were able to carry all before them, as the ammunition of the Barolong, insufficient at the commencement, was now exhausted. Mr. Bethell and Israel Molema, a nephew of Montsioa and member of the Wesleyan Church among the Barolong, prepared to escape together. While doing so, however, Israel's horse was first shot and then he himself was shot through the shoulder. Mr. Bethell attempted to lift Israel on his own horse, intending to spring on behind him, but did not succeed in this. Israel was unable to help himself, and begged Mr. Bethell to leave him and make his escape. While still persisting in his efforts to carry off his companion Mr. Bethell was shot in the face. The bullet almost missed

him, but entered below one eye, which was destroyed, passing out in front of the ear. Thus wounded he fell to the ground, and his horse ran away. The first freebooter who came up to the place was an Englishman; he recognised Mr. Bethell and taunted him with his condition. Mr. Bethell asked the Englishman to take him to the camp as a prisoner. This man consented for himself, but said he would not answer for the Boers. Then two Boers came up, and after taunting Bethell, shot him through the head—both firing at him. Israel Molema feigned death successfully while all this took place, and after nightfall made his escape to Mafiking, where he announced to Mr. Wright and to Montsioa the manner in which Mr. Bethell had met his death. Mr. Wright had also opportunities of hearing ample corroboration of the story from Boer sources, as it was at this time rather boasted of as an achievement. At the request of the High Commissioner, Mr. Wright furnished the above particulars for the information of Her Majesty's Government, and in answer to inquiries made by the relatives of the deceased (4213, 145).

The next startling event of this period at Rooi Grond was the imprisonment of Assistant Commissioner Wright by Van Pittius and his volunteers at Rooi Grond. Mr. Wright was at his post at Mafiking when it was attacked by the freebooters, and did what he could in the interest of peace. He also attended upon the wounded men, and upon other cases of sickness in Mafiking—more especially on numerous cases of smallpox which broke out at this juncture. Indeed the condition of Montsioa's town at this time was one which might have excited pity even in the breasts of the freebooters. But instead of pitying those who suffered so fearfully, they removed from the town by artifice their only medical helper. During an armistice the freebooters sent two of their number under a flag of truce, who, standing outside the town, desired an interview with Mr. Wright. They told Mr. Wright that a deputation of the volunteers was in the neighbourhood, and wanted to see him with reference to making peace, as they were tired of war. Mr. Wright pointed to their white flag, and said he understood

them to ask him to proceed to discuss terms of peace under a flag of truce. They replied that this was so. After proceeding a short distance he met the leader of the party and his attendants. Instead of transacting any business they seized Mr. Wright, placed him on a horse, and took him as a prisoner to Rooi Grond. After ten days' imprisonment, during which this British officer was watched night and day by the armed guards of the freebooters and forbidden to hold any conversation with any one, he managed during the night to effect his escape (4213, 96).

Thus Her Majesty's High Commissioner had the great work devolved on him of evoking confidence and respect for Her Majesty's Government, in connection with its new and most important undertaking in Bechuanaland, in the midst of opposition of all kinds—open and undisguised on the border of the Transvaal, scarcely concealed in Pretoria, and most dangerous and insidious in Capetown. It was for Sir Hercules Robinson to consider how this incumbent duty was to be accomplished. He had had intimate experience of the spirit and methods of the Transvaal Government, having now assisted in making two Conventions with its leaders. He had a clear idea of the sympathy which subsisted between the Transvaal Government and the evil doings on the western border. A year and a half before this date the High Commissioner had himself informed Her Majesty's Government that he was unable to hold out any hope of inducing the Transvaal Government to restrain those of its subjects who were engaged in acts of brigandage. The resources of argument and protest had been already exhausted by Mr. Hudson, the British Resident at Pretoria (3486, 28).¹ Now, however, that a British Protectorate has been established, and treaties have been made with the chiefs, a new element surely enters into the situation of affairs with the appearance of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland; and it is confidence in this new element which the High Commissioner must possess for himself, and be able to impress upon the Transvaal Government.

¹ Page 157.

I am sorry to have to report that the High Commissioner made an unfortunate commencement of his efforts to impress upon the Transvaal Government the reality of the British Protectorate in Bechuanaland. Before my despatches from Mafeking could reach the Colony a telegram from the British Resident at Pretoria, on the 6th June, acquainted the High Commissioner of the attack on the Protectorate, and of my doings in Montsioa's country and the adjoining district of the Transvaal. The urgency of my communication was fully appreciated by our Resident at Pretoria, who mentioned a date at which, unless he were instructed to the contrary by the High Commissioner, he said he would lay the matter before the Transvaal Government. In the meantime he telegraphed for official guidance. He explained that he had hitherto presented Montsioa's and Mankoroane's communications to the Transvaal Government, but had received no instructions from the High Commissioner as to correspondence with the new Deputy Commissioner of Bechuanaland. The Resident clearly pointed out that—

“Mr. Mackenzie desired that representations should be made to the Transvaal Government, requesting them to direct that the law as against theft should be put in action against the depredators.”

As a matter of course, the Transvaal law could only have reference to the Transvaal country; and to put the Transvaal law in action in a case of theft necessarily implied that the thieves, or the stolen property, or both, were within the Transvaal country. Strangely enough, another idea presented itself to the mind of the High Commissioner at Capetown; and he thought it necessary to telegraph the inquiry whether my meaning was “to invite the Transvaal Government to send a force of burghers into Bechuanaland for the purpose of arresting the depredators” (4194, 35). That is to say, the Transvaal Government, through its Deputation in London, having expressly declined to enter Bechuanaland, but having undertaken to be responsible for the peace of their own side of the border, and Lord Derby having expressly assumed, on behalf of the Imperial Government, sole responsibility for the peace of the

Bechuanaland side of that border—when the Deputy Commissioner desires urgently to call upon the Transvaal Government to put its laws in force—does he mean to ask the Transvaal Government to do what we have promised not to ask them, and what they have already formally declined to do? The time spent in putting this question was surely time wasted. The High Commissioner knew that it would never occur to me to ask the Transvaal to do the work assumed by the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland. The answer of the British Resident was as clear as had been his original statement:—

“Mr. Mackenzie does not desire a Burgher Force to be sent into Bechuanaland to arrest depredators, but only that the ordinary law against theft be put in operation, and some action taken by the Transvaal Government to restrain the Rooi Grond people” (4194, 48).

With all his experience to guide him, with the fullest knowledge of the actual condition of Bechuanaland for years, and with my own communication from Mafiking now in his hands, which included a copy of my letter to the British Resident—with the knowledge that it was absolutely necessary that he should now succeed in impressing the Transvaal Government with the reality and strength of our determination to establish peace and order within the Protectorate—the High Commissioner, on the 16th June, addressed the following telegram to the Resident at Pretoria:—

“The High Commissioner fully approves of the course you have taken in communicating Mr. Mackenzie’s letter to the Transvaal Government. He thinks you should direct the attention of the Transvaal Government to the position of affairs at Rooi Grond. It would seem that a gang of cattle-stealers have established themselves just within the Transvaal boundary, so as to make Transvaal territory the basis of their operations and the receptacle of stolen stock. It is impossible to suppose that such a state of things can be tolerated by any civilised Government, and his Excellency is confident that it will be sufficient to communicate the facts in order to ensure prompt action on the part of the Transvaal Executive” (4194, 49).

Now this telegram would have been admirable from a stranger—a new High Commissioner who knew nothing of the Transvaal Government or its western border, and who was quite unaware of the fact that more than a year before “the

resources of argument and protest had been exhausted" by Her Majesty's representatives at the Cape. But coming from Sir Hercules Robinson, this exhortation was only one of many similar remonstrances which had been previously disregarded with impunity. Considering his new circumstances as the head of a Protectorate which had been invaded, the sincerity of the High Commissioner's telegram here quoted is not so apparent as its excessive politeness. In any case the High Commissioner completely failed to make the slightest impression on the Transvaal Government as to the sincerity of the British Government in assuming the Protectorate in Bechuanaland. They treated this remonstrance from him as they had done so many others. The agents of the freebooters proceeded with the enlistment of men within and near the town of Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal. Nor was more attention paid to a formal notification (dated 25th June) by the High Commissioner to the Transvaal Government of the fact that—

"A British Protectorate had been established over Bechuanaland, and a cession of jurisdiction had been accepted from Montsioa" (4194, 52).

This formal notification was afterwards flatly denied by President Kruger in his interview with Sir C. Warren. He pretended that at this time the Transvaal Government knew nothing whatever of any Protectorate of Bechuanaland! Thus it strangely came about that the telegram of the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State of the 26th June, which announced that the cession of jurisdiction had been accepted from Montsioa, and that the Barolong country was clear of freebooters, who were all within the Transvaal, told also of the publication in a Pretoria newspaper of a so-called proclamation by Mr. Gey van Pittius declaring "war in the fullest sense against Montsioa, and calling for volunteers, and promising them a share of conquered land and booty" (4194, 33). The same telegram also asserted the High Commissioner's opinion that if the Protectorate were attacked (of which fact he had the fullest evidence), it should be defended; but this doctrine seemed to need in his mind a new reassuring declaration, which he accordingly

demanded from the Secretary of State, and which he received on the 4th of July in these words:—

“Any attack upon the protected territory must of course be repelled. Her Majesty’s Government are confident that the High Commissioner fully appreciated the importance of not risking a reverse in the absence of reinforcements” (4194, 35).

The reader will naturally inquire, When the High Commissioner telegraphed in this sense, and was promptly replied to by the Secretary of State in London in the beginning of July, why was the real upholding of the Protectorate delayed for four months, and why was the Protectorate dragged through the coarsest degradation and insult in Stellaland and in Goshen before that event? The answer to this question is to be found in Capetown and in Cape politics, and I deeply regret to say, in the lamentable change of attitude on the part of the High Commissioner himself. Instead of resolutely upholding the Protectorate, and inspiring those around him with his own confidence in the sincerity of the Imperial Government, he openly declared to his Colonial Ministers, on the 26th of July, that “Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to send Imperial troops to Bechuanaland” (4213, 8). A more unfortunate position could not have been taken up by Her Majesty’s High Commissioner at this crisis, defeating his own ends in every way.

The assumption of a Protectorate in Bechuanaland by the Imperial Government had been regarded with feelings of intense interest in the Cape Colony, and indeed in South Africa. The course adopted by Her Majesty’s Government had met with the approval of Sir Thomas Scanlen’s party, who were anxious to circumscribe the range of Colonial responsibility with reference to outside native politics, while willing to co-operate with the Imperial Government. The political party, headed by Messrs. Sprigg and Upington, expressed themselves somewhat vaguely as opposed to Imperial Protectorates, and advocated instead annexation to the Colony; and Mr. Rhodes also was strongly of this opinion at this time. But the prominent feeling in the minds of all the leading politicians at the Cape in 1884

was distrust of England's sincerity and steadfastness. Not one of them thought that England was in earnest, or would uphold her position as the Supreme Power in the country. Therefore, as soon as opposition was shown in the Transvaal to the Protectorate, these politicians joined their voices in one chorus to "eliminate" from among the forces controlling affairs in South Africa that "Imperial factor" which they thought was only a sham, and would lead to the betrayal and loss of those who trusted in it. It may be thought there is exaggeration in this, but I assure the reader it is not so: to such a pass as this had our position and our name actually come in South Africa. The highest apology which I am able to offer for the unhappy and meddling interference of Colonial politicians in the affairs of the Protectorate in Stellaland and in Goshen is that, although their arrangements were discreditable, they may have dreaded that in the end Imperial vacillation would be more discreditable still. Nothing more than this can show how nearly we had lost the country: its inhabitants had ceased to believe in our will and our ability to hold it. And this pernicious distrust found its way into the highest circles, where its presence was least to be expected, and where for a time it wrought the greatest mischief.

This state of things had been produced by our own treatment of South African questions. I do not now refer specially to the retrocession of the Transvaal, but to what may be called the practical abandonment of South Africa by England after that event. To have given back to the Transvaal the right of local self-government was a small matter as compared with what was actually done. We are chargeable with the gravest dereliction of duty—that of having left South Africa, divided and incompetent as it was, to look after its own general affairs, without establishing, or assisting to establish, any form of General Government, by means of which this necessary work could be done. It is still more to our discredit that this virtual retreat from South Africa was accompanied by open protestation in England that we were not retreating at all, and that we still intended to uphold our position in the country as the Supreme Power

and the Protector of the weaker races. But there was nothing to show for this in South Africa itself. Politicians went from town to town in England advocating desertion of South Africa, retaining only the Cape as a coaling station, thus constituting another Gibraltar in the Southern seas. Who can wonder at the direct result in South Africa—the formation of the Afrikander Bond? The anti-English people naturally thought of a Republic, and prepared for it; the English and loyal Colonial population ground their teeth, and remained silent and downcast, as colonists who were deserted by the mother country. A few Cape politicians of English race were perhaps the most rabid against the old country. They, rightly or wrongly, nursed a sense of personal desertion, and shrieked rather than said that they would never trust England again. Young English colonists left the country in cases where this could be done. Older men set to work to learn the Dutch language, and be prepared for future possibilities. And yet the great body of the Cape colonists, of whatever extraction, were far from being disloyal to England, and far from endorsing with their approval the deeds of the freebooters. They were the victims of misunderstanding and mismanagement. Why could not the English Government know its own mind, and abide by it? If freebooting was to be discouraged, was the great unoccupied interior to remain without inhabitant? It was not enough for the Imperial Government to say to English or Dutch-speaking colonists, "Ye shall not spread by filibustering;" it must show how this inevitable spreading could take place without disturbance or war, and thus perform the duty of Supreme Power in the country, as long as its own states and colonies were helpless through disunion to do such work.

During his visit to England Sir Thomas Scanlen had done a good stroke of business for the Cape Colony. By the promise which he made in London of the co-operation of the Cape Colony in the work of pacifying the disgraceful freebooting and war in Bechuanaland, he only acted as became the Premier of the leading colony, on whose borders the disturbances were taking place. Had Sir Thomas re-

fused this co-operation, and had another hand from the west, co-operating with friends on the east, closed in British South Africa by the present northern boundary of the Cape Colony, Sir Thomas would have been loudly blamed by those who condemned his promise of co-operation. By acting as he did in London, Sir Thomas endeavoured to serve the Cape Colony as heir to Bechuanaland and the northern territories. We shall see that the action of his political opponents at the Cape was calculated to be as disadvantageous to the Colony as it was disheartening to England. After securing in London its northern outlook for the Cape Colony, it remained for Sir Thomas Scanlen and his Colonial followers to inform and instruct the Cape public concerning the great service which he had thus rendered to the Colony. His action in London was distinguished and advantageous to the Colony, consequently he might and ought to have secured general approbation for his wise procedure. But neither he nor his followers had the full, fearless courage of their convictions. They gave the public at the Cape no information on the great question, and that which was Sir Thomas's merit became his condemnation with the uninformed in and out of Parliament, and actually led to his early defeat in the session of 1884. This defeat no doubt changed the history of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

Mr. Upington, the new Premier, refused to carry out the pledge of Sir Thomas Scanlen to co-operate with the English Government in Bechuanaland. It is difficult to account for this action of the new Ministry on any intelligent and patriotic basis, for one would have thought that, considering the geographical position of the Cape and the various reasons which all colonists had to look northwards, it would evidently be to the great advantage of the Colony to be backed by the Imperial Government in its northward progress. But in the Bechuanaland debate of July 1884 in the Cape Parliament (4194, 85) there was a complete collapse of the party which had advocated the retrocession of Basutoland and the government of the Transkei by the Imperial Government. Both sides now vied with one another

in their expressed desire to banish the Imperial Government from the position which it had assumed in Bechuanaland. Those who were known to be on terms of intimacy at Government House, and who had been eager for Imperial intervention, were now most eager for the immediate annexation, of Bechuanaland to the Colony! The inference drawn from this sudden change of front was one most hurtful to Her Majesty's Imperial Government. When the most loyal men were in hot haste for the Colonial annexation of the Protectorate, it was evident to all that even they did not trust the Imperial Government. If such was the judgment of its friends, what was the verdict of its opponents?

The guiding spirits of Mr. Uppington's party in 1884 did not conceal their desire that Bechuanaland should belong to the Transvaal. Some stipulation might be made as to trade, but the country should become part of the Transvaal. Mr. Hofmeyr's views were given plainly enough in his place in the Cape Parliament when the question of the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Colony was being debated. He opposed the annexation proposal on the ground that the preference of Mr. van Niekerk for union to the Transvaal was undoubted. Mr. Hofmeyr is reported to have said:—

“The Transvaal Convention was not yet ratified, and it was quite possible that it might not be ratified—at all events as to that part which concerned the boundary. Suppose, notwithstanding, that we were to annex the territory. We should at once be landed in a quarrel with the Transvaal. The Volksraad might not think very much of the military power of the Cape Colony, and would not respect our wishes if we wished the boundary-line to be as defined by the Imperial Government. . . . The great question was one of peace and war, and then of Colonial interests. He did not wish to sacrifice the trade route completely; but it was quite possible that an arrangement might be made that, although not nominally belonging to the Cape Colony, we might have virtually the same rights as if it did.”

In the same speech Mr. Hofmeyr drew an alarming picture of what might happen through the raising of the Bechuanaland Police Force. Stellalanders might join the Goshen people, and burghers from all the states and colonies might join in the scrimmage. So spoke the leader of the

Afrikander Party, strongly opposing the appearance of the Imperial Government and dissuading from annexing Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony. In short, the views of Mr. Hofmeyr on Bechuanaland and those of President Kruger and the Transvaal Deputation were identical. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the annexation to the Cape, so desired by Sir Hercules Robinson, did not take place. He might have seen that Bechuanaland was reserved by the Afrikander politicians for the Transvaal.

It was thus openly acknowledged by the leader of the Afrikander Party that the Bechuanaland question might become a bone of contention as between the Transvaal and Cape Colony; and Mr. Hofmeyr hinted that in such a case the Transvaal was not likely to yield. Yet the influence of the High Commissioner was exerted to the utmost at this time, not only to hasten annexation on the part of the Cape Government, but also to induce the Colonial Government to assume towards the Transvaal Government concerning Bechuanaland, the position which befitted the Imperial Government. He besought his Ministers to—

“Inform the Transvaal Government of the resolutions passed by both Houses of the Cape Legislature, and of their intention to annex Bechuanaland next year, inviting its cordial co-operation in maintaining, in the meanwhile, order on each side of the south-western border. The Governor was of opinion that if Ministers only did this, such co-operation would not be refused” (4213, 10).

That is as if to say, I have spoken for years as High Commissioner, and no one attends to me; I have recently received a new Commission, but that does not seem to help. I am pledged, of course, as High Commissioner, on behalf of the Imperial Government; but won't you, Cape Ministers, do what is necessary, and remove the responsibility from me and from the Imperial Government? This attitude was the gravest blunder, and could only increase distrust, if not contempt for an Imperial Power thus going a-begging.

Perhaps the Ministers themselves did not go as far as Mr. Hofmeyr, but they lost no opportunity to underrate the importance of Bechuanaland, and to exaggerate the difficulties connected with its government. And certainly these Min-

isters had never themselves taken the slightest trouble to preserve for the Cape Colony its northern outlook. There may have been overweening confidence on the part of these politicians that they could "jockey" and manage generally their somewhat heavy following. They saw that in the meantime they were in a position to do something to humour their supporters. They could talk largely of "Colonial" interests and of "Colonial policy," as if they were different from Imperial interests and Imperial policy. They could declare that the "Imperial factor" was a disturbing element in the country. This was a most kind and becoming speech, considering that the credit and prosperity of the country depended so much upon the presence in the country of that derided Imperial factor. They could also oppose the Imperial Government, not ostensibly, but in matters of detail. They expected that the difficulties of the question would be so increased, and the courage of the English Government would so evaporate, that the Cape Government would be begged to take charge of the country, and would be even subsidised to do it! It is scarcely credible that such an opinion should be seriously entertained concerning the Government of England. Yet such were the views of Mr. Upington and his Ministry. It does not appear that they seriously considered how they would meet the desire of many of their own party that the Transvaal should get Bechuanaland. They probably left that most serious question to the chapter of accidents, hoping that something would "turn up" to prevent the disgrace of being unable to secure or to govern a country which they had taken in charge at the request of the Imperial Government.

Strangely enough, although they refused to pay anything towards the administration of Bechuanaland, the Cape Ministers formally requested to be allowed to advise the Governor and High Commissioner as to the policy which he was to pursue there. The High Commissioner refused them this position, except in one matter already referred to, entrenching himself on the argument that a contribution must precede advice. Politicians will probably agree that, with their views, it was a false move on the part of the

Cape Ministers to tender advice at that time as to the management of Bechuanaland; and that it was equally a mistake on the part of the High Commissioner not to accept of the tendered advice on his own principles. No doubt contribution and advice must be combined. But there are exceptions; there is, for instance, the obligation of the Cape without advice as to Basutoland. Having tendered advice as to Bechuanaland, the Ministers had in effect pledged themselves to a contribution. Eager for annexation, the High Commissioner here lost another chance of securing it. But no friend of the country is sorry for that.

The High Commissioner thus described the attitude of Cape politicians towards Bechuanaland in a telegram to me:—

“ Nothing has yet been decided here about annexation. Those with whom the decision practically rests are waiting the return from England of Transvaal Delegates to ascertain what they wish ” (4194, 79).

That is to say, the decision has slipped from my own hands as Her Majesty's High Commissioner on account of my desire for immediate annexation to the Colony, and now really rests with the leaders of the Afrikaner Party, who have practical control of the Cape Ministers and of the policy of the country, although themselves irresponsible! The Afrikaner Party will consult together on the arrival of its honoured members President Kruger and his companions from Europe. The question to be decided over my head will be the possibility of recovering for the Transvaal in South Africa the ground which had been lost in England. The decisions then come to in secret anti-English conclave will be worked out by Englishmen; for it is well known that certain members of the Cape Opposition are as willing to fetch and carry for the Afrikaner Bond as any members of the Upington Ministry.

The freebooters conceived that the Afrikaner Party would be their most influential friends, and it would now appear they were right. Thus we learn that Mr. van Niekerk had been commissioned by his Bestuur—

“ To enter into correspondence with Mr. Hofmeyr, Member of the Cape Parliament, in his capacity as leader of the African party, with a

view to obtain an expression of his sentiments and his co-operation in this matter" (4194, 12).

The Afrikaner Bond has affiliated branches in the Transvaal and the Free State, as well as the Cape Colony. Some of its leaders have gone the length of advocating for all South Africa their "own flag." To this Power¹ therefore Mr. van Niekerk was requested to appeal, and Mr. Rhodes was his mouthpiece in the Cape Parliament (4194, 99).

With an unfriendly and practically hostile Transvaal, with a Cape Ministry fully his match in the art of writing minutes, but who refused to assist him in any way whatever in Bechuanaland, the High Commissioner, being also Governor of the Cape Colony, now occupied a position of great and increasing difficulty. No doubt the duplex office was itself to blame. His advisers, responsible and irresponsible, were deeply culpable, but I am bound to say that my own friend and chief was also himself in fault. A man should hold on to his beliefs; and if Sir Hercules Robinson had done so, that very attitude would have been his salvation, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate would never have been snuffed out in his hands as it was. He had before assisted Her Majesty's Government in retreating. But in London he had taken upon himself the responsibility to assist it in its return to supremacy in South Africa. When in London Sir Hercules said that England had great interest in Bechuanaland. Khame's country was described by him, along with the value of Mashonaland. All this he turns his back upon in Capetown. The fact is, after some weeks of a Capetown atmosphere, his London ideas were killed. There was depth enough of soil, the ideas had struck their roots down in the mind of the High Commissioner, but the weeds of Cape rivalries and jealousies and partisanships springing up, choked the plant of Territorial Government and peaceful

¹ Speaking of my removal from Bechuanaland, a Cape paper said:—"We all know that this was done at the dictation of the Bondsmen, with whom Mr. Mackenzie was unpopular, not so much on account of any personal qualities, but very little was known of him by some who used his name most freely, but simply because his name stood for Imperial authority in Bechuanaland, which Mr. Upington, and those for whom he worked, wanted to keep out of the country at any cost."—*Cape Argus*, February 4, 1885.

expansion ; and the mind of the High Commissioner became the mind of the Governor of the Cape Colony, viewing all matters with Capetown eyes, and hearing all matters with Capetown ears. He is asked by his Deputy Commissioner to raise a considerable force of volunteers as High Commissioner, so as to overawe once for all the party of disaffection, and consolidate the position of the Imperial Government. His Ministers unofficially call it a mad scheme, and he writes of it as such. So far as his management of the Imperial question goes, he has come to a complete deadlock, for his only hope now is in the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony, and that annexation his Ministers are instructed to promise will be considered next year ! A steady adherence to himself, to the wishes of the English Government and the English people, a larger outlook on Cape and South African society, and the discovery of the peace and order-loving character of the body of the people in contradistinction to the few rowdies whose noise was taken to represent Colonial opinion—a steady determination to make the Bechuanaland Protectorate a fact in South Africa, an absolute refusal to desert friends or make supplication to enemies, with steady and quiet holding on to the true and the right—would have been more pleasant in the end to the High Commissioner himself, while it would have been an important factor in the success of the Imperial work to which he was committed. People everywhere, even in Cape lobbies, would have been convinced that England would uphold the Protectorate. Opponents, once convinced, would have mitigated or ceased their opposition, and the very annexation which he so eagerly and suddenly desired would have been brought nearer than his distrust-inspiring attitude ever brought it. These are the views which I earnestly brought before the High Commissioner on my return from Bechuanaland in August. It was then too late ; the Rhodes and Bower experiment had to be tried, with its twin-settlement of Goshen. It would not have been too late if I had been allowed to visit the Cape at the time which was originally intended.

CHAPTER IV

THE "COLONIAL" POLICY IN STELLALAND

AT the Cape the selection of the Hon. Cecil Rhodes as my fellow-Commissioner was not followed by the beneficial results which were expected from it. The appointment did not secure the desired and looked-for cordial co-operation of the Cape Ministers—to obtain which I afterwards tendered my resignation. Indeed, a new element of discord was brought in by the new appointment—the rivalries of Cape politics. Mr. Rhodes was a member of the Cape Opposition, and still retained his seat in the Cape Parliament, although now in the nominal service of the Imperial Government. He could not have done so if he had become a salaried officer in the Imperial service. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, enjoyed the services of Mr. Rhodes in Bechuanaland, while he endeavoured to further a "Colonial" in place of an "Imperial" policy, without payment of salary. The Ministers, in noticing his appointment, disavowed all responsibility in the matter. It was freely admitted that there were great political gains to Mr. Rhodes personally, and to his party, in his upholding the land claims of the volunteers of native chiefs. But the unusual and exceptional nature of the appointment excited jealousy among those who had no such chance, and the usual criticism from those political opponents whose side would lose by Mr. Rhodes's political gain. In certain circles Bechuanaland ceased to be an Imperial question; it was one now of local party politics.

On the 3d of August I telegraphed from Vryburg to Mr. Rhodes at Kimberley:—

"Am taking for granted you accept appointment in my absence. Wish to meet you and Lowe together. Things now quiet and satisfactory here. Only Hart River district unsettled. Rooi Grond question demands immediate attention. Can you see your way to any method of personally inducing these men to disperse, without giving them land and without fighting them? You are aware that I tried and failed to do this. Settlement without fighting, if it is possible, is infinitely best from all points of view."

Mr. Rhodes, who, the Imperial Secretary hoped, might reach Mr. van Niekerk as soon as a messenger sent from Kimberley, must needs meet me first. This was awkward from the Van Niekerk policy standpoint; but apparently it would be more awkward still to meet me at my office in Vryburg, surrounded by the acknowledged and elected officers of the Stellaland people; and so Mr. Rhodes wrote to me from Taung that he thought "it would be just as well to meet on this side of Vryburg." This request was a great mystery to me at the time; but I acquiesced in what was asked, packed my waggon, and, instead of waiting to hand over my work to Mr. Rhodes and introduce him to the people, departed from Vryburg on the 4th of August. Only a few miles from the village I met Mr. Rhodes, where we both outspanned and spent the night together.

Mr. Rhodes had with him the latest papers, and directed my attention to his speech in the debate on Bechuanaland in the Cape Parliament as reported in the papers of the 16th July. I shall give here a few sentences from this speech:—

"Mr. Rhodes said the Imperial factor against which he had last year warned the House had now been introduced into Bechuanaland. He was not going to reflect upon the officer who had been appointed by the Imperial Government, but he might say that he more or less sympathised with and defended the native tribes in that district as against the European portion of the population. The hon. gentleman proceeded to read extracts from letters and telegrams received from Mr. van Niekerk to a member of the House, intimating that he was so far successful in maintaining order in Stellaland.¹ Mr. van Niekerk pointed out the danger of the Imperial Protectorate, and said that the Protectorate of Mr. Mackenzie was only regarded as temporary, pending the reply to the petition for annexation. Mr. van Niekerk asked him (Mr. Rhodes) if he was acquainted with members of the Afrikander Party, to communicate the contents of the letter to them and ask for

¹ Mr. van Niekerk was not even in Stellaland when he wrote this.

their co-operation. Mr. Rhodes went on to point out the feeling that there was against the Imperial Protectorate, how desirous the people were to be annexed, and how they had accepted Mr. Mackenzie's rule only as a temporary measure, hoping that the Cape Parliament would accede to their request. . . . Some members would say that we must look for a settlement of this question to the union of South Africa, and that therefore it was a small matter if these northern territories did pass from the Cape Colony. They might hold what views they liked upon South African union, but he claimed as a Cape colonist that in the settlement of that question the Cape Colony should be the dominant State, and that she should dictate the terms of union for South Africa. . . . To show the House how small was the number of natives in Bechuanaland he would say that when he was there he found the territory occupied by Mankoroane to have a reported population of only 8000 or 9000, and they lived, not scattered about the land, but after their custom, in one large town. Take the whole of the Protectorate, and they would not have to deal with a number of natives exceeding 20,000 souls. The native question was practically nothing. They had proof of that in the fact that a few farmers and other people had gone in and occupied practically the whole country. Behind this tract there were millions of acres of unoccupied land (cheers)—land unsuited for native pursuits, but admirably adapted for the pursuits of the people of this country—land consisting of large grazing flats. In this land we should have an enormous asset against our debt. Practically, at this moment we had no Crown lands on this side of the Orange River. . . . They should at once negotiate with the Imperial Government and with the people of the Transvaal, and first and foremost they should try and remove the Imperial factor from the situation. He believed that if they did not, there was on the border of the Transvaal great danger for South Africa" (4194 ; 88, 100).

Such were the views of the gentleman who was now absurdly selected by the High Commissioner to represent that "Imperial factor" in Bechuanaland—his solemn warnings against which had outvied those of all the Dutch-speaking members of the Cape Parliament. I assured Mr. Rhodes, in our conversation on this subject, that his own and other speeches concerning the Imperial Power in South Africa would go far to destroy the good feeling and the confidence of the English Government towards the Cape which had been lately so much increased, and would cause great hesitancy and coldness at a time when the opposite feelings were of so much value. Mr. Rhodes took some pains to explain to me his position as a loyal Englishman and a Cape politician. I could see his difficulties ; I could not follow or

sympathise with his methods and his views. What was said would have been coherent from two men: my difficulty was that the conflicting doctrines were being uttered with gravity by one and the same person. Mr. Rhodes's remarks about the natives in Bechuanaland were entirely misleading. There was so much unoccupied land in Bechuanaland that I felt Mr. Rhodes could have afforded to speak the truth about the remarkable use to which the natives were putting many parts of the country, both as to grazing stock and as to agriculture. In his incorrect statements Mr. Rhodes denied that natives cultivated separate farms. While this, strangely enough, was concurred in by Captain Bower (4036, 44), it was effectively contradicted by the testimony of a Committee of six British officers, appointed by Sir C. Warren, each one of whom had intimate knowledge of Bechuanaland. Their interesting report established what was previously well known to many as to the amount of industry which had been exhibited by the natives (4643, 16). But the politician who started by saying that because Bechuanaland is a grazing country it is unsuited to natives, knowing that one chief and his people had lost 40,000 cattle in the recent disturbances, and who spoke of the natives as not scattered on farms but living in one large town, did not by such speeches lead one to expect that he was likely to see, as Deputy Commissioner, what he had not permitted himself to observe as a traveller.¹

¹ It is amusing to notice that after his appointment by Sir Hercules Robinson Mr. Rhodes was upheld in the House of Commons on behalf of the Government as a gentleman whose views were known to be favourable to the natives! The sole reason for that statement was probably his selection by Sir Hercules Robinson, who had expressed himself so well in England on the native question. Members of the Imperial Opposition declared their conviction that my appointment had never been more than a bogus one, to satisfy English public opinion, and to produce the temporary impression that a firm and intelligent policy was to be carried out in South Africa. They said my speedy withdrawal from Bechuanaland was proof of this insincerity. In disavowing this it was suggested, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, that possibly I had failed through want of previous knowledge of public affairs. Distinguished members of both sides of the House expressed their disapproval of what had taken place, and declared that they already suspected the Government to be once more contemplating a policy of retreat in Bechuanaland, and expressed their determination to watch the matter narrowly. Thus Her

During our interview in Stellaland I considered it my duty to place as clearly as possible before Mr. Rhodes the actual condition of affairs in Bechuanaland at this time, with which the reader of these pages is already acquainted. In whatever direction my remarks might lead, I found Mr. Rhodes's replies led in some strange way back to Mr. van Niekerk. So I made a clean breast on this point in a conversation somewhat like the following :

"Mr. van Niekerk is said by his own former comrades and fellow-officers in Stellaland to have left the country under the influence of Big Adriaan Delarey, and on account of the Honey affair. (I found afterwards that Mr. Rhodes had known long before more than I did then about this matter.) You must have seen in Government House his letter refusing openly and ostentatiously to serve under the Queen. Mr. van Niekerk has in effect declared himself to be a foreigner. We can only treat him with courtesy as such. I invited him to Vryburg to meet his fellow-office-bearers and come to an understanding with them, but he refused. He is openly working for the Transvaal. Any man in Stellaland knows that. What he says about the Cape Colony is a mere blind, and deceives no one here. As to trusting him after what he has done the thing is impossible. To trust him now is to yield to him and make him our master."

"But are you not in danger of being attacked by Mr. van Niekerk?"

"As to myself as an Imperial officer there have been rumours that I should be turned out, put over the line, etc., ever since I came into Bechuanaland. It was never seriously contemplated, and of late has been less likely than ever when I have been surrounded by the Stellaland people."

"But will not the animosity of the two parties of Stellalanders lead to a row?"

"There is not the slightest fear of that in reality. Dutch-speaking people have never yet actually attacked one

Majesty's Government must have felt that however deputy commissioners might be changed, no change of Imperial policy would be tolerated either in the House of Commons or by the country.

another in that way. There is no race question in Stellaland. Our supporters are Dutch-speaking like the others, and practically united. You will of course hear threats and rumours. Van Niekerk is playing a game of brag for the Transvaal, as Van Pittius is doing more roughly at Rooi Grond, where there are few, if any, Dutch to oppose him. But in Stellaland our police and the loyal burghers are more than enough for the district."

As I thought I could still see in Mr. Rhodes a hankering after meeting Mr. van Niekerk, and being fully assured of the ruinous result of any such step, I protested strongly against his taking it. I said to Mr. Rhodes that I should put my protest in writing if I had been as old a civil servant as I was in experience of men and things in Bechuanaland. As it was I would content myself with very earnestly protesting to him, as I then did, against changing our ground in Stellaland, or interfering with what had been happily accomplished and accepted.

I pressed upon Mr. Rhodes what he had read in my telegram on its way to Capetown concerning Rooi Grond and Montsioa. If there was any truth in the saying of a few Cape politicians (Mr. Rhodes among the number) that I had failed at Rooi Grond because I had opposed the Transvaal in England, there was the possibility that Mr. Rhodes might succeed with Mr. van Pittius and his Transvaal following. We were talking about Rooi Grond, and I was expressing my surprise at the High Commissioner's dislike to Mr. Bethell, who was known to me as a capable officer, but who was not known to the High Commissioner at all, when a letter was handed to me by a policeman who had followed me from Vryburg. It was a despatch from Mr. Wright, Assistant Commissioner at Mafiking, and described the fight with freebooters near that town on the 31st July, on which occasion Mr. Bethell was shot (4213, 34).

I could not help saying to Mr. Rhodes, who was waiting to hear the news of the despatch, "The gentleman whose name was on my lips when this letter came will not be the cause of any further discussion with the High Commissioner. Bethell is dead."

We now discussed once more the question of the condition of the country, taking into account this victory of our enemies. As it was well known that part of Van Niekerk's people were then at Rooi Grond, and had contributed to the defeat of a chief under the Queen's protection, Mr. Rhodes was, as I thought at the time, fully persuaded that there could be now no possible gain in dealing with open enemies. He agreed with me that his best course was to proceed at once to Rooi Grond. As the following telegram will show, I was desirous that Mr. Rhodes should have the fullest chance of succeeding by personal influence where I had been refused a hearing:—

"Rhodes and I agree that it is just possible his presence might avert fighting if he went at once to Rooi Grond, and if your Excellency would at once request Transvaal Government to send a Commissioner to meet Rhodes at Rooi Grond, and along with him deal with this question. Please to consider question as to what Lowe and his men ought to do in meantime. No ammunition, no food, or very little, at Mafiking. Remember Rooi Grond men have unlimited source of supply in Transvaal. Rhodes and I generally agreed as to what ought to be done. He proceeds as fast as he can to Rooi Grond, and I shall get down to Barkly as soon as I can" (4213, 35).

On the same occasion Mr. Rhodes telegraphed to the High Commissioner:—

"Mackenzie will have sent you news from Montsioa. I propose to proceed to Rooi Grond at once. I suggest that you should communicate with Transvaal Government, and ask them to send a Commissioner to meet me, in order if possible to effect a peaceful settlement. The alternative, if I fail, must be a force of at least 500 men. An attempt at relief of Mafiking with a weak column exposes us to the risk of a serious disaster" (4213, 37).

The great success of Mr. van Pittius's forces near Mafiking on the 31st of July dealt a deadly blow to the hope of settlement of land and other claims in Bechuanaland by personal influence. The freebooter had conquered, and the death of Mr. Bethell was felt to be a great loss. As the Hart River contingent at Rooi Grond were instrumental in bringing this about, the joy at Rooi Grond was shared by Mr. Adriaan Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk and their followers, as it was also at Pretoria, and indeed wherever the anti-English party was to be found.

Mr. Rhodes parted from me fully resolved at once to proceed to Rooi Grond, and use his influence there in the cause of peace. From his Capetown point of view this was a simple matter. He had regarded Mr. van Niekerk as a loyal and reliable man, and one who had immense influence over his section of the people; and Mr. van Niekerk had been addressed by leading men in Capetown, and requested by them to submit to the Protectorate. If Mr. Rhodes was correct in his estimate of character, and if Mr. van Niekerk would listen to the good advice of his friends at the Cape, then the peace of Hart River district was assured. The residents in Stellaland itself had already submitted to the Protectorate—there was not the slightest trouble to be feared from them. If Mr. van Niekerk was good and reliable, and the master of influence which he pretended to be, then Mr. Rhodes could proceed at once to Rooi Grond, where, as he and his friends thought, a “Colonial” instead of an Imperial politician would win the hearts of Mr. van Pittius and his men.

When Mr. Rhodes reached Vryburg, he found in existence the machinery of European Government having this peculiarity, that the officers had been selected in the first instance by the public of Stellaland and ratified by its previous Government, and they had recently, and as a temporary measure, been recognised by me as Deputy Commissioner in their several offices, upon their taking the oath appropriate to those offices under the Queen. He found also the flag of the Protectorate flying in Vryburg. Before leaving I committed it to the care of the landdrost or magistrate of Vryburg, until Mr. Rhodes should arrive. I explained to the landdrost that in the meantime it was to be in his charge, as the Stellaland flag had been, which was now in my possession. Arrived in Vryburg, Mr. Rhodes took up the extraordinary ground that he had nothing to say to these duly-appointed officers of the Stellaland district of the Protectorate. He refused to work with them, to disacknowledge them, or to discharge them; and he gave no instructions concerning the flag. In point of fact, Mr. Rhodes, while holding an Imperial office, totally ignored the duties

of that office, which stared him in the face on his arrival at Vryburg.

Any impression which might have been made on Mr. Rhodes's mind by my representations (which, owing to his management, were not given in Vryburg, where my statements could have been fully corroborated, but in the solitariness of the "veldt" or open country), was quite transient, and inoperative to prevent him from pursuing the line of conduct upon which it is evident he, in concert with others, had resolved in Capetown, and of which the Kimberley telegrams and their replies were incidents. Letters written at the time from Stellaland informed me that from the first day of his arrival in Vryburg Mr. Rhodes assured the Stellaland people that I should never return. There was to be no Protectorate,—that was practically given up; for although he was acting for the time as Deputy Commissioner, the country was speedily to be annexed to the Cape Colony. In vain did shrewd intelligent men, who themselves were not averse to Colonial annexation, but who knew exactly the state of things in the Transvaal as well as in Stellaland, and who also knew something of Afrikaner views at the Cape, assure Mr. Rhodes that the Transvaal interest was too strong for the merely Colonial interest, and that without the direct help of the Imperial Government, Bechuanaland would never belong to the Cape Colony. They especially assured him of the true attitude of Mr. van Niekerk as being in the interest of the Transvaal, as also the intimate relations which subsisted between Mr. van Niekerk and Groot Adriaan Delarey. But Mr. Rhodes, with the letters of Mr. van Niekerk in his pocket, naturally thought he knew better than Mr. van Niekerk's fellow-officers in Stellaland. Mr. Rhodes and Mr. van Niekerk were practically united on one point—fatal to Mr. Rhodes and to the Cape Colony—the desirableness of banishing the Imperial power from the settlement of Bechuanaland. They then parted company. Mr. Rhodes wished the country to belong to the Cape; Mr. van Niekerk had openly and habitually advocated union with the Transvaal. Each thought he could use the other; and each no doubt thought he could

dispense with the help of the other when a certain point had been reached.

I had for months pointed out to the High Commissioner that there was only one difficulty in Bechuanaland—the attitude of the Transvaal. In one of his first telegrams from Bechuanaland, Mr. Rhodes also adopts this view. He says:—

“My fear is that the Transvaal is directing the whole matter, and if so I am helpless.”

He also tenders to the High Commissioner some advice in the easy and familiar tone of the trusted confidential adviser:—

“You should be preparing the home authorities for the seriousness of the situation.” “The whole Bechuana question looks very serious.” “As far as I can see, you may require your present force for here (Vryburg), and think Lowe should move slowly up, but everything depends on my interview with Niekerk” (4213, 37).

Soon after my departure from Bechuanaland the chief Mankoroane addressed an urgent letter to Capetown begging for my return. He regarded my successors as committed to support the side of his enemies, with whom he observed they always made their headquarters. This letter was at once translated by me and laid before the High Commissioner. No notice was taken of it, and it was not included in the papers forwarded to Her Majesty's Government for publication in the Bluebooks.

The success of the freebooters at Rooi Grond elated the feelings of their relatives and friends at Hart River under Delarey and Van Niekerk (4213, 35). It was natural for the Stellaland contingent then assisting the Rooi Grond people to think of getting similar help from Rooi Grond people to establish Transvaal influence in Stellaland also. This was felt by the Stellalanders who had separated from the Transvaal party, and submitted to the Imperial Government. They telegraphed to me to this effect, and also to the High Commissioner with the concurrence of Mr. Rhodes. These telegrams gave the information that the Hart River section had now placed themselves in open antagonism to

the Imperial Government, refusing to recognise any Government in Bechuanaland except the Transvaal; and that all persons who had negotiated with Her Majesty's Deputy Commissioner should be tried by court-martial on charge of high treason! (4213, 38). Be it remembered that this was with reference to actions done in a country which had now been for months under Her Majesty's protection, and was nothing less than an open defiance of Her Majesty's Government. Having themselves submitted to Her Majesty's Government when called to do so by an Imperial officer, and having since obeyed his commands, the loyal Stellalanders not unnaturally looked to Mr. Rhodes for protection from the consequences of separating themselves from the Transvaal party. This was their one object in sending the telegrams in question. It was their opinion that more police should be enrolled (4213, 68), and that the Protectorate having been established should be defended; they were willing to assist in this by personal service; indeed their young men had been already enrolled as police. It was quite opposed to the wish of the loyal people of Stellaland that Mr. Rhodes should open up correspondence with Mr. van Niekerk—much less did they wish that he should surrender them and Stellaland into his hands. Mr. Rhodes, however, made his own use of their telegram. They thought they were urging the necessary defence of the Imperial Protectorate by pointing out the defiant tone of its enemies on the Hart River, as well as at Goshen. From their recognition of Mr. van Niekerk and his people as a possible source of danger to Stellaland, Mr. Rhodes drew the conclusion—a foregone conclusion in his case—that it was his duty at once to go over to the enemy, and to open up communication with Mr. van Niekerk. As Acting Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes was bound to uphold the Protectorate, and to protect those now under Her Majesty; but we shall see that he soon placed himself in a position in which this became impossible to him.

Mr. van Niekerk had openly and formally ranked himself as the enemy of Her Majesty's Government, under which he himself had taken office some two months before. The "pro-

test" of Mr. van Niekerk as "Administrator" in Stellaland (4213, 50) is worthy of being placed alongside a similar document emanating from Mr. Gey van Pittius and published under the name of the chief Moshette (4213, 88). Both are characterised by their insolence to the Imperial Government. We saw that Mr. van Niekerk had months before acknowledged that the country had passed into the protection of the Queen (4213, 53). He now poses as its "Administrator" at the head of the worst stamp of freebooters, and vows vengeance against all who had submitted to Her Majesty's representative,—they were to be proceeded against by a Stellaland court-martial; and as for Her Majesty's representative in Bechuanaland, Mr. van Niekerk says:—

"Therefore, I hereby, as Administrator of Stellaland, with the Executive Council and in the name of the people, protest against any authority being assumed and exercised in the territory of Stellaland by Mr. John Mackenzie as British Commissioner, holding said Mr. Mackenzie responsible for all the consequences of such act or acts until such time as the lawful Government of Stellaland has heard the resolution of the Honourable Volksraad of the South African Republic, and the result of the negotiations between the Cape Government and the Imperial Government with regard to annexation of Stellaland to the Cape Colony."

This was bold enough and despicable enough coming from a man with pretensions like Mr. van Niekerk. But up to the time of my leaving Stellaland there was great firmness among the body of the people, as I succeeded in inspiring them with confidence in the Imperial Government; and this extravagant proclamation of Van Niekerk would have been met by the proclamation which I had drawn up warning all loyal and peace-loving Stellalanders from joining Mr. Delarey or Mr. van Niekerk. Had Mr. Rhodes in acting for me pursued the same course as I did, notwithstanding the success of Rooi Grond, the peace of Stellaland would not have been seriously disturbed. It was no race quarrel. It was the case of some Dutch-speaking men who had submitted to the Queen, as against others of the same race (and fewer in number when I left Stellaland) who desired to hand over Bechuanaland to the Transvaal. Had Mr. Rhodes issued a notice as Acting Deputy Commissioner, calling a

meeting, he would have found himself surrounded by a body of loyal men, chiefly Dutch-speaking, against whom no Hart River faction could have made any headway. Instead of taking this course, his remarks about his predecessor in office, and about the Imperial Government, were such as to induce very great distrust, and to cause several people to throw themselves into the hands of the Transvaal party.

After the news reached Vryburg that the Transvaal Government had, on the 8th August, ratified the London Convention, and that thus the Hart River district was now separated finally from Stellaland and joined to the Transvaal, the appointed representatives of the Stellaland people telegraphed to me at Capetown to the following effect:—

“Considering ratification of the Convention, deem it advisable that you return speedily to Vryburg and Bechuanaland. Majority of public approve of your policy. Rhodes appears only working for Colonial interest regardless of position of country. Owing to Land Goshen complications, advisable to enlist more police. Think you could effect peaceable settlement. General regret at your absence during present complications. Rhodes gone alone to Niekerk in Transvaal to conciliate him. Public sentiment here worked against Imperial Government, especially yourself, and Vryburg opinion ignored. Statement made that you do not return. Please reply” (4213, 68).

My reply, which was submitted for the approval of the High Commissioner, was to refer them to Messrs. Rhodes and Bower.

It will be remembered that the Stellaland Committee was adjourned by me till the 15th of August, at which date we were likely to know the decision of the Transvaal Volksraad as to the London Convention, and whether the Hart River were to remain a Stellaland responsibility, or were to be joined to the Transvaal. The members accordingly met at Vryburg on the date specified, but the meeting was adjourned till the following day, in the hope that by that date Mr. Rhodes would have returned from his visit to Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey. In his continued absence Mr. C. G. Bodenstein, a leading Stellalander whose name has already occurred, took the chair, and the following resolution was unanimously carried:—

“That this meeting expresses its regret that the Acting Deputy

Commissioner is not present, and resolves further that whereas reasonable grounds exist to suppose that he might enter into negotiations with Mr. G. J. van Niekerk contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants of Stellaland, and whereby the rest and concord would be disturbed, and the loyal subjects of Her Majesty in Stellaland would not only be insulted, but they would be placed in a dangerous and untenable position, and whereas it is contrary to the wish of the inhabitants of Stellaland that the Acting Deputy Commissioner shall hold meetings within the borders of the South African Republic, and shall take notice of any petition and memorial concerning affairs of Bechuanaland, and signed by the inhabitants of the South African Republic; now, therefore, the Acting Deputy Commissioner is urgently requested not to enter into negotiations with Mr. G. J. van Niekerk, or any person or persons who do not represent the public and openly resist Her Majesty's authority in Bechuanaland."

In a letter addressed to Mr. Rhodes on the same day covering the above resolution, the members of the Stellaland Committee reminded him of the fact that the London Convention having been ratified by the Transvaal Volksraad, "both Mr. G. J. van Niekerk and Mr. A. J. G. Delarey (Groot Adriaan) are inhabitants of the South African Republic, are no officials of the Stellaland Government, and that they were deposed from their position as leaders of the people previous to the formal institution of Her Majesty's authority here." On the same day the Committee sent the following telegram to the High Commissioner:—

"Resolution select Committee passed to-day forwarded to Rhodes. Meeting regrets his absence. Reasonable grounds existing to fear his negotiating with Niekerk contrary to wishes of public, whereby peace endangered and insult to loyal subjects of Queen. Warning him not to hold meetings with Niekerk within borders of South African Republic, and not notice memorials and petitions signed by Niekerk and persons not representing public and openly opposing Her Majesty's rule. Reminding him Convention ratified, and that Niekerk and Delarey not officials, not public representatives, but Transvaal inhabitants. Inform us of our position. Please inform Mackenzie."

This telegram was signed by C. G. Bodenstein, G. D. Smith, J. A. Raubenheimer, and T. D. Potgieter.

I deeply regret to have to state that these documents, which placed the true condition of Stellaland beyond doubt or cavil before Her Majesty's Government, and showed that its government under the Protectorate, and with the assist-

ance of its loyal inhabitants, was both practicable and desired by the Stellalanders themselves,—were suppressed, and never saw the light for seven months. When they were brought forward it was not by the High Commissioner or by Mr. Rhodes, to whom they had been addressed, but by the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland, Sir Charles Warren (4432, 157).

As "Protector" of the Bechuana, Mr. Rhodes's attitude was one which could not have been expected from an Imperial officer. We hear much from him and Captain Bower of thefts from Boers; while thefts from natives are lost sight of. The extraordinary doctrine from an Imperial officer in charge of Bechuanaland is laid down, that a native chief who had just signed a treaty handing over the jurisdiction of his country to the Queen, and who did so because it was notorious that the power to govern the country had slipped from him, "should be made responsible for all stolen cattle tracked into Taung"! The true remedy for cattle-stealing was, of course, the presence of police in the country. To give the impression that the Bechuana were the thieves, and that they only needed to be watched, was not the attitude of a true administrator; and it completely ignored the well-known peaceful history of Bechuanaland as bordering on the Colony and the Free State for many years. For two generations the northern border of the Colony had been entirely peaceful and free from cattle-thefts. The recent disturbances had really been imported by strangers into the country in the first instance, and intensified by our abandonment of the country. It was reasonable again to assume the jurisdiction which the chief was no longer able to administer; but it was unreasonable and unjust for an Imperial officer to hold the chief responsible for thefts perpetrated in his country after the jurisdiction had been thus assumed. The first demand of the Hart River party on the 12th of August included the holding of "a court to investigate cattle-thefts that have been committed during the last twelve months, the court to be opened on 26th of August, and that Mankoroane shall have to repay cattle at once" (4213, 112). It was in this fashion that a chief was

to be protected who was said to have lost some 40,000 head of cattle, and who had refrained from invading the Transvaal, or Free State, or Cape Colony, on the track of his stolen cattle, which were driven into these countries.

I regret to say that Mr. Rhodes, while acting for me in Bechuanaland, conceived it to be his duty to bring forward every report which could have the effect of undermining my influence, and thus prevent my return. I was to blame because cattle-thieving had taken place in Bechuanaland since my arrival in it, although I had no police effectually to cope with it. I was to blame because I was favourable to natives, although no act of partiality could be pointed out. I was to blame because I had opposed the claims of the Transvaal in England, although that action was for the highest interests of South Africa, and I had only practised the usual honourable methods of discussion. I was to blame because Montsioa had burned freebooters' houses at Rooi Grond. "This," Mr. Rhodes asserted, "occurred just after Mackenzie left Montsioa's, and the Boers believe he told Bethell to make the attack;" although, as the reader is aware (and as Mr. Rhodes must have known), the hut-burning took place before my arrival in Montsioa's country at all. Such was the unusual style in which Mr. Rhodes allowed himself to write of a fellow-officer—mixing up and giving prominence to such false reports as came to his ears, and persistently distorting or hiding from the High Commissioner every fact favourable to me or illustrative of the real work which I had accomplished in the country (4213, 39).

Mr. Rhodes and those who with him planned his mission to Bechuanaland were still of opinion that he was to succeed. He says, "I firmly believe I shall be successful." As he was aware from the moment of his reaching the country that his view of policy was not that of the body of Stellalanders who had submitted to Her Majesty's Government, and that these people had their correspondents in Capetown and elsewhere, Mr. Rhodes thought it necessary to ask from the High Commissioner his "undivided support." He was of course well aware how he himself had succeeded in withdrawing the High Commissioner's support from his

own predecessor, and was naturally concerned lest some one should perform for himself the same unkind action. As for myself, he had no reason to fear; for although I was living in Government House at that time, I conceived it to be my duty to carry on no correspondence with Stellaland—except what was unavoidable and of an official character, which I always submitted to the High Commissioner.

This success Mr. Rhodes hoped for on the lines which had been planned in Capetown. He thought he could reconcile the Transvaal and the loyal sections of Stellalanders, and with reference to the whole Bechuanaland question, obviate the necessity for the appearance of British troops (4213, 41). His plan was still the old one—the “wild scheme”—of Captain Bower. He says:—

“I start to-morrow to meet Niekerk, and will endeavour to get him to go to Rooi Grond with me.”

And again he says:—

“My policy, if it can be called one, is contained in a few words—viz. to try and effect a reconciliation with the Niekerk party, and obtain their co-operation in dealing with the people at Rooi Grond, or at least their neutrality” (4213, 41).

He elsewhere thus explains the situation:—

“The section here on which Mackenzie relies is just the opposite party to that on which Bower relied. This will at once convey the position to him. My only hope is that my arrival may conciliate the others” (4213, 37).

Mr. Rhodes hoped by personal influence to make an arrangement with the Stellalanders in which the object of the Protectorate would not be lost sight of, to reconcile the Transvaal and loyal sections of Stellalanders, and to make a pacific settlement at Goshen or Rooi Grond. We shall see whether Mr. Rhodes succeeded or failed in these objects. From the first his methods were different from mine. I obeyed my instructions, and declared that Her Majesty had established a Protectorate in Bechuanaland; and a great many people believed me. Mr. Rhodes tried to make people believe that it was a Colonial administration, and addressed his communications to “The Governor

of the Cape." I had trusted those who submitted to Her Majesty's authority in Stellaland, and who came round me as an Imperial officer, and I spoke of annexation to the Cape as a future event. Mr. Rhodes had carried on correspondence with the Transvaal enemies of the Protectorate while still in Capetown, and when he became Deputy Commissioner waited upon the openly hostile Transvaal people in the Hart River district to ask their assistance—assistance which had probably been pledged to him privately, but which was never rendered, even in the smallest degree.

We are not favoured with Mr. Rhodes's letter to Mr. van Niekerk in which he asked for an interview, but Mr. van Niekerk's reply is given (4213, 111), and was to the following effect:—

"KROOMELLENBOOG, August 7, 1884.

"DEAR MR. RHODES—I received your letter last night at eleven o'clock, and would have started at once to meet you, but certain circumstances prevented me doing so.

"I trust it shall be convenient to you to let us meet each other on Tuesday, the 12th of this month, at the other side of the Hart River on a farm of Mr. A. J. G. Delarey, where I have my office, and which place is about half-way from here to Vryburg, and my horses are rather poorly. I shall leave here Monday the 11th, and hope to meet you on the appointed place. Bearer of this will explain the way to you.—Yours, etc.,

(Signed) "G. J. VAN NIEKERK."

The receipt of this letter gave Mr. Rhodes great pleasure. He regarded it as favourable because it agreed to a meeting. Deeper thought might have led to another opinion. The letter was dated from the farm of Mr. van Niekerk, in the Transvaal, close to Christiana. It was written by a British subject (Mr. van Niekerk, it is understood, was born in the Cape Colony, in the district of Hoptown). It is true it contained a protestation of alacrity to meet Mr. Rhodes at once; but, in its business part, Mr. van Niekerk's horses came again to the front, and for their sake he announced that the meeting would take place after an interval of five days from that date, and on the farm of Mr. Delarey. The interval was precious in the hands of Mr. van Niekerk, and he well knew how to use it for his own ends. He was of course aware of Mr. Rhodes's pub-

lished statements against myself and against the Imperial Government. Mr. van Niekerk, therefore, could hardly overstate to his Hart River friends the advantages of such official support. He could give his own version of my departure from the country, and it is only reasonable to suppose that he had been told—what the loyal people of Stellaland were told—by Mr. Rhodes, that I should never return. Then Mr. van Niekerk's own proud position at this time as Adviser or Dictator to Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner could really not be exaggerated, and doubtless he made the most of it in his messages to all waverers in the interval before the meeting. By thus leaving it to Mr. van Niekerk to fix the time and place for a meeting which was to consider the affairs of the Protectorate, Mr. Rhodes, while still professing to act as an Imperial officer, lowered his status from the first, placing himself at a disadvantage, and in a second-rate position as compared with Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk. Whatever interests the Imperial Government might lose by Mr. Rhodes's action, a broad hint—indeed, a definite lead—was thus given to the Stellaland people by the Acting Deputy Commissioner—they were invited with him to worship the rising sun. Indeed the way was made so very plain to the Stellaland claimants to land, that the wonder to me has always been, not that Mr. Rhodes found so many freebooters round Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk, but that every farmer in Stellaland did not follow Mr. Rhodes's example, and go dutifully with him to meet the arbiters of their common destiny—Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey. If under such unusual circumstances every Dutch-speaking man in the country had gathered round Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Rhodes I should not have been surprised, and it would not have invalidated my previous success in the country in the slightest degree. They were surely at liberty to argue that while they might gain by going with Mr. Rhodes, they could lose nothing, save, it might be, their own self-respect; and it was certainly not for them as freebooters to have a higher code of action than an Imperial officer.

The meeting was held at Passop, Mr. Delarey's farm, on

the 12th of August, and was attended by "Messrs. van Niekerk, Delarey, Pretorius, and other leaders"—that is to say, by leaders of the small Transvaal section, not one of whom possessed influence with the main body of Stellalanders. As might have been expected, the terms brought forward were not those of Her Majesty's representative to men who dared to override her authority in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The terms were those of the Transvaal freebooters, now claiming to be the resuscitated Republic of Stellaland, which Van Niekerk himself had publicly admitted was superseded in the previous May (4213, 53), but in the name of which now, through the marvellous and unexpected encouragement of Mr. Rhodes, he dares to claim the right to exercise jurisdiction in Her Majesty's Protectorate! What reason has Mr. Rhodes for this practical betrayal of the Protectorate? Do we find that he gets anything whatever for his condescension? Absolutely nothing. What these Transvaal people demand from Mr. Rhodes, "after a long discussion," and what he "submitted to the High Commissioner," is this:—

"1. That all matters transacted in Stellaland by Mr. Mackenzie be cancelled.

"2. That Stellaland continue its Government as formed before the arrival of Mr. Mackenzie under a Commissioner to be nominated by the Cape Government, pending annexation to the Cape Colony.

"3. That the land titles, as issued and signed by the Administrator and registered in the Deeds Office, be recognised.

"4. That the Commissioner of Bechuanaland shall hold a court to investigate cattle-thefts that have been committed during the last twelve months; the court to be opened on the 26th of this month (August), and that Mankoroane shall have to repay cattle at once.

"5. That none of those persons who have been negotiating with Mr. Mackenzie will be allowed to obtain a Government situation in Stellaland" (4213; 111, 112).

The above terms, which are those of a triumphant enemy, were formally called "Mr. van Niekerk's ultimatum" by Captain Bower (4213, 126), and were as insulting to Her Majesty's Government, and as clearly the product of Transvaal partisans, as anything which ever issued from the pens of the Rooi Gronders, or afterwards from the Government of Pretoria in the annexation of Montsioa's country while it

was under Her Majesty's Protectorate. To my mind, there is a close connection between the attitude of Mr. Rhodes, —supposed to represent the Imperial Government—in his dealings with Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk, and the demands of Mr. van Pittius at Rooi Grond, as well as the annexing proclamation of President Kruger; and Mr. Uppington has openly stated that in his proposed Goshen settlement he was guided by the example of Mr. Rhodes. To add still more to the unsatisfactoriness of the situation, although the Acting Deputy Commissioner had lowered himself so far as to entertain these outrageous proposals for the purpose of forwarding them to the High Commissioner, Mr. van Niekerk, instead of now undertaking to quiet the people, informed Mr. Rhodes that he had called an armed meeting for the 25th inst. "with the object of restoring their original Government, occupying Vryburg, and marching on Taung to recover the stolen cattle!" (4213, 105). Here was defiance of the most uncompromising kind. Mr. Rhodes had provisionally agreed to open a court for the settlement of stock-thefts, which was to assemble and begin its work on the 26th inst. Why, then, should it still have been necessary for Messrs. Niekerk and Delarey to go on with their armed and hostile demonstration summoned for the 25th? What could have been more reasonable, even from the low platform on which they were working, than that they should now have issued a notice intimating that in consequence of the gracious provisional concurrence of the new Commissioner in their demands, it would no longer be necessary to hold their armed meeting? There must have been a reason for their continuance in hostile action. Was it that Mr. Rhodes, while acting alone, shrank from the shame of making such an agreement as is contained in these articles, with men of the stamp of Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk, and preferred that the paper should not be formally submitted to him, but only "handed to Mr. Rhodes to be submitted to the High Commissioner?" (4213, 111). We shall see that Mr. Rhodes repeated this plan at Rooi Grond. When Mr. van Pittius gave in his ultimatum Mr. Rhodes proposed to "submit it to the High Commissioner," and requested that

there should be respite from fighting in the meantime. Mr. van Pittius refused, and went on with the attack on Mafiking. In like manner also Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk, possibly distrusting the sincerity of Mr. Rhodes's action in shifting all responsibility from himself upon the High Commissioner, resolved to continue their open defiance of the Protectorate, and to hold an armed and hostile meeting on the 25th of August, although the above formal proposal from them had already been received by Mr. Rhodes and was on its way to be considered by the High Commissioner. What, then, was the result to Mr. Rhodes of his meeting with Van Niekerk? The humiliation that terms are submitted to him so disgraceful that he shrinks from agreeing to them, and would much prefer that that were done by some one else. As to the Protectorate, it is degraded and derided, while Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk can justly feel that the game is now in their own hands. In fact, Mr. Rhodes already sees that it is easier to talk over after-dinner plans in Capetown than to carry them out in Bechuanaland, and makes special application for the assistance of Captain Bower.

Mr. Rhodes next went to Barkly West to telegraph his views at length (4252, 3). He now held to the opinions of the Kimberley telegrams sent before he entered Stellaland. It was quite erroneous that the majority of Stellalanders had sided with me. The truth, Mr. Rhodes said, would be found in a letter from Van Niekerk to Mr. Upington, to which Mr. Rhodes referred the High Commissioner. No letter from Mr. van Niekerk to Mr. Upington is given in the Imperial Bluebook. There may of course have been many letters, but one is given in a Cape Bluebook (G. 37—'85, 11), which I transcribe as a specimen of the cool, freebooter style:—

“KROOMELLENBOOG, TRANSVAAL,
“August 4, 1884.

“To the Hon. Mr. Upington,

“*President of the Legislative Assembly, Capetown.*

“HONOURABLE SIR—It is a pleasure to me that I am in a position to make known to you the true state of affairs. I therefore take the liberty of sending you copies of the most important documents, which

I trust are worthy of your attention. At the same time I must inform you that robbery is getting worse instead of being stopped, so that some of my people have nothing more to live upon. There is now no doubt that matters are being altogether misrepresented, just as in the time of Shepstone. It has also now appeared that Mr. Mackenzie will not give effect or consideration to the wishes of the honest and true burghers of Stellaland; take notice, therefore, I, with my Executive Council, will not be answerable for the future peace of Stellaland. Permit me further to inform you that immediate intervention on the part of the Cape Government and that of the S. A. Republic by means of a United Commission can be of great service to South Africa. It is the wish of me, my Executive Council, and also that of the large majority of Stellaland, to retain our own Government so long as annexation is pending. Should no mediation take place, and Mr. Mackenzie not be recalled before the 25th inst., then the time will speak for itself, and perhaps unfold further troubles. What was in my power I have done for peace, even so far as that we in time asked the Cape Colony to take us over if the Convention of London should be ratified by the Honourable Volksraad of the S. A. Republic, and we are now still of the same feeling. All this was done in order to have nothing to do with Mr. Mackenzie's Territorial Government.—In expectation, etc.,

(Signed) "G. J. VAN NIEKERK, *Administrator.*

"P.S.—I shall be glad to receive an immediate answer from you under the address, 'G. J. van Niekerk, Post-Office, Christiana, Transvaal. Under care of Mr. M. C. Genis.'"

Shame on all who encouraged or conducted correspondence with a person who had forsworn his publicly undertaken duties under the Imperial Government, and who now, with Mr. Delarey, had the impertinence to call themselves the Government of Stellaland! A tissue of incorrect statements, accompanied by an open threat of violence against Her Majesty's authority, constituted the passport of Van Niekerk to favour and patronage at Capetown. But he knew what he was about and the men he had to deal with; and some of the remarks of this letter were gravely quoted to me by the highest officials when I reached Capetown, without, of course, informing me of their origin. I am not aware of an instance in which sheer falsifying and bounce have carried a man so far with British officers as in the case of the freebooter who dictated his terms from Christiana in the Transvaal to those who chose to obey him.

Mr. Rhodes strengthened his appeal for the assistance of

Captain Bower in Bechuanaland by reporting that there was a combination of natives to attack Mankoroane, which, he said, "was directed by the Hart River party,"—that is, the party under Van Niekerk and Delarey. Unless a representative of the Governor was sent at once, there was sure to be violence.

"It is too much to ask me to cope with Rooi Grond, to cope with Stellaland, and at the same time to continue the Mackenzie policy. I have every respect for him and his intentions, but he has gone hopelessly wrong, and it is just a question in my mind now whether the British Government can withdraw with dignity from the terrible mess we are in. You must not think I have lost heart on account of the overwhelming difficulty; but you can see that I cannot carry this on under the cloak of a continuance of what Mr. Mackenzie has done. I should do no good, but simply bring myself into disrepute" (4252, 3).

That is to say, the Protectorate is over; the "Imperial factor" has gone; I shall try and secure what I can for the Cape Colony.

Having succeeded in establishing another complete scare in Government House, Mr. Rhodes secured the presence of the Imperial Secretary in Stellaland. Learning that the Transvaal Government had consented to send a Commissioner to meet him and co-operate with him at Rooi Grond, Mr. Rhodes left Barkly West and went as far as the Transvaal village of Lichtenburg, where he opened correspondence with General Joubert, and with him proceeded to Rooi Grond, which they reached on the 25th of August.

The persistent request of Mr. Rhodes that he should be assisted by Captain Bower, and by no one else (4252, 1), was granted by the High Commissioner, but with the utmost reluctance. "It is quite impossible for Bower to leave his own work here at present" (4213, 38), the High Commissioner at first telegraphed to Mr. Rhodes, and suggested that he might be assisted by some one else; but Mr. Rhodes needed Mr. Bower only, to carry out their joint plan; and the High Commissioner, bowing to the stronger wills, found that the impossible in this matter could take place, and Captain Bower appeared in Bechuanaland a second time. This was the shrewdest movement which Mr. Rhodes made in Bechuanaland from a personal point of view. It was one thing to

have a general private understanding with the High Commissioner as to what was to be done in Bechuanaland, and how it was to be accomplished. It was quite another thing to commit the Imperial Secretary personally and publicly to the details and the working out of the plan adopted.

CHAPTER V

THE "COLONIAL" POLICY AT ROOI GROND—SUBMISSION OF MONTSIOA TO THE FREEBOOTERS

MR. RHODES, soon after entering Bechuanaland, had endeavoured to open up communication with the Rooi Grond people, and through them with the chief Montsioa, but had failed in his object. In his letter to Montsioa, which was dated 8th August, he informed the chief that he had been appointed "Commissioner of Bechuanaland"; that he would shortly arrive at his place, at the request of the High Commissioner, in order to attempt a peaceful settlement between Montsioa and the laager stationed at Rooi Grond; and he asked the chief to suspend hostilities pending his arrival. In the same manner he addressed "the Commandant, Rooi Grond," in a note to the following effect, which was signed "C. J. Rhodes, Commissioner of Bechuanaland":—

"I beg to inform you of the ratification of the Transvaal Convention, and of the fact that the Transvaal Government have arranged with his Excellency the High Commissioner to send a Special Commissioner to Rooi Grond to try and effect a peaceful settlement. I am instructed to proceed from here to meet him. Pending our arrival, I would ask for a suspension of hostilities. You will oblige by allowing the accompanying letter of similar purport to be given to Montsioa" (4213, 111).

If his own and the Government House anticipations of the effect of his appointment had been realised, the arrival of that note at Rooi Grond would have been a great event, and have led to beneficial results. This was not the case, however, for the two despatch riders—Bechuanaland Euro-

pean Police—were made prisoners by Mr. van Pittius's orders, and detained under the closest sentry supervision for eighteen hours, after which they were brought before the Krygsraad or "Military Court" at Rooi Grond, which granted them a "pass" in which they were forbidden to have any intercourse with any one in "Land Goossen," and the road by which they were to return to Vryburg was pointed out to them. As to the communication itself, no answer whatever was vouchsafed to it by those who had been addressed by Mr. Rhodes. The "Colonial" policy of Mr. Rhodes did not make an encouraging beginning at Rooi Grond.

Whatever might be the reception of Mr. Rhodes himself when he appeared personally at Rooi Grond with the hope of arranging a peaceful settlement with the assistance of General Joubert, he had great reason to be satisfied with the manner in which he had been introduced to the Transvaal Government by the High Commissioner, in a telegram dated the 6th of August:—

"I have sent the Honourable Cecil Rhodes, M.L.A., and late Treasurer-General, to Rooi Grond, and I hope the Government of the South African Republic will send a Commissioner to meet him, in order, if possible, to effect a peaceful settlement" (4213, 43).

In the same telegram the High Commissioner mentions that he had heard accounts of the most inhuman murders of men, women, and children having been committed by the Rooi Gronders in Montsioa's country. In reply, the President emulates the High Commissioner's right feelings over the Rooi Grond enormities:—

"The State President deeply mourns to hear of the bloody conflicts in the Rooi Grond. He has always considered that it is only possible to put an end to the troubles there by going to work in a pacific manner, and not employ force" (4213, 44).

It was as thus introduced that Mr. Rhodes met General Joubert at Lichtenburg, and with him arrived at Rooi Grond. One may surely expect that his reception will not only be deferential, but that his presence will lead at once to pacific results.

But it must never be forgotten that Mr. Rhodes had not only been introduced by his own letter to the Rooi

Grond people ; and by the High Commissioner, to the Transvaal Government ; but he had been fully introduced by the letters and messengers of the Hart River freebooters to their friends at Rooi Grond. Especially had their meeting with him on the 12th of August, and its results, been recounted for the guidance and encouragement of Goshen. At Hart River they had succeeded in the most marvellous and unforeseen manner, although they had had to contend with a large body of loyal Stellalanders. All opposition had been removed—Mr. Rhodes was almost as kind as Captain Bower—and the field was now their own. The same causes would lead to the same results at Rooi Grond. A firm front, and the whole country would yet belong to the Transvaal. Thus, instead of being accompanied by Stellalanders to assist him, there were scores of Transvaal Stellalanders firing on Montsioa when Mr. Rhodes arrived at Rooi Grond. And Mr. van Niekerk, instead of accompanying him to Rooi Grond to assist Mr. Rhodes in a peaceful settlement, remained behind to watch the interests of the common Transvaal cause at Hart River, and stir up the country on all sides so as to have everything ready for a sufficiently telling hostile demonstration when Captain Bower should arrive in the country.

Mr. Rhodes's first difficulty at Rooi Grond was with the Transvaal Commissioner, who, having discussed with him the terms on which, with his instructions, he could agree to negotiate for peace between the freebooters and Montsioa's people, and not having met with a satisfactory response from Mr. Rhodes, sent him a note on the same subject on the 25th of August. General Joubert wished to know—

“How far Mr. Rhodes would declare to accept and promise to acknowledge, respect, and maintain all territorial and *de facto* rights, previously and up to date lawfully acquired by the paramount chief Moshette, both for himself and his people and for his” (freebooting) “followers, to such land as now, in accordance with the recently ratified Convention, remains outside the South African Republic” (4213, 113).

Mr. Rhodes replied :—

“At present I am unable to express any opinion regarding the

complicated land question in the neighbouring territory. I think the first step to be taken is to have an interview with the leaders of the men assembled here, in accordance with our mutual agreement, and ascertain from them the position they assume."

Mr. Rhodes might be content to have no policy or no instructions as to the disposal of Montsioa's land, but General Joubert had evidently both the one and the other; so he replied to Mr. Rhodes's letter:—

"In our conversation at Lichtenburg I gave you clearly to understand the standpoint upon which I am bound to place myself; and I then understood from you that although you could not enter into the details of the various questions, there would be no objection on your side to acknowledge the rights and claims of the persons of whom mention was made by me in my letter yesterday, in as far as the extent of the land which Moshette legally and *de facto* claims would allow of it. And it was only on this ground that I could consent to meet Mr. Gey and others of Rooi Grond with you."

To this it would appear that Mr. Rhodes returned no written reply. In minutes of a conversation, which are published (4213, 114), he did not disclaim the view imputed to him, but declared that the question of rights to land under Moshette was a small matter,—the great matter being the hostile attitude of the freebooters. In Stellaland, however, as every one then at Rooi Grond was well aware, the hostile attitude of the Hart River people had been for their benefit as freebooters, and it did seem strange that a similar result should not follow a like cause at Rooi Grond. Mr. Rhodes also pointed out, face to face with General Joubert, what I had pointed out to the High Commissioner three months before¹—that the whole movement in "Land Goossen" originated in the Transvaal (4213, 106), and that numbers of the fighting people at Rooi Grond were burghers of the Transvaal, and were actually occupying houses situated in the Transvaal; and Mr. Rhodes complained to General Joubert that he (Joubert) was making no effort to stop them (4213, 114). To this Joubert could only reply that he was no field-cornet, to engage in stopping them; his business was only to assist Mr. Rhodes in bringing about a peaceful settlement.

¹ Page 254.

The arrival at Rooi Grond of Mr. Rhodes and of General Joubert attracted no attention whatever from Mr. Nicholas Gey van Pittius, or his raad, or his followers. They took no notice of the Commissioners; but kept on the bombardment of Montsioa's town during the whole night, although these two gentlemen were in their camp. This attitude of the freebooters constituted Mr. Rhodes's second and greatest difficulty. He had evidently expected treatment far different from this; nothing of this sort had been even dreamt of in Capetown when the change of Commissioners was resolved on. And had it not been for his yielding to the demands of Delarey and Van Niekerk, it is possible that the attitude of their friends at Rooi Grond would not have been so utterly insulting.

The noise of the guns firing on Montsioa's town could be heard during the whole night at Rooi Grond. In the morning Mr. Rhodes gave orders to inspan his mules, with the object of leaving the scene of such humiliation. He himself had not been anxious to press any Imperial connection at Rooi Grond; and it was a deep disappointment that his position as a member of the Colonial Opposition seemed to count for little or nothing. Before he left Kimberley he considered that "the only chance was to make it appear as much as possible a Colonial Administration" (4213, 15). Perhaps this was why he termed himself "Commissioner of Bechuanaland" as if really a Colonial officer; and why, in speaking of the High Commissioner who had sent him into Bechuanaland, he mentioned him as "Governor of the Cape of Good Hope," as if he had sent him to Bechuanaland in that capacity—"I must submit these for the consideration of his Excellency the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope" (4213, 118). This "only chance"—of making the Imperial Protectorate appear to be a Colonial Administration—was a sham which was not likely to succeed anywhere, and it made no favourable impression at Rooi Grond. Thus, most unfortunately, neither the status nor the policy of Mr. Rhodes was made very clear at Rooi Grond.

General Joubert appeared at Mr. Rhodes's waggon before his preparations for leaving Rooi Grond were completed, and

prevailed on his fellow-Commissioner to delay his departure. After a great deal of bluster and fencing on the part of Mr. Gey van Pittius, he and his "Bestuur" or Executive agreed to an armistice of fourteen hours; and Mr. van Pittius and his advisers set themselves to work to draw up their proposals for a settlement. It is quite certain that the bombastic Van Pittius had not taken lessons from the wily Van Niekerk in the art of managing British Commissioners. He apparently had not thought of the political value of a piano or the diplomatic uses of the game of croquet.¹ The Goshen Administration came short even in matters of ordinary courtesy. Mr. Rhodes refused to recognise Mr. Gey van Pittius's title to be called "Administrator." The indignant freebooter revenged himself for this by styling the Cape Colony (or Imperial) Commissioner—"Mr. J. C. Rhodes, calling himself Commissioner for Bechuanaland," while the representative of the Transvaal was styled by the same authority "The Most Noble General P. J. Joubert, Special Commissioner, S.W. Border."

The "ultimatum" of Mr. van Pittius and his Bestuur, like that of Mr. van Niekerk, was clearly inadmissible in the interests of the Protectorate and from an Imperial point of view. The Goshen document was in close imitation of the ultimatum of Mr. van Niekerk, and was no doubt in part copied from that document. The non-recognition of the Imperial Government was common to both, and so was the assertion of a local republican government. This was tempered in the case of Goshen with an offer to accept a joint Protectorate from the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Colony. Residents might be sent from these Governments to Goshen, provided the respective Govern-

¹ The Imperial Secretary's report on Vryburg contains the following sentences, showing how susceptible the gallant captain was to the little surprises which were carefully planned and prepared for him: "During my walk through the village I noticed a croquet ground and some well-dressed young ladies playing croquet, and whilst I was writing out my telegram to the Acting High Commissioner I heard the sound of a piano which was being played in a neighbouring house. I had expected to find the place a den of freebooters and brigands, but found the Dutch section of the community engaged in considering the best means of providing funds for building a church" (4036, 38).

ments paid for them, and respected "the free and independent Government of Goshen"! In the case of Stellaland, three months of entire independence had been stipulated for, during which the Protectorate was to be entirely in abeyance (4213, 97). Montsioa and his people, according to Mr. Gey's ultimatum, were to receive only a very restricted quantity of land. By the ultimatum of Mr. van Niekerk some two thousand of Mankoroane's people would have been reduced to destitution (4643, 20). In Goshen the cost of the war was to be levied on Montsioa. At Hart River the same idea was brought out in the form of restitution of stolen cattle. "Mankoroane was to have to repay cattle at once" (4213, 112). The Hart River document took no notice of the natives beyond Stellaland; they were left in the future to uncovenanted mercies. The Goshen document agreed to acknowledge the independence of Montsioa, provided the Transvaal and the Cape Colony Governments would guarantee his good behaviour, and that of the other tribes that had taken Montsioa's side in the war (4213, 117).

Mr. Rhodes did not reject these claims, but proposed to treat the Goshen ultimatum as he had done the Hart River one—submit it to the Governor of the Cape Colony; and asked for a suspension of hostilities for fourteen days for that purpose. Mr. van Pittius replied in writing that the extended armistice would be granted, provided Mr. Rhodes accepted the Seventh Article¹ of the conditions of peace. Mr. Rhodes declined to do this, as he thought that to do so would have been a virtual acceptance of the proposed peace treaty itself. He also stated that the conditions in his opinion were totally inadmissible. Mr. Rhodes then left Rooi Grond, having warned the freebooters that they were at war with Her Majesty the Queen (4213, 117),—

¹ "Article 7. That as soon as these proposals are accepted as a basis of the intervening parties and the chief Montsioa to conclude the peace agreement, then only under these conditions the armistice will be given, on signing a provisional agreement to that effect in which these proposals are mentioned and countersigned by all parties; which armistice will remain in force until such date as the peace agreement be signed and concluded" (4213, 117).

a fact of which they had been aware since the month of May. Putting aside his feelings and forgetting the insulting manner in which he had been personally treated, we must remark that Mr. Rhodes in this spirited action was singularly at variance with his own conduct at Hart River both before and after his visit to Rooi Grond, and also with his declared policy as to keeping the Imperial Power out of the country. That an Imperial officer should truckle to people in open hostility to Her Majesty's Protectorate is an unworthy action whether done at Hart River or Rooi Grond. But if a Colonial politician with an eye on local politics begins a mission with the idea of "making believe" that a British Protectorate is a Colonial Administration—if he meets one party of hostile freebooters and forwards their ultimatum to Capetown without extracting any promise, formal or informal, from them as to ceasing their hostile action (which in point of fact they do not cease)—he is not acting consistently with the character and policy which he has assumed, when he at a later date declines provisionally to accept another freebooter ultimatum as a basis on which a peace agreement can afterwards be signed and concluded. Considering what he had yielded at Hart River, he laid himself open at Rooi Grond to the remark which Mr. van Pittius at once made in letters to the High Commissioner and to General Joubert, that Mr. Rhodes had shown no desire to bring about peace, either by suggesting an alternative proposal or by asking for some modification of their conditions (4213, 87-92).¹ As a matter of fact, the signing of Article 7 would not have committed Mr. Rhodes to the whole treaty of peace; but only to that document as a basis on which the treaty of peace would afterwards be concluded. In taking the course which he did at Rooi Grond, which was certainly the only dignified and right one, Mr. Rhodes seems to have been temporarily guided by those higher impulses which, if they were never clouded

¹ The letter of Mr. Gey van Pittius, to which reference is here made, expresses in unmeasured terms his utter contempt, not only for the Imperial Government, but for the special "Colonial" arrangement of which Mr. Rhodes was the representative.

over or cast aside, would make him a distinguished, useful, and reliable public man.

Mr. Rhodes relates that, while the abortive negotiations with Mr. Gey van Pittius were in progress, messengers from the chief Montsioa managed to reach his waggon at Rooi Grond during the night. Mr. Rhodes says the chief informed him that—

“He was reduced to the last extremity ; but having reposed faith in the promises made to him of Her Majesty’s protection, he had refused every overture received from the Boers ; that he still relied on the pledges of Her Majesty’s representative ; and that if he should be compelled to submit to his enemies, which he would only do in order to save the lives of the women and children of his tribe, he wished me to understand that any treaty to which he might affix his name would be wrung from him under the circumstances herein detailed, and would, in his opinion, have no binding effect. In reply to Montsioa’s messages, I sent him word that Her Majesty’s Government were determined upon fulfilling the obligations towards him into which they had entered, and although it was not in my power to afford him immediate succour, and make the Queen’s protection effective at that moment, he must not consider himself abandoned” (4213, 107).

On the day after Mr. Rhodes’s departure, the chief Montsioa was orally informed by a Transvaal official that they had driven Rhodes away, and that he would no more see Mackenzie, or hear anything of the protection of England. Upon this the chief wrote a letter to the General of the freebooters asking for peace. This letter was handed to General Joubert, the Commissioner for the Transvaal, who sent a Transvaal official with a reply to Montsioa, informing him that—

“Mr. Rhodes had returned to the Cape Colony without having accomplished his purpose ; that Montsioa could come out and speak with the messenger ; and that he, General Joubert, had arranged that in the meantime all hostilities would be discontinued till the end of Montsioa’s interview, and till he had returned to his town.”

This was clear language, and showed that General Joubert was exercising an authority at Rooi Grond when alone which he did not put forth in the presence of Mr. Rhodes. Montsioa followed the lead which was given him by General Joubert through his messenger, and formally

called in the General as mediator between himself and the Rooi Grond volunteers.

Shortly after Mr. Rhodes's departure Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Adriaan Delarey arrived in Rooi Grond. Mr. Rhodes regarded it as unsafe to travel through the Protectorate, and so missed his Hart River friends who had travelled that way. Regret was freely expressed at Rooi Grond that an event so untoward should have happened as that the Commissioner should have missed meeting Mr. van Niekerk there, and they at once sent a messenger after Mr. Rhodes, who missed him also. In the letters sent after him, General Joubert informed Mr. Rhodes that he deeply regretted his departure. Mr. van Pittius mentioned the fact of the arrival of Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk to Mr. Rhodes in a most insulting letter, and expressed the hope that he and his Bestuur in Goshen would soon conclude peace with Montsioa, and also arrange "speedily and with unanimity further regulations as to our future government." It was evident that the Transvaal party, when speaking out their mind, were happier when alone than when in the presence of the Cape or Imperial Commissioner. Mr. van Niekerk expressed his views as to the untoward departure of Mr. Rhodes as follows:—

"ROOI GROND, August 29, 1884.

"SIR—Having come here to meet you and Mr. P. J. Joubert, I heard with regret on my arrival of your departure. While I was here, Montsioa has called in the assistance of Mr. Joubert, because he wished to make peace. I am therefore staying here to await the result, and, if possible, to contribute my aid towards restoring peace, and to prevent further bloodshed. As soon as matters are settled here I will return, and Mr. Joubert will accompany me. I hope then to meet you on the farm of Mr. Adriaan Delarey (together with Captain Bower), as I hear the rule of Stellaland will be followed here.

(Signed) "G. J. VAN NIEKERK.
"Administrator of Stellaland.

"C. J. Rhodes, Esq., Commissioner" (4213, 120).

When Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Adriaan Delarey were solicitous to give their aid to prevent further bloodshed, and to assist in an arrangement at Rooi Grond, which would be a facsimile of that which Mr. Rhodes was kindly helping

them to carry out at Hart River, it was natural that they should regret that gentleman's departure. It was exceedingly convenient to have the services of a Commissioner who himself objected to the presence of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, and who, if he would not himself accept responsibility for arrangements openly hostile to the Protectorate, would sanction them so far as to submit them to "the Governor of the Cape Colony." Then it is quite evident, from the terms of Mr. van Niekerk's note to Mr. Rhodes, that the departure of the latter from Rooi Grond could lead to no practical result in the Hart River district. Mr. Rhodes could do nothing there; he had already so acted that he was now perfectly powerless in the Protectorate. This Mr. van Niekerk knew well; he therefore kindly informs Mr. Rhodes where he expects him to wait for his and Mr. Delarey's return. For excellent reasons Mr. van Niekerk does not wish to lose the presence and help of Captain Bower at this juncture, and therefore notifies his wish that the Captain as well as Mr. Rhodes should await his return. To give further authority to his position, Niekerk quietly mentions that General Joubert, representing the Transvaal, will also accompany him to Hart River. Lest there should be any mistake as to the nature of the work which was detaining him at Rooi Grond, or of the work which he would require of the British Commissioners at Hart River, Mr. van Niekerk informs Mr. Rhodes that Rooi Grond and Stellaland settlements were to be similar. Captain Bower might have dreamed of turning out the Rooi Grond men with Stellaland assistance, and he (Niekerk) might have amused himself with what he considered harmless talk to Captain Bower on that subject. What he always seriously meant was, that he should have a hand in the settlement of Rooi Grond as well as Stellaland; and, of course, that volunteers approved by him and Delarey should get their farms in both places. What he cannot understand is why Mr. Rhodes consents to the complete blotting out of the Protectorate in Stellaland, although accompanied with circumstances of special insult and indignity to his predecessor in office, and yet resents similar treatment to himself at Rooi Grond. From the

Transvaal point of view it was the same thing to make a bogus treaty between native chiefs, whether in Stellaland or Goshen; it was the same thing to insult and ignore a British Commissioner, whether at Hart River or Rooi Grond. Why should not the representative of the Queen bear this treatment with the same equanimity in the one place when offered to himself, as in the other when offered to a fellow-officer? It is true, in the one case it is Mr. Rhodes's own personality which is insulted—in the other, that of his predecessor. But these are only accidents. In both cases, openly and heinously, the insult has been, not to the Commissioners, but to the Government of which they are the servants. If the personal question comes in at all, surely a British Commissioner, being a gentleman, will be very careful that, whatever he has himself to bear as an individual, the authorised actions of an absent fellow-officer shall not be impugned or repudiated with his sanction. Mr. van Niekerk—a stranger to such views—argues that if the Imperial Government can be denied, insulted, and repudiated in one part of Bechuanaland, why not in another? Surely the converse mode of viewing the subject will now occur to Mr. Rhodes and to Captain Bower after the light thrown upon the subject by the Rooi Grond experiences of the former? If the Transvaal party really mean that the settlement of Stellaland and Goshen shall be one, and Mr. Rhodes has objected strongly to that at Goshen, what is left to them in honour but to do the same as to Stellaland?

Before we find out whether they will take this course or not, we must briefly describe the "peace" which was now made between Mr. Gey van Pittius and his followers and the chief Montsioa, through the official intervention of General Joubert, the Transvaal Commissioner. The Rooi Grond people had not recognised the Imperial Government in their proposals to Mr. Rhodes and General Joubert, but offered to recognise the Cape Colony and the Transvaal Government beyond the boundary of Goshen, provided these Governments would be responsible for the peace of those parts of Bechuanaland. After Mr. Rhodes's departure, there was no further mention of the Cape Colony. Montsioa agreed

to Mr. Joubert as arbiter, so that the Transvaal Government was now to be the final court of appeal; and each contracting party agreed to forfeit for the benefit of the other the sum of £10,000 for any breach of the agreement then made—the judges in the matter to be the “Administrator and Government of the Transvaal, to whom was granted an irrevocable power to recover the penalty above named from the party in default” (4213, 94). Montsioa and his people were to receive ten farms; but this was modified by another article which stipulated that the agreement “should in no wise prejudicially affect any of the territorial or *de facto* rights now or formerly acquired by the great chief Moshette and his people and the white population of the Land of Goshen.” Montsioa was made to acknowledge that he had unlawfully broken the former treaty, and now gives himself and his people over unconditionally to the Government and inhabitants of “Land Goossen,” promising to give all assistance to the burghers who will proceed to occupy the farms allotted to them. The chief is made to give thanks because the war indemnity is no longer demanded of him, and agrees to destroy all entrenchments and fortifications, and henceforth to hold Mafiking as an open town; and if he fails to do this, that all consequent military expense shall be levied on him. Montsioa and his people were thus entirely in the hands of Mr. van Pittius and his Bestuur. No mention is made of old Moshette, except as the ornamental figure-head, so to speak, of the Rooi Grond Government. What would have become of him and his people under these Rooi Grond treaties can only be dimly surmised. In short, the native chiefs are in the hands of the people of Rooi Grond—that is, the volunteers of the Transvaal; and these volunteers, with the natives under them, make themselves over to the supervision of the Transvaal. As to British protection, there is not even the mention of it, and yet Bechuanaland has been under British protection for more than three months! And the people attacked at Mafiking and at Taung, and threatened at Vryburg, are people really and truly under the protection of Great Britain!

Missing Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey on his way

south, as also their messenger sent after him soon after his departure, Mr. Rhodes was first able to unburden his mind of his experiences at Rooi Grond to his fellow-Commissioner Captain Bower at Hart River. They compared the insulting treatment which Mr. Rhodes received at Rooi Grond with the still more hostile action shown towards Captain Bower by the roughs at Hart River, of which we shall hear in next chapter. How stands it now with reference to their Capetown ideas and plans? As a matter of fact, they have both failed completely in the work which they had placed before themselves. They have joined in destroying the Protectorate in Stellaland which they found established, and they have failed to obtain an iota of satisfaction from the Transvaal volunteers, either at Hart River or Rooi Grond. Even now, as they take counsel together at Delarey's farm, they find themselves in an entirely subordinate position: they are waiting the arrival of the Transvaal Commissioner, to whose decision the affairs of Her Majesty's Protectorate are being submitted by Van Niekerk and Delarey. The High Commissioner had accepted this charge in England, with the understanding that it should be carried out; he devolved it on men who, he knew, would devolve it again on Van Niekerk and Delarey; and now Delarey and Van Niekerk have taken it to lay it before General Joubert!

There is still one honest course left to these Commissioners, which must have strongly approved itself to their minds, although they did not eventually adopt it,—to return at once to Capetown and announce what had happened to them. At Hart River and at Rooi Grond, independence of all control is demanded, save that of the Transvaal, which is welcomed. They have been deceived; and the more they have trusted certain men, the more the Protectorate has lost. This is an unpleasant story to tell, but it is the truth. It is only fair to the High Commissioner, who has never shared the ardour of their faith in their success, that their failure should be plainly stated. And it is only fair to the loyal and peace-loving people in South Africa, as well as to the English Government and people, that the plain issue as it now stands should be presented to them for their consideration. That issue is,

shall Bechuanaland belong to the Transvaal or not? Shall English supremacy continue to be a fact in South African history, or not? Well had it been for the highest interests of the country had the Imperial or Colonial Commissioners now regarded their cup of humiliation as being too full for further addition; and had the question of upholding the Protectorate and the cause of peace and order, of truth and justice, been brought forward as it then stood. But such was not their final decision. Than the low depths to which they had dragged themselves and the Government they represented, there was to be a lower still; and so they awaited at Delarey's farm the return of the leaders of the Transvaal volunteers and the Transvaal Commissioner.

CHAPTER VI

SUBMISSION TO THE FREEBOOTERS AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE PROTECTORATE

ALTHOUGH I had received poor encouragement in tendering advice in recent Stellaland movements, I could not see them go entirely wrong without an effort to set them right. When it was reluctantly agreed by the High Commissioner to allow Captain Bower to proceed to Bechuanaland to assist Mr. Rhodes there, I strongly urged at Government House that he should at once telegraph from Capetown, and call all within the boundary of Stellaland to a meeting to be held at Vryburg on a date previous to the hostile meeting called by Delarey and Van Niekerk at Hart River. I pointed out that in that way I had drawn off the Stellaland public from Van Niekerk's meetings early in July, and pleaded that it would give the well-disposed Stellalanders a chance of showing their true character and wishes; and that I had not the slightest doubt, from my knowledge of the people, that if this course were followed the Hart River faction would again find themselves in a small minority, and their opposition would be powerless. I urged that this course was absolutely required if we would retain our self-respect or be respected in the country, and that it was imperatively called for if the Protectorate was to be upheld. To my great regret, the proposition was rejected by Captain Bower, to whose decision it was left. But whilst refusing to call this meeting, Captain Bower took back with him the Stellaland freebooting flag, which had been formally handed to me by its real owners, and which I had brought to Cape-

town—a tangible and undeniable proof of what personal influence had accomplished in Stellaland. When Captain Bower made up his mind to carry back the freebooting flag to Stellaland, there was no longer any room for hope as to the Protectorate, or as to the nature of the arrangement which he would make. Taking back that flag and handing it to Van Niekerk and Delarey included everything else, and prepared my mind for everything else, in the way of humiliation to the Imperial Government, which afterwards took place.

Captain Bower left Capetown on the 15th August in order to be present at the meeting of Messrs. van Niekerk and Delarey's followers on the 25th at the Hart River. In the intervening days after his arrival in Bechuanaland, the Captain did as much as could be looked for from one man to lower the position of Her Majesty's Government in the country—of course always with the opposite intention. He began by arresting George Lennox (Scotty Smith) on a charge of having fired at a Boer a long time before, while he made no effort to arrest the latter, although it was said he had been the aggressor, and had fired at Smith first. There had been cattle raids on Mankoroane by natives usually acting under the influence of Delarey and Van Niekerk. These men had been met armed in Bechuanaland by Mr. Rhodes. They attacked Mankoroane's cattle-posts, fired on the herds, and drove off the cattle to the town of Massow, to which they were traced by a party of police. Massow refused to give up Mankoroane's cattle when the officer in charge of the police demanded them. Captain Bower attempted no arrests on this side. Mankoroane's people made reprisals among the cattle-posts of the natives who acted under Stellaland and Transvaal dictation. Captain Bower says Scotty Smith was involved in this latter raid; but this was never proved, nor charged against him at the time of his arrest, and was probably thought of afterwards in justification of an action which was everywhere condemned. George Lennox was found by Captain Bower in the Imperial service, in which he had recently run personal risk, and in which, as I believe, he had made up his mind to work well and honourably. It was easy for Captain Bower in these cir-

cumstances to arrest Lennox and send him off to prison, from which after a time he was discharged, there being no case against him. By this arrest, the news of which astonished all South Africa, the Imperial Government loudly proclaimed to its enemies its helplessness and to its friends its faithlessness. Scotty Smith had "lifted" cattle from the enemies of Mankoroane our ally. In this he was neither better nor worse than the notorious cattle-raiders of the Hart River district, who had "lifted" Mankoroane's cattle. Cattle-thieves, forsooth! In a few days Captain Bower would be their companion if not their guest, and not a word is said in any part of his report concerning the mode of life of men whose doings for years on the Transvaal border would make ordinary people's ears tingle. The true and only explanation of the arrest of Smith was that Captain Bower, as the reader is aware, had the Stellaland freebooting flag in his charge, and his actions must all appropriately lead up to its presentation to Van Niekerk and Delarey.

At Vryburg the Stellaland police enrolled by me from among the sons of the loyal people of the country, were disbanded by Captain Bower. It is true I left the country before I was able to purchase for them the necessary number of horses or to procure for them guns and ammunition; but so it was with reference to the rest of the police. The true remedy was not to disband them, but to complete their equipment. Mr. Rhodes also decried these Stellaland men and approved of their disbandment by Captain Bower. He even coarsely accused me of having enrolled them from an unworthy motive. His words to the High Commissioner on the 14th August were: "Of course Hasset's police are useless: it was simply a sop to get his support" (4252, 4). But when Sir Charles Warren and his officers approached Bechuanaland, with keen eyes and unprejudiced minds, Mr. Rhodes changed his view altogether as to these men, and hastened to telegraph to Sir Charles, while yet at Barkly West, concerning them, on the 14th January:—

"A Mr. Hasset here could raise about forty good men, who can both ride and shoot well—in fact, as well as the Boers. He belonged to the Mackenzie party, and it would materially help me to administer

the country if occupation could be found for these men. . . . I must state that the class of men he could raise would be infinitely better than any you could raise in Kimberley."

So Mr. Rhodes, supposed to be acting as an Imperial officer, informs the High Commissioner in August that a certain body of men enrolled by me are worthless, and they were disbanded by Captain Bower. In January following the same Mr. Rhodes informs Sir C. Warren that the same men are infinitely better than men enlisted in Kimberley, and asks that they may be enrolled again! The reader can make his own comment on conduct so unlooked-for from an officer in Her Majesty's service. In this case also the real reason for the disbandment of these capable and loyal men in Stellaland itself, was that Captain Bower had the flag of the freebooters in his portmanteau, and these very Stellaland farmers and farmers' sons who constituted the Stellaland division of the police, along with their fathers and friends, were the very people who had handed that flag to me, and who with their own hands hoisted the flag of England in its place. The disbandment of the Stellaland division of police by Captain Bower meant that the Queen's protection was withdrawn from Stellaland, and that duly authorised public engagements were repudiated. Whoever had not submitted to the Transvaal party before had better do so now.

Both Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes realised when they reached Bechuanaland what was meant by the hostile Transvaal border, of which I kept writing some months before, but along which it was insisted I ought to send my supplies for Mafiking. We have seen that Mr. Rhodes regarded it as unsafe for himself to travel within the Protectorate. He reported:—

"I was unable to pass through the Protectorate, that portion of it adjacent to the Transvaal border being in possession of the Rooi Gronders" (4213, 108).

But Captain Bower in abandoning Vryburg did so in entire ignorance of the capabilities of Bechuanaland itself in the matter of supply of food, and apparently knowing of no second route to the Colony except the one he himself had

taken. Thus, in spite of their entreaty and protest, Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower deliberately abandoned the loyal people of Stellaland who submitted to the Imperial Government when it first appeared in the country—an excellent lesson surely to teach the next people, white or black, who may be asked in the Queen's name to desist from fighting and submit to Her Majesty's authority. No one need wonder if they think twice before doing so; for they cannot but remember that the Stellaland people submitted to the Queen, but were deserted by Her Majesty's officers, and literally betrayed into the hands of those from whom their loyalty had separated them. The conduct and policy of Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower disturbed the true work of the Protectorate from the beginning, and in the end completely destroyed it. Mr. Rhodes found the great body of the Stellaland people well pleased with the Protectorate. He told them it was at an end, and Captain Bower removed all trace of it. It is seldom that officers in Her Majesty's service allow themselves to perform such actions, and it is still less frequent that they justify their action by spreading such misleading statements as those which were furnished by my successors. Nothing more outrageous has ever been advanced by a responsible officer than the statement by Mr. Rhodes that the party which supported the Protectorate in Stellaland was confined to the town of Vryburg, or the assertions of Captain Bower that Stellaland had been in a state of rebellion for three months: that I had no more than fifty adherents altogether, and that of these no more than four were farmers. No grown-up man could have visited Stellaland at the time Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower did and believed such statements.

Having removed all semblance of a Protectorate from Stellaland, Captain Bower passed over into the Transvaal, reaching Delarey's farm, close to Commando Drift, on the 23d August. Here they were joined by Mr. van Niekerk on the 24th; and Captain Bower informs us that during the course of the day he arranged with him and with Mr. A. J. G. Delarey the proposals which were to be submitted to the meeting to be held at Losasa the next day. These

were no other than the "ultimatum" given to Mr. Rhodes by Mr. Niekerk, and reported in his telegram of the 14th of August, with a clause added "recognising" the Protectorate. These proposals were ostensibly accepted by Messrs. Niekerk and Delarey for themselves, but they expressed themselves as doubtful of their ability to carry the people with them. Captain Bower reports that many, especially those of the poorer class, were bent on war at any price, hoping to get fresh land and loot (4213, 126). It will be observed that, owing to Mr. Rhodes's arrangements, the "ultimatum" of the freebooters at Hart River had to be considered with them at their meeting by the Imperial Secretary, who travelled from Capetown and waited on them for this purpose. The High Commissioner was thus directly and specially involved in the unfortunate transactions which then took place. Having the freebooting flag in his port-manteau, Captain Bower hands it to Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey, and yields to their terms. The freebooters are of course delighted. They have not done business with any one so pleasantly for a long time, if ever; but, instead of admitting this, they skilfully draw in the strongest colours the difficulties of their position, and the cordiality with which, as leaders, Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk would serve an Imperial officer who has given them back their independence, accompanied with their flag; but "the people" are violent; still they will do their best.

Captain Bower describes the meeting of hostile men with whom he did business on behalf of the High Commissioner and Her Majesty's Government on the 26th of August—the very day that Mr. Rhodes spent at Rooi Grond. Captain Bower considered that there would be between 300 and 400 men present. He analysed the crowd as follows:—

(1) Moderate men owning considerable property in Stellaland. "These men," says Captain Bower, "seemed afraid to assert themselves, and although they spoke to me personally and expressed their dissent from the opinions of the others, they never, as a body, seemed to make any stand in defence of their convictions." (2) Those who had lost cattle which were supposed to have been stolen by people living in Mankoroane's country. (3) The most violent class, which "was made up of men who had no property, and who were anxious

for plunder. Some of them were residents in Stellaland"—Hart River district—"but the majority seemed to be Transvaal Boers, who had attended the meeting in the hope that it would be followed by a cattle raid, in which they might share."

The first class of men mentioned by Captain Bower consisted of those loyal Stellalanders who were dragged into the Transvaal, sorely against their inclinations, by the action of Messrs. Rhodes and Bower. They accompanied the Imperial officers, and waited with them on Messrs. van Niekerk and Delarey. Every one of those men would have attended Mr. Rhodes or Captain Bower's meeting had it been held at Vryburg. One of the men who took a leading part in the Stellaland settlement with me was present at this meeting, and his name is found at the final agreement signed by Mr. Rhodes. He would never have taken the steps which he did if the orderly Government of Stellaland had been proceeded with by my successors. He simply followed the new Commissioners to secure his land. There was, no doubt, irritation with reference to cattle-thefts; but none knew better than the loyal people of Stellaland the shortcomings of some of their quondam Hart River friends in this matter of stock-lifting; and the true remedy which I had longed for was by this time in Bechuanaland, in the shape of Major Lowe's police. Who was it who objected at the outset to these police entering Stellaland at all? The Hart River party, by the mouth of Mr. van Niekerk. The men who had lost stock would also have attended Captain Bower's meeting at Vryburg and lodged with him their complaints; and better steps could then have been taken for the recovery of their stock—if it was really within the Protectorate—than any which were taken at Hart River.

We come now to the third division of the crowd:—

"These men," continues Captain Bower, referring to the strangers present, "were strongly opposed to any settlement at all, and a section of them were in favour of compromising the others by shooting me. Two men actually loaded their rifles and, followed by a few irreconcilables, came round within view of the place where I was standing. They announced their intention of shooting the '*verdomde Rooi-nek,*' and one of them actually pointed his rifle at me; but, fortunately, some of the more moderate Boers perceived his intention and prevented

him from firing. . . . Mr. Delarey begged me to come down to his waggon for a time, and I observed that on my return to the meeting there were generally a number of the Delareys or their friends in my neighbourhood" (4213, 127).

It is said the wild beast never announces its presence when it is about to spring on its prey: the assassin who would shoot an English officer would do so without ostentatiously loading his gun and openly presenting it at that officer's head. These wretched miscreants most likely did not mean murder but mere insult and wanton contempt. And the most debased men in that crowd, whose notorious and frightful actions were only imitated at a distance by the wretches who so outraged the Imperial Secretary, were the very men in whom Captain Bower was placing his chief reliance.

With reference to the lawless and rabid crowd from the Transvaal, it ought to be remembered by whom they had been assembled and for what purpose. These Transvaal people had been called together by Messrs. Delarey and Van Niekerk, time and place having long been publicly intimated in the newspapers in the same way that Van Pittius had advertised for recruits. Should they take the law into their own hands, now that they have been brought together, the heads of the meeting, Delarey and Van Niekerk, would certainly be responsible. It is not unlikely that some of these men were really angry, and angry with those who had called the meeting. They saw that so far as Van Niekerk was concerned, it was a bogus meeting—got up as a demonstration to overawe the Englishmen. But what would Delarey and some of the others say, now that the men had assembled? As a matter of course, if any of them went into the Protectorate, it would be for cattle. The idea of their attacking Vryburg was ridiculous. There were no cattle in Vryburg, and not much goods in the village store. And the people of Vryburg were not only poor, but were, after all, Stellalanders like themselves. It was quite as unlikely that they would proceed against Taung for another set of reasons. They had never made anything by an attack on Taung when Mankoroane and his people were alone and without police. Now he was defended by Major Lowe's force; and they

knew that if they went against Taung, it would simply be their destruction. What they could have now done themselves—as they had been doing recently, through the natives who were their allies—was to imitate the Goshen tactics and to go on a rapid raid on some large native cattle-post, seize the cattle with as little delay as possible, and hasten back with them into the Transvaal. There was not a man assembled under Delarey and Van Niekerk who advocated more than the theft of Mankoroane's cattle. And if they did not actually go to steal them, it was not on account of their respect for Captain Bower, or their regard for the leaders of the meeting, but because they did not care to run the evident risk then connected with a raid into the Protectorate. And if such were their feelings when the Imperial Secretary was helplessly standing there among them under the patronage and protection of their leaders, how much less courage would the lawless have had, if every loyal and peace-loving Stellalander there that day, had been at Vryburg, instead of hanging about at Hart River, like the Imperial Secretary, to wait the pleasure of Delarey and Van Niekerk?

Captain Bower was informed by Mr. van Niekerk that the meeting refused to agree to the ratification of any terms. No doubt they thought it would be highly unwise for them to do so without knowing, in the first instance, what their friends at Rooi Grond had succeeded in getting. So Delarey and Van Niekerk, contemptuously breaking off their negotiations with the Imperial Secretary, started on a visit to Rooi Grond to find out how matters had been managed there. Mr. van Niekerk was perfectly frank with the Imperial Secretary, telling him that he had been commissioned to lay the terms on which peace should be granted to the southern part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, before General Joubert of the Transvaal, for his consideration; and Captain Bower was expected to await Delarey and Van Niekerk's return at Mr. Delarey's farm. On receiving this information Captain Bower at once acquiesced, and retired from the meeting to his quarters at Delarey's farm. No Imperial officer before or since was ever in such a position

—dogging the steps of freebooters in the Transvaal with proffered repudiation of our own accredited and official actions within an English Protectorate, and dogging their footsteps in vain! Cape colonist, Free State farmer, roving European—each and all became aware that day that there was no Imperial or Colonial authority in Bechuanaland. Delarey and Van Niekerk were masters; but they gladly acknowledged that they too had a master—the Transvaal Government, then represented on the border by General Joubert; and they accordingly proceeded to lay the affairs of the Protectorate before General Joubert at Goshen, while the secretary of the High Commissioner waited the turn of events, and the wishes of others, at Mr. Delarey's farm.

The first to relieve the tedium of Captain Bower's waiting was the messenger sent after Mr. Rhodes, by Mr. van Niekerk and General Joubert, from Rooi Grond. The letters were sent in such haste because the writers hoped Mr. Rhodes might return on receipt of them. But there are many roads or waggon-tracks in these regions; and so it happened that the messenger sent after Mr. Rhodes only a few hours after he left Rooi Grond, passing him by, reached Hart River before him; so that Captain Bower, opening on the 30th August the letters addressed to Mr. Rhodes, learned first from them that Mr. Rhodes had failed in his mission to Rooi Grond. On the 1st of September Mr. Rhodes arrived at Hart River, and to him, according to Captain Bower, must be ascribed the honour of deciding to wait for the coming of the authorities of the Transvaal. General Joubert could hardly expect to find them there, for he had told Montsioa that Mr. Rhodes had returned to the Cape Colony. But Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey knew they could rely on Captain Bower; and their confidence was not misplaced.

On the 3d of September the two British Commissioners found themselves confronted by Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey, General Joubert and Commissioner Schoeman, and Secretary Buskes. Captain Bower upheld the course which Mr. Rhodes had taken at Rooi Grond; and both British Commissioners coincided in informing General Joubert that—

“They could not possibly recognise in any way the peace agreement with Montsioa or the so-called Government of the Land of Goshen. Our position in regard to those persons was simply that they were a gang of pirates making war on a native chief under Her Majesty’s protection” (4213, 128).

Mr. Rhodes mentions in his report that the Imperial Secretary—

“Warned General Joubert of the serious responsibility which the Transvaal Government were incurring by their almost open encouragement of these lawless proceedings. As an instance of this virtual encouragement Captain Bower pointed to the public enlistment of volunteers at Pretoria which had been for some time going on without let or hindrance from the Transvaal Government” (4213, 108).

These were true words, and one would expect great things on reading them, as to the doctrines which were now to animate the representatives of the English Government at a trying crisis. Van Niekerk and Delarey, on hearing these words, no doubt concluded that their game was up, and their hoodwinking schemes about to be exposed. They could not but expect to be informed by British officers holding such views that they regretted to see another horde of pirates, chiefly from the Transvaal, collected at Hart River, for the express purpose of overawing them as British officers, and extracting from them terms which would be detrimental as well as humiliating to Her Majesty’s Protectorate.

In reply, General Joubert informed Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, with reference to the hostile attitude of the Rooi Grond people to a chief under British protection, that “he had nothing to do with that, his mission being solely for the purpose of assisting Mr. Rhodes in a friendly settlement of affairs” (4213, 128). He was no doubt encouraged in ignoring the Imperial Government by knowing the publicly-expressed sentiments of Mr. Rhodes on this question. It will be remembered that the High Commissioner, in requesting the Transvaal Government to send a Commissioner to meet Mr. Rhodes, expressly stated that the object was if possible to effect a peaceful settlement (4213, 43). And President Kruger emphasised the pacific nature of the work, saying that in his view it was only possible to settle the matter by pacific means, and not by employing force (4213,

44). From the Transvaal point of view this meant that some friendly arrangement would be come to with the Rooi Grond volunteers. This was no doubt the meaning of President Kruger when he spoke of "going to work in a pacific manner." This was also Van Niekerk and Delarey's opinion. But the policy of Captain Bower, in which he thought Van Niekerk would support him, was that the Hart River freebooters should assist us to expel the Rooi Grond freebooters from Bechuanaland. This hope was expressed by Mr. Rhodes even after he reached Bechuanaland (4213, 41). But this would not have been a "peaceful settlement," but a forceful one, even if it had been practicable. The friendly connection between Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, the close connection between Van Niekerk and Rooi Grond, were well known at Pretoria. It was understood that Mr. Rhodes was recognising the pseudo-treaty of Massow and Mankoroane, to the advantage of the Stellaland freebooters. No doubt was entertained either at Hart River or at Pretoria that this implied similar recognition of a similar treaty between Moshette and Montsioa, and to the advantage of the freebooters of Rooi Grond. The treaties were equally worthless; but if one was good, so were they both. At this time no one of those negotiating at Hart River paid any serious attention to the claims or wishes of the Imperial Government in the matter; and so General Joubert, on learning that the British Commissioners would not recognise what he had done at Rooi Grond on behalf of the Transvaal Government, made no overture whatever for revoking it, or even modifying it; nor indeed does he appear to have been asked to do so. Taking on himself and his Government the full responsibility of the openly hostile treatment which had been accorded to a chief under British protection by Transvaal people, General Joubert proceeded to discuss with the two Commissioners—and the two Commissioners consented to discuss with him—the question of stolen cattle!

It was now, however, quite certain that all hope was gone of a "friendly arrangement," except at the dictation of the Transvaal, so far as the Barolong part of Bechuanaland was concerned. It was equally plain that the power

with which England and the party of order in South Africa had to contend was not the freebooters of Goshen and of Hart River alone, but also their supporters and sympathisers in the Transvaal and elsewhere in South Africa. After Mr. Rhodes's own treatment at Rooi Grond, and Captain Bower's rougher experience at Hart River, the British Commissioners would have been fully warranted in leaving that Transvaal border where they had been so ill received. Since they had resolved to wait for the Transvaal authorities, and had united in the expression of the just sentiments quoted above, one would expect them to have shown a similar spirit when the affairs of the rest of the Protectorate were considered. But alas! such expectation is cruelly disappointed by what now took place at Hart River.

The "ultimatum" of Mr. van Niekerk to the officer in charge of Her Majesty's Protectorate in Bechuanaland, which was submitted to the High Commissioner by Mr. Rhodes, has already been given to the reader (4213, 112). It contained no recognition of Her Majesty's Protectorate in Bechuanaland. This ultimatum had been accepted by Captain Bower on the 24th August (4213; 126, 130) with the modification of a nominal recognition of the Protectorate by Messrs. Van Niekerk and Delarey, while they were allowed to govern Stellaland in their own way in the meantime, "pending annexation to the Cape Colony"—an event the probability of which was a quite open question. In this document of Captain Bower, the officers of the Stellaland Government who had all submitted to the Imperial Government were no longer openly threatened with deprivation of office as in the original document, but the offices were to be filled in a way which infallibly secured the same end—the punishment of men, openly and heavily, for their prompt submission to the Queen and their loyalty to her Government. But on the 26th of August a remarkable thing had taken place—the assemblage of Boers refused to accept their own ultimatum as modified by the Imperial Secretary, and containing a "recognition" of the Imperial Government. The fact was that their self-confidence was increased by the yielding attitude of the Imperial officers. Why should they grant

anything to the Imperial Government? Why should they transact any business or make any stipulation with a Government in the attitude presented by Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower? So on the 26th of August, as we have seen, the Boers at Hart River refused to ratify their own ultimatum, when it was in their eyes vitiated by an article recognising Her Majesty's Protectorate (4213, 127). When they saw that their threats had brought the Imperial Secretary from Capetown to treat with them on the Hart River, they determined to press for entire independence of the Imperial Government. We are told by Captain Bower that on the 4th September Mr. van Niekerk brought forward a fresh demand "which he considered would be acceptable to his people." Its terms, however, were such as even Captain Bower could not agree to. Why is not this document given by Captain Bower in his report? To suppress it is unfair to the real Mr. van Niekerk of Hart River, although the ideal Mr. van Niekerk of the Bluebooks might figure strangely as its author. The English and South African statesman has a right to complain that when Mr. van Niekerk—at that time master of the situation—put forward proposals which his friend Captain Bower was unable to accede to, the proposals in question are not given. By the suppression of this document the right understanding of Mr. van Niekerk's position is hindered, and has to be ascertained by inference, whereas in the suppressed document the demands were probably quite as plain as those made at Goshen by Mr. van Pittius. His main effort no doubt was to get, at once, entire independence of Her Majesty's Government. He and his people openly desired and meant to join Bechuanaland to the Transvaal. For this they might have to wait. What they in the meantime insisted on was, that the Protectorate must not be recognised; and that from the outset the affairs of Stellaland must be left entirely in their hands, as Goshen was in the hands of Van Pittius. We shall see that this was fully agreed to. Captain Bower left the Boer meeting to make preparations for the defence of Taung, under the mistaken idea that the blustering fellows he had been treating with would hazard an attack on that

place. He left with Mr. Rhodes, as having his approval, the following agreement, except the fifth Article, which was added by Mr. Rhodes after Captain Bower's departure, and signed by him on behalf of the Imperial Government, and by the Boers on the 8th September 1884:—

“*Article I.*—That all transactions entered into between Mr. John Mackenzie with the Volks Committee and the proclamations issued by him be cancelled.

“*Article II.*—Pending the annexation to the Cape Colony, Stellaland shall continue its own government, recognising, however, Her Majesty's Protectorate, and subject to the conditions that all executive acts must be taken in concert and with the consent of the Commissioner of Bechuanaland.

“*Article III.*—That the land titles issued by the Government of Stellaland be recognised.

“*Article IV.*—That in accordance with the proposal offered by Messieurs P. J. Joubert, Superintendent of Native Affairs, and H. Schoeman, Member of the Native Location Commission for South African Republic, on the one side, and Mr. C. J. Rhodes, Commissioner of Bechuanaland, on the other, the proposal contained in copy of letter A shall be adopted, and copy of letter marked B to the administration of Stellaland.

(Copies A and B attached.)

[This Article, so undefined, had reference to past cattle-thefts, and was explained by Mr. Rhodes thus:—“Note: The suggestion is, we shall each collect a list of claims for stock thefts. Niekerk agrees that in case of non-agreement we refer the matter for arbitration” (4213, 97).]

“*Article V.*—That with the object of Stellaland Government completing its affairs, the period of three months shall be reserved before Article II. will come in force with its Protectorate, and during which time the public shall maintain their rights, and have them fulfilled in accordance with Article IV.

“We, the undersigned Committee, members chosen by the people on the 6th inst., hereby declare to have accepted the above terms and conditions on this 8th day of the month of September 1884:—

(Signed) “A. J. E. DE LA REY, *President.*
 “L. E. L. MUSMANN, *Secretary.*
 “W. J. PRETORIUS, *Member of Committee.*
 “P. J. BODENSTEIN, ”
 “THEODOR DOMS, ”
 “A. P. VAN ZYL, ”
 “J. S. KOTZE, ”

"I, the undersigned, Commissioner of Bechuanaland, hereby declare to have read the above-mentioned terms, and to accept and ratify them on this 8th day of September 1884.

(Signed) "C. J. RHODES,
"Commissioner of Bechuanaland.

"F. R. THOMPSON,
"Secretary of Commission of Bechuanaland" (4213, 123).

I do not know anything which can fairly be brought forward in justification of this degrading arrangement. In extenuation of it, the High Commissioner urged that it was made at a time when we had no force in the country (4432, 106). Great Britain is never in circumstances when her officers are justified in thus degrading her. No agreement would have been better in every way than this one, just as silence is infinitely more desirable than foolish talk. This agreement was made at the wrong place, with the wrong people, and professed to transact business which it was out of the power of Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, in concert with their Hart River friends, to accomplish. From beginning to ending, and with reference to every actor in the affair, it was clearly and distinctly *ultra vires*. Not one of the actors was covered by sufficient authority for what he then transacted. The Transvaal burghers were private persons, acting in direct breach of a proclamation of their State; the Imperial officers had power to act within Bechuanaland only; and when they professed to annul the Imperial Protectorate in part of Bechuanaland and sanction a Republic in its place, their action was evidently null and incompetent. No one in South Africa had authority to cover a transaction of this nature. Officers of Her Majesty had power to uphold the Protectorate by one method or another, but not even the highest officer had authority thus to give it up.

The first and the most disloyal Article in the agreement was the formal repudiation of the Imperial action taken up to this time in Bechuanaland, and the disacknowledging and breaking all the public promises which had been made, and in connection with which oaths had been publicly taken

in good faith. Rightly to appreciate this step it must always be borne in mind that it was taken after Mr. Rhodes's failure to arrive at a settlement at Rooi Grond, and when it was well known to Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes that the exhibition of force on the part of Her Majesty's Government would now be absolutely necessary in the settlement of Bechuanaland, and for the general peace of South Africa. With reference to Article III., and the recognition of all Stellaland land titles, both Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes clearly show that they regarded their Hart River friends as an entirely new organisation. In his proposal of the 24th August, the Imperial Secretary undertook "that the land titles, as issued by the former *de facto* Government of Stellaland," would be recognised at once. Mr. Rhodes had recognised that Van Niekerk's hostile action in June was a new departure—he "had proclaimed a separate Government at Hart River" (4213, 37); and now Captain Bower, in a formal document, recognises the same fact, that Van Niekerk and Delarey had at that time nothing to do with "the former *de facto* Government of Stellaland" which had submitted to Her Majesty's Protectorate, and was now in consequence about to be repudiated at the dictation of Transvaal burghers. By the third Article all right of inquiry into land questions was given up by the Imperial officers. Whatever cases of coercion might occur, and however gross the mismanagement of land and public affairs might have been, Messrs. Rhodes and Bower agreed to endorse without inquiry, and without knowledge of what they were doing, all and any title-deed of the so-called Government of Stellaland under the chief Massow. To sign this would seem to have been a misappropriation and abuse of their powers, which were supposed to be exercised only in behalf of a Protectorate. This was not merely retiring from a Protectorate; it was formally renouncing the power to protect, and was therefore an incompetent action from the first.

The clause of the ultimatum about which there was the longest discussion was the second. Two Transvaal burghers—Van Niekerk and Delarey—after having been assenting

parties to the establishment of Her Majesty's authority in Vryburg in May, with the most astounding presumption, and only by the help of their Capetown friends, came forward in the Transvaal with a new so-called Government for part of Her Majesty's Protectorate, the old Stellaland Government having submitted to Her Majesty's Commissioner, and having been entrusted by him with the management of the affairs of their respective offices as a temporary arrangement. There was, it is sad and degrading to relate, no apparent difficulty on the part of our two Commissioners (Messrs. Rhodes and Bower) about the recognition of this new "Republic" within the Transvaal, as supplying the Government of part of a British Protectorate, or about the repudiation of engagements made in an authorised way within that Protectorate, with the people who had submitted to it. The delay was not caused by their hesitancy on these points, but by the refusal of Van Niekerk's followers to recognise the Protectorate in any shape or form. The freebooters now asked themselves why they should recognise the Protectorate at all? They declined to do so, and insisted that Stellaland must be left in their hands without any Imperial control whatever. They never receded from that position, which amounted to the removal of Stellaland from Her Majesty's Protectorate. Now it was clearly beyond the power of Mr. Rhodes or Captain Bower, or even of the High Commissioner, to abandon the Protectorate, or to transact any business of this nature in the Transvaal Republic, and with burghers of the Transvaal. Captain Bower would seem to have been merely helping Mr. Rhodes, and the Commission of Mr. Rhodes expressly confines his actions within the limits of Bechuanaland. No one in South Africa, without special instructions, had power to give up to a foreign, hostile, and unrecognised body of men a part of Her Majesty's Protectorate; and yet this is what was demanded by this Transvaal faction at Hart River, and this is what they practically succeeded in obtaining from Mr. Rhodes. Refusing positively to recognise Her Majesty's authority in any way whatever, the followers of Van Niekerk gained the day. Mr. Rhodes was

unable to consent to the actual removal from the agreement of Article II., which contained recognition of the Protectorate ; but Mr. Rhodes thought he had power to add a new Article (V.) after Captain Bower's departure, to the following effect :—

“That with the object of Stellaland Government completing its affairs, the period of three months shall be reserved before Article II. will come in force with its Protectorate, and during which time the public shall maintain their rights, and have them fulfilled in accordance with Article IV.”

We do not pause to notice the astounding statement that those with whom Mr. Rhodes was negotiating had a right to regard themselves as the Government of Stellaland. The officers of Stellaland, duly elected under Mr. van Niekerk and the freebooters, were then at Vryburg, and so were the offices and public documents. These men on the Hart River had no “affairs” to complete in Stellaland, except to prevent it from settling down under the Queen's Protectorate. What it is most important to notice, however, is that the presence of the fifth Article *in effect removes the second Article from the agreement for the space of three months.* Article IV. also, *as now interpreted by Article V.,* will always enable the Hart River people to declare that the agreement of the 8th September had not been “fulfilled” in the matter of stolen cattle, to which Article IV. referred ; and that, therefore, the agreement, as a whole, was not binding upon them. We are precluded from the belief that they had any intention whatever to recognise the Imperial Government after three months, by their immediate action in raising a petition for annexation to the Transvaal, and by the bold and even threatening words of a letter which Mr. van Niekerk addressed to his people in connection with that petition, a copy of which letter he forwarded to the High Commissioner, along with a copy of the petition, for his information. Here are Van Niekerk's views as to recognition of Her Majesty's Government :—

“Should no effect be given to our equitable wishes to be incorporated either with the South African Republic or with the Cape Colony, then we continue with you to resist any authority which may be forced on us ; and then may the All-wise and Righteous One grant us light and strength to maintain our cause” (4275, 24).

Thus, a few turbulent men on the western border of the Transvaal overawe a British Commissioner who sends their ultimatum to Capetown. This document contains no recognition of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland. Captain Bower leaves Capetown to negotiate with these Transvaal burghers, and takes with him the Stellaland flag, which he hands over to Van Niekerk and Delarey. In the written agreement, however, Captain Bower inserts an article recognising, on the part of the Boers, the Protectorate of Her Majesty in Bechuanaland—which had been formally declared several months before. The Boers accept their republican flag, but refuse to “recognise” this Protectorate; and Captain Bower’s document containing this recognition is rejected by them on the 26th August, and afterwards at the meetings in the month of September. Captain Bower, therefore, leaves Hart River under the impression that his agreement has been rejected owing to the insertion of the clause demanding a “recognition” of the Protectorate. After his departure Mr. Rhodes adds Article V. to the agreement, which is then signed. A faithful reporter of the actual state of the country would surely emphasise this determined refusal of the Hart River freebooters to recognise the Imperial Government, and their openly stated allegiance to the Transvaal, which was abundantly shown by Van Niekerk’s breaking off negotiations with Captain Bower on the 26th August, in order to submit the whole matter to General Joubert of the Transvaal. A warning would be given by such a reporter that Article II. must be read in the light of Article V.; and that, as a matter of fact, our Commissioners had completely failed in securing any present or real recognition of Her Majesty’s Protectorate. The Boers had indeed dispersed, he would have reported to the Secretary of State, but it was not because we had “quieted” them, but because we had given them back their independence.

On the 11th of September the High Commissioner, who had before him the text of the above agreement, made the following announcement to the Colonial Secretary in London:—

“Rhodes and Bower, from Barkly West, telegraph that after three

days' discussion peaceful settlement of Stellaland difficulty has been effected, and the armed party assembled at Losasa, about 400 in number, have dispersed. Basis of arrangement is that pending annexation to Cape Colony, Stellaland shall continue its own Government—recognising British Protectorate, and subject to condition that all executive acts must be taken in concert with, and with the consent of Deputy Commissioner of Stellaland ; titles to be recognised, and cattle-thefts to be investigated on both sides. Bower adds that if cattle-stealing can be stopped he sees no danger of any disturbance in Stellaland, and the lives and property of the loyals are now perfectly safe. There seems no longer any danger of attack upon Taung, and, in short, except at Rooi Grond, matters in Bechuanaland seem fairly on the way to peaceful settlement" (4213, 65),

The High Commissioner was fully warranted in giving one of the above statements as the opinion of Captain Bower. It was not well founded ; it was afterwards belied by the disturbances in Vryburg ; but it was never given except as an opinion. But what are we to make of the High Commissioner's telegraphic message to the Secretary of State that Stellaland was recognising the British Protectorate, and that its government was to be carried on subject to the condition "that all executive acts must be taken in concert with, and with consent of, the Deputy Commissioner" ? As a matter of fact, this statement was just the reverse of the truth. What the High Commissioner reported to Her Majesty's Government that Mr. van Niekerk and his followers had done was just what they had positively refused to do. This is a very serious, even an alarming statement, but it cannot possibly be avoided, and in referring to it I shall not use an unnecessary word. A cablegram is a method by which people at a distance are enabled to ascertain speedily and precisely the present condition of things—not the possible condition of things three months hence. But Sir Hercules, in his cable message, reported the possible condition of things in Stellaland three months after that time, and suppressed the actual condition of Stellaland, which was then that of a recognised Republic under its own flag, and openly hostile to the Imperial Government ! Having Article V. before him as well as Article II., the idea of a cablegram suggests that the High Commissioner should have at once sent Article V. containing the real and present condition of Stellaland ; and

that Article II. could well have been detained to go by post, as it had reference to a state of things three months afterwards—a state of things which might never be realised. Sir Hercules, however, cabled the second Article as if there were no fifth Article—that which might happen three months hence as if it were then taking place in Stellaland. The telegram above quoted was received in London on the 11th September. It was not till the 8th October that Her Majesty's Government were in possession of the text of the treaty; and the document was forwarded unaccompanied by explanatory remark. It is, therefore, no matter of surprise that Her Majesty's Government do not seem to have discovered for themselves the incongruity between the document of the 8th September and the official description of it which they had received a month before. It was impossible for them in London to dream that instead of receiving submission, their representatives had themselves submitted to the terms of Delarey and Van Niekerk—had, in fact, abandoned the Protectorate in one part of Bechuanaland, and recognised as its rulers a few Transvaal burghers. There are, I feel sure, a good many Englishmen who will hold further that the repudiation (contained in Article I.) of the previous actions of the Imperial Government in Stellaland demanded special notice from the High Commissioner even in a telegraphic description of what had been done by Mr. Rhodes. By suppressing all mention of Article V. he was able to give to the agreement the idea of finality which it never possessed after the addition to it of that Article; for it then showed itself to be a mere arrangement of convenience, of a temporary and tentative nature. It is not, however, complained that a more detailed telegram was not sent. What I have most reluctantly to submit is that in reading the cablegram in question on the 11th September, Her Majesty's Government were warranted in supposing that they had before them the actual condition of Stellaland, while the actual condition of Stellaland was exactly the reverse of what they read in that message.

Whatever was the result in Downing Street, there can be no doubt as to the effect produced in Capetown. It was

given out there, and naturally credited by every one, that Van Niekerk and Delarey and their followers had submitted to the Protectorate, and were recognising the Deputy Commissioner in their administration of Stellaland—all which statements were incorrect. On the other hand, the Hart River party always held that on the 8th of September they had virtually recovered their independence, although the actual engagement only lasted for three months.

In justice to Captain Bower it must be stated that he formally recognised the change which had been effected in the document after his departure ; but he said that he “readily accepted a joint responsibility with Mr. Rhodes for its terms” (4213, 129).

With regard to Mr. Rhodes’s individual action in this affair, it is apparent that he was well aware that he had not succeeded in securing any present or actual recognition of the Protectorate. But in his report to Sir Hercules Robinson, 20th September 1884 (4213, 109), Mr. Rhodes says:—

“He (Captain Bower) left Mr. van Niekerk several heads of agreement, which embodied, as he said, the utmost to which he could recommend your Excellency to assent. These, with slight modifications—chiefly as to the mode of settling the question of cattle-thefts—were agreed to by the meeting, but not until three days had been spent in discussion of the terms, with danger frequently arising of the negotiations being brought to an abrupt conclusion. The clause which created the greatest difficulty was Article II., insisting upon the practical recognition of Her Majesty’s Protectorate, by providing that all executive acts of the Stellaland Administration should be subject to the assent of the Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland. On this point I declined to yield, and ultimately the assent of the meeting was obtained to the clause in the terms originally drafted by Captain Bower.”

These are astounding words when compared with the document itself. However much one would like to do so, it is impossible to believe that Mr. Rhodes was himself deceived. The fifth Article was not introduced in childishness, after Captain Bower’s departure, and after three days’ discussion and disagreement. This Article represented Mr. Rhodes’s surrender of Imperial interests to Mr. Delarey and Mr. van Niekerk. The suppression by Mr. Rhodes in his report, of all mention of this commanding Article in the

agreement, is very striking, especially as the same report carefully tells us that after his arrival in Capetown he had been in daily consultation with the High Commissioner (4213, 109). Mr. Rhodes's report, therefore, deliberately written in Capetown in these circumstances, gives the reader to believe that Captain Bower's draft agreement, with unimportant modifications, had been agreed to, and especially that Article II., after praiseworthy persistence on the part of Mr. Rhodes, had been accepted by the other side. It seems to me that it is not by statements of this nature that Her Majesty's Government can ascertain the actual condition of a country. The document signed by Mr. Rhodes was not the same as that left by Captain Bower; the additional Article completely changed it; but no official information to that effect ever reached Her Majesty's Government.

We have seen that Mr. van Niekerk and his friends had pledged themselves not to recognise the Protectorate. They regarded themselves as quite free from it by the agreement of the 8th September. According to Mr. van Niekerk, "the administration of Stellaland had been left for three months in their hands" (4275, 24). And when, on the 8th January, Mr. Rhodes came to recapitulate in a speech in Vryburg what he had done on the 8th September, he was reported in the newspapers to have said that one of the conditions was "That the public of Stellaland should retain their own Government for a period of three months." There was no mention of recognition of the Protectorate by Mr. Rhodes in Stellaland—only in his official statement to Her Majesty's Government. What is thus described in documents was also carried into practice in Stellaland itself. The old Stellaland officials who had submitted to the Protectorate were disgracefully deserted by Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower. The new Hart River Republic sent its own officials to Vryburg from the Transvaal. Delarey with his own lips proclaimed publicly in Vryburg that "the country had been handed over to Van Niekerk and him, and the people of the Protectorate were now under him." The two young colonists who had hoisted the British flag with my sanction were put into prison by Delarey and Van Niekerk ten days after the con-

struction and recognition of the new Hart River Republic, and seven days after the Secretary of State in London had been informed of the second Article of a certain agreement, but had not been told of a fifth Article in the same agreement which annulled the second Article for at least three months.

When Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes left Bechuanaland together on the 11th of September, what was its true condition as contrasted with that telegraphed by the High Commissioner to London? The Barolong country was in the hands of Mr. van Pittius by the authority and mediation of General Joubert, who did not recognise the Protectorate at all. Stellaland was in the hands of the Hart River faction, who also absolutely refused to recognise the Protectorate. And here the Imperial Protectorate was expressly abandoned by British Commissioners, and formally repudiated by Van Niekerk and Delarey. As Western Bechuanaland had been previously given up by Lord Derby, after I had made treaties at Pitsani, Morokweng, and Ganyesa, the small district of Taung alone remained in the care of the Imperial Government.

I feel bound to point out that the visit of Messrs. Rhodes and Bower to Bechuanaland was a disservice to England, to Bechuanaland, and to South Africa. They left the name and the honour of England in the lowest possible position. So far as the High Commissioner or his Deputy, Mr. Rhodes, was concerned, their utmost effort had now been put forth, with the sinister assistance of Van Niekerk and Delarey. It is easy to see what the Transvaal party had gained—they had gained recognition as a Government, independence, and time. On our side there was only loss to recount. It was indeed told in Downing Street that the Hart River freebooters “recognised” Her Majesty’s Government. The “recognition” was all the other way—the Hart River Republic was “recognised,” if not created, by the Imperial officers. But for the appearance of the Bechuanaland Expedition, Stellaland as well as Goshen would have belonged to the Transvaal; the way to the interior would have been held if not by Germany, certainly by the Transvaal; and the party of pro-

gress in the Cape Colony would have been outnumbered in the present Colonial Parliament, and helpless to prevent the calamity. One question which would have been asked in England, and asked angrily when that took place, would have been, Why were we not told plainly at the time, that the Hart River Boers, as well as those of Goshen, positively refused to recognise Her Majesty's Protectorate in Bechuanaland?

In the Cape Colony his own difficulties were immensely increased by the recognition which the High Commissioner extended to hostile men at Hart River, at the request of Mr. Rhodes. Similar recognition for the claims of other hostile men at Goshen was demanded by the Cape Ministers:—

“Ministers would further beg to point out that the consent of the Stellalanders is far from being sufficient to render the proposed annexation possible; the consent of the Goshenites is absolutely necessary” (4213, 404).

In the Transvaal, the true character of the transactions on the Hart River was afterwards clearly brought out by the republican paper at Pretoria, the *Volksstem*, in advocating the claims of the Goshen freebooters upon Sir Charles Warren:—

“Mr. Upington had proved most convincingly that the Goshenites and Stellalanders are on precisely the same footing. . . . Even if the Goshen people had knowingly and wilfully fought against the Protectorate, they would only again be on the same footing as the Stellalanders, who stood with weapons in their hands ready to attack Vryburg and haul down the British flag.”

Thus our “backing-out” attitude had gained nothing for us at any point, but had only increased and developed the spirit and the demands of the freebooters. When this question was fully before him as Special Commissioner, Sir Charles Warren expressed his view concerning it in the following terms:—

“There can be no doubt to my mind that Mr. Rhodes's action, supporting and upholding the Transvaal party, tended to a considerable degree to prevent peace being established in Stellaland. I consider that the difficulties which occurred in Stellaland since August last were entirely of his own causing; and that had he not come into the country, Stellaland might have been in a quiet state when I arrived” (4432, 122).

CHAPTER VII

THE TRANSVAAL TRIUMPHANT

ON the 18th of September Mr. van Niekerk and his henchman, Mr. Delarey, and a party of followers, unexpectedly rode armed into Vryburg, and on behalf of the new Hart River Republic took forcible possession of everything belonging to the Protectorate. The Stellaland officials—now Imperial servants—had previously begged for instructions as to what they were to do, but had received none. Knowing, however, that the affairs of the Protectorate had been abandoned to the Transvaal party, the officers at Vryburg resolved to give no opposition whatever to the action of Mr. Rhodes, however distasteful it was to them, and to the body of the people. The events of the 18th September were such as to embitter their feelings. The young Free State farmer and his comrade who had desired the honour of hoisting the Imperial flag were singled out for punishment for this specific action, and both put in prison by Van Niekerk and Delarey. Their arrest was attended with insult and blows, and Van Niekerk encouraged the rioters, who were acting in the name of their "Government." As there was really no charge whatever against these men, they were afterwards liberated. During their imprisonment they were threatened with ill-usage and with death, and every mark of indignity and contempt was shown, as indicating what the Transvaal party thought of loyalty to the Imperial Government. A store was also partially "looted" and strong drink freely indulged in, while Groot Adriaan Delarey loudly proclaimed his triumph and the humiliation of the British, shouting that

the town of Vryburg now belonged to him, and its inhabitants were his subjects,—which was only the plain truth. It was their intention to go further with this persecution, and accordingly they proceeded to make fresh arrests. These, however, were now resisted by the loyal people, upon which the others prudently desisted. This was not before one Hart River officer had been forcibly disarmed by those whom he was about to arrest. One sad result of the wild doings connected with the entry of the Hart River roughs upon their government of the Protectorate at Vryburg was the death of the grown-up daughter of one of the leading Stellaland people, as the result of the terror into which she was thrown that day for the life of her father, whom the inevitable Delarey unsuccessfully attempted to arrest at his house. Others of the loyal Stellalanders, knowing well the sort of men with whom the British Government was now working in Bechuanaland, fled from the country. Van Niekerk went so far as to issue a warrant for the apprehension of one of them, and sent it to Major Lowe to be countersigned. Major Lowe, a British officer with his head on his shoulders, while expressing readiness at all times to arrest evil-doers, declined to assist in this arrest; and the persecution had to be given up. The outrage in Vryburg was denied by the Hart River people, and their denial was published with Imperial official endorsement. But the Imperial officer who most strongly endorsed the assertions concerning the happy condition of all under the Hart River régime was the same who also declared that he went to Van Niekerk's meeting expressly at the request of the loyal people of Vryburg, and for their sakes (4213, 98); whereas he did so in spite of their protest, having, as the reader knows, left Capetown for the express purpose of being present at Van Niekerk's meeting.

It was the contention of Mr. du Toit, who succeeded General Joubert on the western border of the Transvaal, that when the Transvaal Commissioner "interfered in the interests of humanity, and to save Montsioa from utter ruin," there actually existed at that time no British Protectorate on the western border of the Transvaal. "Mr.

Rhodes, the British Commissioner," said Mr. du Toit, "retracted what Mr. Mackenzie had done, and returned, leaving things in Goshen without coming to any settlement, and left the rule over Stellaland in the hands of Administrator van Niekerk for three months, pending annexation to the Cape Colony." The volunteers, according to Mr. du Toit, were in favour of annexation to the Transvaal—failing that, an independent Republic; failing that, annexation to the Cape Colony. He thought they would forcibly resist coming under a British Protectorate. This was reported to a Cape paper on the 24th November, and agrees exactly with the statements of Messrs. van Niekerk and Delarey, and proves beyond any doubt that the Protectorate was simply "given away" to the Transvaal party by Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower. Mr. du Toit ignores the loyal Stellalanders, as Mr. Rhodes had done.

From the Hart River point of view, the settlement of Goshen by General Joubert was completely satisfactory. The Goshen freebooters had not secured, like themselves, the ornamental presence, and sanction to their agreements, of an Imperial Commissioner. But perhaps on that very account, the people of Goshen were so much nearer the goal of formal union with the Transvaal. In fact, when they at Hart River thought of it, their own "Cape connection," which had been so assiduously cultivated by them, had now quite served its purpose, and had better be quietly dropped. By its means they had got rid of the Imperial Government, and had now the entire management of Stellaland in their own hands. Their first exercise of their sanctioned freedom was very characteristic. They had no more real intention of living under the Cape Government than under the Imperial Government; and they thought the time had now come to say so. And so immediately after they had signed the "solemn" and "binding" agreement with Mr. Rhodes, the Hart River worthies got up a petition, in direct opposition to the terms of the London Convention, for the annexation of the Republic of Stellaland to the Transvaal. That petition was headed by Mr. van Niekerk's "State Attorney," who had in the previous May submitted to the Protectorate, and

whose papers as a lawyer had been submitted by him to me as Deputy Commissioner, and had been then countersigned. He and Groot Adriaan Delarey, and the "Auditor-General" and "Registrar of Deeds" in the newly-constituted Stellaland Government of Mr. van Niekerk, headed this memorial, which they addressed to Mr. van Niekerk and to two other persons of the name of Delarey, calling them "Executive Council." In point of fact, one-half of Mr. van Niekerk's officers (Transvaal men) got up a petition for annexation to the Transvaal, and addressed it to the other half (also Transvaal men) with the request that they would—

"Forthwith enter into negotiations with the Commissioner of the South African Republic in order that Stellaland may likewise, by means of his mediation, be taken under the protection and administration of the Government of the South African Republic" (4275, 24).

With reference to the Cape, the Hart River petitioners took up in September the position of the loyal people of Stellaland when dealing with me in July—that there was no prospect of immediate annexation to the Cape Colony; only the Hart River people now put it in stronger language, saying that—

"Annexation to the Cape Colony can no longer be considered as a question that is pending." In the preamble of the petition it was also recited that the condition of Stellaland was one of uncertainty, restlessness, thefts, and other troubles, and they (the Hart River burghers) wished to be in a position to manage their own affairs, it was therefore necessary that the territory of Stellaland should be placed under a powerful and well-ordered government, and that "the burghers of Stellaland would prefer to be under no other government than that of the South African Republic." It was also recited, as matter of encouragement, that the Transvaal Government had, "at the express wish of the Government of the Land Goossen, taken that territory under its protection and administration by means of its Special Commissioner, who is still engaged on the western border of the Republic" (4275, 23).

The reply of Mr. van Niekerk and the steps which he then took were characteristic of the man, and shed clear light on his real designs everywhere except in Government House, Capetown. The first sentence was plain enough:—

"Men and brethren, we are pleased to see from your petition that

you so unanimously continue to adhere to our original standpoint, which we have always candidly professed before the whole world, and to which we still remain faithful with you, namely, that of being incorporated with the South African Republic" (4275, 24). At that period, however, and under their present circumstances, they were not in a position to give effect to their wishes. The negotiations between the Cape Government and the Imperial Government about Bechuanaland had not been concluded. Then they had made an agreement "which left the administration of Stellaland for three months in their hands." That agreement they would uphold. But they took care to state that they did not mean to dismiss the petition, merely to "let it stand over until the engagements which have been entered into leave us liberty of action." They would then be the judges whether the Cape Government in its annexation proposals brought forward "reasonable terms and desirable conditions," which would "satisfy the general wish of the burghers."¹ "Or, if this cannot be done, and if we are released from our pledged word, then we shall not fail to duly represent your wishes to the Government of the South African Republic. Should no effect be given to our equitable wishes to be incorporated either with the South African Republic or with the Cape Colony, then we continue with you to resist any authority which may be forced on us; and then may the All-wise and Righteous One grant us light and strength and maintain our cause."

It was at this time represented by the High Commissioner to Her Majesty's Government that the Hart River people under Van Niekerk were recognising the Imperial Protectorate! On the contrary, they were unanimously pledged to oppose it by force, and were at that time recognised by Messrs. Rhodes and Bower to be independent of it. Although Mr. van Niekerk, like General Joubert, thought nothing should then be done formally and officially by the Transvaal Government, much might be accomplished in an informal way; and he therefore sent copies of this petition and of his reply, not only to the High Commissioner, but to "the Governments of the Cape Colony, the Free State, and the South African Republic, as also to the chief directors of the Afrikander Bond and the principal organs of the press in South Africa" (4275, 24). On the supposition that the High Commissioner would continue his wavering, yielding, and repudiating attitude, the success of the policy of Van Niekerk and Joubert was no longer problematical. There

¹ This was a contingency which was certain not to be fulfilled when all the judges were avowedly desirous of annexation to the Transvaal.

was no power in the Cape Government to wrest any part of Bechuanaland from the Transvaal. It was, however, advisable to increase and develop the interest and the prejudice of the Afrikaner Bond party in favour of the adroit management of Van Niekerk and his friends, and this was secured by the circulation of the above petition, which was headed by one-half of his "Government" and addressed to the other half with the reply of the latter.

So far as the High Commissioner and his "Colonial" policy were concerned, they were now played out and disposed of. And his opponents had this inestimable advantage, that they were still able to pose as his friends, and to persuade him that the agreement of the 8th September was a huge thing in diplomacy—a conclusive, solemn, and binding agreement. With conditional statements bristling throughout the document, its own terms were not those of a conclusive engagement; while the circumstances in which it was signed rob it of all solemnity, if not sincerity. The Transvaal party declined to recognise the Imperial Government or its Protectorate, and our officer was content with a declaration from them to the effect that if certain other matters turned out according to their minds, they would recognise the Imperial Government at a certain future time! For three months they were to hold part of a British Protectorate as a Republic; they were to be the judges as to whether the terms of Cape annexation, if ever presented, were favourable enough; in short, they held themselves free as to the future. The reply of Van Niekerk to the petitioners for annexation to the Transvaal, as much as the terms of the petition itself, constituted an open breach of the engagement with Mr. Rhodes, which pledged them to at least a possible recognition of the Imperial Government at a future time. Mr. van Niekerk now openly disavows any such intention—rather will they resist it by force.

The hopes of the Transvaal party were very high at this time at Hart River and Goshen. Their open success at Goshen, attended, however, by disturbing elements of danger, their still more gratifying success at Hart River, gave grounds for the opinion that what had been lost by

the Deputation in London would then be fully secured in South Africa. It may now seem very absurd, but the Hart River people at that time regarded themselves as the supreme Administering Power in South Africa. This is no joke, or unwarranted assertion. Listen to Mr. van Niekerk and two gentlemen named Delarey addressing their followers :—

“ It may be desirable, in the critical condition in which we are placed, that the Administrator should proceed for a short time to a place where he may be in telegraphic communication with the whole of South Africa and Europe. We promise you, however, to continue to promote your interests to the best of our convictions, and with all our might, and that we shall not be unfaithful to those who remain faithful to us. Be unanimous and persevere, and our work shall be blessed ” (4275, 25).

That is to say, we shall not desert our own people as you see the Imperial Government has done in Stellaland. We are all desirous of being joined to the Transvaal. Let us work together and we are sure to succeed. Having submitted itself to us, the Imperial Power is practically bowled over ; and we must therefore look after affairs, and be in communication with the whole of South Africa and Europe ! The letter which Mr. van Niekerk addressed to the High Commissioner, covering the above petition and answer, for both of which he and his own officers and followers were responsible, had a careful reference to what Mr. van Niekerk by this time regarded as the High Commissioner's most vulnerable point. After showing how admirably he was observing an agreement which made him absolute master of Stellaland, Mr. van Niekerk, who had just professed his still determined preference for union with the Transvaal, has the effrontery to ask that the High Commissioner—

“ Will duly represent our cause before Her Majesty's Government, so that we may procure the fulfilment of our just and rightful wishes without being forced into a conflict which we are anxious to avoid, and which cannot be conducive to the interest of any party interested, nor of South Africa in general ” (4275, 23).

That is to say, it is time you were informed that we mean to join the Transvaal. You will find it pleasantest to yield to us, to continue to give us our own way, and to make it right for us with Downing Street. If you don't,

you will after all have "forced us into a conflict,"—we shall fight. Mr. van Niekerk told the High Commissioner all this, and did not think it a bit incongruous afterwards to pose before him, and ask to be favourably noticed as Mr. Facing-every-way; for while he owed his present prominent position locally to the rude help of Delarey, did he not owe its public recognition, in Capetown and in Downing Street, to the Secretary of the High Commissioner and to Mr. Rhodes?

That this was no transient gust of puffed-upness on the part of Mr. van Niekerk, but the assertion of a position and a power to which he conceived he had been advanced by his own skill in intrigue, is shown in a remarkable proposal which Mr. van Niekerk soon after this made to Mr. Rhodes, and which that gentleman would appear to have "submitted to the High Commissioner" without remark. It was forwarded to the Secretary of State by the High Commissioner in like manner, without remark. It is not improbable that some natural misgiving had been privately expressed to Mr. van Niekerk by one or other of his Imperial allies, with reference to the highly objectionable petition for the annexation of Stellaland to the Transvaal. It was therefore necessary for the Hart River Dictator to pen something of a reassuring character; so Mr. van Niekerk very skilfully wrote a letter to Mr. Rhodes on cattle-thefts, and made a proposal as to a final settlement of them. He then assured Mr. Rhodes that he would keep to their engagement, and trusted to Mr. Rhodes's "assistance and co-operation." This meant, of course, what the reader chose to import into the words; the Hart River people read it that Mr. van Niekerk hoped Mr. Rhodes would enter at once into the matters connected with the thefts of stock. On the Hart River, therefore, this letter was of importance to Mr. van Niekerk with his own people, for if Mr. Rhodes did not come forward and inquire into stock thefts, Mr. van Niekerk would be able to point to this letter as absolving him from blame, and as placing it on Mr. Rhodes. As to his standing with Government House, had he not used the words "assistance and co-operation," which he, Mr. van Niekerk, expected from the Com-

missioner of the Imperial Government? The Imperial Government could surely not find higher work than to assist and co-operate with Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey. After this "reassuring" introduction, Mr. van Niekerk proceeds to business. He says to Mr. Rhodes:—

"I am further of opinion that should it be possible for you to accompany me to the Land Goossen, we would speedily put things in order there. Should it be the desire of his Excellency, or of yourself, to send me up to Goossen for the purpose of settling matters there in the same way as with Stellaland, I am prepared and willing, upon receipt of instructions, at once to leave for that part, but should treat only with the inhabitants and burghers of that country, and not with the members of management (Bestuur). Is there a possibility of doing anything in this way? Let it be done at once" (4275, 25).

Mr. van Niekerk sees his way to secure the Goshen chestnuts for the Transvaal, but he needs an Imperial officer, or at least an Imperial order, to enable him to pluck them out of the fire. The Imperial Government has helped him to satisfy one freebooter grudge by enabling him to ride roughshod over the Stellalanders who did not cringe to him and Mr. Delarey. The Bestuur of Goshen had thwarted Mr. van Niekerk in his desire to be President of both Stellaland and Goshen, and it would be very grateful to him if Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner could assist him in this little matter also.

There is no recorded answer to these wonderful proposals of Mr. van Niekerk. They are on record to show the depth of degradation to which the policy of Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower towards Mr. van Niekerk had reduced Her Majesty's Government in South Africa in September and October 1884. This false position had been reached gradually; the humiliation of October was not foreseen by those who recommended a "Colonial" policy in July. It appears to me, however, that the High Commissioner was induced at an early period to take a false step for himself and for the Imperial Government. In forwarding to the Secretary of State documents showing the defiant attitude of Mr. van Niekerk and the Hart River party (4213, 48), he did not direct the attention of Her Majesty's Government to their open hostility, and made no remark adverse to Mr. van Nie-

kerk and those who were banded together under him to do despite to the Imperial Government. The hostile communications from Mr. van Niekerk were franked to Downing Street by the High Commissioner as "protesting on behalf of the public of Stellaland against any authority being assumed and exercised in that territory by the Deputy Commissioner;" whereas the opposition was not to an individual, but to the Imperial Government, and was from the Hart River or Transvaal party alone, and not from the people of Stellaland. In the same way, when there came to be still more violent defiance of Her Majesty's authority in the Protectorate, as represented by Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes, that had also been practically condoned and passed over without any disapproval on the part of the High Commissioner. In following this course we had ceased to be true, and consequently to be strong; and one liberty after another had been taken with Her Majesty's name and authority until, as we have just seen, Mr. van Niekerk came to regard himself as a department of Government House, Capetown.

Passing from these very unsatisfactory results of so-called "diplomacy" between the officers of the Imperial Government and the agents of the Transvaal, I now come to notice a remarkable event in the history of Stellaland itself, which has a direct bearing on the public service of Her Majesty. Captain Bower, it will be remembered, on the 10th September 1884, reported officially to the High Commissioner that the farmer class in Stellaland had been hostile from the first to the Imperial Government; that not more—probably less—than fifty men had supported me as Deputy Commissioner; and of these the High Commissioner's Secretary had only got the names of four persons of the farmer class! (4213, 98). Now, I had not gone into Bechuanaland as a canvasser for votes among the freebooters. Although I had no force, I went, not to submit, but to be submitted to; and the reader knows how submission was yielded to personal influence in Stellaland, even from those who had been most opposed to the Imperial Government. More inaccurate reports were never forwarded by an officer

of Her Majesty, than those of Captain Bower on Bechuana-land.

The reader can fairly judge of the nature of these mis-statements by their result in Stellaland as soon as they were known there after the publication of the Bluebook. The Stellalanders had been compelled to yield to the establishment over them of the Hart River Government, and to the actual reintroduction to the country of a flag which they had publicly and, as they thought, finally exchanged for the flag of England. But that an officer, whom they had learned to like as their Commissioner, and who had appealed to their highest nature, should be befooled, and absolute moonshine about themselves as opposed to the Imperial Government, be brought forward as material for official report concerning the affairs of Stellaland, was more than they could silently bear. Notwithstanding the fact that they were still under the sway of the Hart River party, the Stellaland people held a public meeting on the 5th of November 1884, and unanimously resolved to address the High Commissioner on the subject. The draft of a public petition or address was read and agreed to. The petition of the Hart River party for annexation to the Transvaal had been carried through Stellaland for signature only a short time before. It was stated at the public meeting in Vryburg that this address had been signed in behalf of absent people, women, and little children. Some of those in the meeting said they understood their names had been put to the Transvaal petition, although they had not signed it, and strongly objected to annexation to the Transvaal. In the matter of their own petition, therefore, it was resolved that an authorised Dutch translation of the address to the High Commissioner should accompany the English one; and that gentlemen volunteering for the work should carry the address through the various parts of Stellaland for the signature of the people. Public injunctions were given at the meeting that no signature should be taken about which there could be any cavil. The petition of the people of Stellaland to the High Commissioner was in the following terms:—

“The petition of the undersigned landowners and inhabitants of Stellaland division of Bechuanaland humbly sheweth :

“That your petitioners are loyal subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, residing in or having property in Stellaland.

“Your petitioners have observed in the published papers referring to affairs in Bechuanaland a statement that the ex-Deputy Commissioner, Mr. John Mackenzie, never at any time possessed the confidence of more than fifty of the inhabitants of Stellaland, and that only four of the farmer class had accorded him their support.

“Your petitioners subscribe their names in order to prove to your Excellency that the majority of the landowners and inhabitants in Stellaland welcomed the arrival amongst them of Mr. Mackenzie as Her Majesty’s Deputy Commissioner as an indication of the desire of Her Majesty’s Government to deal with justice and impartiality towards the inhabitants of Stellaland of whatever nationality ; and felt assured that the policy which Mr. Mackenzie inaugurated and endeavoured to carry out was the best for the country, and the one best calculated to bring about a satisfactory settlement of the conflicting interests therein, and accordingly hailed his advent with unmingled feelings of satisfaction, confident that law and order would be established, and that peace and security to their lives and property would be insured under a just and permanent Government.

“Your petitioners, placing implicit trust in Mr. Mackenzie’s ability to bring about so satisfactory a state of affairs, are, therefore, still hopeful that it may please your Excellency to reinstate him in his former office, and promise in that event to afford every material assistance lying in their power in support of his administration.

“Your petitioners, in concert with all loyal subjects of Her Majesty in South Africa, rejoice at the tidings that Sir Charles Warren is now on his way to the Cape from England to establish peace and order, and maintain the supremacy of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen throughout Bechuanaland.

“And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.”

This petition was accompanied by the following letter, signed by Mr. G. D. Smith, one of the Stellaland Committee :—

“TAUNG, *November 19, 1884.*

“YOUR EXCELLENCY—I have been requested to forward to you the accompanying petition from the inhabitants of Stellaland with the request that your Excellency will be good enough to cable the same to the Earl of Derby for his information.

“The petition is signed by ninety-two farmers, who are *bond-fide* landowners, fifty-four landowners who are not farmers, and thirty-five residents in Stellaland, making a total of one hundred and seventy-one inhabitants of Stellaland.

“The number of farms drawn at the lottery was four hundred and two, one hundred of which have been cut into the Transvaal by the

late Convention, thus leaving three hundred and two lottery farms in Stellaland. The petition shows that more than one-half of the *bonâ-fide* owners of land in Stellaland 'proper' have signed the same, and further, that the great majority of the signatures are of Dutch Afrikaners of the farmer class.

"Many more names to the petition might have been obtained, but owing to the threats of the confiscation of property held out by the Niekerk party, they were afraid to sign, giving as their reason for not doing so, that the good work done by Mr. Mackenzie had been put on one side, and although they desired his return, they declined to sign the petition for fear it might bring them into trouble. They preferred awaiting the arrival of Sir Charles Warren.

"Trusting your Excellency will kindly acquaint Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies with the enclosed petition," etc.

This address to the High Commissioner was forwarded to him direct, as the Stellaland people were at the time unaware whether Mr. Rhodes was in Kimberley or in Capetown. It reached the High Commissioner on the 25th of November 1884 (4432, 76). The Imperial Secretary, Captain Bower, acknowledged receipt of the petition, but stated that it should have been sent through the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes, to whom it had been forwarded to report upon. For half a year the Stellaland people were under the impression that their address and petition had been suppressed, and then from the Bluebooks learned what its history had been. Mr. Rhodes retained this document in his possession for three months, forwarding it to the High Commissioner on the 28th February 1885. On the 18th of March it was forwarded to London by the High Commissioner, four months after its first receipt in Capetown—a violent contrast to the "cabling" which the Stellaland people requested in the preceding November.

The reader will remember that I had been recalled to Capetown through certain "reports." These had never been submitted to me, nor had their accuracy ever been tested in any way. As a matter of fact, they were false reports. There had been no scrutiny or examination of any kind of the names or standing of the men who conducted business with Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower at Hart River; incidentally we are told by our Commissioners themselves that the most dangerous part of the crowd to whose dictate they

submitted, consisted of Boers from the Transvaal (4213, 127). No scrutiny had been proposed of a former petition from Stellaland for annexation to the Colony, which was brought to the Colonial border by the identical Mr. G. D. Smith who forwarded the present petition. Afterwards, a petition was signed by the Hart River party and forwarded to the High Commissioner through a private individual, while Sir C. Warren was in charge in Bechuanaland as Special Commissioner. This petition was at once received by the High Commissioner, and forwarded to the Secretary of State without any local inquiry or scrutiny, and without any reference to the Special Commissioner.

Very different indeed was the fate of the document which testified to the loyalty of the people of Stellaland to the Imperial Government, and contradicted in an authentic manner the statements of the Kimberley telegrams of Mr. Rhodes as well as the information given by Captain Bower. That document was simply shelved.

The arrival of Sir Charles Warren in Stellaland early in February had probably something to do with the action eventually taken by Mr. Rhodes in connection with this petition, which had at that time been more than two months in his personal keeping. It would appear that Mr. Rhodes then handed the petition to Mr. Adriaan Delarey and other of his Hart River friends with a view to a scrutiny of the signatures, and they proceeded to take certain depositions (chiefly hearsay) on the 5th and 6th of February. Now the Special Commissioner, Sir Charles Warren, arrived in Vryburg on the 7th of February, fresh from England, and unconnected with anything that had taken place in Bechuanaland. Had it been the case that a bogus petition in my favour had been sent from Stellaland to the High Commissioner, Sir Charles's authority could at once have been called in to expose it, and he certainly would have given such a document short shrift. On the other hand, one would expect that ordinary feelings of delicacy would urge Mr. Rhodes to hand over a document which had more or less direct reference to himself to the calm consideration of a third party. I was not then pres-

ent in Stellaland. Mr. Rhodes had only to hand the Stellaland address to Sir C. Warren, and abide the result of a fair inquiry made in Stellaland itself. Mr. Rhodes, however, did nothing of the sort. He did not take the petition to Sir Charles Warren, who did not know till months after that this document was in Mr. Rhodes's possession in Vryburg at that time; nor was a single person who had signed the address called upon to give information or explanation concerning it. It was in a Bluebook that the original charge of disaffection to the Imperial Government made by Captain Bower had first come to the knowledge of the people of Stellaland, and by public address they had protested against this charge. Again a Bluebook is their first source of information as to their own affairs; and it now contains practically a reassertion of their disloyalty, and stigmatises their petition as fictitious. The Stellalanders did not curse the Government whose officers were capable of such actions, but went to Sir Charles Warren and asked for a fair inquiry and examination of this matter. This formal request raised more than a matter of fair-play between man and man; it was a question of the attachment of a body of people to the British Government as first introduced into Stellaland. The Special Commissioner, therefore, at once acceded to the request of the people, and three British officers were appointed to the work. They were to examine the land register and the list of signatures, and to take sworn depositions. The result was the confirmation of every signature to the petition except one. It seemed probable that the farmer who had spoken so enthusiastically at the public meeting when the flag was hoisted, and who compared the Imperial Government as represented by me to a horse which was a "tripelaar," from which a man would not willingly part, had put to the petition for my return, not only his own name, but that of one of his sons—a young man who was absent when the document was signed. The analysis and affidavits of Mr. Delarey and his friends, along with Mr. Rhodes's report on the subject, take up four pages of a Bluebook (4432, 78). With all this effort Mr. Rhodes himself only professed to invalidate eight names out of 171! And this

is how he did it. Three men swore before Mr. Rhodes's examiners that they did not sign. Then people such as Adriaan Delarey came forward and declared that three more men, then absent, had not signed—this "was known to them." Then a man came forward and swore that there were only eight people of a certain name in Stellaland, while there were ten signatories of that name! When such were all the results of such an analysis, I really think Mr. Rhodes, as a gentleman, should have at once confessed that the petition of the Stellalanders was genuine and sincere. He knew Stellaland, he knew the circumstances under which this address was signed, and he knew well the men who were now, at his request, professing to analyse it. When, months after, there came an open examination before British officers, it turned out that there were eleven people of the name, of which some deponent or other knew only eight, and ten out of these eleven had certainly signed the petition. Witnesses came forward who saw two sign out of the three who denied their signatures before blustering Delarey. And so also of the three who were reported by other people not to have signed, it was satisfactorily proved by actual witnesses that they did sign. According to Mr. Rhodes's own showing, 163 people signed this petition for my return, which, they said in the petition itself, was an attestation that they had submitted to Her Majesty's Government as brought to them by me. Now the petitioners themselves only claimed 171 signatures. Three British officers, after examination, found there were 170 genuine signatures. The following is an extract from their report:—

"It appears that of those who signed the petition

- 74 are owners of fixed property in Stellaland ;
- 92 are residents without fixed property ;
- 4 are temporary residents or travellers.

170 total.

Of the residents without fixed property, a number are sons of farmers who are occupied on the farms registered in the names of their fathers, and many are tradesmen possessed of movable property, and occupying more or less important positions, the said property being in some

cases of considerable value. 94 at least of the 170 signatories are *bonâ-fide* farmers."

Sir Charles Warren regarded this matter in some of its issues as of so serious a nature, especially as to the standing and future work of the Imperial Government, that he at once brought it under the notice of Her Majesty's Government. Mr. Rhodes, it is true, disapproved of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland; but he should not have acted as its opponent, and have stifled loyalty, while professing to fill an Imperial office. Mr. Rhodes had no justification whatever for the gross accusation in his report that the favour in which I was held was owing to the money I spent in Vryburg. The reader is aware that I took over the Stellaland Government and officers as a temporary measure, and that I asked at once for an Assistant Commissioner and also for an Accountant. The Stellaland officials continued to be paid, as before my arrival, by "Good-fors," chargeable to Stellaland, as long as I was in the country. Sir Charles Warren, who was in a position to know the truth about this, reported that this charge, on examination, fell to the ground; and adds, "It is a fact which can be ascertained, in looking into the accounts, that Mr. Rhodes incurred a far larger liability than did Mr. Mackenzie, and also endeavoured to obtain from me a sum of £5000 to defray the expenses of Stellaland." Sir Charles also reported that Mr. Rhodes's references to me, and to my influence in Stellaland, were so unjust as, in all the circumstances, to amount to persecution.

In his report on this matter to the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Warren leaves no doubt as to the loyalty of the Stellalanders, and their acceptance of the Imperial Government. But Sir Charles added, with reference to Mr. Rhodes's communication:—

"The report of the Committee, and the analysis they bring forward, show in the most conclusive manner how completely the facts have been travestied. . . . In conclusion, I have to point out that one of the strongest proofs of the good-feeling towards Mr. Mackenzie is given by the fact that so many months after he left, and in spite of the coercion of Niekerk and his faction, so many (94) of the farmers should have petitioned for his return. . . . I am convinced that if

Mr. Mackenzie had had fair-play, he would have settled this territory at the time he came up without a stronger force than 200 police."

It is with the utmost reluctance that, as a narrator of events, I have placed on record the foregoing all but incredible facts in the history of Imperial administration. In this account the reader will note the straits, subterfuges, and falsenesses belonging to a policy of weakness and "backing out." In leaving an unpleasant topic I must express my deep and heart-felt regret that my friend Sir Hercules Robinson should have consented, as Her Majesty's High Commissioner, to forward unquestioned every Stellaland petition to its destination, except the one which abjured the disloyalty of which that community had been accused, and which stated the truth about my work in Bechuanaland. The suppression of this document for such a length of time, and its eventual transmission to England with such an analysis and such affidavits, were actions unusual in Her Majesty's service.

When General Joubert returned to Pretoria from the western border of the Transvaal, he left there two Republics—one at Rooi Grond, the other at Hart River. The sentiment at both these places demanded union with the Transvaal, but General Joubert took no steps toward hastening such union: his strong point was to be content with the practical independence of these Republics in the meantime. With patience the whole country would yet be gained. They had powerful and unlooked-for auxiliaries. In totally ignoring the loyal people in Stellaland they would be fully assisted by Mr. Rhodes, the Imperial Secretary, and the High Commissioner himself. Those who had repudiated their own policy, and ratified without examination land claims in a country over which they had not even a proclaimed sovereignty, might be frightened into doing anything if the thing were only skilfully handled. Joubert evidently thought the Transvaal Government as such should in the meantime keep in the background. The Afrikaner party at the Cape ought to come forward and press for a "peaceful settlement." He was willing to act with them, and he publicly asserted in

Pretoria that he had been asked by the Cape Ministry to do so. When this statement of General Joubert was communicated to the High Commissioner, he expressed to the Secretary of State his disapproval of the proposed arrangement, and declared that he had not been consulted at all on the subject. It was, of course, quite informal for the Cape Ministers to hold communications on an Imperial question except through the High Commissioner. But what would appear to have been projected was only a repetition by the Ministers of what Mr. Rhodes had done in transacting Imperial business with General Joubert at Hart River after the General's famous "peace" services to Montsioa. Co-operation between General Joubert and Mr. Rhodes had been tolerable to the High Commissioner, but co-operation between his Ministers, Messrs. Upington and Sprigg, and the General would not be satisfactory (4213, 140).

In advocating his sagacious views, General Joubert was evidently of opinion that there was a point at which the indignation of Her Majesty's Government and of the English people might be aroused, and he judged that public and official interference on the part of the Transvaal Government with a territory really under the Protectorate of England would be just that point. Such views were not shared by the Transvaal Executive, including the President himself and the Minister for Education, both of whom had recently been members of the Deputation to England, and had therefore the advantage of having themselves come into contact with members of Her Majesty's Government. They thought they knew their ground; and their success became reasonable certainty when they considered the High Commissioner's action in withdrawing the Protectorate from Stellaland, repudiating the actions of an authorised Imperial officer there, and consenting to the reintroduction of an impromptu Republic within the Protectorate. They knew in the Transvaal that this had been openly sanctioned by the High Commissioner. They did not know, however, that Her Majesty's Government had been grievously misinformed on this very point, so that the true state of the case was unknown in England. No further strain should be put upon Her Majesty's

Government as to Goshen. Mr. Gey van Pittius had been too demonstrative in his devotion to the Transvaal. His management of Goshen would be a danger to Transvaal interests. He could bluster only; to be successful he must add scheming to blustering, as did Mr. van Niekerk. Mr. van Pittius, therefore, must be superseded. No doubt General Joubert would have agreed with all that, and would have suggested that such a change should be urged upon the Rooi Grond volunteers, and be carried through by them without reference to the Transvaal. Indeed this course was actually proposed to the High Commissioner by Mr. van Niekerk! But such methods were unnecessarily tedious in the opinion of the Transvaal Executive. They thought that England could be managed with even less trouble. A "provisional proclamation on philanthropic grounds" was all that was necessary, and this was at once issued by President Kruger. Mr. du Toit was sent to the western border, to administer a territory now proclaimed to be under the protection of the Transvaal as well as of England! President Kruger and his advisers were evidently of opinion that love of justice, the honour of Her Majesty's Government and of England, the interests of the weaker and more dependent races, were hollow pretences on the part of England. Her trade interest they would at once promise to provide for, and they felt confident this would suffice to ensure success.

From the first the Transvaal Government professed to regard the action of Montsioa and the Rooi Grond freebooters and General Joubert, in the absence of Mr. Rhodes, and without any reference whatever to the Protectorate of Her Majesty's Government in Bechuanaland, as perfectly valid, and the chiefs Moshette and Montsioa, with their land and their people, as having actually come under the jurisdiction and control of the Transvaal Republic! The following is the text of the proclamation to this effect which was issued at Pretoria on the 16th September, signed by President Kruger and the State Secretary:—

"Whereas it has appeared desirable and necessary to put an end to the discontent and bloodshed on the western boundaries of this

Republic; whereas special Commissioners have been despatched by the Government of this Republic and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland; and whereas it has appeared that the parties concerned, namely, Montsioa and Moshette, have, with all their subjects and rights, voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of the Government of the South African Republic; so do I, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the South African Republic, in the interest of humanity, and for the protection of the public order and safety, and with a view to establishing a permanent peace on the said western boundaries of this Republic, hereby proclaim, ordain, and make known, that the chiefs Moshette and Montsioa, with their subjects and rights, shall be regarded as standing under the protection and control of the Government of the South African Republic.

“This proclamation is made provisionally, and subject to the terms contained in Article IV. of the Convention of London.

“God preserve land and people.

“Given under my hand,” etc. (4213, 136).

The following letter, purporting to be from Montsioa, was published along with the proclamation (4213, 137). This letter Montsioa and his people entirely disacknowledged; and it bears on its face the traces of its origin. It is given here as showing the estimate of the English Protectorate entertained in the Transvaal at this time:—

“MAFIKING, *August 30, 1884.*

“To Mr. Joubert, from chief Montsioa, Greeting—

“When I, the chief, saw yesterday evening that you had listened to me, and had agreed to make peace, my heart was very thankful. I then said I will be under your arms. I will be under the Government of the Transvaal, with my people, and my land, and my country. When I met you this morning, I thought the peace will now be all right. I and my people and my country will come under the Transvaal, and I was grieved to hear you ask about the work of Mackenzie, for I know now that that work is fraud, which has brought me into the war, and therefore my heart was sore to hear that that work will hinder you from receiving me, with my country, and my people under you. Where is Mackenzie now? Will he help if I am dead? No. I will hear nothing of him. I see that there is but one thing to bring peace into my land, and give my people rest. Therefore I reject the ill word of Mackenzie, and I pray you to bring me under the protection and law of the Transvaal South African Republic; also not to abandon me without making peace between me and the volunteers (wollunteers). I put myself in your hands. I have called you in as mediator, and I am content with what you do. I desire but one thing, that is, to come under the protection of the Republic's law with my people and country; and now, Mr. Joubert, you

must bring me under it, and this letter of mine is my heart, and these words I shall speak so long as I live in the world, and here is my name. I will never again be without the protection of the Republic.

(Signed)	“	Mark	×	of Chief	MONTSIOA.
	”	×	”	JESIAGA.	
	”	×	”	MOTSEGARI.	
	”	×	”	SAAME.	
	”	×	”	H. MOLOKING.”	

The Transvaal flag was hoisted at Rooi Grond by Mr. du Toit on the 3d of October, after a speech in which he said the country had always belonged to the Transvaal State, owing to their conquest of Moselekatse; but waiving that right, it was now theirs by the desire of Montsioa and Moshette. The action of the Transvaal Executive had to be sanctioned by the British Government and by the Transvaal Volksraad. It was for the English Government to say if it wanted peace under the Transvaal flag or continued bloodshed. He had come there only in the interests of humanity and civilisation. He made a glowing address to the Transvaal flag when hoisted—“Youthful is our State,” said Mr. du Toit; “but acorns become trees.” The Commandant of Goshen then hauled down the freebooting flag, and the Transvaal flag waved over a British Protectorate.

Having resolved to take the step of annexing part of Her Majesty’s Protectorate, it occurred to the Transvaal Government that it might be to their advantage if they could induce Her Majesty’s Government at once and on the spur of the moment to sanction this action on their part. They therefore addressed themselves by cable direct to the Secretary of State in London, passing by the High Commissioner, through whom alone they had been accustomed to hold communication. In afterwards explaining their unusual conduct, the Transvaal State Secretary did not hesitate to say that—

“They considered the sending of these telegrams of urgent necessity, because they know by experience how many malicious persons there are in England as well as in South Africa, who endeavour to give a wrong explanation to every measure adopted by this Government in the true interests of the natives themselves, and to bring about a breach of the friendly relations between the two Governments;” and that “they had telegraphed in the cause of humanity” (4275, 2).

The first telegram, September 6, was to this effect:—

“Our Commandant Joubert has brought peace on the western border; all parties laid down arms upon Transvaal Government taking them under its protection and jurisdiction. If Her Majesty’s responsibility be handed over to us effective measures will promptly be taken to restore and maintain permanent peace, subject to Her Majesty’s approval, the rights of all native chiefs being respected. Matter urgent, and requires immediate reply” (4213, 48).

Without waiting for a reply to this, the Transvaal Government issued their proclamation on the 16th, and announced the fact on the 17th September to Downing Street by telegraph:—

“Being implored by Montsioa, Government took him under protection. Letter follows” (4213, 75).

Still no reply from London. On the 1st of October President Kruger himself telegraphs to the Secretary of State, the two former telegrams having been sent by his Secretary:—

“Received no reply to our pressing telegrams, 6th and 17th September, in interest of humanity. Agitation in Cape against my proclamation, issued to prevent immediate bloodshed and destruction of Montsioa’s people. Wish to assure you have acted only to maintain peace. No intention against Queen’s interest and trade route. Wish to co-operate with Her Majesty. Trust agitators will not succeed in disturbing friendly relations” (4213, 84).

On the 7th October, after the long interval of a month had elapsed, President Kruger received a reply from Earl Derby in the following telegraphic message:—

“Your telegrams received. You will receive a communication through the High Commissioner” (4213, 87).

For some reason or other General Joubert, on returning to Pretoria, and finding that annexation of Montsioa’s country to the Transvaal had already taken place by proclamation, and that another Special Commissioner (Mr. du Toit) had been appointed and sent to the western border, resigned all his offices under President Kruger, made grave charges against the President himself, and washed his hands in the most demonstrative manner of all connection with the Transvaal Government as then conducted. This caused a

great disturbance in local political circles, and meetings of the Volksraad were held with closed doors. The President and his Executive, however, weathered the storm, Joubert retired for a time into private life, and the annexation policy of the Transvaal Government on the western border was upheld. It was thus the general opinion of the Transvaal Volksraad that England need not be more thought of or considered in any way. This was the direct and bitter fruit of the recent "make-believe" attitude of Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, culminating in the abandonment and repudiation of the Protectorate and the loyalists in Stellaland. The new Transvaal Commissioner, Mr. du Toit, was not to confine his labours to Goshen, but to deal with Stellaland also—that is, with the Hart River Government (4213, 87).

We have seen that a month elapsed between the announcement by the Transvaal Government to the Colonial Office, London, that Montsioa, with his land and people, had been annexed to the Transvaal, and the reply by Her Majesty's Government to that announcement. I reserve a description of the important events of that interval to a future chapter. There was a clear expression of loyalty to England on the part of the most intelligent colonists, along with an earnest request that the Imperial Government would uphold the cause of order and peace in Bechuanaland, and thus save South Africa from being dominated by freebooters and their friends. This was the "agitation at the Cape" which caused anxiety to President Kruger. The interests at stake to the Cape Colony were of the most vital kind, and the Cape Ministers addressed a minute to the Governor and High Commissioner, in which they urged the upholding of the Convention of London, deprecated the movements of Germany on the west coast, and promised to render to the Imperial Government such assistance as might be reasonably required—limiting the latter, however, to the stringent conditions of their minute of 26th July. It was after conferring personally with the Premier, Mr. Upington, that the Governor and High Commissioner called formally upon the Transvaal Government to disallow the recent annexation of Montsioa.

This expression of high principle and sound policy on the part of the Cape Ministry at a critical time (of which they themselves seemed afterwards ashamed),—along with the unmistakable voice of public opinion throughout the great centres of influence in the Colony,—had great weight both at Pretoria and in England. When Her Majesty's Government at length resolved, on the 7th October, to demand, through the High Commissioner, the rescinding of the Transvaal Proclamation, and when, on the 9th, this was done by the High Commissioner, it was known that the Cape Ministers approved of the demand which was made, and that the public opinion of the Colony supported it. The Transvaal Executive yielded at once on the 11th, and the Volksraad on the 13th formally ratified the withdrawal of a proclamation, the issue of which is the measure of England's degradation at that time in South Africa; and the withdrawal of which is the measure of her influence when firmly and wisely put forth.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAPE MINISTERS VISIT GOSHEN—THEIR PROPOSED COLONIAL SETTLEMENT

IT was easy to draw a false conclusion from the prompt retreat of the Transvaal from its grossly improper and insulting position. If that Government rescinded the annexation proclamation at the demand of the English Government, had not the latter accomplished its object, and might not the whole subject now be dropped? This would have left the country in the hands of the freebooters where it had been placed under the auspices of Mr. Joubert. It is to the credit of the High Commissioner that, however he might yield to one freebooting leader, while openly defying the Queen's Government, he could never stand more than one. Having surrendered to Mr. van Niekerk, he had no quarter whatever for Mr. Gey van Pittius. He therefore, on the 13th October, suggested to the Colonial Secretary, who approved of the suggestion (4252, 8), that the Transvaal Government—

“Should now be informed that Her Majesty's Government are determined to expel Goshen freebooters from Montsioa's country, if necessary, by force of arms, and that Her Majesty's Government expect the Transvaal Government to carry out in good faith the Convention of 1884, and the honourable engagement specified in paragraph 11 of the Colonial Secretary's letter to Delegates—No. 19, 3947” (4213, 103).

On the 13th October the High Commissioner stated his views as to the force necessary to cope with the freebooters in Montsioa's country and their sympathisers. Sir Hercules Robinson now thought that 500 was the maximum of effi-

cient men that could be raised in the Colony in a reasonable time. Three months before, he held that none could be raised. He had now, however, "talked over the matter with Mr. Rhodes," and proposed to the Secretary of State that Mr. Rhodes should be authorised to arrange for the recruiting of 400 men at Kimberley (4213, 102-103). This recommendation does not seem to have been favourably entertained. The High Commissioner also recommended on the same day that Sir Charles Warren should be placed in command of the expedition. He said :—

"I am not acquainted with Sir Charles Warren personally, but I am told by those who know him that he would be the best man to organise the police and to command the whole expedition. He has already conducted a successful campaign in Bechuanaland. He is respected by the Boers, and was greatly liked by the volunteers, who would gladly serve under him again" (4213, 102).

The mandate had been issued some time before to the Cape Ministers by the only newspaper in Capetown supporting the Goshen interest, to this effect :—

"We hope, meanwhile, that the Colonial Government will see its way to take matters in hand in Bechuanaland in such a manner that a like settlement will be effected in the Land of Goshen, as the one carried out by Mr. Rhodes in Stellaland."

Thus the most difficult matter which now came before the High Commissioner was the proposal of his Colonial Ministers, in reply to the Secretary of State's inquiry as to the assistance they were prepared to offer on the part of the Cape Colony. They did not offer any assistance in the sense of the Secretary of State, but mentioned their desire that some members of the Ministry should visit the Protectorate for the purpose of communicating with the inhabitants, and endeavouring to restore order and effect a peaceful settlement without the intervention of an armed force. They refused, however, to accept any direct responsibility in connection with their visit, which thus became one apparently of inspection and inquiry. They made one very remarkable statement in connection with their proposed visit to the Protectorate, that—

"The presence in it of Mr. Rhodes, while they were there, would be unnecessary, and, indeed, embarrassing."

This unexpected objection was upheld by the Secretary of State, who telegraphed that—

“As Ministers urge the presence of Rhodes would embarrass communications, his return to district should be delayed for a short time” (4252, 8).

This incident proves conclusively the unwisdom of the selection of a member of the Cape Opposition as Deputy Commissioner from the point of view of those who desired the speedy Colonial annexation of Bechuanaland.

Ministers held the opinion that the annexation proclamation of the Transvaal having been withdrawn, the state of matters in the Protectorate was the same as when they had concluded an ineffectual correspondence with the High Commissioner in the preceding month of July, and they now took their stand upon what they had then proposed. They took no note of the fact which the High Commissioner pointed out, that in the interval a native chief under the Queen's protection had been attacked and crushed, and that his land was even then being parcelled out by the Transvaal volunteers; that the British Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Wright, had been taken prisoner by the marauders under a flag of truce; and that the British Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes, had been forcibly prevented from proceeding to Montsioa's station. The Cape Ministers in their hearts were quite of President Kruger's opinion concerning the likelihood that the Imperial Government would concern itself much with such matters. Insults to British Commissioners in Bechuanaland need not be more resented now than before. The settlement of Stellaland was a submission on the part of Imperial Commissioners in presence of superior force. Cape Ministers were fully of opinion that they could draw up an arrangement in Goshen which would bear as rigid an investigation as that of Stellaland, whether with reference to interests of natives or to the honour of the Imperial Government.

The Secretary of State, on the 22d October, announced his approval of the Ministers' proposed endeavour to effect a peaceful settlement—on condition that the Ministers undertook, on their settlement being approved, to accept responsi-

bility for control of Mankoroane and Montsioa's country. Any agreement that they might make was of course to be subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government. It would be essential that all white men should leave Montsioa's location except such as Her Majesty's Government, on recommendation of the High Commissioner, might specially allow to remain; and that ample land should be secured for Montsioa's people before any farms were granted to white men (4252, 8). Ministers replied that they wished to proceed to Montsioa's unfettered by engagements. They were prepared to make the best arrangements possible, consistent with the just recognition of the rights and claims of all parties (freebooters included), the terms to be subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government after consideration of their report. They could not at once accept the responsibility of control of the Protectorate, not having consent of Parliament to their doing so. To this it was replied by the Secretary of State that Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider Ministers' proposals for the government of the Protectorate pending the meeting of the Colonial Parliament; and that Her Majesty's Government attached much importance to working in harmony with the Colonial Ministers. This last observation gave Cape Ministers much gratification, but they still declined to be fettered by stringent conditions as to the settlement which they should make. Like Mr. Rhodes at the commencement of his mission, the Cape Ministers felt assured of success, and of being able to—

“Secure to Montsioa and his people the lands actually used by them for cultivation and not granted by the tribe to any person.”

This last clause evidently opened a very wide door indeed—“any person” would include freebooters and the holders of their titles. The Cape Ministers urged that—

“To refuse them permission then to intervene, with a view to amicable settlement, would involve greater loss of life and money than is now apprehended, and will lead to grave complications” (4252, 13).

It was eventually agreed on both sides that Ministers should proceed to Bechuanaland and endeavour to make a

peaceful settlement. Montsioa was to receive the cultivated lands and grazing lands of which he was in possession when the Protectorate was proclaimed in May, or otherwise that he should receive such grazing lands, as well as garden lands, as might be required by the tribe (4252, 21).

The last point upon which there was a difference of opinion between Her Majesty's Government and the Cape Ministers was as to the suspension of all military preparations on the part of the Imperial Government while the Ministers were in Bechuanaland. The High Commissioner very clearly pointed out the unwisdom of yielding to any such stipulation. His view was adopted by Her Majesty's Government, that military preparations should go forward on the part of England; but that no interference would take place with the affairs of Bechuanaland while the Cape Ministers were in the field endeavouring to bring about a peaceful settlement. By this time it was very evident that Ministers were anxious to proceed to Bechuanaland, and there was general agreement on the part of the Colonial public as to the probable reason for their wish to intervene. It excited, therefore, no surprise that, when they found the Imperial Government would not give up preparations for sending a force to Bechuanaland, the Ministers nevertheless expressed their determination to go—they were "so anxious to secure peace and unity of races under Her Majesty" (4252, 24). Be it remembered, in fairness to these Ministers, that they shared Mr. Rhodes's view, that the presence of the Imperial Power was undesirable in Bechuanaland. Mr. Rhodes's view, in this respect, had been very recently modified, apparently by his own reception at Rooi Grond. The Cape Ministers seemed to regard the insults to Mr. Rhodes very much as Mr. Rhodes and others had regarded the insults to the first Deputy Commissioner of Bechuanaland. They must be passed over by Government, and simply be borne by those affected; this was as necessary to the Ministers' peaceable settlement as it had been to that of Mr. Rhodes. It was on the 4th November that Mr. Thomas Upington and Mr. Gordon Sprigg, the Premier and the Treasurer of the Cape Colony, left Capetown for Bechuanaland—on a mission

which had now the qualified sanction of the High Commissioner and Her Majesty's Government.

The disfavour of the more intelligent part of the Colonial public towards the journey to Bechuanaland of the Cape Ministers had not so much reference to the mission itself or its objects, as to the circumstances under which it was undertaken. It was undoubtedly a mission of compromise similar to that of Mr. Rhodes. But it was proposed and urged by Cape Ministers, in circumstances entirely dissimilar to those in which the mission of Mr. Rhodes had been projected. When Mr. Rhodes left Capetown, having a clear understanding of the High Commissioner's views as to Bechuanaland, and when he gravely telegraphed from Kimberley that the Protectorate was in danger,—both the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes had a plan or compromise in their minds, and both were entirely distrustful of the attitude of the Imperial Government toward the Protectorate. At that time, therefore, the High Commissioner felt compelled to bear insult and even to break Imperial promises, because he did not feel justified in asking Her Majesty's Government to uphold the Protectorate. These officers did not believe that Her Majesty's Government would earnestly uphold the Protectorate. The High Commissioner was persuaded to try the "make-believe" Colonial policy of Mr. Rhodes. When that broke down, the public at the Cape and in England spoke out their mind and condemned it. The Protectorate ought to be upheld. Her Majesty's Government also spoke firmly to the same purpose. And this became once more the High Commissioner's own view—the Protectorate must be upheld. When, however, it became known that England would stand by the Protectorate, and assist the party of order and progress in South Africa as against their enemies, the Cape Ministers, instead of expressing their grateful satisfaction, still insisted on trying a similar compromise to that of Mr. Rhodes under widely dissimilar circumstances. It was then that the loyal people of South Africa united in the indignant inquiry—Why practically expel the Imperial Government from the country? why persevere with the compromises of despair prompted

by supposed desertion, now that the longed-for help is at the door? and why should Ministers profess that this question is one of race, when it is merely one of law and order—continued disturbance and freebooting or peaceful progress? The true interests of South Africa needed the appearance of the Imperial Power, and the action of the Cape Ministers tended to prevent this appearance.

Thus, from the first, the mission of the Cape Ministers was looked on with general suspicion and aversion. The power of England was at its lowest ebb in South Africa; and here were men doing their utmost to keep it at that low condition, or rather to expel it altogether. The question as to what influenced the Cape Ministers to visit Bechuanaland need not be inquired into more minutely in their case than in that of Mr. Rhodes. The same local influences appealed powerfully in both cases. It has been publicly admitted that but for the High Commissioner's sanction to the Hart River settlement, that of Goshen would never have been attempted by the Cape Ministers. If a member of the Cape Opposition could get the Governor's sanction to a settlement such as that of the 8th September, by which so much native land was bestowed without inquiry, why should not similar sanction be obtained by the Cape Ministers to a settlement of Goshen, which should not be more dishonouring to England? The answer was difficult from the High Commissioner's standpoint, but otherwise plain enough. The High Commissioner's change of policy was never approved, but was tacitly condemned when in the meantime, the intelligence and conscience of the public had been informed and aroused both in England and the Cape Colony. It was then the general desire that the whole Bechuanaland question, in its civil as well as in its military aspects, should be handed over to the officer who was chosen by the advice of the High Commissioner, amid general acclamation in South Africa, as head of the Bechuanaland Expedition, and who was also appointed Special Commissioner by Her Majesty's Government.¹

¹ It is of singular significance that at least one of the Cape Ministers did

The Cape Ministers left Capetown on the 4th of November, and passed through Bechuanaland on their way to Rooi Grond, and on their return journey travelled through the Transvaal. At Taung they had an interview with the chief Mankoroane. The Ministers placed on record the chief's complaint that, by Mr. Rhodes's concession to Messrs. Niekerk and Delarey, he and his people would lose their ploughing lands between the Kaap and the Morokane Range, running in a direct line from Taung to the latter range about thirty-five miles, and extending westward into Stellaland about twenty-five miles (4310, 20). It will be remembered that this information was kept back by Messrs. Rhodes and Bower. Indeed it was stated that Stellaland claims left Mankoroane's garden ground intact, while his veritable garden land was pronounced by these authorities to be a large game preserve (4036, 44).

In Stellaland, Ministers found the people busy signing a petition for my return to the country as Deputy Commissioner. It seems they took it upon them to give the opinion that it was of no use getting up such a petition, as annexation to the Colony would take place. Strong evidence was tendered to show that gross misrepresentation had been carried on by Messrs. Rhodes and Bower; but the Ministers on this occasion rightly declined to listen to statements affecting the character of Imperial officers! It was pointed out that there was no real Government in the country, that the loyal people were in actual danger from evil-disposed men, and that Van Niekerk had been deposed by his own duly constituted Government. Ministers informed the Stellalanders that the Government of Van Niekerk had been recognised by the High Commissioner. It being so, they said Ministers were also bound to recognise it, although they were in no way responsible for it. This was news to the Stellalanders, who had been living under the "make-believe Colonial policy" of Mr. Rhodes. They said they could not

not share in this general approval of Sir Charles Warren. Mr. Sprigg, in his place in the Cape Parliament in June 1885, declared that the appointment of Sir Charles Warren had been made by the High Commissioner against the remonstrances of Ministers of the Colony.

understand how Mr. van Niekerk had again become President of a Republic which had passed away when the Protectorate was established. The Ministers again explained that this was done by Her Majesty's Imperial Government without consulting them.

At Kunwana they met Moshette, who made it quite plain to them that he had never empowered President Kruger to speak in his behalf in London, and that instead of desiring to be incorporated with the Transvaal, he would prefer the Pretoria Convention line to that recently agreed to in London. I have elsewhere shown that when this chief knocked down the beacons put up by Colonel Moysey, it was not, as the Transvaal authorities said, because the line had not gone far enough west, and had thus excluded him from the Transvaal, but because it had come too far west, and, as the chief thought, cut off unjustly part of his country from Bechuanaland and added it to the Transvaal (4310, 22).

The Cape Ministers reached Rooi Grond on the 17th November. They were demonstratively met, three hours' journey away, by Mr. van Niekerk, "Administrator" of Stellaland, and Mr. Gey van Pittius, "Administrator" of Goshen. The latter gentleman read an address, cordially welcoming the Cape Ministers, and hoping their visit would lead to lasting peace and attention to legitimate requests. Mr. Upington replied that the long journey had been undertaken for the purpose of endeavouring to bring about a peaceful settlement, and to avert bloodshed. Their success in that object would depend upon the confidence reposed in them by the people whom they were about to visit. A higher Power than the Cape Ministry controlled the Protectorate, and it was the duty of all just men to assist in carrying out such conditions as were imposed by that Power, and in arriving at an honest and peaceful settlement. The above information was telegraphed to Capetown *via* Pretoria. It was added by the newspaper correspondent that the negotiations were progressing, but were meeting with great difficulty.

The contrast in the attitude of the Goshen volunteers towards Cape politicians, as shown in their treatment of

Mr. Rhodes in August, and of Messrs. Upington and Sprigg in November, was produced by the roused public feeling both in South Africa and in England. It perhaps did not occur to Messrs. Upington and Sprigg that their reception by the Rooi Grond volunteers would have been very different from what they experienced but for the expression of sound and loyal opinion in the Colony, and the raising and sending out of the Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir Charles Warren. To this, and to nothing else, was it due that the treatment of two members of the Cape Ministry was so different from the previous treatment of a member of the Cape Opposition by the people of Rooi Grond.

When Ministers arrived at Rooi Grond they found that the volunteers, under Mr. Gey van Pittius, had now scattered themselves over the country which they called Goshen, but which they had never occupied till after the recent peace signed under General Joubert's auspices. The intervening months had been used with the very utmost diligence, and they were now able to point to certain huts which they had raised as signs of "occupation." In their telegram to the High Commissioner the Ministers expressed themselves as having been very much struck with the respectability of the men of Goshen. Judging from the manner in which they expressed themselves on this subject, one would think they must have supplied themselves with a copy of Captain Bower's report on Stellaland, and carefully followed his line of remark in that document. The Ministers said of Goshen:—

"Reports as to state of country much exaggerated. Great majority of white inhabitants are respectable, law-abiding people, many of whom had acquired rights by purchase" (4275, 38).

Captain Bower had said of Stellaland:—

"The present inhabitants of Stellaland appeared to me to be a respectable class, quite equal to the ordinary class of Colonial farmers. In many cases the farms granted to the volunteers have changed hands, and I met farmers who had paid large sums for the farms they now occupy" (4036, 44).

It was particularly mentioned by some of the Premier's party, that the Rooi Grond people were remarkably well

dressed. Some one afterwards pointed out in the newspapers that this was not matter of great surprise in the circumstances, as the Goshen volunteers had only a short time before seized upon a Cape Colony trader's waggons and goods, on their way to Khame's country, to the value of some £1500, and distributed the "loot" among one another at Rooi Grond.

As the Ministers copied Captain Bower in his report, they also guided themselves in their settlement by what Messrs. Rhodes and Bower had transacted at Hart River, and which had since received the High Commissioner's ratification, along with that of the Secretary of State (the latter, however, being probably given under entire misapprehension of the actual facts). The following is the text of the Goshen settlement (4275, 38):—

"1. As imperatively required by Her Majesty's Government, Montsioa to be replaced in occupation of garden-grounds and grazing-lands, of which Montsioa and tribe were in undisturbed possession in May last, when they were formally taken under British protection. To this condition following explanatory note has been attached and accepted by signatories.

"It appears to Cape Ministry that object of Her Majesty's Government can be secured by giving Montsioa and his people, who are not numerous, the ground as formerly enjoyed by him and them at Mafiking, Sehuba, and Seleris, with ample grazing-grounds on north bank of Molopo River. For this purpose the grounds at Mafiking, Sehuba, and Seleris must be vacated by all white settlers; but as certain four or five persons acquired, before formal establishment of British protection, *bonâ-fide* rights, by purchase or otherwise, to farms in the districts proposed to be cleared, land equivalent in value shall be granted to such occupiers elsewhere by the Commission subsequently mentioned.

"Montsioa being absent, and it being at present impossible to ascertain his desires, Cape Ministry cannot say whether Montsioa and tribe may not prefer to have extension of arable land along Molopo River instead of resuming occupation of Sehuba and Seleris, and consequently arrangement above mentioned, with consent of all parties, may be altered; but the direction of Her Majesty's Government must be obeyed, and either the land at Mafiking, Sehuba, and Seleris, or sufficient land elsewhere, if desired by Montsioa, must be secured to that chief and his people.

"2. All rights to land enjoyed by white settlers, under Government or transfer before formal establishment of British protection, to be respected in same way as arranged in Stellaland between Deputy

Commissioner and inhabitants of Stellaland, and quit-rents also to be paid, as provided in Stellaland.

"3. After complying with directions of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Montsioa and tribe, and after securing the lawful rights possessed by white settlers before formal establishment of British protection, the remaining vacant land shall be disposed of as follows:—

"(a) Commission shall be appointed consisting of one nominee of Cape Government and one nominee of existing 'Bestuur' of Land Goshen, and G. J. van Niekerk as President.

"(b) Such Commission to inquire into and decide what persons have acquired *bond-fide* rights of vacant lands, and make provision for such rights accordingly.

"(c) Residue of vacant land to be waste crown land of Colony.

"(d) Titles to land and confirmations of existing titles, where necessary, to be issued as soon as possible.

"4. Existing debt of the country shall be inquired into and duly audited, with a view to communication with Her Majesty's Government on the subject.

"5. Pending establishment of fixed form of Government, an officer shall be appointed by Colonial Government, who will, in concert with existing 'Bestuur' of Land Goshen, administer affairs of country and carry into effect foregoing conditions; and inhabitants shall freely afford assistance to maintain order and protect rights of all persons living in country. No act of said 'Bestuur' shall be valid until approved by officer to be appointed.

(Signed)

"THOMAS UPINGTON.

"J. GORDON SPRIGG."

In acceptance of these conditions is added the following:—

"We, undersigned, having read conditions under which territory called Land Goshen is to be annexed to Cape Colony, do accept those conditions subject to approval of the people of Land Goshen, and do cede and transfer to Cape Colony all our rights which we have possessed in the territory called Land Goshen. In witness whereof we have signed at Heliopolis this 22d November 1884. (Signed) N. C. GEY VAN PITTIUS, *Administrateur van Land Goossen*; P. F. DE VILLIERS, J. W. J. VILJOEN, C. J. WEBER, G. P. OTTO, S. T. DEBRUIN BONGA, *Government Secretary*. *Witness*—G. J. VAN NIEKERK, S. T. SCHOEMAN."

"A general meeting of the inhabitants" of the Land of Goshen took place at Rooi Grond on 28th November, at which the settlement provisionally made by the "Bestuur" with the Cape Ministers was ratified. From all that I have been able to gather as to the attitude of the Transvaal volunteers, in conference at Rooi Grond at this time, their determination was unaltered that the country should eventually belong to

the Transvaal and not to the Cape Colony ; but a provisional arrangement with the Cape Colony, which would have the effect of excluding the Imperial Government as represented by Sir Charles Warren, was now seen to be absolutely necessary. In order to be efficacious this must be prompt and apparently hearty. This was the advice of their friends in Capetown and throughout the Cape Colony, and the advice was followed. Themselves no more in favour of annexation to the Cape Colony than were Van Niekerk or Delarey, the men of Goshen now imitated the professed anxiety for that annexation which had secured for the freebooters practical independence in Stellaland. But the conversion of Goshen was so very sudden as to be distrusted and disbelieved everywhere. Be it remembered once more, however, that at the Cape everything was now brought to the touchstone of truth, honour, and good name ; the policy of "make-believe" had been left behind.

Speaking of their arrangement for Montsioa and his people, the Ministers declared to the High Commissioner that they would have ample ground under their proposed settlement, and in explanation informed him that Montsioa's people were not numerous ; and that by Ministers' efforts the chief and his people would be in a better position than under Montsioa's treaty, concluded with Moshette and his Transvaal allies on 23d October 1882. It was indignantly pointed out in Colonial newspapers that, if not numerous now, Montsioa's men had only recently been shot down while under the Queen's protection ; and the success of the enemies of Her Majesty in assailing the Protectorate was thus apparently to affect the question of the tribal land ; in other words, the land was to be taken from the widows and children of natives and given to these enemies of the Protectorate. The statements of the Ministers as to the provision which they were making for the natives were probably more truthful and reliable than the seriously misleading statements, which had been received unquestioned, with reference to Stellaland ; but, brought to the new touchstone of high morality, they met with universal disapproval and execration —which of course they richly deserved.

It was, however, the speech of Mr. Upington to the assembled volunteers of the native chief Moshette, now calling themselves the inhabitants and burghers of the Land of Goshen, that more than anything else sealed the fate of the Ministerial settlement in the public mind. His unstinted praise of the people who surrounded him, and who were fresh from the conquest of part of the Protectorate and from the slaughter of the Queen's subjects; his frank and sympathetic endorsement of their character; his professed entire belief in their unwonted and scarcely learned lip-lesson of loyalty to the Queen; his strong disapproval of the attitude of the Imperial Government with reference to their own mission; his open identification of himself and his Ministry with those whom his hearers imagined they knew well, and understood to be opposed to the English Government and all its ways; his use of the well-known expression "Afrika for the Afrikanders"—as harmless a cry, if uttered with broad ideas, as would be "Australia for the Australians" or "Canada for the Canadians," but quite a different sort of thing when uttered by those who were only a section of South African society, and who also openly longed for their own South African flag, and for the banishment of the flag of England from the country;—the expression of these sentiments combined to render his speech, and through it his whole mission, peculiarly distasteful to the loyal and intelligent people of the Cape Colony. I am quite unaware of anything which could cause his fellow-colonists for a moment to doubt the personal loyalty of Mr. Upington; and from his mouth the above words would be taken, in ordinary circumstances, in the sense they would bear if uttered by the Premier of any other of Her Majesty's colonies. But then in the Cape Colony it was remembered that when he uttered them, this Colonial Premier was outside his own colony; that he was addressing the open red-handed enemies of the Queen; that while he rightly denounced the crime of murder, he raised into the dignity of an honourable war the outbreak of a band of unacknowledged freebooters, who had lowered themselves to become mercenaries of native chiefs; and that he

professed to disbelieve in abuses and enormities which were well established, and which in themselves, considering all the circumstances, were never unlikely. On the whole, therefore, it was the general opinion in all the centres of influence throughout the Colony, that the Cape Ministers at Goshen had entirely mistaken the spirit in which enemies of the Queen's Government should be approached; that they had not identified themselves with the intelligence, loyalty, and progressiveness of the country, but with the dangerous enemies of all these; and that the settlement of Bechuanaland ought not to be attempted by the Cape Colony, whose Government would be unable to withstand the insidious influence of the Transvaal, but should be entirely left in the hands of Sir Charles Warren.

It seems that when the public meeting was held at Goshen there was one acknowledged reporter present, representing a Cape paper, who was personally on friendly terms with the Ministers. It appears, however, that there was another reporter within earshot, although not in a prominent position, who took down what was said for a Kimberley paper, and distinguished himself by the rapidity with which it was forwarded for publication. Judging from a perusal of the two versions, between which there is no serious divergence, one would feel inclined to say that the report in the Kimberley paper represented a speech delivered with warmth and some excitement; while the Cape version represented the exercise of calmer thought and consideration. As the Kimberley version of the speech, although stoutly defended by its well-qualified reporter, has been publicly disavowed and declared to be incorrect, I have not adverted to anything contained in it which is not also in the "authorised version" of Mr. Upington's harangue to the freebooters of Goshen.

It will be observed that the indefatigable Van Niekerk is once more at Rooi Grond. What he would possibly have induced Mr. Rhodes to carry through, if he had only not missed him when Mr. Rhodes left Rooi Grond in August, is now carried through by Messrs. Upington and Sprigg. From Mr. van Niekerk's point of view, it is not less efficacious or

less respectable when it is done by members of the Cape Ministry, instead of by a member of the Cape Opposition. Mr. Rhodes tried to "make it appear" that his mission was a Colonial one; but now there can be no doubt on the subject, for the Rooi Grond people are dealing with actual Ministers of the Cape Colony. And on suitable occasions, when the statement might be supposed to add weight to their mission, the Ministers announce that it is approved by the Imperial Government; that they are Ministers of the Queen, and representatives of the Queen's Government of the Cape Colony. Mr. van Niekerk did not succeed in obtaining the consent of the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes to his making, alone or assisted by Mr. Rhodes, a settlement at Goshen similar to that of Mr. Rhodes at Hart River. But he has now the happiness of finding favour in the eyes of the Cape Ministers, who naturally feel that the man who is trusted by Her Majesty's High Commissioner in one part of Bechuanaland may surely be trusted in another. And Ministers will even venture an improvement on the Hart River settlement. They therefore early in the agreement propose a Land Commission for the settlement of the land claims of Goshen. The Cape Colony is to nominate one member, the Goshen volunteers a second; and Mr. van Niekerk, already trusted and raised to great honour by the High Commissioner, will be its President! One is never sure, however, how the best-arranged scheme may appear to another mind, or to the same mind in altered circumstances. Instead of admiring an arrangement which must have given great gratification, if not amusement, to Mr. Uppington as he devised it, and which was certainly more formal-looking and dignified in appearance than the miserable surrender of everything, without even the semblance of inquiry, by Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes at Hart River, the High Commissioner with great severity (and equal justice) pointed out to Her Majesty's Government that this condition "practically leaves it to freebooters to decide lawful rights possessed by white settlers before declaration of Protectorate." As the nominee of the Cape Colony would probably not be a freebooter, this can only mean that Sir

Hercules Robinson in the end of November feels able once more to calmly term Mr. van Niekerk a freebooter. It is a statement eminently true; but it was equally so on the 8th September, when that freebooter secured to himself the unquestioned right to manage, as an independent Republic under its own flag, a large part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, inhabited, too, by fellow-countrymen and fellow-freebooters who hated and despised him. There is this difference now, however—his Excellency has recalled into his vocabulary the old-fashioned words “justice” and “honour,” which have been borne to his mind from the throats and the hearts of justice-loving people in South Africa and England; and he now tells the Secretary of State that he thinks the honour and name of England should be upheld in South Africa.

The reader has seen that Messrs. Upington and Sprigg, in considering the question of the provisional government of Goshen pending annexation to the Cape Colony (Article V.), closely followed the Stellaland model, but again improved upon it. They did not propose to leave Mr. Gey van Pittius to have his own sweet will in the country for three months, but that an officer should at once be selected by the Cape Government, who would act in concert with the existing Goshen “Bestuur,” as it was wrongly supposed Mr. Rhodes had retained for himself the right to act in Stellaland. The High Commissioner said, with reference to this and other propositions:—

“I do not think that Her Majesty’s Government can accept the last four conditions. They are equivalent to recognition as a *de facto* government of freebooters who have made war on the British Protectorate, and to acknowledgment of the *bonâ-fide* character of the claims of the brigands to land in Montsioa’s country” (4275, 40).

With reference to the settlement of the Cape Ministers as a whole, the final decision of Her Majesty’s Government was as follows:—

“GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CAPETOWN,
“December 5, 1884.

“The Governor, having transmitted to the Secretary of State *in extenso* the telegram addressed by Ministers to the Honourable the

Commissioner of crown lands from Rooi Grond, and dated the 22d ultimo, is now instructed to inform Ministers as follows :—

“ 2. Her Majesty’s Government are willing to agree to the first condition, as telegraphed by Ministers, namely, that ‘the chief Montsioa be replaced in occupation of the garden-grounds and grazing-lands, of which the chief and his tribe were in the undisturbed possession in May last, when they were formally taken under British protection,’ and they will desire Major-General Sir C. Warren to carry out this agreement peacefully if practicable ; but the words ‘undisturbed possession’ are not to be governed by the Treaty of 1882.

“ 3. As to the conditions 2 and 3, Her Majesty’s Government cannot recognise the *bonâ-fide* character of the claims of the freebooters to land in Montsioa’s country, but questions affecting the permanent disposal of land, beyond the territory to be reserved for Montsioa, would, in the opinion of her Majesty’s Government, be matters for the consideration of the Cape Parliament, when the question of annexation comes before it.

“ 4. The fourth condition, Her Majesty’s Government consider, requires explanation. It is obvious that the Imperial Government cannot be committed to meet the expenditure of those who infringed the British Protectorate. Otherwise they have no objection to consider the financial condition of the territory.

“ 5. As to the fifth condition, until Ministers are authorised by Parliament to take over the country, Her Majesty’s Government must retain the administration of the Protectorate in their own hands ; and Sir C. Warren will be instructed to occupy the country with an adequate force. But so long as the first condition is being faithfully observed, he will allow other matters to remain, as far as possible, in *statu quo*, pending the meeting of the Cape Parliament which, it is hoped, will be summoned as soon as possible.

(Signed) “HERCULES ROBINSON,
“Governor and High Commissioner.”

To this the Ministers replied in a minute dated 15th December, which they concluded with words that seemed to imply that they had now washed their hands of Bechuanaland affairs :—

“Their proposals have not met with the approval of Her Majesty’s Government, and consequently it is beyond the power of Ministers to take any further action in the matter. The settlement of affairs is now entirely in the hands of Her Majesty’s Government, and, in closing this prolonged correspondence, Ministers would simply express the hope and desire that, whatever may be the course taken by Her Majesty’s Government, it will be such as shall tend to show to persons of every nationality in South Africa the advantages enjoyed by those who live under British rule” (4310, 13).

At the same time the Cape Premier thus informed Mr. Gey van Pittius of the failure of their efforts :—

“ Her Majesty’s Imperial Government declines to approve of the conditions under which annexation to the Colony of the territory known as Land Goshen was suggested ; and he requested Mr. van Pittius to cause the fact to be notified to those interested. Mr. Upington further expressed his regret to the people who attended the meeting on the 28th November, that the settlement proposed by the Cape Ministry had not been considered to be such as Her Majesty’s Government could accept. That settlement, he added, was made in the interests of peace, and Mr. Upington desired again to urge earnestly upon Mr. van Pittius to continue to keep the peace, and to meet General Warren in a friendly spirit ” (Cape Bluebook G. 37, ’85, p. 61).

No doubt the Cape Ministers were deeply disappointed at the failure of their mission to Rooi Grond. But, if we would derive the highest benefit from their failure, it ought to be studied apart from its personal surroundings ; it contains a lesson not merely for individuals, but also for governments—South African as well as English. Prevention is better than cure. What is wrong in morals cannot become right in diplomacy, either at Hart River or Goshen.

It is important to mention here the opinion of Sir Thomas Scanlen, the previous Premier of the Cape Colony, as given in the report of a speech delivered by him in the Cape Parliament :—

“ The men who entered into these disturbances beyond our borders were violating the laws of their respective countries. . . . These men had no right there ; they went in there and took part in the disturbances in direct violation of the laws of their country, and each one of them would be liable for breaking that law. Mr. Mackenzie had invited the people to furnish him with their claims, so that they might be inquired into ; but Her Majesty’s Government would be prepared to recognise no claims of those who, after clear notice of the establishment of the Protectorate, went into hostility against Her Majesty.”

On their return to the Cape Colony the Ministers must have been astounded at the reception which awaited them. In the town of Kimberley, which represents as clearly as any town in the Colony a healthy and intelligent European and Colonial sentiment, the Ministers were hooted and their effigies were burned in the street near their hotel, amid the execrations of men whose approbation any Colonial Minister

would be glad to secure. On their homeward way the Cape newspapers reached them, containing the account of an "indignation" meeting which had been held in Capetown, and at which their action had been strongly condemned by their fellow-colonists. They must have been shocked to see that, after the meeting, their effigies had actually been burned in Capetown itself. The published reports informed them that there was one voice raised on their behalf in that excited Capetown meeting—the voice of one who could fully estimate the difficulties of their situation. Having been—according to the newspaper report—"loudly called for by the meeting to speak," I endeavoured in perfect good faith to lay what I regarded as the real question before the enthusiastic meeting, and to withdraw as far as I could the popular indignation from the unfortunate Ministers themselves. I quote a few sentences from the published report:—


"The question was a South African one, higher than any party question, and it did not fit in with Cape party cries. It was not a question of Stellaland, Goshen, the Ministry, or the Cape Colony, but a South African and an Imperial question. Three years ago he had informed the High Commissioner that there was no power in Bechuanaland that could keep the peace. Since that time the intelligent interest of England had been aroused; and now they had Sir Charles Warren—an honest and capable gentleman (cheers)—once more among them. With patience and strength of mind there was a clear way out of the difficulty. The majority of the meeting had condemned their Ministers. ('And they will be condemned throughout the country.') But their conduct was only the culminating point in a series of false steps. If their Ministers said 'We have sinned' ('We won't forgive them,' and laughter)—well, he wanted to say they might forgive them. What they had to do was to have the affairs of Bechuanaland placed completely in the hands of Sir Charles Warren. (Loud cheers.) Let him settle the question in all its bearings, as if there had been no Mackenzie and no Rhodes and no Bower. (Cheers.) We had indeed arrived at a crisis, but it was a hopeful crisis (hear, hear); we had the sympathy of the mother country—the intelligent, well-informed appreciation of our peculiar circumstances. England, in the words of one of her greatest politicians, intended to stick to South Africa, and we must see to it that South Africa stuck to England. (Cheers.) With regard to race differences, he thought that people were raising shadows and fleeing from them. They could all be quite happy in South Africa if their minds were directed to one object—the prosperity of the country. (Cheers.)"

When asked after the meeting to join those who were spectators of the effigy-burning, I declined to do so. The only personal allusion which I made (and I must submit that the temptation was singularly great) was, on rising, in a single sentence to recall to mind the words "injudicious and unpopular," which the Cape Ministers in an official minute had used of me as an Imperial officer acting beyond the Colony. The striking applicability of their own words to themselves was clear enough, and caused great amusement to the meeting.


Such is the most painful and humbling story of "backing out." "What might have been, is always a forlorn study; but one sighs to think of the difficulties of Government, and hindrances to progress, that might have been obviated in this country during the last four years, if authority had always been believed to be backed by the force on which it ultimately rests."¹ It is right and necessary to tell this story, because it ought to be known and pondered by our Administrators, our statesmen, and our people. But it is quite permissible, to narrator and to reader, to feel relief when we come to its end, and are able to exclaim, "Here endeth the story of shirking and shrinking—we have done with 'backing out.'"


¹ *Cape Argus*, February 18, 1886.


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












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